Étiquette : Frente Polisario

  • Los BRICS subrayan la necesidad de aplicar la legalidad internacional al Sáhara Occidental

    ETIQUETAS : BRICS, SAHARA OCCIDENTAL, MARRUECOS, FRENTE POLISARIO,

    Los países miembros del grupo BRICS subrayaron en Johannesburgo (Sudáfrica) la necesidad de alcanzar una solución política « mutuamente aceptable » a la cuestión del Sáhara Occidental, de conformidad con los principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y las resoluciones de la legalidad internacional.

    « Insistimos en la necesidad de alcanzar una solución política duradera y mutuamente aceptable a la cuestión del Sáhara Occidental de conformidad con las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y de conformidad con el mandato de la Misión de las Naciones Unidas para el Referéndum del Sáhara Occidental ( MINURSO)”, indica el comunicado final publicado al final de los trabajos de la 15ª sesión de la cumbre de los BRICS, celebrada desde el martes.

    Los países BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India, China, Sudáfrica) ya habían pedido, el 26 de abril, una solución política capaz de garantizar el derecho a la autodeterminación del pueblo saharaui, durante la reunión preparatoria de la Cumbre de Johannesburgo de Viceministros de Asuntos Exteriores y Enviados Especiales de los BRICS para Oriente Medio y el Norte de África (MENA), celebrada en Ciudad del Cabo.

    LEA TAMBIEN : Por qué la cumbre de los BRICS podría ser tan importante

    El presidente de la República Árabe Saharaui Democrática (RASD) y secretario general del Frente Polisario, Brahim Ghali, llegó este martes a Johannesburgo para participar en la reunión BRICS/África, cuyos trabajos tendrán lugar el jueves en esta ciudad sudafricana, a las la invitación de los países de este grupo, tras el fracaso de los intentos del régimen marroquí de Makhzen de cancelar la participación del Sáhara Occidental en esta reunión.

    Para camuflar su fracaso, Marruecos publicó a través de su agencia oficial una información citando a « una fuente autorizada » que afirma que « se trató de una reunión organizada sobre la base de una iniciativa unilateral del Gobierno Sur-Sur africano ».

    Ghali participó también en una cena ofrecida el miércoles por la noche por el presidente sudafricano, Cyril Ramaphosa, en honor de los más de 40 Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno que participaron en la reunión de Johannesburgo.
    Además, el grupo BRICS saludó « los continuos esfuerzos colectivos de las Naciones Unidas, la Unión Africana (UA) y las organizaciones subregionales, en particular la cooperación entre el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y el Consejo de Paz y Seguridad (PSC) de la UA ». , para abordar los desafíos regionales, incluido el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad” en el mundo, agrega el comunicado.

    LEA TAMBIEN : Marruecos pide oficialmente adherir el BRICS

    En el mismo contexto, reiteró que el principio de “soluciones africanas a los problemas africanos” debe seguir sirviendo como “base para la resolución de conflictos” en el continente, según la misma fuente.

    « En este sentido, apoyamos los esfuerzos africanos de paz en el continente, mediante el desarrollo de las capacidades pertinentes de los Estados africanos », agregaron los países miembros.

    Sin embargo, el grupo BRICS ha expresado su preocupación por el empeoramiento de la violencia en Sudán. « Instamos al cese inmediato de las hostilidades y al acceso irrestricto de la población sudanesa a la ayuda humanitaria », subrayaron al respecto.

    Y continúa: “Seguimos preocupados por la situación en la región del Sahel, en particular en la República de Níger. Y apoyamos la soberanía, la independencia, la integridad territorial y la unidad nacional de Libia”, según la declaración final.

    APS

  • The UN warns of the risk to regional stability in Western Sahara

    The UN warns of the risk to regional stability in Western Sahara

    Tags : Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, Morocco, Algeria, ONU, MINURSO,

    The two years of rupture of the ceasefire by the Polisario Front fuel the outbreak of tension between Morocco and Algeria derived from Rabat’s historic claim to that territory

    Where there are white vehicles with the acronym of the UN there is an international problem. Where there is a headquarters of the organization, the problem is also old. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (Minurso) occupies the premises of a former school in the center of El Aaiún, not far from the collective taxi rank. It is an ancient building, with a landscaped interior patio, kept in an apparent state of magazine like many other UN facilities in the world with a barracks-like appearance. Nobody has bothered to change the furniture, most of it from before 1991, when he began his mandate after the ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario. The resumption of hostilities between the two contenders for a little over two years now leads the Minurso.

    “We are in a situation of low intensity conflict, with incidents on the wall or embankment (which divides the territory of the former Spanish colony, to the west under the control of the Moroccan Army) and drone attacks after the collapse of the ceasefire in November 2020″, says a senior United Nations diplomat, who speaks to EL PAÍS on condition of anonymity. “In Western Sahara there are no other UN agencies that can report, no NGOs or international media, like in other places. Only we can see what happens, ”he explains, referring to the latest report by the Secretary General, António Guterres, to the Security Council, published last October.

    Can you imagine a situation without the presence of the Minurso in Western Sahara? “The mission is important and very useful. Above all because we represent a political trip wire (detonation or alarm cable) not only between Morocco and the Polisario, but also between Algeria and Morocco. The situation runs the risk of being much worse, and the tension may increase, with real regional implications for stability”, points out the senior diplomat consulted in El Aaiún.

    The political mediation of the current envoy of the Secretary General for the Sahara, the veteran Italian-Swedish diplomat Staffan de Mistura, seasoned in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria, remains completely silent. He excepted some signs of stagnation, presumably because of diplomatic pressure from Morocco. In July of last year, everything was prepared at the Minurso headquarters for De Mistura’s visit to El Aaiún. But it was canceled at the last moment when he was in Rabat and had already traveled to the rest of the points on his regular tour: Algiers, Nouakchott and Tindouf (Algeria), where the Saharawi refugee camps are located under the control of the Polisario Front independence movement.

    According to the verbal report of a UN official in El Ayoun, the situation suggests that it is now not safe to move around Western Sahara, particularly east of the wall or embankment where the Polisario usually operates. Nor is it possible to resupply the international observer teams from both sides, as was the case before. There have been attacks with drones against water tankers, the same ones that are used by the Minurso teams. For UN personnel, freedom of movement is a basic rule, and if you lack it, you are in danger.

    “Demining operations have been halted since the collapse of the ceasefire. We hope to be able to restart them soon. We are in one of the areas with the greatest contamination or propagation of mines in the world. Now there are also unexploded projectiles after the resumption of hostilities, » details a senior MINURSO official.

    The UN mission for the Sahara does not have a traditional humanitarian mandate. In Tindouf, Minurso worked in the past with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in adopting confidence-building measures, but this activity was suspended about 10 years ago. It has about 500 local and international members – 300 civilians and 200 military – and deals essentially with operational and logistical issues.

    “It would be a lot worse if we weren’t here. There is no other way for the international community to have impartial information on the ground. We received reports of 27 drone attacks last year and were able to investigate 18 of them, » added a senior UN official consulted. “The presence of our observation teams to the east of the wall or embankment deters a regional escalation. The MINURSO military observers are not armed and attacking them is a war crime. That is one of its strengths, ”he argues.

    —With everything that is happening now in the Ukraine or in the Sahel, don’t you think that the Western Sahara conflict has been relegated?
    -I do not think it is like that. A potential worsening of relations between Morocco and Algeria has consequences for the rest of the world. The supply of gas to Europe through the Gibraltar Strait pipeline, for example, is at risk. I don’t see it as a forgotten conflict.

    The recent statements by the director of the Moroccan Royal Archives, Bahiya Simu, on the so-called Eastern Sahara, the border part of Algeria that Morocco claimed as its own after French decolonization and for which both countries waged the War of the Sands six decades ago, they have unleashed a political storm on both sides of the deserted border.

    Simu spoke in February in Rabat at a forum of the MAP press agency to ensure that « there are historical documents that attest to Morocco’s sovereignty over the so-called Western Sahara, but also over Eastern Sahara. » In his opinion, colonial France handed over Moroccan territory to « French Algeria thinking of continuing to keep the country under its rule. » Tindouf, where the refugee camps controlled by the Polisario Front are located, is the capital of the disputed region.

    His words have caused an impact in the neighboring country. The president of the Algerian House of Representatives, Brahim Bughali, has spoken during a public session on the controversial issue of Eastern Sahara. “The Moroccan regime is trying to parasitize our country and sell its expansionist objectives. The National Liberation Army [Algerian Armed Forces] is ready to protect our borders,” warned the third highest-level charge in Algeria, quoted by the Moroccan digital portal Hespress.

