Étiquette : Morocco

  • Morocco’s Advanced Status with the European Union: a recognition of Morocco’s reform process and a geopolitical and strategic necessity for the EU

    Morocco’s Advanced Status with the European Union: a recognition of Morocco’s reform process and a geopolitical and strategic necessity for the EU

    Tags : Morocco, European Union, advanced Status,

    By Dr Saad Dine EL OTMANI
    Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the kingdom of Morocco

    As the European Union prepares to welcome in the upcoming weeks, its 28th member, and thus continuing its enlargement eastwards in what seems to be reaching its maximum capacity in the East, for obvious geopolitical reasons coupled with a stalled Union for the Mediterranean process, it is important to reflect on the future of the European Neighborhood Policy and the nature of the relationship that will bind the EU to its southern Mediterranean neighbors in particular the Kingdom of Morocco.

    There is no doubt that interesting developments have taken place in recent years in the context of the Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean process and the signing of the Morocco-EU advanced status agreement, however the Arab spring that glided through North Africa combined with a deadlock in the Middle East Peace Process has stalled this encouraging momentum. Today the EU partnership with its neighbors in the south Mediterranean can be viewed as a cup half full for some or a cup half empty for others.

    In light of new disturbing challenges that have emerged in the Sahel region, particularly following the thwarted attempt of terrorist and extremist groups to take full control over Mali, it is now more than ever an urgent need for a renewed partnership between the EU and its southern neighbors.

    Over the years, it is undeniable that Morocco has proven time and again that it is a pioneer, both as an Arab and an African country, in leading the way towards a more strengthened partnership with the EU and a renewed euro-Mediterranean order.

    While history, geopolitics and trade may have contributed to this end, it is undeniable that the vision set out by the late King Hassan II and His Majesty King Mohammed VI towards a reinforced EU-Morocco partnership as well as shared values and aspirations, have been important driving factors behind one of the closest partnership that the EU has ever developed with a country on the southern shores of the Mediterranean sea.

    The Morocco-EU Advanced Status Agreement: A clear recognition of decades of reforms by Morocco. Indeed the Morocco-EU partnership has grown steadily over the years. It namely witnessed an important leap forward with the signing, on 13th October 2008, of the Moroccco-EU advanced Status agreement that propelled the half a century old ties into a new level allowing for a strengthening of the existing multidimensional partnership at the political, economic and human levels. Through this agreement, Morocco and the EU agreed to give new impetus to their bilateral cooperation based upon shared values of democracy, rule of law, good governance, respect of human rights, a reinforced political dialogue, a common economic zone namely through the recent launch of negotiations over a new FTA, the gradual participation of Morocco in community activities and programmes as well as a common space for knowledge and cultural, university exchanges and scientific research.

    Perhaps one of the most important aspects of this agreement is that it serves as recognition by the EU of the deep and multidimensional reforms that Morocco has undertaken at the political, economic, social, cultural and human rights levels on its path for greater openness and in its transition to greater democracy over the past two decades but also reflects the trust placed by the EU in Morocco to pursuing these efforts further. This agreement also entails that the Kingdom will continue upon the path of reforms that it has initiated while the EU will continue to support such efforts.

    The advanced status agreement, the first in its kind to be signed with a country in the region, continues to represents an important step forward in the context of future prospects of cooperation within a revamped European Neighbourhood Policy. Morocco’s request for an advanced status was not aimed at standing out from the rest of the crowd but rather motivated by its belief in the need of a strengthened north-south euro-Mediterranean space. It is encouraging to see that Morocco’s approach has inspired other countries in the region such as Tunisia or Jordan to follow this same path and to review its partnership with the EU.

    Morocco: a credible partner for the EU in an unstable southern Mediterranean zone. It can easily be argued that history, geography and a clear vision for a democratized Moroccan society are not enough, in an interest led world, to explain the nature of existing Euro-Moroccan relations.

    Given the growing political changes that have shaken North Africa and the confirmed security threats that have emerged in the Sahel region, Morocco’s stability, its Arab, African and Mediterranean identities combined with its shared values of openness and democracy have been valuable asset for the European Union in the framework of the existing political dialogue. Furthermore, Morocco’s active involvement in finding solutions to conflicts affecting the African continent or the Arab world as well as its readiness to foster greater regional security cooperation have made Morocco a strategic interlocutor for the EU.

    At the economic level, Morocco remains an important economic partner of the EU (Need to find statistics). As of march 1st, negotiations have begun between the EU and Morocco towards the signing of a Free Trade Agreement that will replace the existing association agreement. However, Morocco’s wide array of Free Trade Agreements already signed or are being negotiated with countries in North America (USA and Canada), the arab-mediterranean zone (Agadir agreement) and West Africa (UEMOA) represents an opportunity for the EU in a time marked by economic and financial difficulties.

    Furthermore, Morocco’s vision for gradual convergence, technical twinning aimed to align its norms, standards and regulations to those of the EU are also an asset allowing for easier movement of goods and services. While more needs to be done, Morocco is determined to pursue this objective with the sole objective to align in the near future all its norms to those of the EU.

    The way forward:

    As the EU’s enlargement seems to be reaching its limits in the East, the southern shore of the Mediterranean represents a new frontier for enhanced and deepened partnerships. Analysis and reflexions on this issue should become a priority on both ends of the Mediterranean Sea to create a common strategic zone able to compete against other forums such as NAFTA or ASEAN.

    Morocco’s partnership with the EU can be used as a model for others to follow.

    Five years after the signing of the advanced status agreement, and as a new Comprehensive and deepened Free Trade Agreement is to be discussed next month (April 2013), it is important to envisage the future as well a new perspectives of the Morocco-EU relations through the establishment of a “privileged partnership” building upon the half a decade old ties and recent advancements.

    If the Kingdom of Morocco is consciously required to continue on the path of political and socioeconomic reforms, the EU, for its part, is required to adopt a more open and balanced concept of partnership namely based on solidarity and security. The way forward will also require the EU-south Mediterranean partnership to be less focused on border control and security related issues but rather on enhanced cultural exchanges and development partnerships that take into account the issues of identity, cultural and “civilizationnal” diversity.

    The democratic developments witnessed in the south Mediterranean basin, the recent financial shockwaves that rocked the biggest economies of the world all coupled with the emergence of multidimensional challenges, be it security, energy or environment related, as well as growing interrogations related to the issue of identity, all point towards the clear need of a debate of the future of the EU-South Mediterranean partnership and of a geostrategic transformation of the Mediterranean space.

    The democratic transformation witnessed by Arab countries, in particular, implies the setting up of a newly conceived charter for the Mediterranean region covering, on an equal footing, the issues of regional security, democracy and common development and solidarity.

    This charter can be built upon acquired assets of the early sixties with the signing of trade conventions, the cooperation agreements of the seventies, the partnership agreements of the nineties and more recently on the neighbourhood policy of the XXIst Century.

    Such a charter could allow for the consolidation of economic integration between the two banks edified thanks to these conventions. It could also help to build synergies among the strategic priorities of all the members of the region towards the edification of euro-Mediterranean cultural body that brings together specificity and universality as well as openness and tradition.

    At the economic level, this charter will target the creation of a joint competitive economic space able to face and compete against the American and Asian trade blocs, which would allow trade agreements (in agriculture, services and maritime fishing..) to flourish through the recovery of trade exports from the south to the north. This entails a more ambitious and evolving objective surmounting the limited logic of free trade and taking into consideration that the trade surplus of the EU in the Mediterranean region is the most important at the international level.

