Étiquette : European Union

  • Ukraine. Are the Europeans in war with Russia?

    Tags : European Union, USA,

    (B2) One year after the start of Russia’s massive military intervention in Ukraine (February 24, 2022) and the equally massive European support for Ukraine, we can legitimately ask the question today. Elements of reflection .

    To see clearly… let’s take the definition of Clausewitz, the modern war theorist: “ war is 1. an act of violence whose 2. objective is to compel the adversary to carry out our will (…) To achieve this end with certainty 3. we must disarm the enemy ”. War leads to climbing “ to extremes ”, it is a question of having an “ unlimited use of force ”, but also of having a “ calculation of the efforts ” necessary and a “ measured escalation ”.

    Are these elements (objective, means, tempo) met? To get to the bottom of it, let’s examine the means implemented by the Europeans (and more generally by the Allies).

    1. Political will . The designation of the adversary is very clear. Russia, its government, are explicitly designated as the initiator of the conflict:  » an unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine « , an  » invasion  » according to the established terminology. She is considered responsible for most war crimes, on orders, and even for genocide. And its leaders must be judged for their deeds. Hence the idea of ​​an international tribunal or a special tribunal to judge its leaders.

    The objective of compelling the adversary to carry out the will is also clear. The Europeans regularly affirm their desire to “ increase the collective pressure on Russia so that it ends its war and withdraws its troops ”. They say just as regularly alongside Ukraine: “ the EU will support Ukraine and the Ukrainian people against [this] war […] as long as it takes ”.

    And the goal of this pressure is also clear: the liberation of all the territory within “ its internationally recognized borders ”. In other words: all of Donbass, even Crimea. The Europeans recalling their “ unwavering attachment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within [these] borders ”. NB: the quotes, taken from the joint declaration at the EU-Ukraine summit on February 3, will be repeated this Thursday (February 9) at the European summit in Brussels in the presence of Ukrainian President V. Zelensky.

    A position of the Atlantic Alliance. If the Allies (Europeans and Americans) have designated Russia as an adversary, they have avoided doing so in a too conspicuous way. But this is a political trick. It is indeed the Atlantic Alliance as a political being, linking the various European countries that are members of NATO and related countries (Finland, Sweden, etc.) which is committed today alongside the Ukrainians just as much as the European Union and its Member States. With one singular exception: Turkey.

    2. Economic pressure . She is very clear, strong and assumed. With almost ten sanctions packages (the last of which should be presented if not approved by February 24), the objective is not just to send a political signal. It is a question of laying down part of the Russian economic and technological resources. It is about undermining Russia’s military capacity to act in Ukraine, or at least slowing down its efforts, by cutting off all European financial and economic flows. In short, to  » disarm  » it in the classic sense of the term, but by « peaceful » means, soft power: the economy, by cutting off its supplies.

    3. The massive military support assumed . This support involves a wide range of equipment: from ammunition to fighter aircraft parts, including portable missiles, tanks, artillery support, air defense, or gasoline, … the Allies have gradually increased, and above all assumed, this military assistance.

    The amount today is negligible. We have reached almost €12 billion on the European side alone. That is one billion € per month on average. This is roughly half of the equipment budget of the French army. €3.6 billion of which is jointly financed via the European Peace Facility (EFF).

    The recent decision by Berlin and Washington to deliver Leopard and Abrams tanks (read: The Allies will equip a Ukrainian armored brigade. The Leopard tank club gets underway ), and London the Challengers is not in itself revolutionary. It is part of a continuum that began from the start with the delivery of Soviet-made heavy tanks (type T-72, more than 400 delivered).

    The novelty lies elsewhere: it lies rather in the media coverage and in the asserted desire to act in coalition. Where before, each country had a varying policy of media coverage — from Latin discretion to Polish-British excess. And where everyone was careful to specify that these were national decisions.

    4. Strong support in the training of the Ukrainian army . This support is not anecdotal. Europeans and other allies (United Kingdom and USA) want to train several Ukrainian brigades to prepare them in an express time (two months maximum per rotation) for combat.

    A massive effort unmatched in modern times! On the European side, the target of 15,000 (by May) at the start has been raised to 30,000 trained men by the fall of 2023. Ditto on the British and American sides. The objective is indeed to provide the Ukrainian forces with the manpower necessary to face a Russian offensive as well as to replenish its troops lost in combat (about 100,000 men dead or wounded out of action).

    5 . Intelligence support . Discretion is required in this area. But it is proven. European (French, German, British) and American satellite resources are used to provide valuable information to the Ukrainian forces.

    It is part of the Allied intelligence power placed at the service of the Ukrainians which allows them to have a complete perception of the combat zone, with its own field « sensors » (human intelligence in particular), quite effective (of the Ukrainian baba with his mobile phone which informs local sources to analysts). Ukrainian intelligence benefits from European analysts on the spot.

    Officially, there is no ground troop commitment . And the Europeans are careful not to deceive them on this point. If there are Europeans engaged alongside the Ukrainians in the troops, these are individual acts. And the presence of special forces, particularly in the context of intelligence or “training” support, remains underground (this is the very principle of these forces: neither seen nor known). But there are indeed “liaison officers” with the Ukrainian forces, in order to facilitate not only the delivery of materials and equipment, but also to try to coordinate the strategy.

