Étiquette : Morocco

  • Sex and Lies review: testimonies from women in Morocco

    Tags : Morocco, sex, sexual turism, prostitution, women, Leïla Slimani,

    Leila Slimani bravely portrays accounts of extra-marital sex punishable by law

    What did it take for a book like Sex and Lies to get to me? First, its author had to be born. (That’s obvious, but let’s start there.) Leïla Slimani was born in Morocco. She grew up in Rabat and was raised Muslim. At 17, she moved to Paris to study political science, then worked as a journalist with Jeune Afrique. Sex and Lies is not a memoir, but Slimani’s autobiographical details are noteworthy; who she is, recording this story.

    Next, she had to become a writer. This is relevant in terms of craft, but also because it was on a tour for her book, Adèle, that Sex and Lies began to take form. Women came to her. They told her their stories. “Novels have a magical way of forging a very intimate connection between writers and their readers, of toppling the barriers of shame and mistrust,” she notes.

    Sex and Lies comprises testimonies from mostly women about their experience of sex in Morocco where extra-marital sex is punishable by law. To write this book, Slimani had to be, by some measures, brave. Not the kind of brave that jumps in front of a bullet, but something more subtle and galvanising. Provocative might be the word. Her Prix Goncourt-winning book, Lullaby, is about a nanny who kills a child. Adèle is a subversive portrait of a female sex addict. Were her work not so transgressive, Slimani’s housekeeper might not have stopped her and said: “I know what your book is about”, then struck up a conversation about prostitution, consent and the things that happen to women in her small neighbourhood in Morocco. There is power in words – especially dirty words – it seems.

    ‘Death warrant’

    The women who share their stories here are the truly brave ones, though, and Slimani reminds us “quite how difficult it is, in a country like Morocco, to step out of line”.

    An unhappily married woman who “signs [her] own death warrant” for a moment of forbidden love; a woman who tries to live a sexually free life, yet still allows a man she is seeing to believe she is a virgin; a woman who is forced to leave her children with a violent ex-husband: the stories give a wide-ranging insight into the consequences of oppression. The aim seems to be to bring to European eyes the nuance and subtleties behind a culture that might seem hard to fathom.

    Yet Irish eyes will easily recognise sentences like: “Do what you like, but do it in private” or “Everyone knows it – but no one will acknowledge or confront it”, as well as stories of women facing criminal charges for having abortions, stories of babies found abandoned, and even the almost throwaway sentence “not to mention the corpses found in public bins”. I thought of Caelainn Hogan’s recent book, Republic of Shame as I read, and I thought of reports in these pages by Rosita Boland and others. It did not feel far from home. What the book demonstrates so clearly are the ways in which women’s bodies are the battleground for colonial and cultural tensions. If Morocco’s objective is to differentiate itself from the West as Ireland once wished to differentiate itself from Britain, by imposing a brutal sort of morality, it is the women who suffer.

    Slimani’s lens

    “What I want is to render these women’s words directly, as they were spoken to me,” Slimani professes. Yet these words passed through Arabic, French and now English, as translated by Sophie Lewis, before they reached me. And they passed through Slimani’s lens. The testimonies are interlaced with her own reflections. She recounts losing her virginity as a teenager. “[E]veryone I knew could be split into two groups: those who were doing it and those who weren’t.” It almost sounds like an American high school. However, “[T]he choice, for us, cannot be compared to that made by young women in the West because in Morocco it is tantamount to a political statement […]By losing her virginity, a woman automatically tips over into criminality.”

    In many ways Slimani represents both sides: Europe, Morocco. But she also acknowledges her distance: “I left Morocco more than 15 years ago. With the years and the distance, I have surely forgotten quite how difficult it is to live without the freedoms that have become so natural to me.”

    It’s risky to jump in and pretend to understand – “both” can easily become “neither” when it comes to identity – but risk is Slimani’s middle name. She is teaching us to be intersectional feminists, which is a fancy way of saying your empathy should reach past your own self-interest to the interest of those who are different to you. And if you’re really free, then exercising that freedom is no risk at all.

    Source

    #Morocco #Sex_Tursim #Sex #Prostitution #Women

  • Dirty time

    Tags : Morocco, Moroccogate, European Parliament, Bribery, corruption, Christian Cambon,

    Dirty time for the Moroccan regime, the latter no longer makes people cry. On the contrary, day after day, more and more voices are being raised to condemn its unacceptable actions and violations. The time when the corrupt regime in Rabat could afford to trample on the law now seems to be well and truly over. To this effect, the French newspaper L’Humanité published an article on the Makhzen’s policy of influence in the heart of European institutions, particularly in the French Senate, where some senators are privileged targets of the regime. This is the case of Christian Cambon, president of the France-Morocco friendship group in the French Senate, who systematically aligns himself with Rabat’s positions, even if it means denouncing a European resolution against violations of press freedom, writes L’Humanité in an article published under the title: « Sous les ors du Sénat, les amitiés marocaines de Christian Cambon ».

    According to the same newspaper, the approach of the senator « Les Républicains » from Val-de-Marne is not very surprising if one knows the close ties that the Alawite kingdom maintains with him. Practically at the same time, it was the Italian public television station RAI3 that exposed, among other things, Rabat’s colonialist policy. This was done by broadcasting a report on the corruption affair in the European Parliament (EP), shedding light on the interference and espionage manoeuvres of the Makhzen with corrupt MEPs, as well as on the crimes of the Moroccan occupation in Western Sahara.

    The report, entitled « Europe for sale », presented through the programme « PresaDiretta », evoked the central theme of this investigation carried out by the Belgian Federal Prosecutor’s Office since last December, namely the illegal practices that Morocco has resorted to in order to circumvent and avoid any resolution that does not go in its direction, especially with regard to the occupation of Western Sahara.

    Illustrating with images of confidential documents revealed to the general public, the journalist said that a note from Morocco’s mission to the European Union (EU) leaked in 2014, alerted its foreign ministry to the possible tabling of malicious amendments by opponents before the EP’s adoption of reports on torture, human rights and the EU’s trade relations with Mediterranean countries.

    Now we know what was behind the opposition of some members of the European Commission and Council to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling on Western Sahara’s natural resources – bribes!

    #Marocgate #Maroc #Qatargate #European_Parliament #Bribery #Corruption #christian_cambon

  • Bodies for Sale: Prostitution in Morocco

    Bodies for Sale: Prostitution in Morocco

    Tags : Morocco, prostitution, sex turism, pedophilia, Marrakech,

    By Diana Sharkey

    [dropcap]I[/dropcap]n Gueliz, a trendy neighborhood in Marrakech, young people walk the streets, laughing and carrying on. Women do not grace the street without carrying the gaze of many men. A group of black women walk past a large Starbucks: the four of them are wearing skin-tight clothes, and approach an older white man who had taken a seat against the store’s windows only a few minutes prior, facing out towards the walkway. One by one they exchange two kisses on each of his cheeks, banter in French, laugh, and saunter away waving a cellphone, implying a “call me later”.

    Of many coffee shops throughout the country, this particular Starbucks is a known pick-up spot for prostitutes. It is large and centrally located in the Gueliz neighborhood, where nightlife reigns not far from gaudy tourist resorts, and where interactions such as these illustrate how sex work operates quite freely.

    A local who works at a small cafe in Jemaa el Fna, the main market square of Marrakech, confirms that prostitutes do work in the city. “Everyone knows that it goes on,” says Maxine Rich from Search for Common Ground, a nonprofit against violent extremism.

    Amendments to Morocco’s penal code in 2003 criminalized sex tourism, sexual abuse, trafficking in persons, and child pornography, but really exposed a Pandora’s box that was long open. Over a decade later in the United States’ most recent Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP), Morocco remains in the Tier 2 classification because of its failure to meet the minimum standards set forth by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Ongoing reports conducted by both the U.S. Department of State and the Moroccan government reveal that sex work, as well as sex trafficking, is still a deeply-ingrained issue in Morocco. Moroccan women, men, and children are trafficked throughout Europe and the Middle East for sexual exploitation (2014 TIP Report). Women and girls, as young as six years old, are among the most common groups trafficked to the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, Syria, and throughout the European continent (2014 TIP Report).