    Culturally speaking, Morocco, which has always been at the forefront of countries concerned with the euro-Mediterranean partnership, considers that this new charter is meant to reinforce the values of openness, pluralism, diversity and respect of the specificities of each other.

    The prevalence of the populist discourse in some regions of Europe raises questions of the purpose of the European Institution and threatens the cohesion and the culture of coexistence which has always characterized the Euro-Mediterranean space.

    In this day and age, resorting to isolation or holding strongly to one’s identity without accepting the other’s goes against the existing trend of a more globalized world, increased mobility, economic competitiveness, new demographic equilibrium and technological development. All these aspects constitute an opportunity and a source of common wealth that would benefit all Euro-Mediterranean societies.

    In the same context, a balanced approach to the issue of immigration covering all its aspects would allow to redress the demographic gaps between countries of the Mediterranean. This could be achieved through the encouragement of temporary immigration between these countries and ensuring greater social and economic integration of migrants in host countries.

    This unique point in time in the history of the Euro-Mediterranean zone should be seized in order to build a newly reinvigorated Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, a partnership that is able to provide new synergies and opportunities, a safer and more secure Euro-Mediterranean zone while at the same time bringing hope and answers to the needs of the peoples of the Mediterranean.

    Morocco is ready to play its part, in this new vision of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and to continue to play a pioneering role through the conclusion of a “privileged partnership” between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union.

    #Morocco #UE #Advanced_status

  • The main arguments against Kerry’s suggestions

    The main arguments against Kerry’s suggestions

    Tags : Morocco, Western Sahara, John Kerry, MINURSO, Human rights,

    Mr. Kerry’s suggestion to expand the role of the MINURSO to include human rights monitoring in the Moroccan southern provinces and the Algerian controlled Sahrawi camps should be perceived as a hasty decision and a clear infringement of Moroccan sovereignty over its territories. This suggestion is, in diplomatic terms, “hasty and ill informed”.

    This move was strongly criticized across the Moroccan political spectrum, not least because Morocco has shown a genuine and serious commitment in dealing with this issue, over ALL the parts of its territory, by establishing a solid human rights body (CNDH) that works in closer consultation with several international human rights bodies, such as the Human Rights Council and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human rights, in order to improve its human rights records.

    Morocco’s claim is further legitimized because of the lack of impartiality in this matter, since The MINURSO has been reporting on the human rights situation on the Moroccan southern provinces without assessing properly the lack of freedom of movement in those camps, where creation of associations is forbidden (written in the constitution of the pseudo RASD) and where oppression of all kinds of dissidence is flagrant – Abdelaziz is probably the last person to get elected four times with a last election result win of 96% of the votes.

    The main flaw however in Mr Kerry’s suggestion remains in trying to request it to be done for both sides, as if both are equal in terms of state structure and state recognition. It should be clearly spelled out that Morocco is a sovereign state, and has signed to all Human Rights conventions and adheres fully to the UN human rights charter, contrary to that pseudo state that has no legitimate existence. Furthermore, Morocco has regained that territory peacefully and in the last 37 years no armed rebellion took place in that area, the reason being is that 1) citizens of those provinces acknowledge Morocco’s right to that territory, and 2) (undoubtedly) the absence of systematic oppressive means of ruling in those regions didn’t urge the Sahrawi people to resort to violence.

    The Moroccan government reiterates at every possible occasion its commitment to reach a mutually agreed and a just solution for this conflict, but it will spare no efforts in defending its sovereignty, national unity and territorial integration.

    The US should be better informed about human rights abuses in Tindouf. The United Nations envoy to the Western Sahara should have an equal courage to expose to the international community the harsh economic conditions and the imposed civil liberties restrictions faced while living in those camps.

    The UN under its High Commission for Refugees (HCR) ought to dispatch an independent party, for a census and identification process (The only “refugee” camp in the world not to have gone through this process) and to collect, investigate and report on instances of human rights abuses in the refugee Camps.


    Steps and actions to be taken by the Moroccan diplomacy, civil society and political parties

    The Moroccan public opinion needs to be sensitized about the this issue and the Moroccan diplomacy should make the international community aware that the proposition of expanding the MINURSO monitoring on human rights in the Moroccan southern provinces is futile and unnecessary.

    Civil society and the political parties have to raise a ONE million petition letter to the UN secretary General and lead a large media and social media campaign to denounce the hasty US proposition to expand the role of the MINURSO to include human rights monitoring in the Moroccan Southern provinces

    Civil society and political parties have to raise a ONE million petition letter to the UN secretary General and lead a large media and social media campaign to denounce the state and request the freedom of our Moroccan sequestered brothers and sisters in the camps of Tindouf – The camps of shame.

    A ONE million March needs to be organized in Rabat, and around the UN Headquarters in New York on the day and the hours the resolution is being discussed to give momentum to our Moroccan delegation at the UN.

    Opening of channels of communication with International media outlets between the period of the submission of the UN envoy on the 22nd of April until the passing of the resolution. A common and well prepared documentation of arguments need to be provided in the English, French, Spanish and Arabic languages to controlled speakers who will be allowed to appear on those programs.

    Request the Moroccan Diaspora to lobby and demonstrate in a peaceful manner (Americans are indeed our allies) its discontent with the American hasty decision and raise awareness on the fair and just claim of Morocco’s right to defend the total integrity of its territories, and the disastrous situation endured by the people living in those camps. The tempo should be intensified from the period of the release of the UN envoy report till the passing of the resolution.

    #Morocco #Western_Sahara #MINURSO #John_Kerry #Human_rights


  • Morocco / United States Strategic Partnership

    Morocco / United States Strategic Partnership

    Topics : Morocco, Unites States, USA, strategic partnership, cooperation,

    Political dialogue

    High-level political dialogue:

    -Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to meet once a year in Washington or in Rabat.

    Share assessment and analysis on :

    -regional issues such as African Affairs, Middle East Peace Process, Maghreb, Sahel-Saharan region

    -multilateral issues such as Peace Keeping, Terrorism, Environment and Human Rights.

    -Coordinate actions at the UN and other international forums

    Human rights dialogue:

    -Strengthening of the existing Human rights dialogue and extending it to thematic meetings on Press freedom, civil society, freedom of speech, etc.

    -Extension of the dialogue to cooperation, capacity building and exchange of best practices.

    Regional cooperation

    -Morocco/US cooperation in the MENA region:

    -Morocco provides experts and advisors on developing civil society and political cooperation (regional training center for Governments officials, NGOs, community leaders, youth, etc.)

    -Triangular aid on the advancement of the role of women

    -Establishment of a Gender institute in Morocco

    Morocco/US cooperation in the Maghreb :

    -Implementation of the US/North Africa Entrepreneurship initiative:
    Next summit to be held in Morocco in October 2011$

    Morocco could host a Regional Enterprise Fund, similar to the SEED banks set up by the US in Eastern Europe (capacity building of small and medium sized enterprises, equity capital investments, extension of financial services, etc.). One of the first actions taken could be to invigorate the Morocco-US FTA to develop enterprise activities in target countries to accelerate economic growth and job development

    -Regional scientific cooperation. Morocco to host the US Conference on Science, Technology and Innovation (Cairo initiative), to be held in June 2011.

    -Morocco/US cooperation in Africa

    -Triangular cooperation towards African countries:

    -Cooperation between the development agencies of both countries (USAID and AMCI)

    -Cooperation in the fields of agriculture, water, health and environment.

    -Dialogue on crisis management / resolution in Africa.