    From El Ayoun, the senior United Nations diplomat contacted highlights that the world has been involved for decades in East Timor, which is a much more difficult place to find on a map than Western Sahara. “Preconceived ideas about that territory changed. Everything changes. The incidents of November 2020 in the Sahara are a perfect example of this ”, he adds.

    ―Is the decision of the United States to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara another example?

    -Things change. From our perspective, we are in a moment of evolution in a context of political and operational changes. Minurso’s role in promoting regional stability remains important. Our [original] mandate was to organize a referendum [on self-determination]. But I think it would be naive – that is my personal opinion – to think that a referendum could be held tomorrow. The center of gravity seems to be shifting towards other types of political agreements than those foreseen at the beginning of the 1990s.

    « But I could be wrong, » concludes the head of the Minurso before saying goodbye in El Aaiún. “If you had asked me in 1998 if there was going to be a referendum in East Timor, I would have said no. The territory voted for self-determination the following year. You never know ».

    Source

    #Western_Sahara #Morocco #Algeria #UN #MINURSO

  • Un an après la lettre de Sánchez à Mohamed VI, le revirement sur le sahara n’est pas accepté

    Tags : Sahara Occidental, Maroc, Front Polisario, Espagne, Pedro Sanchez, Ceuta, Melilla,

    Un an après la lettre de Sánchez à Mohamed VI, les partenaires et l’opposition n’acceptent toujours pas le revirement sur le Sahara.

    Le gouvernement invoque la baisse de l’immigration et l’augmentation des échanges commerciaux, mais l’ouverture totale des douanes se fait toujours attendre

    MADRID, 14 mars (EUROPA PRESS) – « L’Espagne considère la proposition marocaine d’autonomie (pour le Sahara) présentée en 2007 comme la base la plus sérieuse, crédible et réaliste pour la résolution de ce différend ». Par ces mots, le Premier ministre espagnol, Pedro Sánchez, dans une lettre à Mohamed VI, le gouvernement a opéré un virage à 180 degrés dans sa politique traditionnelle à l’égard de l’ancienne colonie et a ouvert une nouvelle étape dans ses relations avec le Maroc.

    Un an après que les Espagnols aient pris connaissance de la nouvelle position sur le Sahara par un communiqué de la Maison royale marocaine, tant les partenaires de la coalition que l’opposition restent peu convaincus des raisons qui ont conduit le gouvernement à ce qu’ils n’ont pas hésité à qualifier de « virage historique » et des bénéfices que cette nouvelle position a apportés, comme ils l’ont clairement exprimé lors des récentes interventions du ministre des Affaires étrangères, José Manuel Albares, devant le Congrès et le Sénat.

    Suite à cette lettre, Sánchez a été reçu le 7 avril à Rabat par Mohamed VI et tous deux ont signé une déclaration conjointe avec la « feuille de route » sur laquelle la nouvelle étape de la relation est basée, et qui a été ratifiée lors de la réunion de haut niveau (RAN) les 1er et 2 février dans la capitale marocaine.

    Dans ce sens, le fait que Mohammed VI – qui était hors du pays comme c’est relativement souvent le cas – n’ait pas reçu Sánchez pendant le RAN, comme c’était traditionnellement le cas lorsque le sommet se tenait au Maroc, a été qualifié par le PP d’ »humiliation » et de « moquerie diplomatique ».

    La Moncloa a minimisé l’importance du geste, arguant que le Roi avait parlé à Sánchez par téléphone avant la réunion et qu’il l’avait convoqué pour une prochaine visite à Rabat, pour laquelle il n’y a toujours pas de date. Il a également souligné les bonnes relations personnelles entre les deux hommes et le fait qu’en avril, il l’avait invité à participer à l’ »iftar », le dîner par lequel les musulmans rompent le jeûne du Ramadan.

    LE GOUVERNEMENT DÉMENT LA TOURNURE DES ÉVÉNEMENTS

    Entre-temps, le gouvernement s’est efforcé de réfuter le « mantra » de la pirouette, insistant sur le fait qu’il maintient son soutien à la « centralité » de l’ONU dans la recherche d’une solution mutuellement acceptable pour les parties, le Maroc, d’une part, et le Front Polisario, qui représente les Sahraouis, d’autre part.

    Il a également invoqué le fait que l’Espagne est le principal bailleur de fonds des camps de réfugiés sahraouis pour réfuter la « trahison » dénoncée par le Front Polisario et a fait valoir que ce qu’il ne veut pas, c’est que le conflit se poursuive pendant un autre demi-siècle.

    Cependant, les deux chambres du Parlement ont expressément demandé au gouvernement de revenir à sa position initiale, considérant qu’en soutenant le plan d’autonomie, il soutient la thèse du Maroc et abandonne le droit des Sahraouis à l’autodétermination, comme ils l’ont récemment rappelé à Albares.


    Face aux critiques unanimes sur sa position, le gouvernement s’est efforcé au cours de l’année écoulée de mettre en avant les avantages de la nouvelle relation et les bénéfices concrets qui se font sentir, notamment à Ceuta et Melilla, ainsi qu’aux îles Canaries et en Andalousie.

    BAISSE DE L’IMMIGRATION ET AUGMENTATION DES ÉCHANGES

    À cet égard, la Moncloa cite deux informations : la réduction drastique de l’arrivée d’immigrants en provenance de la côte marocaine et l’augmentation des échanges commerciaux. L’Espagne est déjà le principal partenaire économique et commercial du Maroc et le gouvernement espère maintenant qu’elle deviendra également son principal investisseur, avec en ligne de mire les 45 milliards d’euros que le royaume prévoit de dépenser d’ici 2050 dans des secteurs clés.


    En ce qui concerne l’immigration, au cours du mois de janvier, les arrivées ont diminué de 69 % en Andalousie et de 82 % aux îles Canaries, des chiffres qui contrastent avec le reste des routes migratoires vers l’Europe, qui ont connu une augmentation des arrivées au cours de l’année dernière.

    Cependant, Haizam Amirah Fernández, chercheur à l’Institut Royal Elcano, minimise quelque peu ces avancées. Ainsi, dans des déclarations à Europa Press, il souligne que la diminution des arrivées d’immigrants en provenance du Maroc montre qu’il y a « une composante de volonté politique », tout en soulignant qu’ »il n’y a pas de garantie d’irréversibilité » ou s’il y en a une, elle n’a pas été expliquée jusqu’à présent.

    Quant à l’augmentation des échanges commerciaux, il souligne qu’en réalité « elle répond à une tendance qui existait déjà avant la pandémie du COVID-19 » et qu’en fait l’Espagne était déjà le premier partenaire économique du Maroc.

    LA DOUANE, TOUJOURS EN SUSPENS

    Mais l’une des questions en suspens qui suscite le plus d’intérêt est sans aucun doute l’ouverture des douanes à Ceuta et Melilla. C’est Sánchez lui-même qui a annoncé à Rabat, le 7 avril, la réouverture du bureau de douane de Melilla, fermé unilatéralement par le Maroc depuis 2018, et la création d’un nouveau bureau à Ceuta.

    Après quelques doutes initiaux concernant l’engagement du Maroc à prendre cette mesure, les deux gouvernements ont annoncé que l’ouverture aurait lieu avant la RNH et plus tard en janvier. Cependant, ce qui s’est passé jusqu’à présent, ce sont deux essais pilotes d’expédition commerciale, l’un le 27 janvier, quelques jours avant la RAN, et l’autre le 24 février, avec certains des problèmes détectés dans le premier déjà résolus.

    Le gouvernement a qualifié d’ »étape importante » le fait que le bureau de douane de Ceuta ait commencé à fonctionner, bien que pour l’instant dans une phase expérimentale, et a également précisé qu’il existe un calendrier convenu avec le Maroc pour son ouverture complète, de manière progressive et ordonnée, mais il ne veut pas le rendre public pour éviter les avalanches et la répétition des « images du passé », en référence aux porteurs et au soi-disant commerce atypique.

    Le gouvernement a qualifié de « jalon » le fait que le bureau de douane de Ceuta ait commencé à fonctionner, bien que pour l’instant dans une phase expérimentale, et a également précisé qu’il existe un calendrier convenu avec le Maroc pour son ouverture complète, de manière progressive et ordonnée, mais il ne veut pas le rendre public pour éviter les avalanches et la répétition des « images du passé », en référence aux porteurs et au soi-disant commerce atypique.

    Cependant, l’absence de dates concrètes a généré un certain malaise dans les deux villes autonomes. Dans ce sens, le Sénat a approuvé la semaine dernière, sur proposition du PP et avec le PSOE votant contre, de demander au gouvernement de rendre public le calendrier de l’ouverture des douanes.

    AUTRES QUESTIONS EN SUSPENS

    D’autre part, le groupe de travail pour la délimitation des eaux territoriales sur la côte atlantique a également repris ses activités, une question qui intéresse particulièrement les îles Canaries, préoccupées par la prospection pétrolière que le royaume alaouite pourrait autoriser dans les eaux proches de l’archipel.

    A ce jour, on ne sait pas si les discussions ont progressé, bien que les deux gouvernements aient toujours exprimé leur volonté de régler la question par la voie diplomatique et le dialogue, étant donné que la délimitation de la plaque tectonique proposée par le Maroc se heurte à celle formulée par l’Espagne pour les îles Canaries.

    Lors d’une récente comparution devant une commission sénatoriale, Albares s’est défendu des plaintes de certains sénateurs sur la lenteur du processus en soulignant que cela faisait 15 ans que ce groupe ne s’était pas réuni. « Ils ne s’attendront pas à ce que nous résolvions en six mois ce qui n’a pas été résolu en 15 ans », a-t-il déclaré.

    Aucune avancée concrète n’a non plus été enregistrée sur un autre point de la déclaration du 7 avril, à savoir l’ouverture de négociations « sur la gestion de l’espace aérien ». En réalité, ce que le Maroc cherche à travers ce dialogue, c’est que l’Espagne cesse de gérer l’espace aérien au-dessus du Sahara, ce qui est actuellement fait à partir des îles Canaries.

    Le gouvernement a indiqué dans une réponse parlementaire au PP que ces discussions « se limitent exclusivement à la gestion de l’espace aérien et à la coordination entre les deux afin de parvenir à une plus grande sécurité dans les liaisons », réfutant ainsi que l’Espagne va céder sur cette question.

    Source

    #Sahara_Occidental #Marruecos #España #Frente_POlisario #Pedro_Sanchez #Ceuta #Melilla

  • Marruecos-Qatargate: Visita a Tinduf de Antonio Panzeri

    Etiquetas: Sáhara Occidental, Marruecos, Antonio Panzeri, Parlamento Europeo, Argelia, corrupción, Frente Polisario,

    27/10/2011

    Con referencia a la correspondencia citada en referencia, tengo el honor de informarles que al margen de la sesión plenaria del Parlamento Europeo en Estrasburgo, esta Misión tuvo una reunión informal con el Consejero del Sr. Pier Antonio Panzeri, que llevaba un mensaje de este último, a la atención de las autoridades marroquíes.

    Estas son las tres ideas principales de este mensaje, tal como fueron comunicadas:

    -La visita a Tinduf es fundamental para consolidar la credibilidad del señor Panzeri ante Argelia y el Polisario, después de que este último lo acusara de promarroquí. A Marruecos no le interesa que el Sr. Panzeri sea percibido como tal. Panzeri hizo todo lo posible para evitar la fecha del 6 de noviembre. La fecha de la visita (7 de noviembre) es un compromiso razonable, en el sentido de que visitar los campamentos en la continuidad de una visita a Argelia es simbólico en sí mismo y constituye, en cualquier caso, una opción mejor (para Marruecos) que una visita ad hoc. visita a los campamentos.


    -METRO. Panzeri inicia sus intercambios con los líderes de Argelia y del Polisario a partir de la posición del CPM, que siempre ha colocado la cuestión del Sáhara en el marco del tema de la regionalización avanzada. Sin embargo, el Sr. Panzeri no tiene la intención de mencionar la autonomía con el Polisario, ni hacer una declaración en este sentido durante su visita. Indicó que simplemente escucharía a sus interlocutores.

    – Hay una fuerte demanda del PE con respecto a la cuestión del Sáhara. Esta pregunta es planteada regularmente por los eurodiputados y explotada en gran medida por los partidarios del Polisario, que ejercen una presión significativa (particularmente dentro del S&D). La mejor manera de manejar esta presión es contenerla en el marco de AFET y canalizarla a través del Sr. Panzeri, quien puede ser un interlocutor creíble para todas las partes.

    A primera vista, el mensaje del Sr. Panzeri pretende ser tranquilizador. El interesado es muy consciente de la sensibilidad de su visita a los campamentos de Tinduf, y está haciendo un importante esfuerzo para justificarse y no comprometer definitivamente sus entradas en Marruecos. Parece tomar en serio la recomendación de no ir al área al este de la estructura de defensa, y promete mantener informada a la Misión sobre el progreso de su programa en Tinduf.

    Desde un punto de vista dinámico, los acontecimientos recientes se sitúan en la continuación del trabajo metódico iniciado por el Sr. Paneri desde los primeros tras su elección al frente de la Delegación del Magreb (cf. M/F 033/2p/ 2011/CRU del 26/01/2011). Sus contactos con el Polisario (hoy coronados por la visita), los contactos con las autoridades argelinas (incluso sobre la cuestión del Sáhara), los puentes de confianza que supo tender con sus interlocutores marroquíes (a través del CPM y su valiosa apoyo al PE) y, sobre todo, la « ambigüedad constructiva » con la que supo rodear sus actitudes frente a frente, son las manifestaciones de una agenda política de largo plazo, llevada a cabo de forma voluntaria, a veces peligroso, pero siempre con tacto y maestría. Es difícil no ver en ello, además, una demostración subliminal de una « capacidad de molestia », tanto que muestra hasta qué punto el interesado puede ser un aliado de peso o un adversario temerario.

    Visto desde este ángulo, los acontecimientos recientes denotan, en la línea política del Sr. Panzeri, una continuidad raramente observada entre otros eurodiputados. En esta lógica, cabe pensar que, lejos de ser una operación de comunicación, la visita a Tinduf es un hito táctico en la agenda personal del presidente de D-MAG; una agenda que podría experimentar una fuerte aceleración en las próximas semanas y meses.

    De hecho, el Sr. Panzeri planea lanzar un “proceso” en el PE en el que la cuestión del Sáhara sería objeto de un debate regular e institucionalizado en el marco de la Comisión AFET. En esta etapa, el interesado no tiene claro el objetivo de tal “proceso”. En estos intercambios tanto con esta Misión como con el copresidente de la CPM, se contenta con indicar que se trata de entablar un diálogo sobre la cuestión del Sáhara, sin precisar sin embargo si este diálogo tiene un objetivo (en su ojos), o si es un fin en sí mismo.

    Tantas razones que abogan por un encuadre de los conocimientos del Sr. Panzer sobre la cuestión del Sáhara y sus intenciones a muy corto plazo. A tal fin, cabe señalar que, por invitación del copresidente marroquí de la CPM, el Sr. Panzeri estará en Marruecos del 28 de octubre al 1 de noviembre de 2011m, es decir, en vísperas de su visita a Argelia, que también lo llevará a Tinduf. Esta Misión recomienda que el Presidente de la D_MAG pueda tener una entrevista (o más), con uno (de los funcionarios) capaz de informarle sobre la cuestión del Sáhara de manera adecuada y, si es necesario, anticipar el mensaje que recibirá durante las etapas de Argel y Tinduf la que no sobraría llamar su « gira de los partidos afectados » por la cuestión del Sáhara.

    Embajador Menouar Alem

    Fuente :

    5738bruxelles-1Download


    #Marruecos #Sahara_Occidental #Argelia #UE #Parlamento_Europeo #Corrupción #Antonio_Panzeri #Tindouf

  • Sáhara Occidental: Un problema internacional no resuelto

    Sáhara Occidental: Un problema internacional no resuelto

    Tags : Sahara Occidental, Frente Polisario, Marruecos, ONU, MINURSO, RASD,

    Todos los lunes, Eye in the Retro te hace revivir una historia significativa del pasado. Este lunes, rumbo a Marruecos. En medio de una investigación sobre la corrupción en el Parlamento Europeo por parte de Qatar y Marruecos, descubrimos que tenemos que remontarnos al 27 de febrero de 1976 para comprender las razones que pueden empujar a Marruecos a influir en los eurodiputados.