    6. Place Ukraine beyond the reach of Russian influence.This political, military and economic pressure on Russia is coupled with a political and economic will to “snatch” Ukraine from Russian domination and influence. A desire that began gently in 2014 with the signing of an association agreement which today is coupled with a promise of membership of the European Union. An accelerated process! With the declaration of the recognition of candidate country in a few months. All accompanied by net financial support (approximately €1.5 billion per month in budgetary support, €18 billion for 2023), via the association of Ukraine at accelerated speed with European instruments. We are thus witnessing an urgent reorientation of the Ukrainian networks (train, electricity, road, etc.) to the European networks, until the insertion of Ukraine into the space ofEuropean telephone roaming .

    The war. .. or peace

    If we go back to the classic definition of war given by Clausewitz, we see that certain elements are there: the goal of  » compelling the adversary to carry out our will « , the  » seeking to overthrow the adversary « , to  » disarm « , the  » calculation of the necessary efforts « , etc. But there remains a notable absence all the same: it cannot be said that there is an act of “ violence ” on the part of the Europeans towards Russia nor of a desire to “ unlimited use of force ”.

    Without being belligerent — the notion of co-belligerent is very vague: one is belligerent or not — the Europeans are therefore halfway to belligerency, clearly alongside a party at war (Ukraine), using all the instruments at their disposal (except military force) against its adversary (Russia). Without any ambiguity. But they cautiously stay below the war line, confining themselves to self-defense.

    The final objective sought by the Europeans is not the overthrow of the regime in Russia (see box), but its withdrawal from Ukraine. It is thus a singular difference compared to the definition of the traditional war. It would rather be hybrid warfare: use all means, staying below the limit of open warfare. In fact, to the open war launched by the Russians, the Europeans and Allies reacted by hybrid means.

    It should be noted, however, that in the history of modern Europe, to my knowledge, never have Europeans committed themselves so clearly and so massively in favor of one country against another. Even during the Yugoslav wars, even if there was support, it remained more or less discreet (especially for military support). The military intervention in Kosovo under cover of NATO is an exception. But it was short and limited in space, and was not marked by confrontation with a member of the UN Security Council endowed with nuclear power.

    (Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

    Source

  • Morocco’s Advanced Status with the European Union: a recognition of Morocco’s reform process and a geopolitical and strategic necessity for the EU

    Morocco’s Advanced Status with the European Union: a recognition of Morocco’s reform process and a geopolitical and strategic necessity for the EU

    Tags : Morocco, European Union, advanced Status,

    By Dr Saad Dine EL OTMANI
    Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the kingdom of Morocco

    As the European Union prepares to welcome in the upcoming weeks, its 28th member, and thus continuing its enlargement eastwards in what seems to be reaching its maximum capacity in the East, for obvious geopolitical reasons coupled with a stalled Union for the Mediterranean process, it is important to reflect on the future of the European Neighborhood Policy and the nature of the relationship that will bind the EU to its southern Mediterranean neighbors in particular the Kingdom of Morocco.

    There is no doubt that interesting developments have taken place in recent years in the context of the Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean process and the signing of the Morocco-EU advanced status agreement, however the Arab spring that glided through North Africa combined with a deadlock in the Middle East Peace Process has stalled this encouraging momentum. Today the EU partnership with its neighbors in the south Mediterranean can be viewed as a cup half full for some or a cup half empty for others.

    In light of new disturbing challenges that have emerged in the Sahel region, particularly following the thwarted attempt of terrorist and extremist groups to take full control over Mali, it is now more than ever an urgent need for a renewed partnership between the EU and its southern neighbors.

    Over the years, it is undeniable that Morocco has proven time and again that it is a pioneer, both as an Arab and an African country, in leading the way towards a more strengthened partnership with the EU and a renewed euro-Mediterranean order.

    While history, geopolitics and trade may have contributed to this end, it is undeniable that the vision set out by the late King Hassan II and His Majesty King Mohammed VI towards a reinforced EU-Morocco partnership as well as shared values and aspirations, have been important driving factors behind one of the closest partnership that the EU has ever developed with a country on the southern shores of the Mediterranean sea.

    The Morocco-EU Advanced Status Agreement: A clear recognition of decades of reforms by Morocco. Indeed the Morocco-EU partnership has grown steadily over the years. It namely witnessed an important leap forward with the signing, on 13th October 2008, of the Moroccco-EU advanced Status agreement that propelled the half a century old ties into a new level allowing for a strengthening of the existing multidimensional partnership at the political, economic and human levels. Through this agreement, Morocco and the EU agreed to give new impetus to their bilateral cooperation based upon shared values of democracy, rule of law, good governance, respect of human rights, a reinforced political dialogue, a common economic zone namely through the recent launch of negotiations over a new FTA, the gradual participation of Morocco in community activities and programmes as well as a common space for knowledge and cultural, university exchanges and scientific research.

    Perhaps one of the most important aspects of this agreement is that it serves as recognition by the EU of the deep and multidimensional reforms that Morocco has undertaken at the political, economic, social, cultural and human rights levels on its path for greater openness and in its transition to greater democracy over the past two decades but also reflects the trust placed by the EU in Morocco to pursuing these efforts further. This agreement also entails that the Kingdom will continue upon the path of reforms that it has initiated while the EU will continue to support such efforts.