    Security cooperation

    -Establishment of a bilateral security committee addressing a wide range of issues, such as drug trafficking, terrorism and human trafficking (3 reports of the State Department)

    -Morocco to join the Global Counter Terrorism Forum to be officially launched in September 2011

    -Economic and trade cooperation

    -Establishment of a US/Morocco Business Council:

    -Composed of private sector representatives from both countries
    That issues recommendation for an enhanced cooperation in the field and a better implementation of the FTA

    -Strengthened cooperation on agriculture and renewable energies.

    -Scientific and Cultural cooperation

    -Establishment of “Excellence centers” in the field of public health, on the basis of the existing health centers and in cooperation with counterparts in the US

    -Joint initiatives aiming at the promotion of tolerance, religious dialogue and the fight against racism and anti-Semitism.

    -Strengthening of exchange programs for scholars, students, artists

    -Increasing the number of beneficiaries of Fullbright scholarships

    -Intensifying the learning of English language

    #Morocco #USA #Strategic_partnership

  • What the Moroccans wanted from Hillary Clinton

    What the Moroccans wanted from Hillary Clinton

    Topics : Morocco, Western Sahara, USA, Hillary Clinton,

    Background

    Hillary Clinton’s scheduled February 26 visit to Morocco will very likely be her last trip to Morocco as US Secretary of State. She has made clear that she will not remain in her current position should President Obama win re-election in November. Consequently, her visit later this month will likely represent our best opportunity to secure a commitment from her to make significant progress on several important objectives that we have hoped to achieve during her tenure at the State Department. The visit will offer a good opportunity to consolidate progress made during Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri’s meeting with Secretary Clinton in Washington in March of last year, as well as a new opportunity to take an important step forward in consolidating US support for Morocco’s initiative to resolve the issue in Western Sahara.

    Objectives for the Visit

    -Secure a public statement of support from the Secretary for Morocco’s reforms and the importance that the US attaches to working with Morocco as a partner in promoting progress in the Middle East and North Africa. In this regard, seek assurance of the Secretary to formally inaugurate the Strategic Dialogue announced one year ago.

    -Gain Clinton’s support for committing US development resources to improving the lives of those living in the Southern Provinces as authorized in the December 2011 Omnibus Appropriations Bill that gives the Obama Administration a green light to use US funds in the Sahara provinces.

    -Receive a commitment from the Secretary that the Department will respond to the Leahy language in a strong positively worded answer, in order to put this issue to rest, once and for all.

    -Encourage the Secretary to reiterate US support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative as “serious, credible and realistic” and to state publicly that events in the region make a resolution of the Western Sahara issue through a political compromise a necessity in order to promote regional cooperation and integration, as well as combat the growing influence and activities of regional terrorist and criminal elements that seek to profit from the uncertainties of Arab Spring developments in the region.

    Suggested Points on Western Sahara

    -Describe steps Morocco has taken in an effort to improve relations with Algeria and foster a better climate for regional cooperation and resolution of the Sahara. Explain Moroccan perception of the results of these efforts.

    -Give Secretary Clinton a full understanding of Morocco’s commitment to resolving this issue as quickly as possible and explain the dangers of continued stalemate, especially as AQIM and other criminal groups seek to destabilize the region.

    -Express Morocco’s appreciation for Congress’ authorization for the Obama Administration to use US development assistance funds to help improve the lives of those living in the Southern Provinces. Explain how such actions could help create a better climate for resolving the larger problem in the Sahara. Express willingness to work closely with the State Department and US development agencies to identify programs that could be implemented and suggest that a working level meeting in the near future should be arranged to address this opportunity to enhance US/Morocco efforts on this issue. This will be the one and only signal during her tenure that moves the WS issue incrementally forward. She should see it accomplished before she leaves office. This is one of the two most impactful items Clinton can do with Morocco before leaving office.

    -The other issue that would leave an indelible Clinton signature is the US-Moroccan Strategic Dialogue. She should make sure that this Dialogue is established as an on-going process, and that the first meeting is held prior to her leaving office.

    -Encourage Secretary Clinton to make a strong public statement of support for the need to resolve the Sahara problem and reiterate the need for compromise as she again expresses the US view of Morocco’s initiative as “serious, credible and realistic.” Anything less will be perceived as the State Department “walking back” previous commitments.

    -In this regard reiterate Morocco’s commitment that the refugees in the Algerian camps are welcome to come home and will be assisted in building a new life for themselves and their families.

    -Explain the consequences of the Leahy language to the bilateral relations and the perception by the Moroccan population. Specifically explain the importance of an unequivocal and strong positive response from the State Department in this regard in order to lay this issue to rest, once and for all.

    #Morocco #Western_Sahara #Hillary_Clinton

  • The 2012 Elections for the US House and Senate: What’s At Stake For Morocco?

    The 2012 Elections for the US House and Senate: What’s At Stake For Morocco?

    Topics : Morocco, United States, USA, Congress, Senate, lobbying,


    1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com

    To: His Excellency Rachad Bouhlal
    Moroccan Ambassador to the United States
    From: Toby Moffett
    Chairman, The Moffett Group
    Date: August 28, 2012

    Re: The 2012 Elections for the US House and Senate: What’s At Stake For Morocco?

    Mr. Ambassador,
    The goal of this analysis is to provide you and Moroccan officials in Rabat with various scenarios related to the upcoming United States elections and how the results might affect the U.S.-Moroccan relationship. In other words, who are the likely winners among those with jurisdiction over issues of interest to Morocco?

    As you know, this is not an exact science. We have no way of knowing who will win in certain races where the races are close and the campaign is hard-fought. As we have seen in recent days, a number of unforeseeable events and circumstances can shift the fortunes of individual candidates and even of an entire party, i.e. the selection of Rep. Paul Ryan as Governor Romney’s running mate, the damaging remarks by Rep. Todd Akin in the Missouri Senate race, and the economic data that indicates the economy is not improving.

    Please note that this analysis is based on what we are observing at the moment and the reality on the ground. Nonetheless, our assumptions are that the House of Representatives will remain under Republican control (the Republicans currently hold a 49-seat advantage (242-193). We believe a new Republican House majority in the 113th Congress will have a margin of only a handful of votes.

    With regard to the U.S. Senate, we believe that either party could control the Senate, with no more than a one or two vote margin. Currently, the Democrats currently hold a 6-seat advantage (53-47). Given the races that are considered “toss-ups,” we view a Democrat majority in the Senate as slightly more likely than a Republican one.

    COMMITTEES MOST IMPORTANT TO MOROCCO AND POSSIBLE LEADERSHIP CHANGES

    Both the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House and the Foreign Relations committee in the Senate are vitally important to Morocco, especially with regard to matters relating to the Western Sahara dispute and any un-related issues.

    At the same time, the Appropriations committees – particularly the Subcommittees on State-Foreign Operations – are extremely relevant as all foreign assistance money, both military and civilian, are approved by these committees in the House and Senate. 1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com

    Aditionally, given the increasing importance of security-related matters, especially relating to the Western Sahara but also in Mali and other parts of North Africa, the Select Committees on Intelligence in both chambers are becoming more and more important to Morocco.

    MOST LIKELY CHANGES IN COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP

    Two key committees in the House and Senate may both have new leadership when the 113th Congress convenes in January 2013. Both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could have new chairmen/women.

    In the House, the current chairwoman, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL) faces a party-imposed term limit, so there certainly will be a new chairman. Please see below for our analysis of the prospects for new leadership.

    In the Senate, with the departure of Secretary Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State following the November election, there is a distinct possibility that Senator John Kerry (MA), currently the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would become Secretary of State should President Obama be re-elected. This would automatically leave the senate chairmanship vacant.

    SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

    DEMOCRATS

    If the Democrats retain control of the Senate, and Senator Kerry is not chosen as the new Secretary of State, he would remain the leader of the committee. But if Kerry departs, there are several veteran Democrats who might become chair of the committee.

    Currently second in seniority on the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Barbara Boxer (CA) also serves as chairwoman of the Environment and Public Works Committee. It is in our view unlikely, but not impossible, that she would relinquish that position to take over Foreign Relations.

    Another possible chairman is Senator Bob Menendez (NJ). He is currently in a harder-than-expected re-election race in New Jersey, but is almost certain to retain his seat. If so, and if Senator Kerry departs for the State Department, Senator Menendez would almost surely choose the Foreign Relations chair. He is passionately supportive of Morocco. His chief focus, as a Cuban-American, is on matters impacting Cuba, but he would be very positive towards Morocco. 1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com


    Behind Menendez in seniority is Senator Ben Cardin (MD). He is another long-time supporter of Morocco and its position on the Western Sahara. He is a Jewish-American and has been positively influenced by various U.S. Jewish groups who support Morocco and appreciate its relationship with Israel and the Moroccan diaspora in Israel.

    REPUBLICANS

    The primary defeat of Richard Lugar (IN), the committee’s top Republican since 1985, has ignited speculation as to which Republican senator would assume their party’s top position on this committee.

    If Republicans win control of the Senate, the most likely new chair of the committee would be Senator Bob Corker (TN). While by no means as skilled and focused on foreign relations as the past two chairman – now-Vice President Joe Biden or Senator Kerry – Corker has increasingly shown more interest and greater knowledge of the world. We have every reason to believe the Senator Corker, as committee chairman, would be supportive of Morocco, specifically on the Moroccan framework for resolving the Western Sahara dispute.

    Corker, however, may choose to forego that chairmanship for another. It is quite possible that should the Republicans control the Senate, Corker would select the chairmanship of the Banking Committee where he occupies a senior position.

    In that case, two other Senators may inherit the Foreign Relations chair, and neither have a great deal of experience in foreign affairs. Both are relatively junior members: Senator Jim Risch (ID) and the other is Senator Marco Rubio (FL).

    With regard to the Subcommittee Near Eastern and South and Central Asian (which has jurisdiction over Morocco), if current Ranking Member Sen. Risch does not assume the chairmanship of the full committee, it is expected that he would become chair of that subcommittee. Another possible chair of the subcommittee is Senator Mike Lee (UT). From all indications, both of these Senators would be supportive of Morocco’s approach on the Sahara.

    HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    The House Foreign Affairs Committee faces significant change next year because of Republican term limits for its chairwoman and an uphill re-election battle for its ranking Democrat. There are also a slew of senior members retiring from both parties. So, regardless of who controls the chamber, the committee is poised to feature an almost entirely new lineup in its upper ranks in the 113th Congress. 1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com


    REPUBLICANS

    Despite only getting one Congress as chairwoman of the committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL) is coming up against House Republican term limits for committee leaders at the end of the 112th Congress. Republican leaders count time served as ranking member toward their three-term cap on committee chairmanships, and Ros-Lehtinen served as the senior most Republican on the panel in the 110th (2007-2008) and 111th (2009-2010) Congresses. Unless the party leadership grants her a waiver – which is a very rare occurrence – she will be forced to give up the gavel.

    There is a chance that Rep. Ros-Lehtinen could make a legitimate pitch for a term-limit waiver based on the fact that she is the only female and only Hispanic member chairing a House committee. Both GOP members who sought waivers from their party last Congress, however, were rejected and that is not expected to change in the 113th Congress.

    Rep. Chris Smith (NJ) is next in seniority and actually has more seniority in Congress than Ros-Lehtinen. He was passed over, however, for ranking member when Rep. Ros-Lehtinen took the top Republican spot in 2007. He was also stripped of the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs chairmanship at the start of the 109th Congress, after a standoff with GOP leadership over veterans’ health care funding.

    Rep. Smith has a tendency to go his own direction on the issues he is passionate about – most notably abortion and human rights – regardless of the political or diplomatic implications, which is a significant obstacle to any chairmanship aspirations. There is a chance, however, that Republican leadership would bow to his decades of experience on the committee. He is currently the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights (AGHHR).

    It is important to note that Rep. Smith has joined virtually every call for religious freedom in Morocco made by U.S. officials, particularly his congressional colleagues. He was very outspoken against the Moroccan government when it ordered Christian proselytizers to leave the country.

    A more likely possibility is that Rep. Ed Royce (CA) will leapfrog Rep. Smith and Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (CA) – seen by Republican leaders as too unpredictable – for the top position. The other senior Republicans on the committee, Rep. Dan Burton (IN), Rep. Elton Gallegly (CA) and Rep. Donald Manzullo (IL) are all retiring this year.

    Rep. Royce is currently the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, has been a quiet, but steady, voice on foreign affairs from the committee. He also 1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com

    has been a team player on party politics, kicking in more than $200,000 from his campaign account to the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) this cycle. There is a chance, however that Rep. Royce could get the chairmanship of House Committee on Financial Services next year because current chairman Rep. Spencer Bachus (AL) is also term-limited and Royce is third in line in terms of seniority.

    If Royce takes the chairmanship of the Financial Services Committee, Rep. Steve Chabot (OH) could become chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Rep. Chabot, currently the chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, served in the House from 1995 to 2008 before losing re-election, only to win back his seat in 2010.

    With regard to the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Africa, if Rep. Smith is passed over again for the chairmanship of the full committee, he will most likely retain the gavel of this subcommittee. If, however, he assumes the chair of the full committee, Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (NE) is next in line on the subcommittee. The other three Republican members of that panel Rep. Tom Marino (PA), Rep. Ann Marie Buerkle (NY) and Rep. Bob Turner (NY), are all freshman members and therefore most likely not in a position to become subcommittee chair.

    DEMOCRATS

    Ranking Member Rep. Howard Berman (CA) is currently in a tough race for reelection against fellow Democrat and Foreign Affairs Committee member Rep. Brad Sherman (CA), thanks to redistricting in California. Berman finished second to Sherman in California’s new “jungle” primary system in June. Since the two incumbents were the top two finishers, they will face off again in the general election in November. Rep. Sherman has benefited from the newly redrawn district because it encompasses far more of his old district than Rep. Berman’s. As of now, Rep. Berman is the underdog.

    If Rep. Berman somehow manages to come out on top in November, he will retain his position as top Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee. If Rep. Sherman defeats Rep. Berman (as is expected), he would also be well positioned to take over the top Democratic spot on the committee.

    The two members ahead of Rep. Sherman on the Foreign Affairs Committee are Rep. Gary Ackerman (NY) and Del. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega (American Samoa). Ackerman is retiring at the end of the 112th Congress. Del. Faleomavaega has indicated interest in the post should Berman lose his race, but there is little precedent for a non-voting member to serve as chairman of a full committee.

    If Democrats manage to win back the majority of the House the chairmanship would likely go to whichever member survives the Berman-Sherman primary. Democrats tend to stick 1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com

    more closely to seniority for committee assignments than Republicans. The next two Democrats on the committee after Rep. Sherman are Rep. Eliot Engel (NY) and Rep. Gregory Meeks (NY).

    With regard to the key Africa subcommittee(which in the House has jurisdiction over Morocco-related matters) freshman Rep. Karen Bass (CA) has held the top spot since the unfortunate passing of Rep. Donald Payne (NJ) in March. Rep. Bass is likely to retain this post, though the Democratic makeup of this Subcommittee is likely to change drastically.
    Please note that all of the Democrats mentioned here as possible chairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee have been very supportive of Morocco and, specifically, of the Moroccan framework for resolving the Sahara dispute.

    SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

    DEMOCRATS

    If the Democrats retain control of the Senate in November, Senator Daniel Inouye (HI) is likely to remain as Chairman of the Committee, despite his advanced age (he is currently the second-oldest Senator at 87 years of age).

    The general Democratic makeup over the Committee is likely to remain largely the same: only three of the Committee’s sixteen Democrats are in close races for re-election. Senator Ben Nelson (NE) is retiring, Senator Sherrod Brown (OH) is in a very close race in one of the country’s most hotly contested states, and though he is favored to win at this point, this race could easily change, and Brown could lose. Finally, Senator Jon Tester (MT) is in one of the closest Senate races this fall, and his race will almost certainly be a tossup until Election Day.

    The makeup of the Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations is likely to remain largely intact. Senator Pat Leahy (VT) is likely to remain Chairman of the Subcommittee if the Democrats retain control of the Senate, and only Senator Brown is among the subcommittee members who may lose re-election.

    Please recall that Senator Leahy has not been among Morocco’s staunchest allies in the past, and that this attitude is likely to continue.

    REPUBLICANS

    If Republicans win control of the Senate in November, Senator Thad Cochran (MS) will become the next chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. If the GOP falls short of the 51 seats they need, however, there will be a new top Republican on the committee, as 1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com

    Cochran would have to give up the ranking member slot due to Republican term limits for committee leaders.

    At this point, it is very unclear who would take over the top spot for the Republicans should the GOP remain in the minority. The next three Senators in line – Mitch McConnell (KY), Richard Shelby (AL) and Kay Bailey Hutchison (TX) – all have reasons as to why they would not assume to the top position on the committee. McConnell is currently the Republican Senate leader (a position he’s expected to retain), Shelby is currently the top Republican on the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee (a position he’s expected to retain), and Hutchison is retiring at the end of this Congress.

    With regard to the Subcommittee on State-Foreign Operations, Senator Lindsey Graham (SC) is expected to keep the top position for Republicans regardless of which party holds in majority after November.

    HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

    REPUBLICANS

    On the House side, the leadership picture is much clearer with regard to appropriations. Current full committee chairman Rep. Hal Rogers (KY) and subcommittee chairwoman Rep. Kay Granger (TX) will keep their leadership positions no matter what happens in November.
    They have both been strong supporters of Morocco especially on the issue of the Western Sahara and aid.

    DEMOCRATS

    The Ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, Rep. Norm Dicks (WA), has announced that he will retire at the end of this term. The identity of the new Ranking Member (or Chairman, should the Democrats win back the House) remains somewhat unclear.

    Rep. Marcy Kaptur (OH) is the second-most senior Democrat on the committee, but has clashed with Democratic leadership in the past. Some Democrats view her support of abortion rights as wavering, and this issue may play heavily in the campaign for the committee’s top spot for Democrats. Rep. Nita Lowey (NY), the former chairwoman of the State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and a strong supporter of Morocco, is expected to challenge Kaptur for the post. Rep. Jim Moran (VA) may also make an attempt to win the position. 1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com

    The makeup of the State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee will be substantially different in the next Congress, regardless of whether or not the Democrats take back control of the House. Rep. Nita Lowey (NY) is likely to win re-election. If she does not take over as ranking member of the full Committee (see above), she is likely to return as ranking member of the subcommittee. Rep. Lowey has been a consistent support of Morocco, especially on the issue of aid.

    Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr. (IL) has recently undergone treatment for health problems, the precise details of which have not been revealed. He would be next in line to take over as ranking member of the subcommittee, but there is at least a small chance that he will not return to serve a full term next year. In that case, the Ranking Member post would pass to Rep. Adam Schiff (CA).

    Finally, Rep. Rothman (NJ) was defeated in a primary election by fellow Democratic Rep. Pascrell (NJ) and will not return to Congress in 2013. Rep. Rothman has been a strong supporter of Morocco on the Subcommittee.

    If the Democrats should unexpectedly win control of the House, there will be a strong contest for the chairmanships both of the full committee and the Foreign Operations Subcommittee involving the members mentioned above.

    SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE & HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

    With regard to the leadership of the intelligence committees in both chambers, little is expected to change for the 113th Congress.

    Current Senate Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) is expected to retain the gavel should the Democrats maintain control of the Senate. Vice Chairman Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) will remain as the top Republican regardless of the outcome of the November election.

    In the House, current Chairman Mike Rogers (R-MI) will remain as chairman if the Republicans keep control of the House. Ranking Member C.A. “Dutch” Ruppersberger (D-MD) will stay on as the top Democrat. 1801 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008 p: 202. 299.9599 | www.moffettgroupdc.com

    The biggest change in the House Intelligence Committee will come on the subcommittee level. Currently, the chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, Rep. Sue Myrick (R-NC), will be retiring at the end of year. The next person to fill her spot at the top of the subcommittee, if Republicans hold the House, would be Rep. Mike Conaway (R-TX). Rep. Mike Thompson (D-CA) will most likely retain the top position for the Democrats regardless of which party holds the majority in the 113th Congress.

    Again, in the unlikely event that Democrats capture control of the House, Rep Thompson would be a favorite to win the chairmanship.

    It is important to note that each Senator and Representatives mentioned are supportive of Morocco and, the stabilizing role they play in the North Africa region. Morocco is well positioned with regard to both intelligence committees in the next Congress.

    #Morocco #USA

  • Thione Niang mission report

    Thione Niang mission report

    Tags : Morocco, United States, USA, Western Sahara, Young Democrats of America, lobbying,

    Executive Summary

    Upon my return to Tindouf I set up some meetings in DC to talk to key people to inform them about the situation in the Camps and my recommendations from a young American leader.

    Conference Call with YDA National Executive board
    The week of our return in DC Chris Anderson and I held a conference call briefing of the Trip and steps to take toward resolution with YDA (Young Democrats of America) national executive board.

    Outcome: This again continues to bring awareness to the young leaders across the country whom knew nothing about the Sahara issue prior to our involvement.

    Letters to the State Department
    Upon my return to Tindouf I send a meeting request letter to inform the US State Department and the White House about my trip in both Tindouf and Morocco and share my thoughts with them. My main concern with them will be the need for the US to act for our security. I had was with Tashea Brodgins who is helping me set up the meeting in Washington with the young Moroccans and the Young people from the Camps.

    Meeting with Congressman Payne

    Background on Conyers:

    Congressman Conyers is the chair of the Black Caucus. He wrote the letter to President Obama to pressure Morocco to investigate the recent issues in Layoone. He is an important person on this issue in DC.

    In this meeting I gave a report of our trips in Tindouf and Morocco, what we have seen on both sides and the need for the United States to act quickly.

    I also stressed the need for the Black Caucus to investigate all information it receives from all parties very carefully. Because when I arrived to the meeting there was impressions that the other side has gotten to them by their grassroots work on the recent events in Layoone. In result to that Payne’s office delivered a letter to the President to pressure Morocco to investigate the death of a young boy.

    I have informed them that in my very recent trip in Morocco last week that those photos was not real and stressed the need to take time to investigate.

    I have also indicated that it will be for the best interest our country and our reputation take a look at both sides to have a better picture of the situation like I just did which they promised to so.

    Actions-Reoprt-1Download the original file

    Issue: In this matter I have learnt that the grassroots of the other side has been very strong in DC and was successfully able to put Morocco against the defense mode.