    Ese día, el último soldado español abandonó lo que todavía se llamaba el Sáhara Español, provocando un espinoso problema internacional que aún hoy no está resuelto. Entonces, ¿de qué estamos hablando? Procedente de un territorio del noroeste de África que da al Atlántico, frente a las Islas Canarias, que aún son españolas.

    Este territorio, que se españolizó a finales del siglo XIX, se convirtió en Sáhara Occidental en 1976. A diferencia de otras descolonizaciones, aquí, cuando el colono se va, los vecinos del Sáhara Occidental se reparten el territorio. Marruecos se apodera de dos tercios del Sáhara y Mauritania del tercio restante, en virtud de un acuerdo con España. Pero nadie pidió la opinión de los saharauis. Y el 27 de febrero de 1976, cuando partieron los últimos soldados españoles, el movimiento de liberación nacional, el Frente Polisario, declaró la independencia del Sáhara Occidental.

    Entrará en lucha armada contra los que considera los nuevos ocupantes, Marruecos y Mauritania. Tres años después, en 1979, Mauritania abandonó la lucha y reconoció al Frente Polisario como soberano del territorio que ocupaba. Pero Marruecos aprovecha para apoderarse también de esta parte.

    Desde entonces, el conflicto ha continuado, aunque en la práctica Marruecos ocupa ya el 80% del territorio protegido por un muro. Y detrás de este muro está la pequeña parte sin acceso al mar, bajo el control del Frente Polisario.

    Para Marruecos, considerar el Sáhara Occidental como su territorio es obvio, una forma de consenso nacional. Es más, cuando se le pidió su opinión en 1975, la Corte Internacional de Justicia reconoció que cuando llegaron los colonizadores existían lazos legales de lealtad entre el sultán de Marruecos y ciertas tribus que vivían en el Sáhara occidental.

    Sin embargo, en esta misma opinión, la Corte Internacional de Justicia dice otra cosa que no está de acuerdo con Marruecos: especifica que no se establece ningún vínculo de soberanía territorial entre el Sáhara Occidental y Marruecos. Por lo tanto, la ONU nunca ha reconocido esta anexión.

    Hoy, el estatus internacional de este territorio sigue sin resolverse. Algunos estados reconocen la soberanía del Frente Polisario sobre el Sáhara Occidental y otros son más conciliadores con la posición marroquí. Por ejemplo, abogan por una forma de autonomía del Sáhara dentro de Marruecos. Este es particularmente el caso en los Estados Unidos, Francia, España y Bélgica.

    Y a la vista del Qatargate, no se puede dejar de pensar en la influencia de los lobbies marroquíes, que sabemos están activos en el Parlamento de la misma manera que los qataríes, hasta el punto de que, sacudidos por sospechas de corrupción, los diputados europeos acaban de votar por última vez. mes por abrumadora mayoría un texto pidiendo a Marruecos que respete la libertad de expresión, lo que el Parlamento Europeo nunca ha hecho hasta ahora, votar un texto como este.

    Fuente

    #Sahara_Occidental #Marruecos #RASD #Frente_Polisario #MINURSO #ONU

  • Sobre la guerra en el Sáhara Occidental

    Sobre la guerra en el Sáhara Occidental

    Tags : Sahara Occidental, Marruecos, Frente Polisario, ONU, MINURSO, muro de defensa,

    Nick Brooks

    Es posible que haya escuchado o no que el alto el fuego que se ha mantenido durante casi 30 años en el Sáhara Occidental se rompió ayer y el territorio ahora está en guerra nuevamente. No hay nada en el sitio web de noticias de la BBC al respecto en el momento de escribir este artículo, aunque recibió una breve mención en el Servicio Mundial y hay un artículo del New York Times.

    Ambos lados en el conflicto, Marruecos y el Polisario, tienen sus versiones de lo que sucedió, y es probable que Marruecos tenga la voz más alta. Así que aquí está mi opinión.

    Marruecos invadió el Sáhara Occidental en 1975, cuando España se retiró. El Polisario, formado unos años antes para luchar por la independencia de España, se opuso a la ocupación de Marruecos. Se libró una guerra hasta 1991, cuando la ONU negoció un alto el fuego e instaló una fuerza de mantenimiento de la paz: la Misión de las Naciones Unidas para el Referéndum en el Sáhara Occidental, conocida por su acrónimo en francés, MINURSO. Como su nombre lo indica, esta fuerza recibió el mandato de organizar un referéndum sobre la autodeterminación. Esto nunca ha sucedido y la MINURSO sigue siendo la única fuerza de mantenimiento de la paz sin un mandato de supervisión de los derechos humanos. El Sáhara Occidental sigue siendo un territorio no autónomo según lo definido por el Comité de Descolonización de la ONU. En otras palabras, el proceso de descolonizaciónaún no se ha competido. El Sáhara Occidental se conoce a menudo como la última colonia de África .

    A lo largo del conflicto de 1975-1991, Marruecos aseguró el territorio que había tomado detrás de terraplenes defensivos o bermas . Para 1991, estos se habían fusionado en una sola estructura, The Berm , que se extiende 2700 km (alrededor de 1700 millas) a lo largo del territorio, dividiéndolo efectivamente en una zona controlada por Marruecos al oeste y al norte, y una zona controlada por el Polisario al este y al sur. (Figura 1). Garfi (2014) proporciona un análisis detallado de la berma y su evolución .

    Figura 1 . Sáhara Occidental bajo el alto el fuego, que muestra la partición de la berma marroquí, las ubicaciones clave y el despliegue de las fuerzas de mantenimiento de la paz de la MINURSO. Mapa de MINURSO/ONU Mantenimiento de la paz.

    Según los términos del alto el fuego , el Sáhara Occidental se divide en tres áreas (Figura 1):

    i) una Franja de Amortiguamiento que se extiende por 5 km al este y al sur de la berma en el lado del Polisario, que es efectivamente una zona de exclusión o tierra de nadie, en la que no se permite personal o equipo militar;

    ii) dos Áreas Restringidas, que se extienden por 30 km a ambos lados de la berma, en las que están prohibidas las actividades militares; y

    iii) dos Áreas con Restricciones Limitadas, que incluyen todo el resto del territorio del Sáhara Occidental, en las que se pueden desarrollar actividades militares normales a excepción de aquellas que supongan una escalada de la situación militar.

    Figura 2. Esquema que muestra las diferentes áreas definidas bajo el alto el fuego.

    La información anterior, incluidos los mapas que muestran las diferentes zonas y el texto del alto el fuego ( Acuerdo Militar #1 ), solía estar en el sitio web de la MINURSO, pero se eliminó hace algunos años. Cuando se les preguntó, MINURSO y el mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU no explicaron por qué, lo que llevó a muchos a concluir que esto fue el resultado del cabildeo marroquí. La narrativa de Marruecos es que controla todo el Sáhara Occidental excepto una franja de seguridad establecida por la ONU para su protección, y que el Polisario no tiene presencia en el Sáhara Occidental. Los mapas y el acuerdo militar lo contradicen claramente.

    Desde 1991, Marruecos ha estado afianzando su ocupación del Sáhara Occidental y desarrollando sus recursos naturales, en contra de las convenciones internacionales que prohíben a las potencias ocupantes explotar los recursos en los territorios ocupados para su propio beneficio. Estos recursos incluyen fosfatos, pesca y recursos hídricos: Marruecos ha desarrollado la agricultura en el Sáhara Occidental ocupado, incluida la producción de cultivos que requieren mucha agua, como los tomates (incluida la marca Azera).

    Algunos de estos recursos y los productos derivados de ellos transitan por Mauritania hacia el sur, por ejemplo, los productos pesqueros de las aguas ocupadas del Sáhara Occidental que se destinan a los mercados africanos a través del puerto de Nouadhibouin Mauritania. Esta ruta involucra el tráfico que pasa a través de la berma al sur del asentamiento de Guergerat (Figura 3), luego atraviesa la franja de protección durante 5 km hasta la frontera con Mauritania (Figura 4).

    Figura 3. Ubicación de Guergerat en el extremo suroeste del Sáhara Occidental.

    A fines de octubre de 2020, los manifestantes saharauis comenzaron a bloquear la carretera entre el cruce de Guergerat Berm y la frontera con Mauritania (Figura 4), dentro de la franja de seguridad. Protestaban contra la exportación de recursos naturales, incluido el pescado destinado al puerto mauritano de Nouadhibou, desde el Sáhara Occidental ocupado por Marruecos. También acusaron a Marruecos de facilitar el tráfico de drogas y personas a través de Guergerat.

    Figura 4. La carretera que atraviesa la berma (arriba) al sur de Guergerat, atravesando la franja de protección de 5 km establecida bajo el alto el fuego de 1991 , hasta la frontera entre el Sáhara Occidental y Mauritania. Ver figura

    Los días 12 y 13 de noviembre, Marruecos envió tropas para dispersar a los manifestantes y tomar el control del tramo de carretera que atraviesa la Franja de Amortiguamiento. Simplemente entrando en la Franja de Amortiguamiento, Marruecos violó el alto el fuego. El 13 de noviembre, el Polisario declaró que esta ruptura marcaba el final del alto el fuego y la reanudación de las hostilidades, y que ahora estaban en guerra con Marruecos. Más tarde, el día 13, Marruecos informó de enfrentamientos a lo largo de la berma en el norte del Sáhara Occidental, y el 14 parecía que se estaban produciendo combates en las cercanías de Mahbes y Hauza en el norte del Sáhara Occidental, y Aouserd y Guergerat en el sur. .

    Todo esto se produce en un contexto de 45 años de conflicto y exilio para los saharauis. En algún lugar alrededor de 100.000 saharauis viven bajo la ocupación marroquí, mientras que quizás alrededor de 200.000 viven en cinco campos de refugiados en el desierto de Argelia alrededor de la ciudad de Tinduf. Estos campos están gobernados por el Polisario y son efectivamente una sociedad y un estado en el exilio. El Polisario también controla las áreas al este y al sur de la Berma, conocidas por los saharauis como la Zona Libre.

    Durante décadas, el descontento en los campamentos ha ido en aumento, particularmente entre los jóvenes saharauis, en respuesta al estancamiento, el fracaso de la ONU para organizar el referéndum largamente prometido y la comprensible percepción de que han sido olvidados y abandonados por el resto de mundo. Muchos ven el regreso a la guerra como la única forma de tener alguna esperanza de resolver el conflicto, ya sea a través de medios militares o como resultado de la diplomacia facilitada por lo que esperan sea un nuevo foco de atención en el territorio si se reanudan las hostilidades. Durante muchos años, el Polisario ha logrado contener este descontento y ha evitado el conflicto. Parece que la última provocación de Marruecos ha sido demasiado flagrante para que este enfoque siga siendo viable.

    Nick Brooks ha viajado mucho por el Sáhara Occidental, como codirector del Proyecto del Sáhara Occidental , un proyecto de investigación centrado en la arqueología y el cambio ambiental pasado en el territorio. Entre 2002 y 2009 dirigió seis temporadas de trabajo de campo en la zona del Sáhara Occidental controlada por el Polisario, y viajó al territorio en siete ocasiones, pasando también un tiempo en los campos de refugiados saharauis alrededor de Tinduf. El trabajo de campo implicó frecuentes desvíos hacia Mauritania para evitar la berma marroquí.

    Fuente : Sand&Dust, 14/11/2020

    #Sahara_Occidental #Marruecos #Frente_Polisario #ONU #MINURSO #Muro

  • A return to war in Western Sahara

    A return to war in Western Sahara

    Tags : Morocco, Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, UNO, MINURSO,

    Nick Brooks

    You may or may not have heard that the ceasefire that has held for nearly 30 years in Western Sahara broke down yesterday, and the territory is now at war again. There is nothing on the BBC news website about it at the tike of writing, although it did get a brief mention on the World Service and there is this article from the New York Times.

    Both sides in the conflict – Morocco and the Polisario – have their versions of what’s happened, and Morocco is likely to have the loudest voice. So here’s my take.

    Morocco invaded Western Sahara in 1975, when Spain pulled out. The Polisario, formed a few years earlier to fight for independence from Spain, opposed Morocco’s occupation. A war was fought until 1991, when the UN brokered a ceasefire and installed a peacekeeping force – the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known by its French acronym, MINURSO. As the name indicates, this force was mandated to organise a referendum on self-determination. This has never happened, and MINURSO remains the only peacekeeping force without a human rights monitoring mandate. Western Sahara remains a non self-governing territory as defined by the UN Committee on Decolonisation. In other words, the decolonisation process has not yet been competed. Western Sahara is often referred to as the Last Colony in Africa.

    Throughout the 1975-1991 conflict, Morocco secured territory it had taken behind defensive earthworks or berms. By 1991, these had merged into a single structure – The Berm – which stretches 2700km (about 1700 miles) across the territory, effectively partitioning it into a Moroccan controlled zone to the west and north, and a Polisario controlled zone to the east and south (Figure 1). A detailed analysis of the Berm and its evolution is provided by Garfi (2014).

    Figure 1. Western Sahara under the ceasefire, showing partition by the Moroccan Berm, key locations, and deployment of MINURSO peacekeepers. Map from MINURSO/UN Peacekeeping.

    Under the terms of the ceasefire, Western Sahara is divided into three areas (Figure 1):

    i) a Buffer Strip extending for 5km east and south of the Berm on the Polisario side, which is effectively an exclusion zone or no-man’s land, in which no military personnel or equipment are permitted;

    ii) two Restricted Areas, extending for 30km either side of the Berm, in which military activities are prohibited; and

    iii) two Areas with Limited Restrictions, which include all the remaining territory of Western Sahara, in which normal military activities can be carried out with the exception of those that represent an escalation of the military situation.

    Figure 2. Schematic showing the different areas defined under the ceasefire.

    The above information, including maps showing the different zones and the text of the ceasefire (Military Agreement #1) used to be on the MINURSO website but were removed some years ago. When asked, MINURSO and UN Peacekeeping would not explain why, leading many to conclude this was a result of Moroccan lobbying. Morocco’s narrative is that it controls all of Western Sahara except a buffer strip established by the UN for its protection, and that the Polisario has no presence in Western Sahara. The maps and military agreement clearly contradict this.

    Since 1991, Morocco has been entrenching its occupation of Western Sahara and developing its natural resources, against international conventions that prohibit occupying powers from exploiting resources in occupied territories for their own gain. These resources include phosphates, fisheries and water resources – Morocco has developed agriculture in occupied Western Sahara, including the production of water-intensive crops such as tomatoes (including the Azera brand).

    Some of these resources and the products derived from them transit through Mauritania to the south, for example, fish products from occupied Western Saharan waters that are destined for African markets via the port of Nouadhibouin Mauritania. This route involves traffic passing through the Berm south of the settlement of Guergerat (Figure 3), then traversing the buffer strip for 5km to the border with Mauritania (Figure 4).

    Figure 3. Guergerat location in the far southwest of Western Sahara.

    In late October 2020, Sahrawi protestors started blockading the road between the Guergerat Berm crossing and the Mauritanian border (Figure 4), within the Buffer Strip. They were protesting against the export of natural resources, including fish destined for the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou, from occupied Western Sahara by Morocco. They also accused Morocco of facilitating the trafficking of drugs and people via Guergerat.

    Figure 4. The road that passes through the Berm (top) south of Guergerat, traversing the 5km Buffer Strip established under the 1991 ceasefire, to the Western Sahara-Mauritania border. See Figure

    On 12th/13th November, Morocco sent troops to disperse the protestors and take control of the section of road traversing the Buffer Strip. By merely entering the Buffer Strip, Morocco breached the ceasefire. On 13th November, the Polisario declared that this breach marked the end of the ceasefire and the resumption of hostilities, and that they were now at war with Morocco. Later on the 13th, Morocco reported clashes along the Berm in the north of Western Sahara, and on the 14th it appeared that fighting was taking place in the vicinity of Mahbes and Hauza in the north of Western Sahara, and Aouserd and Guergerat in the south.

    This all comes against a background of 45 years of conflict and exile for the Sahrawi. Somewhere around 100,000 Sahrawi live under Moroccan occupation, while perhaps around 200,000 live in five refugee camps in the Algerian desert around the town of Tindouf. These camps are governed by the Polisario, and are effectively a society and state in exile. The Polisario also controls the areas to the east and south of the Berm, known to the Sahrawi as the Free Zone.

    For decades, discontent in the camps has been growing, particularly among younger Sahrawis, in response to the stalemate, the failure of the UN to organise the long-promised referendum, and an understandable perception that they have been forgotten and abandoned by the rest of world. Many see a return to war as the only way of having any hope of resolving the conflict, whether through military means or as the result of diplomacy facilitated by what they hope will be a renewed spotlight on the territory if hostilities resume. For many years, the Polisario has managed to keep this discontent contained and has avoided conflict. It seems that the latest provocation by Morocco has been too flagrant for this approach to remain viable.

    Nick Brooks has travelled extensively in Western Sahara, as co-director of the Western Sahara Project, a research project focusing on archaeology and past environmental change in the territory. Between 2002 and 2009 he led six seasons of fieldwork in the Polisario-controlled zone of Western Sahara, and travelled to the territory on seven occasions, also spending time in the Sahrawi refugee camps around Tindouf. Fieldwork involved frequent detours into Mauritania to avoid the Moroccan Berm.

    @SAHARAWIVOICE on Twitter is a good source of updates on the conflict.

  • Sahara : Madrid Agreement signature related by CIA

    Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Spain, Juan Carlos, Transition, Mauritania, Frente Polisario, Algeria,

    National Intelligence Bulletin November 15, 1975

    Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania agreed yesterday to set up a joint provisional administration to govern Spanish Sahara withdraws completely early next year.

    The Spanish information minister predicted yesterday that Spain would be out of the Sahara by the end of February. He said that details of the new agreeement would not be made public by Spain until the Spanish parliament completed the process – scheduled to start newx Tuesday- of formally decolonizing the territory.

    Preliminary comments from Spanish officials indicate they are unhappy with the pact. One spanish officials who has been involved in the negotiations told the US embassy in Madrid that it was a « bad agreement », but was made necessary by the UN’s demonstrated inability to prevent the situation from degenerating into war.

    CIA-accord-de-Madrid-1Download

    With the agreement, Madrid has abandonned ist insistence on a referendum for the area. The Spanish official said that « consultations3 will be held with local tribal leaders on the future of Spanish Sahara. Madrid is uneasy about the arrangement because it expects Algeria to be displeased. Algeria is Spain’s main supplier of natural gas, but Madrid apparently preferred to risk its energy supplies ratcher than become engaged in hostilities in the Sahara.

    The UN may not have a role now that it has been presented with an accomplished fact. At best, there may be an attempt to obtain UN approval.

    The agreeement is victory for Morocco’s King Hassan, who has long sought to annex at least part of Spanish Sahara. Hassan will be able to present the new joint authority as fulfilling a promise he made in August to liberate Spanish Sahara by the end of the year.

    As co-administrators; Rabat and Nouakchott will be able to hand-pick Sahara tribal leaders -including the head of the territory’s general assembly, who defected to Morocco- for any « consultations ». The outcome of such « consultations » would almost certainly be a decision to partition the territory; giving to Morocco the northern region; with its rich phosphate deposits; and to Mauritania the southern portion; with its iron ore.

    Algeria looks like the big loser. The Algerian Foreign Ministry yesterday issued a statement indicating that Algiers would not approve any agreement to which it had not been a party. The statement strongly reiteratd Algeria’s unequivocal support for the principle of self-determination, suggesting it attends to push for a referendum for Spanish Sahara. An official Algerain news agency warned Madrid that any action to divide the territory would be a grave mistake. The agency said such an action would jeopardize Spain’s interests; apparently a reference to Algeria’a natural gas. Although the agency did suggest that the Saharan people would fight to liberate their homeland, it did imply that Algeria would participate directly in the struggle.

    Algeria will; as a firts step, try to enlist support in the UN to reverse the agreement. Algiers will note that the proposed « consultations » are not in accord with an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which upheld the Saharan’s right to self-determination. Althoug a UN report last month stopped short of backing a referendum explicitly, earlier assembly resolutions endorsed self-determination.

    The Algerians will also move to create as many problems for Morocco as possible. The will, for example, continue to provide arms, training, and possibly some « volunteers » to the Polisario Front, a pro-independence Saharan group. With sanctuary in Algeria and suffient arms, a relatively small number of Front guerrillas could carry out sabotage and terrorist attachs directed against the new joint administration. Algiers could also renew its support of dissidents inside Morocco.

    Algeria would probably hope that a Polisario insurgeny againt Moroccan occupation would tie down a large number of troops for some time to come. The Front already claims it controls part of the territory. Front leaders want a complete independence for Spanish Sahara and have vowed to fight to achieve that aim. Press reports from Algeria say that as many as 2555 armes Polisario members aren in the territory.

    Spain

    Prince Juan Carlos is extracting maximum advantage out of his status as « temporary » head of state.

    Capitalizing on the emergeny nature ot the Sahara problem, he has acted decisively and is given much of credit for reversing the Moroccan march. His leadership imagr has been strengthened by his chairing of two National Defense Council meetings -something Franco rarely did. Juan Carlos’ handling of the Sahara issue to date has also improved his rapport with top military leaders whose support he will need in the months to come.

    Althoug Juan Carlos has not been as assertive on domestic issues, Franco’s continued presence has given the prince an excuse not to be. Eben so, the media have applauded Juan Carlos for the recent indications that the government is taking stemps to resolve the sensitive issue of regionalism.K On November 11 the cabinet adopted a decree -initiated several months ago- setting up a commission to prepare a special administrative statute for two of the Basque provinces (…) The press has also reported that a decree approved last May authorizing the teaching of regional languages in schools and their use in local government activities will also be issued soon.

    In general, however, there is a paralysis in domestci policy-making will probably continue as long as Franco lives. During the interregnum, the activities of the ultra-right -if left unchecked- will ci-omplicate Juan Carlo’s efforts to open up Spanish society after he is sworn in as king. Blas Pinar, leader of the ultra-right New Force, has been holding rallies around the country warning of the dangers posed by political parties. Pointing out that the monarchy will derive its legitimacy solely from Franco, he has called Juan Carlos to purge the government of all who have not supported Francoism.

    Right-wing extremists, such as the Guerrilas of Christ the King; who have been linked to the New Force, have recently beaten up student demonstrators and opposition lawyers, and sent threatening letteres to oppositionists and even to some of the more open-minded establishment figures.

    Security forces, meanwhile, have taken full advantage of th’ wide powers granted by last summer’s anti-terrorist decrees to step un arrests and repress all forms of dissent: Il the past few days; according to press estimates; more than 100 people have been arrested, including the editor of the presigious independe newspaper Ya who was indicted for publishing an article on the succession. Six priests have been fined because of their sermons, and the government has banned several conferences by important professors, including former minister Ruiz Gimenez.

    Juan Carlos will not be able to postpone domestic policy decisions much longer even if Franco lives. A decision is due on a successor for Rodriguez de Valcarcel; the conservative president of parliament whose six-year term expires later this month. The position is important because the incumbent automatically becomes president of the Council of the Realm, which is instrumental in the choice of new prime ministers, and the three-man Council of the Regency, which will govern from the time of Franco’s death until Juan Carlos is sworn in.

    Should Juan Carlos decide to retain Rodrgiuez de Valcarcel, the decision will be interpreted by the Spanish left as Francoism without Franco. If someone else is chosen, his political credential will be carefully examined for clues as to the direction in which Juan Carlos plans to take Spain.

    Source

    #Western_sahara #Morocco #Spain #Algeria

  • Washington team March 2012 progress report

    Washington team March 2012 progress report

    Tags : Morocco, USA, Lobbying, Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, Terrorism, Sahel,

    Introduction

    In the highly politicized atmosphere in Washington during this US presidential election year, US foreign policy receives little attention except when crises occur. In times past, US presidents could count on “flying the flag,” appealing to American patriotism as a means of building support for policies. Today, every word or action is placed under a magnifying glass to determine or infer hidden meanings that reveal the weakness of the proposed policies. Thus, very little moves in Washington regarding policy that is not related to problems and challenges that cannot be delayed.

    This challenging milieu makes the efforts of the Washington Team to move the Obama Administration to approve US funding for projects in the Western Sahara even more daunting. Yet the results to date are largely positive. Despite the negative media coverage of the Amina Filali case and Aminatou Haidar’s regular visits to New York and Washington to speak against Morocco’s human rights record, Morocco continues to find a positive reception in Congress. The Washington Team’s drive to have more than 300 meetings with Congressional offices before the summer recess is making great progress. The key message, that US foreign assistance to the camps should be given on condition that it directly improves the lives of the refugees, is being well received. The Team is also working with members and staff to define what these “conditions” should be and concrete projects that the US should fund in the South.

    There is a dilemma in the Washington Team’s activities in that Morocco is not in crisis, therefore, some policy makers would prefer to leave the Kingdom’s issues off the agenda while the Administration deals with Syria, Iran, Iraq, and crises beyond the MENA region. Ending the Western Sahara conflict, while a helpful outcome to US interests in the region, is not given a high priority by some in the government. It was therefore helpful that the remarks following the meeting between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Clinton reaffirmed the centrality of the Western Sahara conflict and the commitment to the bilateral strategic dialogue. This visit, and Secretary Clinton’s visit to Morocco, and the generally high praise that Morocco is receiving for its role on the UN Security Council, continue to make the case that Morocco is a leader in the region, and among America’s friends worldwide.

    The Communications report below indicates that positive coverage of Morocco far outweighs negative coverage associated with Amina Filali and Aminatou Haidar. Security concerns related to the region, Morocco’s leadership at the UNSC, continued concerns with the direction of the Arab uprisings, and op-eds that show how Morocco is making progress in its reforms and economic development, all contribute to the positive image of Morocco in the media.

    This report is not exhaustive nor is it fully detailed as we focus on the items that have the most impact on our strategy. Since it is difficult to distinguish some of the work of the Moroccan American Center from that of the Embassy, this report includes select activities of the Embassy, MAC, and its consultants as the “Washington Team”.

    OR:

    This report is prepared by the Moroccan American Center, including MACP, MACC and MATIC.  It is not exhaustive nor is it fully detailed as we focus on the items that have the most impact on our strategy. While we attempt to only highlight work that MAC has been involved in, in some cases we touch upon the work of others, such as the Embassy or other pro-Moroccan entities. In such related cases, we try to only report on activities where MAC has had a role as well, or where the activity is worthy of highlighting to the Rabat team since it relates to one of the Team’s main objectives.  In all cases we try as much as possible to keep this reporting to the principal work of MAC. 

    Campaigns

    MoroccoOnTheMove.com (MOTM)

    The Washington Team’s MOTM website and social media program (@MorocOnTheMove) continues to broaden the reach for our messaging, in terms of quantity and targeted audiences. After five months online, nearly 250 postings of news articles and original content by the Washington Team have appeared and the website has received more than 24,000 hits. In that same period, @MorocOnTheMove has sent nearly 900 tweets, has close to 250 followers, and has been retweeted regularly by influential personalities on Twitter. Although we have to improve these numbers even more in the months ahead, this is a strong beginning to our social media efforts.

    As part of increasing efforts to engage more regularly with our target audiences, particularly through email and social media, the Washington Team distributed an e-letter, “Reform, stability, and the Western Sahara” to our contacts database of approximately 3,000 policymakers, media, academics, think-tank and NGO leaders, Administration officials, and Congressional staffs. This e-letter highlighted and redistributed materials mentioned in the Communications report including the ICTS report, the Atlantic magazine article, the paper published by the Carnegie Endowment, the Roll Call column, Congressional Record remarks, The Hill op-ed, , the Washington Post “Right Turn” column, the POMED column, and positive press about the launch of RAMED, Morocco’s large-scale healthcare program aimed at providing care to disadvantaged citizens, as well as specific items Rabat wants us to highlight though its mediatization requests.

    Also, in March, the Washington Team began distribution of a weekly “Morocco highlight e-mail” to our contacts database, in which one or two events, publications, and/or positive press articles are featured. The purpose of this weekly highlight is to draw attention to an important messaging opportunity to the contacts about Morocco. The first “Morocco highlight e-mail” redistributed the March 27 Global Post op-ed.

    Morocco as a Leader

    During the month of March, the Washington Team continued its efforts to promote Morocco as a model of progress and reform by regularly briefing and engaging influential policy makers, think-tank leaders, and target journalists.

    Activities:

    On March 8, The Atlantic magazine, a well-respected publication on culture, current events, and politics for more than 150 years, published an article, “The coming Arab identity crisis,” by Massoud Hayoun which focuses on the questions of Arab identity that have resurfaced during the Arab Spring. The Washington Team arranged an interview for its author with Ambassador Edward Gabriel, who is quoted among other influential leaders in the Arab Diaspora. For further distribution, a blog column highlighting the article was posted on “Who’s who in the Arab world? Examining Arab identity,” on the Foreign Policy Association’s Foreign Policy Blog.

    On March 13, Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, hosted a roundtable at the Council’s offices in Washington with Ambassador Bouhlal entitled, “Morocco and the Arab Spring.” At the event, which was organized through the Washington Team’s outreach to Abrams and CFR, Ambassador Bouhlal detailed Morocco’s reform process and answered questions about the implementation of the new Constitution.

    In early March, the POMED Wire, a blog of the Project on Middle East Democracy, posted a report citing dubious torture allegations against Morocco made on the Sahara Press Service (SPS) website. The Washington Team contacted POMED’s executive director, alerted him to the questionable nature of many SPS publications, which prompted him to inform his bloggers to keep the unprofessional nature of SPS in mind before republishing or sourcing its work. Following the conversation, POMED agreed to post a piece on the POMED Wire authored by Ambassador Edward Gabriel, “Gabriel: Change, reform, and progress in Morocco,” which outlined the year of reform in Morocco and how its “Arab Spring” experience was successful and exceptional.

    On March 23, the Foreign Policy Association’s Foreign Policy Blog published a column by Moroccan-American international attorney, Leila Hanafi, “Constitutional reforms in Morocco: Outlook for youth rights.” The article examined the success of the current reform process in Morocco and what measures will be necessary to insure that success is sustained and far-reaching. Knowing that Ms. Hanafi’s articles can be somewhat dubious in content, when she asked the Washington Team for feedback we reviewed the draft at her request in order to ameliorate any adverse consequences.

    Results:

    In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight Morocco’s role as a leader for democratic reforms and peace in the region generated more than 320 positive media placements and 20 million favorable media impressions.

    The Polisario and Terrorism in the Sahara/Sahel

    During March, the Washington Team continued its efforts to call US attention to the growing threat of AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Sahara/Sahel in order to shape the debate and reinforce perceptions of the Polisario’s negative role in the region. These efforts included journalist outreach, arranging briefings by Washington Team members and third-party spokespeople, and creating fact sheets and other supporting documents for distribution to target audiences.

    Activities:

    Following the March 2 publication by The Hill of an op-ed by Ambassador Edward Gabriel, « Stop subsidizing recruiting grounds for terrorists and traffickers, » several other media outlets republished or cited the piece, including the World247.net News network and the U.K. Foreign Office/U.K. Government Online. Also, the Italian-based online newspaper, Lettera 43, published an article about terrorism in the Sahel that cited ICTS reports and maps.

    To maintain US media attention on the continued detention of the European aid workers kidnapped by members of an AQIM-related group with suspected help from members of the Polisario Front, the Washington Team authored a blog posting on the MOTM website on March 20, “Day 150 – still hostage: Rosella Urru, two others seized by AQIM sect in Polisario camp.” This posting will be a part of a regular series of updates on the kidnapping as the situation develops.

    On March 27, the Global Post published an op-ed by Jordan Paul, “Why are we perpetuating a source of instability in North Africa?” The op-ed made the case for retargeting non-humanitarian aid destined for the Polisario to stop perpetuating the refugee camps’ deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions and urged US leadership to resolve the Western Sahara conflict.

    In late March, the Washington Team compiled a paper, “Spotlight: The case for redirecting US support for the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, which are becoming a recruiting ground for AQIM, arms and drug traffickers.” The paper provides background information and a chronology of documented incidents and reports linking members of the Polisario Front with AQIM, trafficking, and other illicit activities in the region. It will be widely distributed in April to key contacts in Congress, the media, and think tanks.

    Results:

    In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight the Polisario’s involvement with rising terrorism in the region generated more than 200 favorable media placements and 21 million media impressions.

    Resolving the Western Sahara: Autonomy under Moroccan Sovereignty

    Ahead of and following the ninth round of informal talks on the Western Sahara conflict, the Washington Team conducted outreach to journalists, policymakers, and government officials to highlight the urgent need to solve the conflict for security as well as humanitarian reasons and to promote Morocco’s compromise autonomy proposal.

    Activities:

    To focus US media attention on the informal talks and Morocco’s efforts to offer genuine compromise in the negotiations, the Washington Team issued a press release on March 12, “US, France voice strong support for Morocco’s autonomy plan to resolve Western Sahara dispute, remove obstacle to peace in region.” The release, which highlighted recent public declarations of support for the autonomy plan by US Secretary of State Clinton and French Foreign Minister Juppé, was distributed to PRNewswire and targeted journalists. It was posted by more than 150 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, Forbes, Boston Globe, Dallas Morning News, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sacramento Bee, Yahoo News, AOL News, AfricaBusiness, and Afrik-News. MAP published an article, “Les 9è pourparlers sur le Sahara se tiennent avec en toile de fond un soutien consolidé de Washington au Plan d’autonomie,” that referenced the release and the ICTS report, which was republished by L’Opinion, Le Matin, and several other Moroccan news publications.

    Following regular briefings and updates by the Team, two Members of Congress also made strong, public statements of support for Morocco’s autonomy plan as a peaceful, compromise solution to the Western Sahara conflict. In an opinion piece published March 12 in Roll Call, “Changes offer positive sign for Western Sahara”, Rep. Steve Cohen of Tennessee gave the background on why the autonomy proposal was the best option for peace. In remarks for the Congressional Record, Rep. Chris Murphy of Connecticut said the people of the Western Sahara « deserve for this longstanding dispute to be resolved » and stated that Morocco’s compromise proposal is « a reasonable offer and can serve as a basis for negotiations. » Murphy acknowledged, « it is in the interest of the United States and the parties involved to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue[.] » MAP ran stories on both Members’ statements, “US Congressman highlights overwhelming bipartisan support for Morocco’s autonomy plan within two chambers of US Congress,” and “Moroccan autonomy proposal, a democratic solution that can serve as a basis for negotiations, US Cong.”

    On March 13, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a paper by Professor Anouar Boukhars, “Simmering discontent in the Western Sahara,” in which Boukhars examined a number of internal and external factors that affect resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. The paper – which cited several information sources the Washington Team helped generate – was distributed widely to key contacts and targeted journalists and incorporated into our regular information packet on the Western Sahara.

    In order to highlight the urgent need to address the humanitarian crisis in the Polisario-controlled camps in southern Algeria through implementation of durable solutions for refugees, Robert Holley authored a blog posting on the MOTM website, ”You don’t have to live like a refugee”, which is a play on words from Tom Petty song with the same title.

    Results:

    In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight to US audiences the broad support for Morocco’s autonomy plan and need for US leadership to help resolve the Western Sahara generated more than 650 favorable media placements and 57 million media impressions.

    Upcoming in April

    On April 3, the Washington Team will host a roundtable, “The Western Sahara crisis: Why US leadership is needed now,” where an expert panel will offer insights on the crisis in the Western Sahara, the growing threat of terrorism in the region, the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and how US leadership can help bring this conflict to a peaceful end. The roundtable will feature Jean AbiNader, Senior Advisor, Moroccan American Center (Moderator), Ambassador Michael Ussery, Former US Ambassador to Morocco, Dr J. Peter Pham, Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council, and Robert Holley, Senior Policy Advisor, Moroccan American Center for Policy. To encourage attendance and coverage of the roundtable, the Washington Team widely distributed a press advisory to target journalists, as well as an invitation to all major policymakers and US government officials who focus on Morocco. The advisory was picked up and posted by more than 120 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, CNBC, CNN Top News, Boston Globe, African Press Organization, Sacramento Bee, Yahoo News, AOL News, and Afrik-News.

    Congressional Activities

    The Washington Team conducted over 90 meetings with Congressional offices in March alone, which focused on our core themes: Morocco as a leader, the rising threat of terrorism in the region and the dangers of the Polisario camps, the need to target assistance to the camps, and the need to resolve the issue of the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

    These meetings serve to maintain our majority support in Congress, to ensure that the truth is known about the Polisario, to build support for targeting assistance to the camps, and to create a greater awareness of the importance of a strong US-Morocco bilateral relationship. These meetings constitute the base we build every year as we never take for granted our current supporters and always seek to secure the support of additional members. The Washington Team followed up on these meetings with a series of emails containing updates, recent news, publications so as reinforce our messaging provided at each meeting. The latter also lay the groundwork for our upcoming meetings so that members are aware of the issues to be discussed well in advance. .

    The Ambassador continued his introductory meetings to key Members of Congress. In April, he was hosted for a lunch in the Congressional Members Dining Room where he met with Rep. Steve Cohen (who wrote the Op-Ed earlier in the month), Rep. Ed Towns, Rep. Ed Markey, Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee, and Rep. David Dreier. The Ambassador also met the co-Chair of the Morocco Caucus, Rep. Michael Grimm. These introductory meetings will continue throughout the year.

    The Washington Team also produced significant statements around the latest informal round of the negotiations. Rep. Chris Murphy (D-CT) made a statement in support of Morocco on the eve of the Manhasset talks and Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN) published a very favorable Op-ed on the Monday of the talks. These statements and Op-Eds from leftist, democratic members help to reinforce the concept that the autonomy/sovereignty solution has broad based support and is the inevitable solution. The more that this message takes hold, the easier it will be to secure congressional support for establishing facts on the ground (building on the language from last year) and conditioning aid to the camps.

    The Washington Team also worked with the office of Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart to pose questions to the Administration during oversight hearings with Secretary Clinton on how they planned to implement the language authorizing US assistance to Morocco to be spent in the southern provinces. This helps to keep the issue in front of the State Department and makes them aware that Congress is intent on seeing action this year. The Washington Team is also working with the Appropriations Committee to develop language and secure support for targeting assistance to the refugee camps away from the status quo and towards durable solutions, including a census and resettlement.

    MATIC

    MATIC worked with the US Chamber of Commerce in setting up its first business delegation to Morocco March 20-22, which including major corporations such as Raytheon, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and others, as well as six companies focused on renewable energies. The Moroccan Embassy arranged for the participation of a number of senior government officials to attend events and lunches and dinners hosted by AMDI and Maroc Export. MATIC hosted a luncheon for the delegation on March 21 and worked with ADEREE, MASEN, and ONE on a panel on renewable energies. Ambassador Kaplan and members of the US Embassy attended the luncheon.

    The most important news of the month was an announcement by the China Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund) that it had chosen Morocco for its regional office for North, West, and Central Africa. MATIC has escorted three different CAD Fund delegations in Morocco and helped them survey possible office and apartment sites. MATIC was involved with them in setting up meetings for and providing logistical support, as well as coordinated with GOM officials. MATIC was the first among several Moroccan entities to make contact with the CAD Fund.

    MATIC also set up the latest in a series of meetings for MANAS Development Group http://www.manasdevelopment.org/ an international company that provides training services to agencies and companies, which resulted in their choosing Morocco as the location for the regional office serving North, West, and Central Africa.

    MACC

    Throughout the month of March, MACC staff attended a number of events on the Maghreb and the Middle East, including an Ambassadors forum hosted by the US-Arab Chamber of Commerce, a roundtable on democracy in the Arab World held at the National Press Club, and a conference on access to justice hosted by the American Bar Association.

    Ambassador Edward Gabriel

    #Morocco #USA #Lobbying #Western_Sahara #Frente_Polisario #Edward_Gabriel

    Rabat-Team-March-2012-report-English-1Download the report
  • Ambassador Ed Gabriel report on Western Sahara -Mar 22, 212-

    Ambassador Ed Gabriel report on Western Sahara -Mar 22, 212-

    Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Ambassador Edward Gabriel, Frente Polisario,

    The information contained herein is from a generally reliable source but has not be corroborated by third party sources.

    BEGIN TEXT :

    As you may have seen in the media this morning, an attempted coup is under way in Mali, following a mutiny by troops stationed in the north of the country, where a Touareg revolt has been raging since the beginning of the year.

    The following report, received shortly before the outbreak of the mutiny/coup d’Etat, may be relevant:

    A Saharawi NGO activist based in Oran, NW Algeria, states that the Algerian army has introduced new security measures in SW Algeria, as of the end of February, aimed at preventing all movement by nomadic groups between Algeria, Mauritania and northern Mali. Saharawi refugees from the Tindouf camps can no longer travel as they please beyond the perimeter of the camps. Permits issued by the Saharawi authorities, which were hitherto commonly used by camp residents for travel, in particular to Mauritania, no longer suffice for refugees who wish to travel outside the camps. Refugees who wish to go out of the camps for whatever reason now need a permit to travel on Algerian territory.

    According to an Algiers-based Saharawi journalist, the Algerian authorities have have informed the SADR/Polisario via PM Abdelkader Taleb Oumar that Algiers is willing to provide all possible assistance to facilitate family visits between the Tindouf camps and the territories administered by Morocco.

    END

    #Morocco #Western_Sahara #Edward_Gabriel #Frente_Polisario