    The advanced status agreement, the first in its kind to be signed with a country in the region, continues to represents an important step forward in the context of future prospects of cooperation within a revamped European Neighbourhood Policy. Morocco’s request for an advanced status was not aimed at standing out from the rest of the crowd but rather motivated by its belief in the need of a strengthened north-south euro-Mediterranean space. It is encouraging to see that Morocco’s approach has inspired other countries in the region such as Tunisia or Jordan to follow this same path and to review its partnership with the EU.

    Morocco: a credible partner for the EU in an unstable southern Mediterranean zone. It can easily be argued that history, geography and a clear vision for a democratized Moroccan society are not enough, in an interest led world, to explain the nature of existing Euro-Moroccan relations.

    Given the growing political changes that have shaken North Africa and the confirmed security threats that have emerged in the Sahel region, Morocco’s stability, its Arab, African and Mediterranean identities combined with its shared values of openness and democracy have been valuable asset for the European Union in the framework of the existing political dialogue. Furthermore, Morocco’s active involvement in finding solutions to conflicts affecting the African continent or the Arab world as well as its readiness to foster greater regional security cooperation have made Morocco a strategic interlocutor for the EU.

    At the economic level, Morocco remains an important economic partner of the EU (Need to find statistics). As of march 1st, negotiations have begun between the EU and Morocco towards the signing of a Free Trade Agreement that will replace the existing association agreement. However, Morocco’s wide array of Free Trade Agreements already signed or are being negotiated with countries in North America (USA and Canada), the arab-mediterranean zone (Agadir agreement) and West Africa (UEMOA) represents an opportunity for the EU in a time marked by economic and financial difficulties.

    Furthermore, Morocco’s vision for gradual convergence, technical twinning aimed to align its norms, standards and regulations to those of the EU are also an asset allowing for easier movement of goods and services. While more needs to be done, Morocco is determined to pursue this objective with the sole objective to align in the near future all its norms to those of the EU.

    The way forward:

    As the EU’s enlargement seems to be reaching its limits in the East, the southern shore of the Mediterranean represents a new frontier for enhanced and deepened partnerships. Analysis and reflexions on this issue should become a priority on both ends of the Mediterranean Sea to create a common strategic zone able to compete against other forums such as NAFTA or ASEAN.

    Morocco’s partnership with the EU can be used as a model for others to follow.

    Five years after the signing of the advanced status agreement, and as a new Comprehensive and deepened Free Trade Agreement is to be discussed next month (April 2013), it is important to envisage the future as well a new perspectives of the Morocco-EU relations through the establishment of a “privileged partnership” building upon the half a decade old ties and recent advancements.

    If the Kingdom of Morocco is consciously required to continue on the path of political and socioeconomic reforms, the EU, for its part, is required to adopt a more open and balanced concept of partnership namely based on solidarity and security. The way forward will also require the EU-south Mediterranean partnership to be less focused on border control and security related issues but rather on enhanced cultural exchanges and development partnerships that take into account the issues of identity, cultural and “civilizationnal” diversity.

    The democratic developments witnessed in the south Mediterranean basin, the recent financial shockwaves that rocked the biggest economies of the world all coupled with the emergence of multidimensional challenges, be it security, energy or environment related, as well as growing interrogations related to the issue of identity, all point towards the clear need of a debate of the future of the EU-South Mediterranean partnership and of a geostrategic transformation of the Mediterranean space.

    The democratic transformation witnessed by Arab countries, in particular, implies the setting up of a newly conceived charter for the Mediterranean region covering, on an equal footing, the issues of regional security, democracy and common development and solidarity.

    This charter can be built upon acquired assets of the early sixties with the signing of trade conventions, the cooperation agreements of the seventies, the partnership agreements of the nineties and more recently on the neighbourhood policy of the XXIst Century.

    Such a charter could allow for the consolidation of economic integration between the two banks edified thanks to these conventions. It could also help to build synergies among the strategic priorities of all the members of the region towards the edification of euro-Mediterranean cultural body that brings together specificity and universality as well as openness and tradition.

    At the economic level, this charter will target the creation of a joint competitive economic space able to face and compete against the American and Asian trade blocs, which would allow trade agreements (in agriculture, services and maritime fishing..) to flourish through the recovery of trade exports from the south to the north. This entails a more ambitious and evolving objective surmounting the limited logic of free trade and taking into consideration that the trade surplus of the EU in the Mediterranean region is the most important at the international level.

    Culturally speaking, Morocco, which has always been at the forefront of countries concerned with the euro-Mediterranean partnership, considers that this new charter is meant to reinforce the values of openness, pluralism, diversity and respect of the specificities of each other.

    The prevalence of the populist discourse in some regions of Europe raises questions of the purpose of the European Institution and threatens the cohesion and the culture of coexistence which has always characterized the Euro-Mediterranean space.

    In this day and age, resorting to isolation or holding strongly to one’s identity without accepting the other’s goes against the existing trend of a more globalized world, increased mobility, economic competitiveness, new demographic equilibrium and technological development. All these aspects constitute an opportunity and a source of common wealth that would benefit all Euro-Mediterranean societies.

    In the same context, a balanced approach to the issue of immigration covering all its aspects would allow to redress the demographic gaps between countries of the Mediterranean. This could be achieved through the encouragement of temporary immigration between these countries and ensuring greater social and economic integration of migrants in host countries.

    This unique point in time in the history of the Euro-Mediterranean zone should be seized in order to build a newly reinvigorated Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, a partnership that is able to provide new synergies and opportunities, a safer and more secure Euro-Mediterranean zone while at the same time bringing hope and answers to the needs of the peoples of the Mediterranean.

    Morocco is ready to play its part, in this new vision of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and to continue to play a pioneering role through the conclusion of a “privileged partnership” between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union.

    #Morocco #UE #Advanced_status

  • Implications of Europe’s Turn to Mediterranean Gas

    European Union, gas, Russia, Algeria, Western Sahara, Morocco, Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Egypt, Qatar,

    With Strings Attached: Implications of Europe’s Turn to Mediterranean Gas
    Samuel Bruning and Dr Tobias Borck

    In its efforts to wean itself off Russian energy supplies, Europe is increasingly looking to its southern neighbourhood. But this comes with its own set of geopolitical challenges.

    As heatwaves hit Europe, governments across the continent are already worrying about a cold winter and a deepening energy crisis. Since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine five months ago, European countries have been scrambling to reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas imports, not least to limit one of Moscow’s most important sources of revenue. Yet, they also fear that Russia could beat them to the punch and cut off energy flows to Europe before alternative sources have been secured. Russia has already stopped supplying gas to Poland, Bulgaria and Finland, and reduced deliveries to Germany, Italy and other European states.

    As Europe searches for alternatives to Russian gas, debates about fracking are re-emerging, and discussions about if and when Europe can import more liquified natural gas (LNG) from leading exporters such as the US and Qatar are drawing much attention. Additionally, European states are turning to old and new gas producers in the eastern and western Mediterranean, lured not least by the promise of short supply routes along which pipelines already exist or could feasibly be constructed.

    In the eastern Mediterranean, Israel is emerging as a major gas producer. In June, the EU, Israel and Egypt agreed to work on a partnership that could eventually see Israeli gas be transformed into LNG in already existing Egyptian gas liquification plants before being shipped to Europe. Meanwhile, further west, Algeria, a longstanding gas producer that already sends about a quarter of its gas to Spain, signed a deal with Italy in May to increase its supplies to Europe.

    Neither arrangement represents a quick fix. It will likely take years for the necessary infrastructure in Europe, Israel and Algeria to be built and for the latter two to sufficiently increase their production capacity to even begin to replace the volumes of gas Europe imports from Russia. Just as importantly, both deals tie Europe more closely to complex and potentially explosive geopolitical contexts. If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions; considering their strategic implications for European security is therefore vital.

    Israeli Gas, Hizbullah’s Drones and the Egyptian Economy

    The eastern Mediterranean has long been a highly contested space. Just over the past decade, the overlapping rivalries and shifting alignments among the region’s states – Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey – have shaped (and been shaped) by the conflicts in Libya and Syria, and between Israel and the Palestinians, to name but a few. At various times, these conflicts have repeatedly drawn in extra-regional powers, including European states, Russia, the US and even Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

    With the gas deal with Israel and Egypt, the EU has increased its own stake in this complex environment beyond the obligations it already had to its member states of Cyprus and Greece. Two aspects are particularly important to consider.

    If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions

    Firstly, with the agreement, the EU wades into the longstanding maritime border dispute between Israel and Lebanon. The offshore Karish Field, from which the gas destined for Europe is supposed to come, is adjacent to the area that both countries claim to be part of their own exclusive economic zone. The US government has appointed a Special Envoy, Amos Hochstein, to mediate in the dispute, but negotiations have been progressing slowly – if at all – in recent months.

    Buckling under an unprecedented economic crisis and a dysfunctional political system, the Lebanese state’s capacity to effectively engage on these matters is somewhat limited at the moment. But Hizbullah, which suffered a setback in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in May, appears to see the border dispute and the international spotlight on gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean as a useful opportunity to bolster its anti-Israeli credentials. On 2 July, Israeli authorities said that they had shot down three Hizbullah drones approaching a gas rig at Karish.

    Hizbullah later said the drones had been unarmed and were part of a reconnaissance mission, but the incident certainly illustrated the volatility of the situation in the area. This does not have to deter Europe from seeking to expand energy trade with Israel or other eastern Mediterranean producers, but the obvious political risks must be taken into account in Brussels and should inform thinking about future security arrangements in the region.

    Secondly, the EU–Israel–Egypt gas agreement comes at a time when policymakers across Europe are increasingly concerned about Egypt’s economic stability. Hit hard by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, particularly with regard to food security, the Egyptian government is struggling to contain a potentially burgeoning economic crisis. While macro-economic growth figures have remained relatively strong, inflation and soaring food and energy prices are causing increasing strain. Scarred by the experience of the political instability that gripped the Middle East and North Africa in the aftermath of the 2010/11 Arab Uprisings, and in particular the migration crisis triggered and facilitated by the violent conflicts in Syria and Lebanon, renewed instability in Egypt represents a nightmare scenario for many European governments.

    The gas agreement should bring some economic benefits for Egypt, but not necessarily in a way that will help to address poverty and Egypt’s other related socio-economic challenges. The EU will therefore have to ensure that the energy deal is part of a more comprehensive engagement with Cairo that seeks to increase the resilience of the Egyptian economy through reform.

    Algerian Gas, Morocco and the Western Sahara

    In the western Mediterranean, meanwhile, Algeria has long been an important gas supplier for Europe. Spain has imported Algerian gas via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which runs through Morocco, since 1996, and via the undersea Medgaz pipeline since 2011. However, relations between Madrid and Algiers, including the energy trade between the two countries, have persistently been affected by the conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara, which Morocco claims as its territory, while Algeria supports the Polisario Front that seeks Sahrawi independence. Over the past two years, tensions have steadily grown.

    New partnerships with Mediterranean energy producers must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are

    In 2021, Algeria decided to end exports via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline and therefore cut off supplies to Morocco, planning instead to expand the capacity of the Medgaz pipeline. Subsequently, in March 2021, Algiers was angered by Spain’s reversal of its position on the Western Sahara. Having previously been mostly neutral on the territory’s status, insisting that it was a matter for the UN to resolve, Madrid endorsed Rabat’s plan to retain sovereignty over the Western Sahara while granting it autonomy to run its domestic affairs. The move was to a significant extent motivated by Spain’s need to deepen cooperation with Morocco to contain migration, particularly to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melita.

    As things stand, Algeria has said that it will continue to supply Spain with gas via the Medgaz pipeline. But its Ambassador to Madrid, whom Algiers withdrew in March, has not returned. Moreover, the Algerian government has repeatedly warned Spain not to re-export gas it receives from Algeria to Morocco, which has struggled to make up for shortages caused by the termination of flows via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline.

    The new deal concluded in May between Italy’s energy giant ENI and Algeria’s national oil company Sonatrach has to be considered within this context. Even if Italy may find it easier to avoid becoming embroiled in the Algeria–Morocco dispute, the tensions in the Algeria–Spain relationship demonstrate that energy trade in the western Mediterranean cannot be divorced from the geopolitical realities in North Africa.

    Searching for a European Position

    In the search for non-Russian energy supplies, Europe is rightly looking to its southern neighbourhood. Algeria, Israel and Egypt – and perhaps, in time, other (re)emerging Mediterranean energy producers and transit countries such as Libya and Turkey – can all play an important role in increasing the continent’s energy security. However, these new energy partnerships must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are. More than mere commercial transactions, they tie Europe more closely into local conflict dynamics – be it between Israel, Lebanon and Hizbullah, or between Algeria and Morocco. They should therefore be embedded in a clear-eyed and strategic European approach to the EU’s southern neighbourhood.

    In May, the EU published its new Gulf strategy, which offers at least a conceptual framework for how European governments intend to balance expanding energy relations with the Gulf monarchies with other interests, ranging from economic engagement to human rights concerns. The document is far from perfect, and it remains far from certain if and when many of its ambitious intentions will be implemented. But if the EU wants to become a more serious geopolitical actor and increase its resilience to political shocks such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, developing similar strategies for the eastern and/or western Mediterranean is necessary.

    The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 25 July 2022

    #European_Union #Gas #Russia #Algeria #Morocco #Western_Sahara #Israel #Egypt #Qatar #Lebanon #Hezbollah

  • Nationalism, Liberalism and the War in Ukraine

    Nationalism, Liberalism and the War in Ukraine

    Russia, Ukraine, NATO, European Union, Etats-Unis, nationalism,

    by Hadas Aron and Emily Holland

    Hadas Aron is a visiting assistant professor at New York University’s Center for European and Mediterranean Studies specialising on populism, nationalism, democracy, and European politics. Emily Holland is an assistant professor at the Russian Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, specialising in Russian foreign policy, the geopolitics of energy and European politics.

    During a recent night-time address to the Ukrainian people, president Volodymyr Zelensky proclaimed that Kyiv is now “the capital of global democracy, the capital of the struggle for freedom for all on the European continent”.1 Zelensky has been a powerful communicator throughout Russia’s war against Ukraine. His speeches paint a stark picture: the darkness of Russian dictatorship marching over Ukraine to extinguish the beacon of liberal democracy.

    The world is watching the alliance of liberalism and nationalism in Ukraine’s struggle for survival. These two ideas were the defining ideology of foundational struggles 1 Ukrainian Presidency, Kyiv Is Now the Capital of Global Democracy, the Capital of the Struggle for Freedom for All in Europe – Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 6 April 2022, . for liberation from tyranny like the French Revolution and the revolutions of 1989. Yet, nationalism and liberalism have contradictory elements that arise once moments of crisis have passed. After the revolutions of 1989, the West, drunk on the triumph of liberalism, misunderstood the centrality of nationalism and implemented policies that ultimately reinforced exclusionary nationalism and weakened liberalism.

    Nationalism, the struggle for sovereignty and self-determination, is not often associated with liberalism, the political philosophy that emphasises protection of individual rights. In recent years in particular, nationalism has come to mean exclusionary nativism. Movements like the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers are anything but liberal: they are white supremacists that try to undermine global liberal democracy. Historically however, liberalism and nationalism were on the same side in certain crucial historical junctures.

    As history demonstrates, these forces align when they have a common enemy in tyranny but often become contradictory after the struggle for liberation is achieved. In Europe, until the 1848 revolutions, nationalists like Lafayette, Garibaldi and Mazzini were liberals. They sought to unite their nations under constitutions that would guarantee individual rights. But the liberal revolution failed and after the restoration of monarchies in 1849, the goals of liberals and nationalists diverged.

    Liberals sought to preserve their new constitutional rights, whereas nationalists continued to fight for national unity but in an exclusive and conservative form. In Germany, instead of aligning German speaking people under one set of civic liberal ideals, the militant Prussian state united Germans through war and expansion. In France, republicans sought democratic rights and socio-economic equality, while nationalists wanted to restore France to its monarchical glory. These two forces became the defining cleavage of the French political system until at least World War II.

    In 1989, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe took to the streets to demand freedom from Soviet oppression, physically tearing down the walls that separated east from west. Among them was a long-haired, 26 year-old Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s controversial prime minister, who was the embodiment of the combination of liberalism and nationalism. In a famous speech he proclaimed that young people were “fighting for the establishment of liberal democracy in Hungary”.2

    Yet, beginning in the early 1990s, Orbán, then a member of parliament and the leader of the Fidesz party, took a hard turn towards the right and emphasised nationalism. In recent decades he has become an enemy of liberalism, rewriting the Hungarian constitution, dismantling the courts and limiting independent media and civil society.3 Today, Hungary is no longer considered a democracy.4

    In Poland, the liberal nationalist Solidarity, the emblematic movement of 1989, split into liberal and nationalist factions directly after the transition and these remain locked in an existential struggle over the future of Poland.5 Just prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Poland, like Hungary, was facing severe European Union sanctions for the ruling party’s degradation of the rule of law.6

    In both Poland and Hungary, deep animosity between liberals and nationalists led to a nationalist attack on liberal democracy and worrying democratic decline in the two most promising cases of post-Soviet democratisation.

    The past decade has indeed seen a rise of nationalism all over the world, a surprising setback for liberalism. The number of people living in liberal democracies is the lowest it has been since 1989,7 essentially erasing the advances made since the end of the Cold War. But nationalism did not re-emerge out of thin air: a close historical examination reveals strong nationalist themes in the struggle for freedom from communist rule. In that triumphant liberal moment the West regarded nationalism as a bygone ideology that would no longer shape political outcomes.

    The end of history?

    Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History?” captured the post-1989 heady sense of victory. According to Fukuyama, liberalism had finally triumphed over all alternative political ideologies – communism, fascism and nationalism were all to be relegated to the dustbins of history.8 Though Fukuyama warned of the dangers of populism and rising ethnic and nationalist violence, his central argument became the defining creed of the post-Cold War era, and policy makers relied on it to design the architecture of a “new world order”.

    The most prominent policy implication of the triumph of liberalism was the belief that the West can and should export democracy for the benefit of humanity. Democracy promotion became an umbrella for a host of policies including economic reforms in foreign countries, the design of political institutions, investing in civil society and even the expansion of NATO.9

    But the promise of the end of history did not materialise. In less than a decade Yugoslavia shattered into a series of bloody nationalist wars, and the nascent promise of Russian democracy collapsed into chaos and instability. The democracy promotion agenda was not tailored to the particular history and social contexts of the countries they targeted. Consequentially, even in countries that were already moving towards democracy, like Hungary and Poland, this top down intervention in domestic politics kindled a backlash against liberalism that erupted after the financial crisis of 2008. Voters blamed liberals, who they associated with global neoliberal reforms, for their hardships.

    The Clinton administration championed one-size fits all economic reforms, which in some places failed almost immediately. In many postcommunist states, the first set of reforms, privatisation, happened quickly, but necessary regulatory reforms lagged. This incentivised corrupt actors to take over services and benefit from partial reform.10 The collapse of the Russian currency twice in the 1990s followed suit, ultimately supporting the rise of Vladimir Putin as a saviour of the nation from the pains and instability of liberalism.11 This also happened in Ukraine in the 1990s, creating a powerful class of oligarchs that plundered the state and blocked further reforms.12

    Anti-corruption efforts have had mixed results and are ongoing. Western actors have also profited from Ukrainian corruption in various ways.13 Paul Manafort is a shameful example of a political actor who advanced the interests of pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs for personal gain.14 More broadly, widespread corruption and mercenary exploitation supported the nationalist assertion that Western liberalism was hypocritical window dressing for economic interests. Far more promising than outside reform efforts is increasing pressure from Ukrainian citizens fed up with a corrupt system, which translated to political change.15

    For people who experienced communism, trust in state institutions was almost non-existent. After the transition, there was no major attempt to convince citizens that liberalism was an important value system. Instead, the rapid imposition of strongly liberal institutions like powerful constitutional courts did not leave room for the development of rule of law norms and eventually sparked a backlash. In Ukraine, the constitutional court is already considered a political actor,16 though not necessarily a liberal one. Ukraine should practice judicial restraint and understand the limitations of courts in liberalising societies.

    EU membership is the holy grail for democratising countries. Ukraine’s frequent appeals for expedited membership during a deadly war demonstrate that the cultural and economic benefits of membership remain a top priority for prospective states. Central and Eastern Europeans watched enviously as their Western neighbours grew rich and prospered after WWII.

    For political elites in Central and Eastern Europe the prospect of joining the EU was so attractive that there was no political discussion about the direction of required reforms. This often a means a fundamental transformation of the structure of the state. Going through this transformation without deliberation meant that when European accession did not deliver on its unrealistic promises, domestic liberals were accused of trading the national interest for their own benefit. They became the domestic agents of a demeaning foreign process.

    Nationalism and liberalism in Ukraine

    Since 1991, Ukrainian politics has been deeply polarised, chaotic, marked by endemic corruption and its development stymied by the penetration of pro-Russian interests. As a result, the Ukrainian political system has been paralysed leading to outrage and two popular revolutions in 2005 and 2014.

    Yet, as sociologist Charles Tilly famously theorised, states are consolidated through warfare.17 Since the Maidan Revolution and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 Ukraine has been undergoing a process of change.18 For Ukrainians, a sense of unified national identity has grown stronger. The current war is bound to further solidify Ukrainian national identity that is composed of nationalist and liberal elements because Ukrainian nationalism inherently opposes illiberal Russian imperialism.

    The alignment of nationalist and liberal forces also occurred in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s because national identity in the region opposed illiberal Soviet oppression. However, once the threat of Russian invasion diminished, the two forces were torn apart. As long as there is a prominent Russian threat against Ukraine, nationalism may continue to be a liberal force. Hopefully, the current conflict will be resolved soon, but this will hardly remove the geographic and strategic reality of having Russia as its next-door neighbour. Regardless, history demonstrates that there is no guarantee that nationalism will remain liberal.

    After the conflict, Ukraine will need significant reconstruction, but it is crucial that this process give space and autonomy for Ukraine to internally resolve the tension between nationalism and liberalism. For the West it is important to support the demand for liberalism in Ukraine – liberalism is a tenet of the Western way of life and its most important discursive tool in its competition with China. At the same time, it is important to avoid outcomes like contemporary Hungary and Poland, where liberalism has lost ground to illiberal exclusionary nationalism. Ukraine has been mired in trouble since independence, but prior to WWII many Western European countries were non-democratic, and in some cases fascist. Ukraine’s history and future development should not be treated as deterministic.

    25 May 2022

    1 Ukrainian Presidency, Kyiv Is Now the Capital of Global Democracy, the Capital of the Struggle for Freedom for All in Europe – Address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 6 April 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zarazkiyiv-ce-stolicya-globalnoyi-demokratiyistolicya-boro-74129.

    2 For a translation of the speech see: “Fill in the Blanks”, in The Orange Files, 20 June 2013, https://wp.me/p3vCr9-5i.

    3 Human Rights Watch, Wrong Direction on Rights. Assessing the Impact of Hungary’s New Constitution and Laws, 16 May 2013, https:// www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrongdirection-rights/assessing-impact-hungarysnew-constitution-and-laws; Patrick Kingsley, “After Viktor Orban’s Victory, Hungary’s Judges Start to Tumble”, in The New York Times, 1 May 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/ world/europe/hungary-viktor-orban-judges. html; Krisztián Simon and Tibor Rácz, “Hostile Takeover: How Orbán Is Subjugating the Media in Hungary”, in Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Articles, 22 August 2017, https://www.boell.de/en/ node/62129.

    4 Freedom House, “Hungary”, in Nations in Transit 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/ node/3458.

    5 Krzysztof Jasiewicz, “From Solidarity to Fragmentation”, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April 1992), p. 55-69.

    6 “EU Fines Poland €1 Million per Day over Judicial Reforms”, in Deutsche Welle, 27 October 2021, https://p.dw.com/p/42DrB. 7 Vanessa A. Boese et al., Autocratization Changing Nature? Democracy Report 2022, Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute, March 2022, https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022. pdf.

    8 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, in The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), p. 3-18. 9 Michael Mandelbaum, “Preserving the New Peace. The Case against NATO Expansion”, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May-June 1995), p. 9-13.

    10 Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions”, in World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (January 1998), p. 203-234.

    11 Kristy Ironside, “The Ruble Has Plummeted. It’s Not the First Time”, in The Washington Post, 28 February 2022, https://www. washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/28/ ruble-has-plummeted-its-not-first-time.

    12 Serhiy Verlanov, “Taming Ukraine’s Oligarchs”, in UkraineAlert, 19 November 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=322616.

    13 OECD Anti-corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Anti-Corruption Reforms in Ukraine: Prevention and Prosecution of Corruption in State-Owned Enterprises. 4th Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul AntiCorruption Action Plan, Paris, OECD, 4 July 2018, https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anticorruption-reforms-in-ukraine.htm.

    14 Ilya Marritz, “Let’s Recall What Paul Manafort and Rudy Giuliani Were Doing in Ukraine”, in ProPublica, 1 March 2022, https://www. propublica.org/article/lets-recall-what-exactlypaul-manafort-and-rudy-giuliani-were-doingin-ukraine.

    15 Steven Pifer, “Ukraine: Six Years after the Maidan”, in Order from Chaos, 21 February 2020, https://brook.gs/3bXkGmx.

    16 Alina Cherviastova, “False Dilemma”, in Verfassungsblog, 21 February 2021, https:// verfassungsblog.de/false-dilemma.

    17 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992, Cambridge, Basil Blackwell, 1990.

    18 Sofiya Kominko, “Ukraine’s Nation-Building Journey and the Legacy of the Euromaidan Revolution”, in UkraineAlert, 20 April 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=380204.

    Istituto Affari Internazionali

  • Morocco: Western Sahara at the heart of the mission of the new ambassador to the EU

    Morocco: Western Sahara at the heart of the mission of the new ambassador to the EU

    After having been ambassador in countries considered hostile to Morocco, Youssef Amrani is now posted in Brussels, where he must defend the Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara, his specialty since the 1990s.

    Since the recognition by the US of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, in exchange for the normalization of its relations with Israel, the kingdom has been leading an all-out diplomatic offensive to encourage other powers to take the plunge. Particularly its main European partners. Appointed Moroccan Ambassador to the EU in October, Youssef Amrani is one of the faces that embody this strategy. With more than 30 years spent in various positions within the MFA, this diplomat is considered a specialist in one of the most sensitive issues in North Africa: that of Western Sahara. The question of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony considered a « non-autonomous territory » by the UN, has for decades pitted Morocco against POLISARIO Front, supported by Algiers, which broke diplomatic relations with Algeria in August 2021. Rabat. On Sunday January 30, a senior Algerian official accused Morocco of “murdering” civilians “outside internationally recognized borders” and using “sophisticated weapons”, referring to the use of drones. Recruited in 1978 as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the diplomat has climbed from all levels of Moroccan diplomacy: consul, ambassador, secretary general of the MFA, minister delegate to the same department, project manager in the royal cabinet… with the common thread is the Western Sahara file. An “unusual” profile insofar as his predecessors had very different backgrounds. This is the case, for example, of Ahmed Rahhou who, before presiding over the destinies of this strategic embassy between 2019 and 2021, had been appointed head of a bank and could not claim any experience in diplomacy. But the choice of Youssef Amrani would be dictated in particular « by the tensions with certain European countries around the question of the Sahara and by the need to defend the interests linked to it in Brussels », confides to Middle East Eye a fine connoisseur of Moroccan diplomacy.

    “He has already maneuvered in more hostile terrain”

    Former general manager of Microsoft in North and West Africa and former Minister of Industry, Ahmed Reda Chami, the predecessor of Ahmed Rahhou, had never gravitated in the diplomatic universe either before taking the reins. of this embassy in 2016. Amrani’s choice is also dictated by the context. In a diplomatic dispute with Spain, because of the hospitalization in April 2021 of Brahim Ghali, the leader of POLISARIO, in a hospital in Logroño after complications linked to his contamination with COVID-19, Morocco had recalled its ambassador to Madrid and cut all diplomatic ties with its largest trading partner in Europe. Since then, the kingdom has been maneuvering so that its European neighbor adopts a more frank position in favor of the autonomy plan it is proposing for the settlement of the conflict. Morocco had also suspended, in March 2021, all its diplomatic relations with Germany, accusing it of « antagonic activism » the day after the recognition by the US of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Berlin then requested a closed session of the UNSC devoted to the decision taken by Donald Trump. “Our diplomacy now requires frankness from its partners. Amrani’s mission, which perfectly masters this file, is to help obtain recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara from European countries. Knowing that he has already maneuvered in more hostile terrain”, decrypts our source. The diplomat had indeed been ambassador to Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama with residence in Bogota from 1996 to 1999, then to Chile until 2001, before being appointed to Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Belize, territories which were – and still are for some – hostile to the autonomy initiative presented by Morocco. Before his appointment as ambassador to the EU, Amrani was also posted in South Africa, a country with which Morocco had completely cut off its diplomatic relations in 2004 following its recognition of SADR. “His posting to Pretoria in 2018 took place a few months before South Africa joined the UNSC for two years. His role was then to rally South African personalities and institutions to the autonomy plan. It was difficult given Pretoria’s position, but he managed to defend the Moroccan position through publications and interventions in the South African media, » a former diplomat told MEE.

    No trade partnership without Western Sahara

    A former member of the Istiqlal, a nationalist party whose Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara has been a pivot since the country’s independence, the ambassador now has the mission of applying a new doctrine: no commercial partnerships that do not would not include the territory of Western Sahara. This is essentially the watchword given by King Mohammed VI on November 6 on the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the Green March, a great march towards the Western Sahara, then under Spanish occupation, launched by King Hassan II in the aim of recovering it: “We would like to express our consideration to the countries and groups which are linked to Morocco by conventions and partnerships and for which our southern provinces constitute an integral part of the national territory. On the other hand, to those who display vague or ambivalent positions, we declare that Morocco will not engage with them in any economic or commercial approach that would exclude the Moroccan Sahara”. A thinly veiled warning against Bruxelles, whose ECJ had just canceled two trade agreements relating to agricultural products and fisheries from Western Sahara between Morocco and the 27. The cancellation, pronounced on September 29, followed an appeal lodged by POLISARIO. A snub that Rabat did not digest, although the EU appealed the decision on November 19 to maintain the agreements. “There is a clear change of course. While Ahmed Rahhou had missions of an essentially economic nature, such as removing Morocco from the gray list of tax havens, or even migration and climate change, Youssef Amrani has the mission of strengthening Morocco’s relations with the ‘Europe without yielding anything on the Sahara file’, summarizes the former diplomat.


    Middle East Eye, 21/02/2022

    #WesternSahara #YoussehAmrani #Morocco #EU