    Now, in 2018, Moroccan women are being sold for lump sums of cash to work as maids in Saudi households over Twitter.

    Morocco has earned a reputation for sex trafficking within the region, especially in countries like Saudi Arabia. A Deutsche Welle article published this year detailed a post-2011 influx of Moroccans, mostly entering domestic work, caused outrage among Saudi women due to fears that Moroccan women would seduce their husbands. Within the region, the Moroccan woman bears much of the burden of the hypersexualization of the Arab woman as a relatively Westernized country. Their fetishization and eroticization leads to the belief that they are sexually promiscuous. This conceptualization influences the way Moroccan and other regional societies view victims of sexual abuse, tending to shift the blame.

    This reputation is partly why Morocco is not only a source of sex work but also a destination for sex tourism. While it may not be common knowledge amongst global citizens, a notable subset of the population, including foreigners and Moroccan men, are all too aware of Morocco’s “dark secrets.” Morocco’s underground industry is quite popular with men from the Persian Gulf. Foreigners, primarily from France and Spain, also make the discreet journey to the neighboring continent lured by the availability of child sex tourism (2016 TIP Report).

    Aside from attracting beneficiaries of the trade, Morocco is also a place to engage on the other end of sex work. Unaccompanied women and children entering from Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Nigeria, and Cameroon are particularly vulnerable to trafficking networks that force women into prostitution. Suspected Cameroonian and Nigerian networks facilitate this trade by threatening victims and their families, most often those from their own country (2016 TIP). On the southern border, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are coerced into prostitution and criminal networks forcing undocumented women into prostitution operate along the eastern Algerian border in Oujda and in the northern coastal town of Nador (2016 TIP). When women recruited for work arrive in the country, they may become victims of forced labor where employers refuse to pay wages, withhold passports, and physically abuse them (2016 TIP).

    In addition to the exploitation of migrants, young Moroccan women, recruited from rural areas for domestic work in the cities, subsequently become victims of forced labor in the home, and are particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse (TIP 2016, Al Jazeera 2013). Nestled near the foot of the Atlas Mountains, along the palm-tree studded Atlantic coastline, is the beautiful Agadir, a city where exploitation is prevalent. M’hamed El Kadi, the International Rescue Committee Manager from Peace Corps Morocco, explained, “Women actually go from different parts of the country to work there, and it’s mainly seasonal. And when [the agricultural season] is over, they make other practices… just to survive…sex practices…and that’s why also it’s a tourist resort. Agadir is a tourist resort, that’s why the rates in Agadir are very high.” Elsewhere throughout the country, one can easily find prostitutes in the discos, bars, clubs, and certain large gardens in the major cities where people can engage in these illegal transactions.

    Morocco is ranked number 139 out of 145 countries in the 2015 Global Gender Gap Report. Thus, women with limited educational and economic opportunities are lured by offers of work and promises of making enough money for their families. High percentages of sex workers are divorced women, who married at a very early age, and are left marginalized. Risky behavior for the sake of the family follows suit. A 2015 study conducted by the Moroccan government discovered that some women are even forced into prostitution by members of their own families. Whether Moroccan-born or immigrant, engagement in sex work is not a choice.

    Morocco’s classification under Tier 2 means that the country has acknowledged that its current approach to eliminate trafficking is substandard and is making “significant efforts” to improve these standards. However, within the legal system, gaps allow pimps, prostitution dealers, and network masterminds to operate throughout the country. Moroccan law regarding trafficking is vague enough that not all forms of trafficking are prohibited. The general nature of the law clusters together human trafficking, human smuggling, and illegal migration, meaning anyone involved in these activities is liable. In this sense, blame could fall on trafficking victims just as easily as it would on the perpetrators who orchestrate and financially benefit from the trade.

    In addition, the Moroccan government is putting in minimal effort to investigate potential crimes under existing laws. When the government did conduct investigations, details regarding the the busts were not made public. In 2014, the Moroccan government reportedly disbanded 105 human smuggling and trafficking networks. In 2015, the government reported 34 cases involving the abduction and illegal confinement of children. However, the 2016 TIP report stated that it was unclear what the outcomes for the cases were and whether the alleged suspects or criminal groups were actually charged. Failure to follow through with these big busts continues into recent years. In 2017, 112 trafficking and migrant smuggling networks were dismantled, in addition to 29 “masterminds”, 66 smugglers, and 12 accomplices involved in 33 different trafficking-related criminal networks back in 2016. Yet the Moroccan government did not release details on the status of either of these investigations.

    Despite the significant presence of sex work in Morocco, premarital sex is illegal and stigmatized. As a consequence, women cannot carry condoms, which are seen as a sign of illegal activity during police round ups of usual hotspots. A female sex worker has trouble reconciling her own sexual health, through basic protection from STDs and pregnancy, over the fear of being arrested. The topic itself is taboo. Women forced into sex work need to lay low beneath the law. Anything they do must be done covertly. Dr. Taha Brahni, the Hepatitis C Project Manager at Association de Lutte Contre le SIDA (ALCS), said, “The problem here in Morocco [is] that the vulnerable people…cannot [speak] out. They cannot say, ‘I’m a sex worker.’ As sex workers, they would be marginalized, discriminated against, stigmatized.”

    Thankfully, organizations like ALCS provide necessary services that many sex workers are often denied. ALCS is the most prominent organization fighting AIDS in Morocco. They work with vulnerable populations, including men who have sex with men, migrants in the North, and sex workers, to combat and prevent the spread of HIV and other sexually transmissible diseases. Brahni explained, “Every day we have a special kind of people who come here. Today is Thursday, it’s the day for sex workers, female sex workers. Tomorrow is the day for men who have sex with men.” Programme PPF, run by Dr. Azza Ezzouhra, is a prevention program specifically for female sex workers.

    ALCS runs various programs in a number of key locations throughout the country, spreading awareness about HIV, educating the population, administering STD testing through mobile clinics, and providing clinical consultations by volunteer medical professionals. Medicine is even given out for free.

    Although the Ministry of Health provides the antiretrovirals for HIV treatment it does not provide the necessary supplemental services. ALCS distributes the medicines and provides free therapy. They even provide food, assist in the job-hunting process, and pay for patients’ children to attend school. Brahni explained, “The people that come here, they say that ‘When we cross that door, we feel that we are not in Morocco. We can speak freely, and we can feel comfortable.’” Where their government falls short, the Moroccan people can find support at organizations like ALCS.

    Because various forms of trafficking, smuggling, and illegal immigration are conflated together, vulnerable people–Moroccan and migrants alike–are lumped into the second-class citizen category. Rather than protecting them, laws and cultural norms criminalize them. Because Morocco does not offer government-facilitated assistance to trafficking victims, foreign embassies and civil society organizations wind up being the primary providers of protection services for victims.

    In recent years, Morocco has implemented some new legislation that could potentially help victims of trafficking. A February 2018 law, No. 103-13, specifically combats violence against women. And while the anti-trafficking law is not comprehensive according to Human Rights Watch based in New York, it is an important first step in the right direction. The next step is to fill in the gaps, round it out to make it inclusive, and provide enough detail to make it workable. The law needs to be strong enough to prosecute trafficking perpetrators and put a stop to prostitution rings of trafficked peoples. The victims of trafficking themselves need to be decriminalized in a victim-centered approach. Those working in the sex trade as informal victims of a system inherently hindering their socioeconomic status and consequently, human dignity, need to be recognized by the state. NGOs cannot be the only providers. Women need access to the economic opportunities that allows them to thrive in an increasingly modernizing country.

    In the words of Dr. Brahni, “…Sex workers, they need help, especially social help. Because many of them… become sex workers just to help their families.”

    Source

    #Morocco #Pedophilia #Sex_turism #Prostitution #Marrakech #Sex

  • Western Sahara : The Troika effects on other crises

    Tags : Western Sahara, African Union, PSC, AUC, Morocco, Algeria, UNO, SADR,

    How the latest AU decision on Western Sahara could affect other crises

    At its 31st summit in Nouakchott, Mauritania the African Union (AU) decided to limit its own peace efforts in the Western Sahara in order to support the process led by the United Nations (UN). This support will be through a troika of heads of state, together with the AU Commission (AUC) chairperson. The move is a big win for Morocco, which believes the AU-led efforts are biased. However, it could set a precedent for other AU member states that disapprove of AU interventions.

    Morocco’s return to the AU and subsequent election to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in January 2018 has brought a new dimension to the AU’s approach to the crisis in Western Sahara. In the past, the AU usually described this as a ‘decolonisation’ issue and accepted the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a member. This membership is still seen by Morocco as proof that the organisation is not impartial.

    Morocco has often objected to the way the PSC – at the level of ambassadors in Addis Ababa – continues to call for the territory’s independence.

    The AU’s decision in July 2018 to fully support the UN process in order to resolve tensions between member states could therefore be seen as a victory for Morocco. The assembly appealed to the parties in the conflict ‘to urgently resume negotiations without pre-conditions and in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN, whose Security Council is seized of the matter’.

    This decision is also in line with the outcome of the UN meeting in April 2018 that urged member states to support the UN peace process, which involves negotiations between the parties.

    Some view the 31st summit decision on Western Sahara as a compromise to prevent the deterioration of the relationship between Morocco’s allies and staunch supporters of Western Sahara such as Algeria, South Africa and other countries in Southern Africa. Keeping the discussions out of the PSC could be a way to avoid confrontation.

    However, the decision has serious implications for the PSC, owing to the precedent it sets for other member states.

    Reversal of prior AU decisions

    The latest decision to provide decisive support to the UN process is a reversal of the AU’s January 2018 decision, which called for ‘joint AU and UN facilitated talks for a free and fair referendum for the people of Western Sahara’.

    The new decision also states that the AU will engage the issue mainly at the level of the newly established troika, which is made up of the outgoing, current and incoming AU chairpersons and the AUC chairperson. The troika will provide support to the UN process and report directly to the AU Assembly and, if need be, the PSC, but only at the level of heads of state.

    The decision nullifies the ad hoc committee of heads of state on Western Sahara that was established in 1978, during the early years of the violent confrontations. The Nouakchott decision also makes no mention of the AU high representative for Western Sahara, currently the former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano.

    Precedent for other member states

    This latest Western Sahara decision is crucial for the AU and the PSC because, for the first time, the AU has taken a formal decision to limit the PSC’s involvement in a crisis in Africa. Since the re-launch of the continental body as the AU in 2002 and the operationalisation of the PSC in 2004, the PSC has seen itself as a major player in every security issue on the continent.

    In line with the PSC Protocol, conflict situations on the continent are discussed by the 15-member PSC at all levels. Most of the time it is at the level of the Addis Ababa-based permanent representatives, who meet regularly on security issues irrespective of whether the peace processes are led by other intergovernmental organisations.

    For instance, the PSC has engaged on several issues, including the situations in Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, where the UN and sub-regional actors play dominant roles. While the AU may play a minimal role in a peace process, the PSC’s discussions complement mainstream processes, thereby enabling the AU to fulfil its day-to-day conflict management role.

    While the PSC has shied away from discussing certain emerging security threats such as Cameroon and Zimbabwe owing to political pressure from member states, no formal decision was ever made in this regard. As a result, nothing prevents the PSC from putting it on the agenda of its deliberations at ambassadorial level in future.

    Impact on the PSC working methods

    The assembly’s decision to limit the PSC’s role in Western Sahara to heads of state could negatively impact the council’s working methods. PSC summits at the level of heads of state take place only once or twice a year and are usually scheduled to discuss a burning crisis situation. The past few summits since 2016 have been devoted to the situation in South Sudan.

    This means that the Western Sahara issue may not make it to the PSC summits and, even if it does, there may not be binding decisions, given that the AU is meant to support the UN process.

    The implications for other issues are evident. In future, member states that disagree with the PSC’s involvement could insist on a UN process with the support of heads of state. This not only affects the working methods of the PSC but could also undermine its relevance in addressing certain security threats on the continent.

    Limits of the AU troika

    Experience also shows that committees of heads of state often lack the political will to deal with crises. Besides, the troika of former, current and future AU chairs is a notion that is not inscribed in the AU Constitutive Act and it has no real powers outside the AU Assembly. Similar high-level committees were set up in the past to address conflicts in Libya, Burundi and South Sudan, but failed to record any major milestones in either setting the agenda for peace or effectively resolving the crises in those countries.

    Going forward, the AUC chairperson has a responsibility to include the issue of Western Sahara on the agenda of the AU Assembly and PSC summits of heads of state. This includes developing a roadmap for the AU troika to meet regularly to urge the UN to accelerate efforts to resolve one of Africa’s long-running crises.

    Source

    #Western_Sahara #Morocco #African_Union #AUC #PSC #SADR #Algeria

  • President Abdelaziz Bouteflika : « I am not Jesus »

    Tags : Morocco, Algeria, Wikileaks, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Western sahara,

    Cable in which Algeria rules out a confrontation with Morocco

    President Bouteflika assures, at a meeting in 2005, that the Sahara question will not lead to a ‘casus belli’.

    03 DIC 2010 – 22:30 CET
    ID: 38855
    Date: 2005-08-19 11:35:00
    Origin: 05ALGIERS1753
    Source: Embassy Algiers
    Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    Dunno:
    Destination: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001753

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2015
    TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PBTS, WI, AG, MO, Algeria-Morocco Relations, Polisario
    SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR DISCUSSES WESTERN SAHARA,
    ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH BOUTEFLIKA

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

    1. (C) Summary. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
    Chairman Richard Lugar, accompanied by Ambassador, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, and members of his delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika the morning of August 18. Following the meeting, Senator Lugar and his delegation departed for Tindouf to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario.

    Lugar expressed appreciation for Bouteflika’s efforts to create new momentum for resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Bouteflika recalled his commitment to President Bush in 2001 to support James Baker, noting that he had done so and accepted the Baker Plan, but when Baker quit he had left a vacuum that had not been filled. Bouteflika reiterated his assurance that Western Sahara would not be a casus belli for Algeria, but said the Polisario had the right to resume fighting « on its own territory » if it chose to do so. Bouteflika insisted that Algeria would respect the outcome of a referendum no matter what it was, but would not be a party to negotiations with Morocco on behalf of the Sahrawis. Bouteflika sharply complained about Morocco’s last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting with King Mohammed in Rabat in June by Prime Minister Ouyahia, saying he could not accept « dealing with diplomatic relations in such an irresponsible manner. »

    Referring to advice from Presidents Bush and Chirac that he bear in mind King Mohammed’s youth, Bouteflika said, « I am not Jesus Christ, and will not turn my other cheek. » Algeria was ready to discuss « objective interests » with Morocco, but only if the Moroccans were « serious. » Senator Lugar noted that President Bush had asked him to undertake this humanitarian mission, adding that the U.S. wanted Algeria and Morocco to reopen the land border and reengage at the highest level. Did Bouteflika think the Moroccans understood his position on a referendum? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara had been on the UN’s agenda since the 1970s. Algeria favored respecting international law and was defending the right of self-determination, but would not accept being a negotiating partner on the fate of the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the U.S. End summary.

    LUGAR MISSION
    ————-

    2. (U) Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard Lugar and his delegation, which included Supreme Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, visited Algeria August 17-18 as part of a Presidential Mission to oversee the release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario Front in Tindouf. Senator Lugar, Ambassador, General Jones, and members of Lugar’s delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for two and a half hours the morning of August 18 before flying to Tindouf. NEA DAS Gray, EUCOM J-5 General Gration, NSC Director Pounds, and DCM also attended the meeting, at which Bouteflika was flanked by Presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir, Chief of Defense General Gait Saleh, Council of the Nation President Bensalah, and Minister Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Messahel. Septel reports Lugar and Bouteflika’s discussion of U.S.-Algerian relations and a number of regional issues.

    A HUMANITARIAN MISSION
    ———————-

    3. (C) Senator Lugar began by conveying the greetings of President Bush, who fully supported the humanitarian mission to secure the release of the Moroccan POWs. The initiative taken by Bouteflika should create new opportunities for Algeria and Morocco and develop momentum toward resolving the Western Sahara conflict. Lugar noted the UNSYG’s appointment of a new personal envoy, van Walsum, as a positive sign of the UN’s support as well. Bouteflika warmly welcomed Senator Lugar and his delegation, adding that he was aware of the Senator’s record of reaching consensus. Bouteflika said he was aware that there were some concerns in Washington about Lugar’s planned meeting in Tindouf with Polisario leader Abdelaziz, but commented that there was no need for concern since this was a strictly humanitarian mission. The Sahrawis, he said, would talk about their concerns, but this should « not offend anyone from the land of Washington and Wilson, » the leader of a war for independence and the founding father of the idea of self-determination.

    4. (C) Bouteflika recalled his first meeting with President Bush in 2001, at which the President had asked him if he was ready to work with James Baker. Bouteflika promised the President he would work cooperatively with Baker and had done so (i.e., accepting the Baker Plan and getting the Polisario to accept it as well) until Baker had resigned. Baker’s resignation had left a vacuum in the settlement process that still had not been filled. Bouteflika praised Baker for being able to see the needs of both sides, Morocco and the Polisario’s. Baker « represented the American values we admire. »

    WESTERN SAHARA NOT A CASUS BELLI, BUT POLISARIO HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIGHT
    ————————————-

    5. (C) Recalling the Houston Agreement negotiated by Baker with Morocco and the Polisario, Bouteflika said he had still been out of politics then. But at the time, he had thought the agreement flawed because it did not set a deadline for implementation. He said that if he had been the Polisario, he would have signed the agreement but insisted on the right to take up arms after six months or one year if it were not implemented. The Polisario was now paying the price for not insisting on a time limit.

    6. (C) Bouteflika said that when he became President in 1999 he had taken a position that was not completely accepted at the time by the army and intelligence services, i.e. that the Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria. The Polisario cannot drag Algeria into war, he stressed. But if they decided to fight « on their own territory, » that would be their decision. If they did so, they would not be allowed to fight in Western Sahara and then return to Algeria as a base.

    MOROCCO MUST GO BACK TO UN
    ————————–

    7. (C) Bouteflika said he had urged Morocco to return to the UN framework. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the international community mobilized itself, but the Western Sahara was considered a « mere tribal issue » even though it had been a Spanish colony. Bouteflika criticized Spain, saying the Spanish Socialists had not been honest with the Sahrawis. From time to time, Spain approached Algeria about entering negotiations with France, Morocco and Spain to resolve the conflict.

    Algeria, however, had no claim to the Western Sahara and would not negotiate on the Sahrawis’ behalf. Bouteflika stressed that he was only advocating self-determination, a principle enshrined in the UN Charter. Morocco wanted improved relations with Algeria, but Algeria would not respond until Morocco agreed to return to the UN framework. The only thing Algeria asked of Morocco was to accept UNSC resolutions and international law. That is my sincerest hope, Bouteflika said.

    ALGERIA WILL ACCEPT RESULT OF REFERENDUM
    —————————————-

    8. (C) Bouteflika said he was ready to sign a document now committing Algeria to accept the result of a referendum, whichever way it turned out. He said he realized a referendum was a « Pandora’s box, » but Algeria would accept the outcome. Algeria would defend the right of self-determination even if it was the last UN member-state to do so.

    « I AM NOT JESUS CHRIST »
    ———————–

    9. (C) According to Bouteflika, bilateral relations with Morocco had started to gain momentum earlier this year. Prime Minister Ouyahia was ready to visit Rabat with a large delegation. There were many bilateral agreements with Morocco dating to the 1960s and they were in serious need of review. The Moroccans informed Bouteflika that King Mohammed would see Ouyahia and his delegation. Then, only an hour later, the Moroccans said that « circumstances were not favorable » for the visit, even though it had been prepared months in advance. Bouteflika underscored that he could not accept dealing with diplomatic relations « in such an irresponsible manner. » Morocco would always be Algeria’s neighbor, neither country would move and they had to get along. But it was unacceptable to handle serious issues in an « infantile manner. » Bouteflika said that in his discussions with Presidents Bush and Chirac, among other leaders, he was told that the king was young while he was a veteran diplomat. But, he said, « I am not Jesus Christ » and will not turn the other cheek.

    10. (C) Bouteflika recalled that he was born in Morocco and knew that country very well. Morocco stood to gain a great deal from reopening the land border, since north-east Morocco depended on trade with the Oran region of Algeria. Even with the border closed, Morocco makes three billion Euros a year from smuggling, he claimed. Both countries have objective interests in better relations, but if the Moroccans want to discuss normalizing relations they must be serious about how they treat Algeria.

    11. (C) Turning to the Arab Maghreb Union, Bouteflika said that if the Libyans organized a summit, he would attend in order to make it a success, not to embarrass anyone. As soon as Morocco returned to the UN framework for the Western Sahara, Algeria would engage on bilateral relations and the AMU.

    U.S TRIES TO DO THE RIGHT THING
    ——————————-

    12. (C) Senator Lugar said the United States tried to act in a manner consistent with democratic values of human rights and respect for the right of self-determination that Bouteflika had mentioned. The U.S. acted even when its own national interests were not directly engaged when it was the right thing to do. It was in this context that President Bush had asked that the Senator undertake this mission. The President respected Bouteflika’s initiative to gain the release of the prisoners and was looking for ways to improve Algerian-Moroccan relations. The U.S. believed the two countries should reopen their border and reengage at the highest level. The U.S. wanted to work with Algeria to see how we could make a difference.

    13. (C) Senator Lugar asked whether Bouteflika thought the Moroccan Government understood his position that Algeria would support the results of a referendum no matter what they were? Was the question of who would have the right to vote still a significant issue? What were the other principal issues? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara was not a new issue for the UN. Baker had done very good work, and the UNSYG had a complete list of voters in a referendum. Algeria will accept the results of a referendum, but that did not mean it would « condone Moroccan tricks. » The Western Sahara has been on the UN agenda since the 1970s, at the same time as Brunei, Suriname, and Belize, all of which were long since independent. Algeria supported respecting international law. It would not accept being a negotiating partner on the Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the United States, but Algeria would defend the right of self-determination.

    Source : Wikileaks

    #Morocco #Algeria #Western_sahara

  • Corruption: Leaking of confidential AU documents

    Tags : Western Sahara, African Union, African Commission, Moroccogate, Qatargate, Maroc, DGED, bribery, Jean-Baotiste Natana, Morocco,

    On the occasion of the widespread media coverage of the scandal known as Marocgate, which shook the European Parliament, it should be recalled that these corrupt practices have been widely practiced by Morocco in Africa and the African Union.

    Indeed, presidents, ministers, ambassadors and civil society figures have received money and gifts in order to obtain their support for Moroccan aims in Africa, in particular to prevent the African Union from intervening in the UN-led peace process in Western Sahara. For Rabat, this intervention was an initiative of the African Commission under the chairmanship of Ms. Dlamini Zuma.

    Thus, Morocco succeeded in recruiting Ms. Zuma’s chief of staff, Jean-Baptiste, a dirty cop from Burkina Faso, a country that is part of the French-led nebula known as Françafrique, of which the Kingdom of Morocco is the main stronghold.

    Thanks to its recruit, Rabat obtained confidential documents from the African Commission, including a letter sent by Ambassador Yilma Tadesse, the African Union’s representative to MINURSO, to Ms. Dlamini Zuma, regarding the publication of a Moroccan media on the former president of Mozambique, Joachim Chissano.

    Indeed, the website Duid.ma published on July 1, 2014 an article entitled « AU. A drug trafficker appointed as special envoy for Sahara-REabat totally rejects the decision of the African Union » which caused the indignation of Ambassador Yilma Tadesse, representative of the African Union to MINURSO, the UN mission operating in Western Sahara. « Writing a news story on the development is, of course, one thing but engaging in a scurrilous defamation, simply quite another. It is indeed regrettable that the paper had to stoop so low in launching such an attack on the person of one of the African freedom fighters and dedicated leaders or oru continent, » he wrote in this regard.

    #Qatargate #Maroc #Parlement_Européen #Eva_Kaili #Antonio_Panzeri #Francesco_Giorgi #Qatar #Marocleaks #Mohamed_Belahrach #Moroccogate #DGED #Yassine_Mansouri #Western_Sahara #African_Union


  • Morocco’s New Tango with the African Union

    Tags : Morocco, Western Sahara, African Union, bribes, corruption,

    Ahead of the African Union Summit which takes place from 22-31 January 2017 in Addis Ababa, Yohannes Woldemariam analyses Morocco’s campaign for readmission to the continental body.

    Why is King Mohammed VI of Morocco suddenly keen to join the African Union (AU), after his late father King Hassan II abandoned the continental Organization of African Unity the (OAU), in 1984?

    Morocco is currently courting a number of African countries relentlessly, including Madagascar, Tanzania, Rwanda, and others. Morocco has signed 19 economic agreements with Rwanda and 22 with Tanzania—two countries that traditionally backed the Western Sahara’s quest for decolonisation. Nigeria and Morocco have also signed a total of 21 bilateral agreements, a joint venture to construct a gas pipeline that will connect the two nations as well as some other African countries to Europe.

    Clearly, the economic agreements with these countries imply ulterior motives for increasing Morocco’s leverage in its campaign to return to the AU and deal a blow to Western Sahara’s aspirations for self-determination. Morocco is waging a similar campaign internationally and in the halls of the US congress by hiring expensive lobbyists and public relations firms.

    For Morocco, joining the AU is part of the tactic of trying to use the organisation for its objective of neutralising Western Sahara, from the inside, which has become a terribly divisive wedge issue within the AU.

    Outside Africa, Morocco has powerful support for its position from influential Gulf States such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which are not members of the AU, but which can still use their political influence and the power of the purse to coerce and lobby cash-strapped African countries and the United Nations. In a clear show of muscle, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and UAE walked out from a meeting of the Arab and African foreign ministers meeting, which was held in the capital of Equatorial Guinea, Malabo, in preparation for the fourth Arab-African summit, because of opposition to the presence of a delegation from the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Among African countries, Senegal strongly backs Morocco’s position, undoubtedly due to great pressure from France and Moroccan economic investments in Senegal. Morocco is also the largest investor in Ivory Coast and therefore can count on strong Ivorian support. Morocco has stronger support in Francophone Africa.

    Kenya, which once supported SADR reversed course in 2007 but now Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed, candidate to head the African Union Commission, is calling for holding, as quickly as possible, “the referendum on Western Sahara people’s self-determination.” Zambia has similarly vacillated after early support for the cause of Western Sahara. According to WikiLeaks, at least until 2009 Ethiopia’s position was to recognise the SADR, declared by the Polisario (Western Sahara’s guerrilla army) in 1976 as its representative body. It still remains to be seen, how countries will line up when it really matters.

    The case of Western Sahara bears striking resemblance to Eritrea’s struggle for independence from Ethiopia and the independence struggles of Namibia, Belize and East Timor. According to the Wikileaks report, both Belize and East Timor are listed among countries who recognise SADR.

    Africa committed itself to maintain colonial borders, drawn arbitrarily in the 19th and 20th centuries, after the collapse of European colonialism. This commitment was not made because those borders made any sense: borders were rarely congruent with ethnic geographical homelands or previous historical delineations. One can debate the pros and cons of this but Africa made the decision in Cairo in 1964, to keep these borders in order to avoid disruptive and endless conflict of trying to rearrange colonial boundaries, to fit language groups or ethnicities. For better or worse, that is what was decided with the Cairo resolution (AHG/Res. 16(I)). Nevertheless, Morocco is choosing to violate that resolution by gobbling up Western Sahara.

    But why does Morocco need the AU, the much troubled continental body? The explanation lies in Morocco’s illegal Occupation of the Western Sahara and its need to legitimise it by enlisting as many African countries as possible, to accept Western Sahara’s fate as fait accompli. Morocco has been colonising the territory since 1974. Recently, UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon characterised Morocco as an occupying force, which obviously did not sit well with Morocco.

    An impasse of a no-war, no-peace status exists since 1991, after a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. Morocco has proposed “internal autonomy” but the Saharawis insist on a United Nations supervised referendum vote, with independence on the table. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) after consideration of materials and information provided by both sides concluded there is no evidence:




    establish[ING] any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity… the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.




    In a rare show of some backbone, the OAU welcomed Western Sahara’s membership, which incensed Morocco and caused its withdrawal from the organisation in 1984—making it the only country to do so in its history. This was a strategic mistake by Morocco, which it seems to have finally realised.

    Illegal Mining of Western Sahara’s Potash Resource

    Morocco is exploiting and using Western Sahara’s potash resource to bribe and lobby countries like Ethiopia, casting doubt on the sincerity of its offer for “internal autonomy” to the territory.

    According to the financialpost.com:



    Two Canadian fertilizer firms have become the dominant buyers of phosphate rock from the disputed territory of Western Sahara after other companies stopped the practice… Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) found that Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc. and Agrium Inc. shipped a combined 916,000 tonnes of phosphate from the territory last year. That accounted for 64.5 per cent of all purchases from Western Sahara in 2015. Potash Corp. shipped 474,000 tonnes and Agrium shipped 442,000…


    The Financial Times reported that the OCP (Morocco’s state-owned phosphate company) sealed a deal to build $3.7bn fertiliser plant in Ethiopia. This is hailed as the largest investment of Morocco outside the country and as an example of South–South cooperation. The clue for this motive is to be found in “Ethiopia’s support for Morocco’s return to the African institutional family …articulated in a joint statement issued following King Mohammed VI’s … visit to Ethiopia, the first since his accession to the Throne.”

    Moroccan robbery of Western Sahara’s resources is widespread. Hillary Clinton was complicit with relaxing US foreign aid restrictions on Morocco during her tenure as Secretary of State, allowing US funds to be used in the territory of Western Sahara where OCP operates phosphate-mining operations. Collaterally, Hillary’s favour to Morocco resulted in US$12-million for the Clinton-Foundation, courtesy of King Mohammed VI.

    Morocco’s commitment to South- South Cooperation is questionable at best. Morocco is framing its charm offensive in Africa in terms of South– South cooperation. But what really is Morocco’s commitment to South-South cooperation? Like Ethiopia, Morocco’s commitment, first of all, is commitment to an extreme form of neoliberalism and to an environmental narrative that blames pastoralists and their overgrazing practices as an excuse for invading and appropriating land for commercial agriculture and other land grabs. In Morocco, stat e services such as health care and education have faced drastic reduction. The promotion of exports and the lowering of tariffs is the reality. For the majority of their populations, rampant degradation and poverty are the reality in both countries.

    A central tenet of South-South cooperation is poverty reduction, but neoliberalist market fundamentalism is incompatible with reducing inequality and protecting the environment. The beneficiaries from these policies are the elite and international capitalists; the results are a far cry from South-to-South cooperation that would alleviate poverty. Even the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP22) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was used by Morocco to insert itself in the 16 November 2016 meeting of the Africa Action Summit in Marrakesh. King Mohammed VI was the new face in the meeting, clearly pushing his campaign to get rid of SADR from the AU.

    The struggle to deal seriously with climate change should not be circumvented by the unjust political agendas of opportunistic leaders. As Hamza Hamouchene of War on Want, articulates: there cannot be authentic environmental justice in Morocco when its government ignores the political rights of the Saharawi people.

    Similarly, In 2009, in his capacity as a designated negotiator, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi betrayed the G77’s and Africa’s collective stance in Copenhagen by making a back-door deal with France retreating from the agreed upon 1.5 degrees Celsius target to 2 degrees and thereby dealing a serious blow to the bargaining capacity of the global South. As Kate Sheppard of Mother Jones magazine wrote:



    The major powers welcomed Ethiopia’s defection from the 1.5-degree target. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown…endorsed the side deal with France….Obama placed a call to Zenawi [in which he] expressed his appreciation for the leadership [of] the Prime Minister… [In negotiating] with African countries on climate change.




    The truth was that Meles used Copenhagen to further his own immediate agenda at the expense of Africa and King Mohammed VI was using COP22 to support Morocco’s agenda of denying the rights of the Saharawi people. Ethiopia is now seen as key for Morocco’s goals, as a founding member of the OAU hosting the headquarters of the AU’s Chinese-funded 200-million-dollar building in Addis Ababa, showcasing Chinese soft power. The world must not forget that Ethiopia still sits on its own violation by occupying parts of Eritrean territory in contravention of an ICJ verdict.

    Moroccan and Ethiopian version of South-to-South cooperation is simply a repackaged version of neoliberalism based on extractive activities and destroying the lives of the most vulnerable.

    The honorable thing for African Countries and the AU to do, as they recently have done in standing up to Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia, is to rebuff Morocco’s arm twisting and vigorously support the self-determination of the Saharawi people.


    Dr. Yohannes Woldemariam is a Visiting Professor of International Political Economy at Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica.

    LSE, 20/01/2017

    #Morocco #Western_Sahara #Bribes #African_Union #Bribes #Corruption

  • Bribes for Qatar: investigations in Milan into the ‘friends’ of Doha money ring

    Tags : Qatargate, Morocco, Antonio Panzeri, Eva Kaili, Franceso Giorgi, corruption, European Parliament,

    by Giuseppe Guastella
    For now, the Deputy Prosecutor Fabio De Pasquale, head of the « international affairs » pool, is moving by providing judicial assistance to colleagues in Brussels who have asked to hear witnesses

    If Panzeri’s Fight Impunity was the means through which to bribe those in the European Parliament who could ’embellish’ the image of Morocco and Qatar with his words, if through it the money ended up mainly to Italians, MPs or not, then it is in Italy that it should be sought and possibly found. The first objective of the investigation by Milan’s Deputy Prosecutor Fabio De Pasquale is precisely this. For the time being, the magistrate in charge of the « international affairs » pool is moving forward by providing judicial assistance to his colleagues in Brussels who have asked to hear witnesses, acquire bank accounts and verify whether there are people connected to Antonio Panzeri who may have received money from his NGO, which, formally committed to the defence of human rights, seems to work more to protect the interests of Rabat and Doha, according to the few, meagre official allegations that are known. And there are already the first results. And it is not excluded that the Milan Public Prosecutor’s Office could open its own file.

    Milanese investigative sources speak of ‘substantial’ funds deposited in the first current accounts under investigation. Qatar would have needed to avoid seeing its image tarnished by the debate on human rights violations on its territory, especially those of the workers who died in their hundreds in accidents during the construction of the World Cup. Excessive attention would have meant the risk of boycotts, defection of athletes or even entire national teams or, as happened, demonstrations by some footballers, such as those embryonic and immediately crushed by FIFA in the very first matches.

    The fact is that the World Cup is coming to an end and the noble themes of human rights have been drowned out by the shouts of the fans. Morocco has been pursuing the same path of improving its image for years. On two issues: the treatment of the poor immigrants who pass through its territory from the Sahel on their way to Europe; the problems with the independence groups on the border with Algeria linked to Rabat’s aims of extending its territory eastwards into the Sahara. Panzeri’s action, therefore, should have been precisely aimed at creating fertile ground among the parliamentarians he frequented during the ten years he was a member of parliament for the PD and then for Articolo 1, also through the dense network of their collaborators. Among them is Francesco Giorgi, the 35-year-old sailing instructor from Abbiategrasso whom Panzeri took with him as a collaborator in Brussels when he was a Member of Parliament, guaranteeing him the important salary that is granted by the institution to these figures. When Panzeri was not re-elected in 2019, Giorgi moved on to do the same job with Eva Kaili, who later also became his partner; they now have a 22-month-old daughter. Envied as the most beautiful couple in the European Parliament, the two are now in jail with Panzeri in the investigation where they are accused of criminal conspiracy, corruption and money laundering.

    Corruption and money laundering: these are offences that are usually committed with the passing of goods and money. In Panzeri’s house, 600,000 euro in cash were found, another 750,000 in the beautiful house in Brussels where Kaili and Giorgi lived until their arrest and which the latter, also to save his partner’s life, confessed were only his. But investigators suspect that the loot is not limited to this mountain of cash notes. The offshoots of the money, other than the one seized, could have travelled from Belgium to Italy. Not only in the possession of Panzeri and Giorgi, but also of other people (the offices of 19 collaborators of parliamentarians were seized and sealed in Brussels, many of them Italian). Finding them by following the flow of is the task of De Pasquale and the Guardia di Finanza.

    While the arrests were being carried out in Brussels, Panzeri’s wife and daughter were arrested in Calusco d’Adda (Bergamo) on 9 December. They are now under house arrest pending the hearing in which the Brescia Court of Appeal will decide tomorrow whether to hand them over to the Belgian judiciary. At the same time, their home and Giorgi’s home in Milan were searched, where another 20,000 euro in cash was found, and the office of an accountant in Opera where, however, nothing suspicious was found.

    Cronache agencia giornalistica,17 december 2022

    #Morocco #Qatargate #Bribes #Corruption #Eva_Kaili #Antonio_Panzeri

  • Qatar corruption scandal at the European Parliament

    Tags : Qatargate, Morocco, European parliament, Eva Kaili, Antonio Panzeri, Francesco Giorgi, corruption,

    The Qatar corruption scandal at the European Parliament, also known as Qatargate, is an ongoing political scandal in which politicians, political staffers, lobbyists, civil servants and their families are alleged to have been involved in corruption, money laundering and organised crime involving the state of Qatar in exchange for influence at the European Parliament. Qatar denies the allegations. Law enforcement authorities in Belgium, Italy and Greece seized €1.5 million in cash, confiscated computers and mobile phones, and charged four individuals with the alleged offences.

    Investigation, raids and arrests

    In July 2022, the Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (French: Office central pour la répression de la corruption, OCRC, Dutch: Centrale Dienst voor de Bestrijding van Corruptie, CDBC), a unit of the Belgian Federal Police, opened an investigation into an alleged criminal organisation. The investigation was led by the investigating magistrate Michel Claise.

    Acting on the investigation, on 9 December 2022, Belgian police executed 20 raids at 19 different addresses across Brussels in connection with the conspiracy and made eight arrests across Belgium and Italy. The homes and offices of the suspects were searched, including offices within the premises of the European Parliament buildings in Brussels. In line with the Belgian Constitution, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, was required to return from her home in Malta to be present for the search at the home of Eva Kaili, who has diplomatic immunity as an MEP and a Vice-President of the European Parliament.

    Following the raids at Kaili’s home, her father was later arrested as he tried to flee the Sofitel hotel at Place Jourdan in Brussels after being tipped off about the raids. Investigators found a suitcase with « several hundred thousand euros » on his person as he attempted to flee.

    Included in the raids were locations linked to Pier Antonio Panzeri, an Italian former MEP. Upon searching his home, police found a large quantity of cash in his « well stocked safe ». At the same time investigators raided the offices of the international NGO Fight Impunity, an organisation set up to promote the fight against impunity for serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity, of which Panzeri is the president.

    After the conclusion of the Brussels raids, police had arrested Eva Kaili; Antonio Panzeri; Francesco Giorgi, Kaili’s husband and an advisor of the Italian MEP Andrea Cozzolino; Alexandros Kailis, Kaili’s father and former Greek politician; Luca Visentini, general secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC); Niccolò Figa-Talamanca, Secretary-General of the NGO No Peace Without Justice; and an unnamed assistant of the Italian MEP Alessandra Moretti. Alexandros Kailis was released from custody and Visentini was conditionally released. €600,000 in cash was reportedly found at Panzeri’s home with additional cash being found at Kaili’s father’s home, his hotel room and the home shared by Kaili and Giorgi. In total, the combined amount of cash found in the raids totalled €1.5million. Following Kaili’s arrest she was detained at the Prison de Saint-Gilles until her transfer after five days to a prison in Haren, Brussels.

    In addition to the searches of properties belonging to those who were arrested, searches were also carried out at the homes of four Parliamentary assistants (Federica Garbagnati, Giuseppe Meroni, Donatella Rostagno and Davide Zoggia), among others, but these raids did not result in arrests. Garbagnati, Rostagno and Zoggia are assistants to the MEPs Alessandra Moretti, Marie Arena and Pietro Bartolo, while Meroni works as assistant to Lara Comi. Other raids took place at the homes of two undisclosed advisors and one European Parliament official.

    As the raids were being carried out in Brussels, the Italian State Police executed two European Arrest Warrants across Italy. Maria Colleoni, Panzeri’s wife, was arrested at their family home in Calusco d’Adda, close to Bergamo, Italy, and his daughter, Silvia Panzeri, was arrested later that evening in Milan. Both women were transferred to a Bergamo prison for detention. Shortly thereafter, Italian authorities carried out a raid at the Italian home of Giorgi where an additional €20,000 in cash was confiscated. As of 14 December, the two women had been released under house arrest to a property in Lombardy.

    The European Arrest Warrant revealed that the charges against Panzeri also relate to similar charges involving gift received from the state of Morocco.

    The day following the raids, on 10 December, a further search was carried out at the home of the vice chair of the European Parliament’s delegation for relations with the Arab Peninsula, the Belgian MEP Marc Tarabella; Tarabella was not arrested.

    On 12 December 2022, it was announced that the Greek Anti-Money Laundering Authority had frozen all of Kaili’s assets and those of close family members. This includes all of Kaili’s bank accounts, safes, companies and any other financial assets. Of particular interest to the authorities, according to the head of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority, is a newly established estate agency in Kolonaki, an upmarket neighbourhood of Athens.

    As the European Parliament convened for the first time following the scandal, on 13 December 2022 at its seat in Strasbourg in France, the offices of Pietro Bartolo MEP and the Parliamentary official Mychelle Rieu were both sealed by investigators.

    On 15 December the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) requested the European Parliament to lift its diplomatic immunity from Kaili and her fellow Greek MEP Maria Spyraki; the EPPO stated that the request was based on an investigative report received from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) regarding « suspicion of fraud detrimental to the EU budget, in relation to the management of the parliamentary allowance », specifically regarding money paid to parliamentary assistants.

    Trial and prosecution

    The four charged suspects, Kaili, Panzeri, Giorgi and Figà-Talamanca, were scheduled to appear at the Palais de Justice, Brussels, the country’s primary law courts, on 14 December for arraignment proceedings. Three of the four suspects appeared in court, but strike action by prison staff prevented Kaili’s appearance; her appearance was rescheduled for 22 December 2022. Panzeri and Giorgi were both remanded into custody pending further investigation. Figà-Talamanca was released from custody pending further investigation on the condition that he wear an electronic monitoring ankle bracelet.

    On 15 December 2022, Giorgi confessed to having been bribed by Qatari officials to influence the European Parliament’s decisions.

    Reaction

    Immediately following the arrests, strong reactions of condemnation of Vice-President Kaili came from around the European Union. After the story was first reported by Belgian media, the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, stated that the European Parliament had been complying with an ongoing investigation, without specifying its nature. Immediately following the arrests, both PASOK, Kaili’s political party in Greece, and the Socialists and Democrats Group inside the European Parliament announced Kaili’s suspension from their respective parties. Two days following the arrests, Metsola suspended Kaili’s responsibilities and powers as a Vice-President of the European Parliament. In a vote of the full chamber, Kaili was officially removed as vice president by a supermajority.

    At the opening of the first meeting of the European Parliament following the raids, on 12 December President Metsola announced that all work with Qatar would be suspended. At the same meeting the Greens–European Free Alliance and Renew Europe both called for an inquiry committee to be set up by the European Parliament. The suspension of Parliamentary business at this time is significant as it comes just three days before the Parliament was due to vote on introducing a visa-free travel agreement with Qatar and other countries. This resulted in the vote on visa-free travel to Ecuador, Kuwait, and Oman also being cancelled. In addition, a major and controversial air transit agreement that would have allowed Qatar Airways unlimited access to the EU market was put on hold after warning that Qatar may have interfered in Parliament’s internal deliberations on the agreement. During the negotiations there was criticism by EU member states that the agreement, negotiated by the Parliament’s transport committee, was unduly favourable to Qatar. Later the full chamber voted to suspend all work on files involving Qatar in a 541–2 vote, with three abstentions.

    Ahead of the opening of the plenary discussion several MEPs in the Socialists and Democrats Group stepped down from positions within the Parliament. Marc Tarabella suspended himself from the S&D group entirely, Marie Arena stood down as the Chair of the Parliament’s human rights committee, Pietro Bartolo suspended his position as group spokesman on visa liberalisation and Andrea Cozzolino suspended his role as group spokesman on urgencies. Tarabella was later suspended by his national party, the Walloon Socialist Party.

    The chair of the Parliamentary EU–Qatar Friendship Group, José Ramón Bauzá MEP, announced the suspension of the group following the revelation. In a statement Bauzá said that he was doing so « in view of the very serious events of the last few days, and until we get to the bottom of the matter ».

    The European People’s Party (EPP), the largest political group inside the Parliament, took the decision to suspend all foreign policy work relating to all matters external to the European Union until the integrity of the procedure could be ensured. The EPP encouraged other parties to follow suit.

    Dino Giarrusso MEP reported that he and others had been approached by Qatari officials many times: « They were hoping to improve the country’s reputation especially in the run-up to the FIFA World Cup ». The behaviour of some MEPs regarding Qatar had already been the subject of criticism even before the scandal began: a resolution by Manon Aubry condemning the exploitation of migrant workers in Qatar had stalled in the Parliament for more than one year before passing, due to opposition from the S&D and EPP group.

    After the scandal broke out, several media organisations noted that Kaili had visited Qatar one month before the scandal, meeting with the Qatari Minister of Labour Ali bin Samikh Al Marri; upon her return to Brussels, she had praised Qatar as a « frontrunner in labour rights » in a speech in front of the European Parliament.

    Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, accused Qatar of seeking to buy influence in the European Parliament chamber and that it was of the « utmost concern ». Von der Leyen called for a body to be created to uphold the rules on integrity and ethics across all EU institutions. The former President of the European Parliament and current European Commissioner responsible for Foreign Affairs and Security, Josep Borrell, was quoted as saying « the news is very worrisome, very, very worrisome. We are facing some events, some facts that certainly worry me. [We] have to act according to not only to the facts but to the … evidence. I am sure you understand that these are very grave accusations. » The European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, was, however critical of the response of Von der Leyen and fellow politicians and institutions, highlighting the lack of progress shown by von der Leyen following her pledge that transparency would be a core part of her mandate when she became European Commission President. O’Reilly called for a body to be created with real investigatory and sanctions powers.

    The Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo was also critical of the European institutions in his response, stating that « Belgian justice is doing what, at first sight, the European Parliament hasn’t done. The European Parliament has a lot of means to regulate itself. It turns out that this is largely a system of auto-control based on voluntary efforts, which has clearly not been sufficient. »

    Belgian justice is doing what, at first sight, the European Parliament hasn’t done. […] the European Parliament has a lot of means to regulate itself. It turns out that this is largely a system of auto-control based on voluntary efforts, which has clearly not been sufficient.

    —Alexander De Croo, Prime Minister of Belgium, 13 December 2022
    Annalena Baerbock, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, highlighted that the scandal is leading to concerns from citizens and affects the credibility and legitimacy of the institutions of the European Union.

    Reactions also came from European civil society organisations. Transparency International described the incident as « the most egregious case » of alleged corruption the European Parliament has ever seen. The founder of the Good Lobby commented that « [w]hatever its final outcome, [the] Qatar ‘corruption’ scandal has unveiled an inconvenient, and for most Europeans already obvious, truth. Money does buy influence in the EU », and that « [t]he EU Parliament and most of its members have historically resisted stricter integrity rules and [an] effective enforcement system. »

    As news broke of the investigation, the honorary board of the implicated NGO, Fight Impunity, resigned en masse. The board members included high-profile European policymakers including Federica Mogherini (a former EU High Representative in the Juncker Commission), Bernard Cazeneuve (formerly Prime Minister of France), Dimitris Avramopoulos (a former EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship in the Juncker Commission), Cecilia Wikström (a former Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Petitions) and Emma Bonino (a former EU Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection in the Santer Commission). The honorary board has no executive or managerial role, so there is no suspicion or accusations against any member of the board.