    There is not enough pressure from Morocco on the grassroots side to do the same or at lest balance things.. In result to that the image of morocco here needs to be protected and I will just be honest.

    Outcome of this meeting:

    The Congressman, his office and many many people including my self receive so many emails every week from the other sides on every little thing that happens in Layoone or Dakhla and for that they get sensitive to the issue. I personally forwarded all of the emails I have been receiving since the Layoone from the other side.

    So I shared with the Congressman what I have heard from Morocco that those pictures the Spanish newspapers are just using them to make Morocco look bad but there more untold stories there. He asked me to share those info Algene and follow up with a meeting with her.

    Another Meeting with Algene Sajery

    Background on Algene: She is the author of the letter that the Congressman wrote and is the point person dealing with this issue at the Africa Subcommittee. As of last week she became the new staff director of the committee. She is also important because her position tends to influence the Payne’s.

    Algene and I met again few days after the initial meeting to talk about the event I am working on to bring the young Moroccans and young people from Tindouf on the table here. But most importantly follow up with her on Payne’s request. In this meeting I have stressed the need for her to go to Tindouf so she can see the difference.

    She is very sensitive about the people on the camps I believe because of the pictures they have been showing them and there is no one up until now that is telling them the opposite and I guess that is what I am doing at this point with her and the rest of the members that I have been meeting.

    Issue:

    She informed me that they were working on another letter for Congress and the White House they are working on and this time for Human Rights issues in Layoone. She also had been received a lot of emails and info from the other side. They are daily sending info where there is nothing from Morocco in return.

    Outcome of this meeting:

    I was able to convince her to take her time to look at both sides because there is obviously some propaganda here when it comes to the info she receives from the other side and I care more than anything about the credibility of our Nation. I showed her the videos that I received from Manelle and pictures, which helped to have her think about things a little different, but there is still a lot of work to be done with her and I am willing to continue to do so.

    Needs:

    To continue to work with the Congressman Payne’s office and keep putting pressure on them to let them know that it is not Ok to take blunt decisions without consequences. The way to do that is to monitor the actions and always follow up with whatever comes up. We cannot wait till things happen to respond, there should be a permanent operation going on non‐stop in DC which I will highlight on my recommendations.

    Meeting with Congressman Conyers and his stuff

    Background on Conyers: He is the founder of the Black Caucus and been serving in Congress since 1965. He is the Chairman of the US Congress Judicial Committee. He is the second longest serving member in the US Congress now.

    In our first trip to Morocco he arranged for the CIA to give us a report on the issue and set up a meeting for our delegation to be received by his friend US Ambassador Kaplan in Rabat.

    Meeting:

    In the meeting I gave him a full report of the rip to Morocco and Tindouf. I have shared with him what I have seen in Layoone, the progress, the development, my meeting with families who came back from the camps, the Cheikhs, the Human Rights Organizations who assured me that all was going well in that matter, etc… I have also shared with him the situation at the camps and how difficult it is for people there, and that our government should do something immediately. Because he is in charge of the security of our nation, CIA, FBI and Homeland security, we discussed the security aspect where I warned him of the potential threat if we don’t move fast because of the vulnerability of the youth in the camps who can be picked up by Al‐aeda if we do nothing.

    I have shared with him pictures of both sides. He asked his staff member Isaac Robinson present in the meeting to note the security part and he will call a meeting to hear from the State Department to see what has been done and we go from there. He has been informed now and he is going to take steps and I will continue to follow up with him cause I am also helping him for a Bill he dearly cares about which is the Water for the World Act that I testified in Congress last Wednesday. I also organized a conference call for him with the National Board of the young Democrats of America. So it is a huge step to work on having him on our side because he is very listened to in Washington DC. I also urged him on the propaganda from the other side in case he receives anything from them or Payne’s office.

    Outcome of this meeting

    In this meeting I gave the Congressman a full report of both of my trips. He instructed his stuff/ advisor Isaac Robinson (Vice President of the Young Democrats of America whom I brought to Morocco with me) and work with me on following up with the State Department and see what have been done and he will take the steps forward. I am willing to follow up with that as well

    Meeting with Congressman Bobby Rush’s staff (Angelle Kwemo)

    Background on Bobby Rush: He is a senior member and also the Chair of the Commerce and trade committee. He is also one of the seniors of the Black Caucus. He is very close to the President. The Congressman signed the first letter sent to the President to pressure Morocco.

    Angelle Kwemo: She is the Legal Counsel for the Congressman and advice the Congressman on this particular issue.

    Once I received the letter that went to the White House, I immediately called a meeting with Angelle Kwemo who is a good friend of mine and we both serve in the Congressional African Staff Association( this association is for all African born staffers or former staffers of US Congress) which she is the President and I am the communication Director. I was able to clarify things with Angelle, to show her the videos that I received from Manele. She was shocked to learn about it from Morocco’s point of view. Few days later she talked to the Congressman and decided the will NOT SIGNED ANOTHER letter and they from now on as I urged them to investigate all of the info that they receive from either side.

    Article

    Upon my return I have written an article sent to the Washington Post and the New York Times, which was not published as of now.

    Concerns:

    I am aware that you stressed importance of this article in your last email but I think that if this article was published Ok it will be good for Morocco for a day or two but the long‐term I will be very limited to what I can do to help bring end to this issue. Many articles have been published about the issue both in New York Times and the Post and/or support letters sometimes by members but situations still did not change if it is not worsen. Therefore I believe we have got to take a different approach. And that approach has to be the grassroots and also for me to be able to navigate around DC having in mind that the end goal is to show that the autonomy plan is the ideal to resolve this issue. I can’t reach that by jumping to conclusion openly this soon. There is a lot of work to be done and it can’t be minimized.

    Morocco is way behind when it comes to the grassroots in the US. Everyone has info from the other side but no office that I went had anything from Morocco on the

    recent events in Layoone. If I openly step forward, the other side will scream to the rest of the people in DC whom can listen to me that I am bought by Morocco so I am not credible to speak. I have to try at least to bring solutions. This is how I have to be seen. And to be honest that’s how I feel because I want to see an end to this.

    So the grassroots work I have been doing is way more important than a published letter or article because I am able to know who is thinking what and I am working on changing the perception toward the situation and specially toward Morocco.

    Note: I am not excluding the support letter but I just want it to be more timely and more effective. Write a letter to just write it will not help.

    Example: The other side agreed to let their youth come meet their counterparts from Morocco and if I do the letter now they will shut all of their doors immediately and we will not have no progress. We will start from zero again. But if I try those steps, I will be able to have the ear of my government afterward when I send a letter or go to Congress and testify which I plan to do. It will be important in Congress when I testify to show that I have taken the steps necessary and I believe after all that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is the solution. For now it is premature and will not help Morocco at all.

    Recommendations

    What is clearly missing in DC for Morocco is the grassroots aspect I repeat. The other side is way ahead of you guys on this very important issue to you. In result to that Morocco is always on a defense side, which is not very good.

    We ought to create strategic outreach plan to build a grassroots portfolio in DC to target the concerning parties and have a very constant operation. We can help with that, specially with the huge databases that we possess. I am open to discuss that after we clear this item. If needed, we will prepare a proposal for you. This will be with my team, as it will take more teamwork to get the job done.

    Thione NIANG

    Chair, International Affairs Committee
    Young Democrats of America

    #Morocco #Western_Sahara #Thione_Niang #Young_democrats_of-America

  • Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan: Morocco’s islamists dissidents going legit?

    Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan: Morocco’s islamists dissidents going legit?

    Tags : Morocco, Jamâa Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan, PJD, Islamists,

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 001169
    SIPDIS
    STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PI, DRL/IRF AND DRL/NESCA
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2023
    TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PTER, PINR, KISL, IT, MO
    SUBJECT: AL ADL WA IHSAN: MOROCCO’S ISLAMIST DISSIDENTS
    GOING LEGIT?
    REF: A. RABAT 462
    B. 07 RABAT 1838
    RABAT 00001169 001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    1. (C) Summary: The banned Islamist religio-political organization Al Adl wal-Ihsan (Adl) (more commonly known as the Justice and Charity or Justice and Good Works Organization) may be moving toward political participation, perhaps as a legal political party. Adl spokesman Fatallah Arsalane highlighted Adl’s political project to PolCouns December 11. Noting stability is Adl’s key goal, he denounced terrorism and violence, while protesting ongoing repression. Democratic politics was meaningless, he said, given the powerlessness of Parliament and royal absolutism, but he did not challenge the legitimacy of the monarchy.

    Arsalane echoed Adl’s charismatic Sufi leader Abdelsallam Yassine’s public disavowal last summer of Adl’s historic call for a Caliphate, reinforced by the Sheikh’s suspension of outreach, reported December 15. In their often symbolic dialogue, the authorities transmitted some positive signals of their own, while still holding some Adl members in jail.

    Were Adl to accept the monarchy and become legal, it could enhance stability but it could also increase Islamic influence on Moroccan politics. Arsalane closed by extending a hand to the new U.S. administration, urging changes in policies toward the region. End summary.

    2. (C) Al Adl wal-Ihsan (Adl) spokesman and executive committee (Majlis al Shura) member Fatallah Arsalane and Hassab Bennajeh, the director of Adl’s public relations office, met with PolCouns and Casablanca PolOff (notetaker) at Arsalane’s home in Rabat on December 11. Arsalane was welcoming and spoke openly and at length about Adl’s political aspirations and its difficult relationship with the GOM.

    ——————————-
    Adl: « Stability » and Good Works
    ——————————-

    3. (C) Arsalane began discussing the organization by stressing, « Our first goal, above all others, is the stability of Morocco. » Both left and right have failed, leaving only Islam as a model. Within Islam there are moderates and extremists and, « we have chosen moderation. »
    He said Adl wanted to work with other groups and political parties to help pull Morocco out of the political, social and economic crises it now faces.

    4. (C) Adl is best known for its grassroots organizational abilities and for its social welfare programs among the poor urban Moroccans. Arsalane admitted that Adl’s social programs were a source of its popularity, which was based more on Adl’s message and ideas. The government ban on Adl’s offering these services has only increased Adl’s popularity.

    (Note: We have heard many of these efforts continue under the guise of Adl-related independent NGOs. Adl also has focused on youth; it gained control of the student unions of most Moroccan universities and the national organization of students. Its activists on campus continue to harass more secular students.)

    ——————————————— –
    Repression and Dialogue: An evolving Approach
    ——————————————— –

    5. (C) Arsalane reported that GOM repression of Adl is widespread and includes bans on all public activities as well as all publications. In recent years police have raided private meetings in homes, but many of activities are tolerated. His own house was kept under surveillance and he was confident that his phones were tapped, but was unconcerned, noting, « We have nothing to hide. » (Note: As we departed, an apparent surveillance team of three made a choreographed exit of their vehicle, parked just behind our embassy car, making sure we noticed. End note.)

    6. (C) Arsalane acknowledged that Adl had over the years maintained informal communication with the Moroccan regime.

    This was only rarely direct, and more often one-way and symbolic. He contended that the « undemocratic regime » was unwilling to engage in a more open and formal dialogue, maintained political red lines and imposed conditions on allowing Adl greater scope for activity. « In Morocco we have the motto: ‘God, Nation, King’ but in fact the only thing that matters here is the King. »

    7. (C) When asked about the historic support of Adl for a Caliphate or Islamic state, Arsalane said this was not Adl’s position, claiming legitimacy and authority comes from the people and the Ulema. He thus substantiated the major but largely unremarked turnaround on this basic question by Sheikh Yassine during an interview this summer with the Arabic satellite TV channel Hiwar that opened the door to Adl’s potential acceptance of the monarchy — albeit not in its current state.

    ——————————
    Condemning the Use of Violence
    ——————————

    8. (C) Arsalane insisted that Adl was a political organization, and opposition to violence was a key principle.

    Adl also demanded that its members reject violence and expelled those who did not. He acknowledged that one participant in a failed bombing of a tour bus in Meknes in 2007 had once been a member, but claimed that the bomber had been out of Adl for a long time before the incident.

    Unprompted, Arsalane raised the detention and subsequent release, at the end of November, of 11 Moroccan immigrants in Italy, including members of Adl. Arsalane strongly rejected that these members were involved in terrorism and charged the Italian police were well aware of their activities. He contended that the arrests took place at the instigation of the Moroccan government, which unable to prove any wrongdoing, falsely continued to try to paint Adl members as terrorists. Arsalane contrasted Adl to Salafist groups truly bent on terrorist violence. « We reject these extremists … they are against us and call us ‘kufar’ (non-believers). » He insisted that Adl regularly condemned terrorist attacks.

    9. (C) PolCouns urged that Adl be more vocal in its condemnation of terrorist attacks, such as the 2007 suicide attacks against the U.S. Consulate General and other sites in Casablanca, and other terrorist attacks around the world.

    Arsalane responded that Adl in fact had denounced the 2003 Casablanca attacks, all terrorist attacks in Morocco and many elsewhere.

    ——————————————
    Intra-party dialogue on its Political Role
    ——————————————

    10. (C) Arsalane noted that there is a constant dialogue within Adl about the extent to which the movement should participate in elections or the political process. He recounted that in 1981 Adl had asked to become a political party, but the GOM refused. In the lead up to the 2007 parliamentary elections, Adl decided not to participate because it believed that the Parliament does not have any real power to effect change. « It does not matter which party is in power, even the Party of Justice and Development (PJD). » If the GOM were now to allow Adl to become a political party, Arsalane averred they would accept.

    Relations with the PJD
    ———————-

    11. (C) Arsalane characterized Adl’s relationship with PJD as respectful but denied that there is any active political cooperation except on Arab/international issues, such as Palestine and Iraq, as in their recent joint demonstrations in Tangier against a visit by senior Israeli officials.
    (Comment: It is unclear just how much the undeclared Adl boycott of the 2007 parliamentary elections contributed to the abysmally low turnout. If Adl members had voted for the PJD, the PJD might have fulfilled the many predictions that it would emerge as the largest party, and would have been in a position to form the government. So in the convoluted logic of Moroccan politics, this boycott served the regime’s purpose. End comment.)

    —————————-
    Succession of Sheikh Yassine
    —————————-

    12. (C) We asked about what would happen after the death of Adl’s charismatic leader, « Sheikh » Ahmed Yassine, reportedly 80 and poor health. Arsalane said that Adl has internal rules governing succession, which would be decided by an election of its executive committee (Majlis Ash-Shura).

    —————————————-
    A Message to the New American Government
    —————————————-

    13. (C) Like virtually all our Moroccan interlocutors, Arsalane expressed interest in the incoming U.S. administration and asked that we convey a message to it.

    First, he said, the USG should stop supporting dictatorial regimes in the region and encourage them to be more democratic. The USG, in his view, has spoken much about principles of freedom and democracy but has observed them only when there was no conflict with U.S. regional interests.

    Second, he urged that the incoming administration devote its energy from outset to helping solve the Palestinian issue which would help solve many of the other problems in the region. Finally, he noted that prior to 9/11 many in the Islamic world aspired to visit the United States. Since then, however, many across the region, particularly moderate Islamists, are afraid to visit, because they believe that USG will falsely accuse and imprison them at behest of their repressive home governments. He also hoped some intervention could be made on behalf of party members he claimed were falsely convicted of homicide in Morocco and have gone a long way towards serving their 20-year sentences.

    ————————————–
    The all-Embracing Makhzen opens a door
    ————————————–

    14. (C) For its part, the authorities have responded with some positive signals to Adl,s overtures. While the newspaper remains banned, there appears to be less tampering with the well-constructed Adl website (www.aljamaa.net in French and Arabic). Arrests continue but appear to be diminishing in both frequency and scope. The prosecution of Nadia Yassine, the Sheikh,s daughter, for verbal assault on the monarchy continues to be delayed. (Note: Arsalane described this as equivalent to judicial supervision.) In another step, earlier in the week Minister of Endowments and Islamic Affairs Ahmed Toufiq paid a condolence call on the family of a recently deceased Adl Board member and close companion of Yassine, whom Toufiq knew long ago in a common Sufi brotherhood, a visit that likely required palace assent.

    15. (U) On December 15, media reported that Sheikh Yassine decreed that the organization would suspend all public activity, assemblies, meetings, etc., apparently to avoid any confrontation with the authorities. (Note: This is in context of, and may be an attempt to insulate Adl from, a current GOM crackdown against Islamic extremists.)

    ——-
    Comment
    ——-

    16. (C) Arsalane represents an apparently growing tendency within Adl that is eager to engage more actively in the political life of the country. In contrast to past expressions of religio-political identity, he clearly acknowledged its principally political nature and aspirations, pointedly making little or no reference to it being a religious body. It is unclear to what extent Sheikh Yassine’s own epiphany is behind this evolution of the movement, or whether he is reflecting the wishes of the politicized next generation, be it Arsalane and his politicized cohort or the sheikh’s daughter Nadia Yassine — who appear to be rivals. There has been widespread speculation that after the sheikh’s death there will be a split in the organization. It now seems clear that either way the politicos will dominate, with the religious element possibly becoming a parallel organization, as is the case with the PJD and its religious counterpart the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR).

    17. (C) Although Arsalane was adamant that the GOM/Palace has not engaged in a formal dialogue with Adl, it is clear that an understanding is developing between them. The GOM has tolerated the activities of Adl so long as it did not press the question of the king’s legitimacy or take steps to mobilize its followers against regime. Some analysts believe that Adl has played a critical role as a release valve for social and political tensions through a non-violent organization. Certainly, Adl exploited these frustrations to swell its ranks. The GOM periodically alleges Adl involvement in violent or terrorist activities, as it apparently did in Italy, but has presented no evidence for this. All indications appear to substantiate Adl’s commitment to avoid violence.

    18. (C) Adl’s potential buy-in to the system could have an important effect on enhancing stability in Morocco, just at a time when it is under pressure due to the global economic downturn. It would also, however, increase Islamic influence on politics, adding to the leverage of the PJD, but even together, Islamists would almost certainly remain a minority.

    Like most politics here, this potential « conversion » to legitimacy will remain for some time obscure, and play out only over time. End comment.

    19. (C) Note A: The last time mission has had contact with Arsalane was before 9/11/2001, and the government protested.

    We have heard no such protest so far. We have avoided contact with Nadia Yassine since her indictment, and have been in touch only at a lower level.

    20. (SBU) Note B: Al Adl wal-Ihsan has frequently been translated as the Justice and Charity Organization, with the familiar acronym JCO. In fact, the organization itself prefers the translation Justice and Spirituality. While perhaps the best translation of the Islamic concept of Ihsan would be « good works, » the term encompasses that notion as well as charity and the performance of spiritual acts.

    Following local press usage, we plan to continue to use Adl (Justice). End Notes.

    21. (U) This cable was drafted by Casablanca PolOff and has been cleared with the Consulate General.
    22. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.

    #Morocco #PJD #ALadl_walihsan #Islamists

  • Sahara : Madrid Agreement signature related by CIA

    Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Spain, Juan Carlos, Transition, Mauritania, Frente Polisario, Algeria,

    National Intelligence Bulletin November 15, 1975

    Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania agreed yesterday to set up a joint provisional administration to govern Spanish Sahara withdraws completely early next year.

    The Spanish information minister predicted yesterday that Spain would be out of the Sahara by the end of February. He said that details of the new agreeement would not be made public by Spain until the Spanish parliament completed the process – scheduled to start newx Tuesday- of formally decolonizing the territory.

    Preliminary comments from Spanish officials indicate they are unhappy with the pact. One spanish officials who has been involved in the negotiations told the US embassy in Madrid that it was a « bad agreement », but was made necessary by the UN’s demonstrated inability to prevent the situation from degenerating into war.

    CIA-accord-de-Madrid-1Download

    With the agreement, Madrid has abandonned ist insistence on a referendum for the area. The Spanish official said that « consultations3 will be held with local tribal leaders on the future of Spanish Sahara. Madrid is uneasy about the arrangement because it expects Algeria to be displeased. Algeria is Spain’s main supplier of natural gas, but Madrid apparently preferred to risk its energy supplies ratcher than become engaged in hostilities in the Sahara.

    The UN may not have a role now that it has been presented with an accomplished fact. At best, there may be an attempt to obtain UN approval.

    The agreeement is victory for Morocco’s King Hassan, who has long sought to annex at least part of Spanish Sahara. Hassan will be able to present the new joint authority as fulfilling a promise he made in August to liberate Spanish Sahara by the end of the year.

    As co-administrators; Rabat and Nouakchott will be able to hand-pick Sahara tribal leaders -including the head of the territory’s general assembly, who defected to Morocco- for any « consultations ». The outcome of such « consultations » would almost certainly be a decision to partition the territory; giving to Morocco the northern region; with its rich phosphate deposits; and to Mauritania the southern portion; with its iron ore.

    Algeria looks like the big loser. The Algerian Foreign Ministry yesterday issued a statement indicating that Algiers would not approve any agreement to which it had not been a party. The statement strongly reiteratd Algeria’s unequivocal support for the principle of self-determination, suggesting it attends to push for a referendum for Spanish Sahara. An official Algerain news agency warned Madrid that any action to divide the territory would be a grave mistake. The agency said such an action would jeopardize Spain’s interests; apparently a reference to Algeria’a natural gas. Although the agency did suggest that the Saharan people would fight to liberate their homeland, it did imply that Algeria would participate directly in the struggle.

    Algeria will; as a firts step, try to enlist support in the UN to reverse the agreement. Algiers will note that the proposed « consultations » are not in accord with an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which upheld the Saharan’s right to self-determination. Althoug a UN report last month stopped short of backing a referendum explicitly, earlier assembly resolutions endorsed self-determination.

    The Algerians will also move to create as many problems for Morocco as possible. The will, for example, continue to provide arms, training, and possibly some « volunteers » to the Polisario Front, a pro-independence Saharan group. With sanctuary in Algeria and suffient arms, a relatively small number of Front guerrillas could carry out sabotage and terrorist attachs directed against the new joint administration. Algiers could also renew its support of dissidents inside Morocco.

    Algeria would probably hope that a Polisario insurgeny againt Moroccan occupation would tie down a large number of troops for some time to come. The Front already claims it controls part of the territory. Front leaders want a complete independence for Spanish Sahara and have vowed to fight to achieve that aim. