Tags: Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, USA, Henry Kissinger, Green March, Abdelaziz Buteflika, France,
A document , product of the diplomatic archives of the United States, refers to the meeting that the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger held in Paris on December 17, 1975 with the late Algerian President Mohamed Bouteflika when he was the head of Algerian diplomacy. King Juan Carlos was already reigning in Spain and the government of this first post-Franco monarchy was putting the finishing touches on the farce with which they had opted to leave the still officially Spanish Sahara, doing everything possible for the international community to consent to the illegal occupation. Moroccan of the territory.
The first thing that attracts attention when reviewing the content of this text is the cordial and relaxed tone that presides over the dialogue between Buteflika and Kissinger, very far from the tensions that would have been expected from the story that we usually have about the supposed bad relations that in the time maintained by the United States and Algeria because they were on opposite sides in the context of the Cold War. The transcript of this secret conversation does not fit in with the vision that blames the Spanish mess on the enormous pressures with which the mischievous American imperialism forced Spain under the dying Franco regime to hand over province number 53 to Morocco. Here, too, it is assumed that the objective was to prevent the birth of a Saharawi State liable to fall into the orbit of Algeria and thus become.
However, from the beginning of the meeting, there is nothing to suggest that the FLN’s progressive and revolutionary Algeria was, as accounts of the time tend to suggest, the number one enemy of the United States in North Africa. Both politicians seem to compete with each other in a kindness that seeks to avoid the slightest misunderstanding. They have an obvious interest in attracting the opponent to their own field but without this being able to tarnish a relationship that neither has any complaints about, quite the contrary.
Kissinger himself stresses that Algeria is a country in which the United States has many interests and recognizes that both governments maintain a « very positive » relationship. In fact, he thanks Bouteflika for the Algerian cooperation in the political field in relation to the Middle East. For his part, the then Algerian minister agrees with him and adds to these elements the « formidable cooperation » that apparently also already existed in the economic field. If we trust this text, Algeria and the United States were not so far apart, although, yes, neither of them had an interest in making it too noticeable.
The obsession with the cold war that is rightly attributed to Kissinger appears in the exchange of opinions that both had in relation to the conflict in Angola. Not a trace, on the other hand, when talking about the Saharan issue, the second topic discussed at the meeting. The first thing that Kissinger did when addressing this issue was to go before Bouteflika to assure him that, from Washington, no pressure had been placed on Spain and that, even, an attempt had been made to dissuade King Hassan of Morocco from allowing the Green March on 6 November did not enter the Spanish Sahara.
When explaining the reasons for the US non-opposition to the invasion, Kissinger places a lot of emphasis on not interpreting his position as support for Morocco but rather as a neutral attitude. But above all, he goes out of his way so that the « neutral » attitude of his government is not interpreted as an anti-Algerian gesture. He also tries to justify himself with the supposed ambiguity of the opinion of the Hague Tribunal, the scant interest of the United States in the Sahara or the doubts that prevent him from seeing that the case has to do with a « question of principles », as Bouteflika alleges, al Compare it to the Palestinian question.
For his part, with great kindness, Buteflika is dismantling these arguments and proposes to defend a solution that involves the holding of a referendum on self-determination in which the Sahrawis could freely decide their future. This passage explains that when Assange’s organization posted this cable on its site, some pro-annexationist analysts became enraged with Bouteflika’s alleged disloyalty (to Alawite interests) when addressing the Saharawi conflict. Although, probably, what hurt them the most when reading this part of the diplomatic summary is that Kissinger, in principle, did not oppose Bouteflika’s proposal and promised to think about the referendum solution.
Full document text
Paris , December 17, 1975, 8:05–9:25 am
PARTICIPANTS
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria
Mohamed Bedjaoui, Algerian Ambassador to France
, Aide to Bouteflika
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Isa Sabbagh, PAO, Amembassy Jidda
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
SUBJECTS
CIEC, Spanish Sahara, Angola, Middle East
[Omitted here is discussion of CIEC.]
Spanish Sahara
Kissinger: Let’s talk about the Sahara. You should know we put no pressure on Spain for any particular solution. In fact, we attempted to dissuade the King [Hassan] from marching in.
Did you hear what Moynihan said? He said if the Russians took over the Sahara, there would soon be a shortage of sand. [Laughter]
We frankly want to stay out of the Sahara question. It is not a heroic posture.
[Page 298]
Bouteflika: I think if we want to address the problem correctly we are obliged to speak frankly, and directly. The problem of the Sahara is a precedent for the world and is a problem which is important also for the Middle East.
Kissinger: Why for the Middle East?
Bouteflika: If there is an accord between Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, do you think also that the Arab world would abandon the Palestinians? It is the same problem. You can’t abandon the people of Sahara, or anymore the people of Namibia.
We have Morocco and Mauritania involved, and they try to settle it. Now there is a decision of the International Court of Justice.
Kissinger: It was ambiguous.
Bouteflika: No, it considered each side’s brief in detail and came out for the one peaceful solution.
Kissinger: I don’t know what self-determination means for the Sahara. I can understand it for the Palestinians, but it is a slightly different problem.
Bouteflika: The population of Qatar is no more important.
Kissinger: But they had a sheikh. They had an independent state.
Bouteflika: But they can be independent also. Have you been to Dubai?
Kissinger: No. Because our security people think my reception would be too enthusiastic. They won’t let me. [Laughter]
Bouteflika: I don’t think either side—those who encouraged you or those who discouraged you—have any right to do so. They are countries that are worthy of being seen.
Kissinger: What will happen in the Sahara?
Bouteflika: I would want to see if you could give your consideration to proposing a solution, because it is important.
Kissinger: What solution?
Bouteflika: There is only one kind of solution. It is a problem of principle. There could be a referendum, and Algeria would accept the results of the referendum. If they want to be with Morocco or with Mauritania, Algeria would have no problem. Or to be independent.
Kissinger: Can the referendum take place while the Moroccans are there?
Bouteflika: There would have to be guarantees. There can’t be a referendum under a bayonet. They could have done it under the Spanish, because they were leaving.
Kissinger: The Mauritanians are there too. Did they split it half and half?
[Page 299]
Bouteflika: Maybe half and half, but there are many aspects of the problem. Fishing. There is the political problem and the economic problem and the sovereignty problem.
It is absolutely excluded that Morocco follows neither the ICJ or the UNO. The Ivory Coast can’t judge right. One of the judges on the ICJ said it was a question of monarchical solidarity. He told me. In The Hague.
Kissinger: One of the few international bodies which you don’t dominate.
Bouteflika: It’s the same for the U.S.!
Kissinger: I repeat, we have no interest in the problem, as such.
Bouteflika: But you, yourself, should look at it.
Kissinger: Why?
Bouteflika: Because you work with great subtlety. I have to tell you frankly—perhaps it was not by you.
Kissinger: It was done by you.
Bouteflika: Your position was one of principle, it was very clear. Your press—Newsweek, the New York Times—were very objective on the problem. And we find that the U.S. could have stopped the Green March. The U.S. could have stopped it, or favored it.
Kissinger: That’s not true.
Bouteflika: We think on the contrary that France played a crude role. There was no delicacy, no subtlety. Bourguiba, Senghor—they tried to use what influence remained for France. Bongo. No finesse, no research.
I don’t know if this corresponds to your situation. But there are sentiments, and we were very affected because we thought it was an anti-Algerian position.
Kissinger: We don’t have an anti-Algerian position. The only question was how much to invest. To prevent the Green March would have meant hurting our relations completely with Morocco, in effect an embargo.
Bouteflika: You could have done it. You could stop economic aid and military aid.
Kissinger: But that would have meant ruining our relations with Morocco completely.
Bouteflika: No. The King of Morocco would not have gone to the Soviets.
Kissinger: But we don’t have that much interest in the Sahara.
Bouteflika: But you have interests in Spain, and in Morocco.
Kissinger: And in Algeria.
[Page 300]
Bouteflika: And you favored one.
Kissinger: I don’t think we favored one side. We tried to stay out of it.
Bouteflika: Your role could never be marginal or devoid of interest because obviously there was military cooperation with Morocco, so, given that, you could not be neutral between Morocco and Algeria. So I understand you had to be, or appear to be, favoring Morocco, because of that.
Kissinger: [To Sabbagh, who is interpreting] But what the Foreign Minister complains about is that we didn’t favor Algeria. To take his position, we would have had to reverse positions completely.
Bouteflika: Maybe it would have been easy to take the principle of self-determination as a starting point. Now we have a neighbor which has mobile frontiers—with Mauritania, with Niger, and with Algeria. Moving frontiers. After 10 years. We have come to accept Mauritania in the region. If Morocco occupies it with a minimum of legality, it’s a significant precedent. If in the region there is this precedent of broken frontiers, there is the risk of conflict. It’s not too late for you to aid a path to a solution. It would have to have the maximum of guarantees of the UN for a referendum, and Algeria would accept it. Neither the ICJ nor the UN recognized the rights of Morocco or Mauritania.
Kissinger: Let me think about this and I’ll contact you through our Ambassador.
When will you send us an Ambassador to Washington?
Bouteflika: Effectively your remark is pertinent. At the beginning of the year we will designate someone. I think sincerely that it is in our interest to pick someone appropriate. I will solve the problem very, very rapidly.
Kissinger: It would be helpful if we had someone in Washington.
Bouteflika: I want to find someone of enough stature to fit into that position.
Kissinger: He will be well-received in Washington.
Bouteflika: This is the way we think about it, Dr. Kissinger, and we have established such a wonderful rapport based on cooperation, and in the economic field we have established a tremendous cooperation that we will never forget. In the political field, the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger can have no complaints.
Kissinger: No, you have been very helpful.
Bouteflika: If you had a problem with Cuba or Vietnam or Cambodia, we would be very glad, discreetly. . . .
Kissinger: Our UN people don’t always understand our relationship. But I agree we have had a very positive relationship, which I have valued.
[Page 301]
Bouteflika: I repeat and emphasize we are true friends. We have nothing to hide; we don’t maneuver. Just this gesture that we are here at the table as your guests indicates it. You could have said, “Let’s go off into a corner some
where.”
Kissinger: Exactly. Let me look into the question of a referendum. Especially if it doesn’t require withdrawal before a referendum.
Bouteflika: Yes, you said provided withdrawal is not a factor. But it must be also provided there are enough strong guarantees that the people can decide freely. You know assassinations can be rife.
We don’t want any remaining problem. Genocide.
Kissinger: In the Sahara?
Bouteflika: I’m completely positive. It is a problem of interests. I don’t know why Mauritania wants frontiers like that or why Algeria has to be frightened. It is not healthy. If Morocco and Mauritania partition it, it is not politics.
Kissinger: We have not played a very active role. Because we have enough problems without taking on new ones. But I will look into it and I will be in touch.
Bouteflika: Think about it.
Kissinger: I will think about it.
Bouteflika: I don’t think you want a new state in the region.
Kissinger: If it had developed, we would have accepted it. Guineau Bissau, Cape Verde, we have accepted.
Bouteflika: There is great wealth there. In 10 or 12 years, it will be the Kuwait of the region.
Kissinger: But we didn’t oppose it. We had no particular interest.
Bouteflika: The equilibrium that we worked for in the region, it is important that it be maintained. I don’t have the feeling that in the region your interests coincide with disorder.
Kissinger: I agree with you.
Bouteflika: I was astonished to see France and Tunisia working together as “Mediterranean powers.” With the problems in the Middle East and Cyprus, with the problems existing in Maghreb, to speak of the Mediterranean is to be optimistic.
Kissinger: We were basically inactive. We were not doing a great deal on either side. We didn’t help you, but not Morocco either.
Bouteflika: In the Middle East you have seen the situation of occupation of territory, and fait accomplis, and everyone speaks of negotiations. If you speak with the Mauritanians, there is no reason to defy the decision of the ICJ. There is no reason to distrust the decision of the ICJ. It was the Ivory Coast and others.
[Page 302]
I would add this. Whatever elements favored Morocco were dis-intoxicated after the decision of the ICJ. It was a kind of mystification.
Kissinger: Let me think about what if anything can be done. I’ll think about it. I never like to promise anything I cannot do.
Bouteflika: If you can.
[Omitted here is discussion of Angola and the Middle East.]
—————————————
Summary: Kissinger and Bouteflika discussed the role of the United States in the Spanish Sahara crisis. Bouteflika asked Kissinger to become more involved, and exert greater pressure on Morocco to accept a UN referendum on the fate of the region and its inhabitants.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 101, Geopolitical Files, Algeria, September–December 1975. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the American Ambassador’s residence. Kissinger was in Paris to attend the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.
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