    The Qatari Mission to the European Union said in a statement, « The State of Qatar categorically rejects any attempts to associate it with accusations of misconduct. Any association of the Qatari government with the reported claims is baseless and gravely misinformed. The State of Qatar works through institution-to-institution engagement and operates in full compliance with international laws and regulations. »

    Kaili has also denied any wrongdoing in the incident. Her lawyers appeared on Greek TV stating, « Her position is that she is innocent, she has nothing to do with bribery from Qatar ».

    Following Visentini’s conditional release on Sunday 11 December 2022, in a statement issued through the ITUC, he replied to the allegations by saying:

    I am pleased that the questioning has concluded and I was able to fully answer all the questions. Should any further allegations be made, I look forward to the opportunity to refute them, as I am innocent of any wrongdoing. Any form of corruption is completely unacceptable and I am absolutely committed to the fight against corruption. I also wish to reconfirm the position that I have taken publicly that further pressure must be put on Qatar for workers and other human rights. The situation today is still not satisfactory, as I stated to the media at the end of my visit to Qatar.

    On 15 December the European People’s Party (EPP) reacted by declaring « We need to discuss hypocrisy […] This is an S&D scandal ». In an attempt to focus the scandal on the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats Group (S&D), rather than the European Parliament as a whole, they continued, « There has been a consistent effort to turn #Qatargate into an institutional issue alone. But this scandal is not an orphan. […] It has an address. And that’s the S&D Group.” However, one of the assistants whose flats were searched (Giuseppe Meroni) works for the EPP member Lara Comi, and the EPP member Maria Spyraki was later also put under investigation by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).

    Source : Wikipedia, 17/12/2022

    #Qatargate #Morocco #Antonio_Panzeri #Eva_Kaili #Francesco_Giorgi #European_parliament

  • A return to war in Western Sahara

    A return to war in Western Sahara

    Tags : Morocco, Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, UNO, MINURSO,

    Nick Brooks

    You may or may not have heard that the ceasefire that has held for nearly 30 years in Western Sahara broke down yesterday, and the territory is now at war again. There is nothing on the BBC news website about it at the tike of writing, although it did get a brief mention on the World Service and there is this article from the New York Times.

    Both sides in the conflict – Morocco and the Polisario – have their versions of what’s happened, and Morocco is likely to have the loudest voice. So here’s my take.

    Morocco invaded Western Sahara in 1975, when Spain pulled out. The Polisario, formed a few years earlier to fight for independence from Spain, opposed Morocco’s occupation. A war was fought until 1991, when the UN brokered a ceasefire and installed a peacekeeping force – the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known by its French acronym, MINURSO. As the name indicates, this force was mandated to organise a referendum on self-determination. This has never happened, and MINURSO remains the only peacekeeping force without a human rights monitoring mandate. Western Sahara remains a non self-governing territory as defined by the UN Committee on Decolonisation. In other words, the decolonisation process has not yet been competed. Western Sahara is often referred to as the Last Colony in Africa.

    Throughout the 1975-1991 conflict, Morocco secured territory it had taken behind defensive earthworks or berms. By 1991, these had merged into a single structure – The Berm – which stretches 2700km (about 1700 miles) across the territory, effectively partitioning it into a Moroccan controlled zone to the west and north, and a Polisario controlled zone to the east and south (Figure 1). A detailed analysis of the Berm and its evolution is provided by Garfi (2014).

    Figure 1. Western Sahara under the ceasefire, showing partition by the Moroccan Berm, key locations, and deployment of MINURSO peacekeepers. Map from MINURSO/UN Peacekeeping.

    Under the terms of the ceasefire, Western Sahara is divided into three areas (Figure 1):

    i) a Buffer Strip extending for 5km east and south of the Berm on the Polisario side, which is effectively an exclusion zone or no-man’s land, in which no military personnel or equipment are permitted;

    ii) two Restricted Areas, extending for 30km either side of the Berm, in which military activities are prohibited; and

    iii) two Areas with Limited Restrictions, which include all the remaining territory of Western Sahara, in which normal military activities can be carried out with the exception of those that represent an escalation of the military situation.

    Figure 2. Schematic showing the different areas defined under the ceasefire.

    The above information, including maps showing the different zones and the text of the ceasefire (Military Agreement #1) used to be on the MINURSO website but were removed some years ago. When asked, MINURSO and UN Peacekeeping would not explain why, leading many to conclude this was a result of Moroccan lobbying. Morocco’s narrative is that it controls all of Western Sahara except a buffer strip established by the UN for its protection, and that the Polisario has no presence in Western Sahara. The maps and military agreement clearly contradict this.

    Since 1991, Morocco has been entrenching its occupation of Western Sahara and developing its natural resources, against international conventions that prohibit occupying powers from exploiting resources in occupied territories for their own gain. These resources include phosphates, fisheries and water resources – Morocco has developed agriculture in occupied Western Sahara, including the production of water-intensive crops such as tomatoes (including the Azera brand).

    Some of these resources and the products derived from them transit through Mauritania to the south, for example, fish products from occupied Western Saharan waters that are destined for African markets via the port of Nouadhibouin Mauritania. This route involves traffic passing through the Berm south of the settlement of Guergerat (Figure 3), then traversing the buffer strip for 5km to the border with Mauritania (Figure 4).

    Figure 3. Guergerat location in the far southwest of Western Sahara.

    In late October 2020, Sahrawi protestors started blockading the road between the Guergerat Berm crossing and the Mauritanian border (Figure 4), within the Buffer Strip. They were protesting against the export of natural resources, including fish destined for the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou, from occupied Western Sahara by Morocco. They also accused Morocco of facilitating the trafficking of drugs and people via Guergerat.

    Figure 4. The road that passes through the Berm (top) south of Guergerat, traversing the 5km Buffer Strip established under the 1991 ceasefire, to the Western Sahara-Mauritania border. See Figure

    On 12th/13th November, Morocco sent troops to disperse the protestors and take control of the section of road traversing the Buffer Strip. By merely entering the Buffer Strip, Morocco breached the ceasefire. On 13th November, the Polisario declared that this breach marked the end of the ceasefire and the resumption of hostilities, and that they were now at war with Morocco. Later on the 13th, Morocco reported clashes along the Berm in the north of Western Sahara, and on the 14th it appeared that fighting was taking place in the vicinity of Mahbes and Hauza in the north of Western Sahara, and Aouserd and Guergerat in the south.

    This all comes against a background of 45 years of conflict and exile for the Sahrawi. Somewhere around 100,000 Sahrawi live under Moroccan occupation, while perhaps around 200,000 live in five refugee camps in the Algerian desert around the town of Tindouf. These camps are governed by the Polisario, and are effectively a society and state in exile. The Polisario also controls the areas to the east and south of the Berm, known to the Sahrawi as the Free Zone.

    For decades, discontent in the camps has been growing, particularly among younger Sahrawis, in response to the stalemate, the failure of the UN to organise the long-promised referendum, and an understandable perception that they have been forgotten and abandoned by the rest of world. Many see a return to war as the only way of having any hope of resolving the conflict, whether through military means or as the result of diplomacy facilitated by what they hope will be a renewed spotlight on the territory if hostilities resume. For many years, the Polisario has managed to keep this discontent contained and has avoided conflict. It seems that the latest provocation by Morocco has been too flagrant for this approach to remain viable.

    Nick Brooks has travelled extensively in Western Sahara, as co-director of the Western Sahara Project, a research project focusing on archaeology and past environmental change in the territory. Between 2002 and 2009 he led six seasons of fieldwork in the Polisario-controlled zone of Western Sahara, and travelled to the territory on seven occasions, also spending time in the Sahrawi refugee camps around Tindouf. Fieldwork involved frequent detours into Mauritania to avoid the Moroccan Berm.

    @SAHARAWIVOICE on Twitter is a good source of updates on the conflict.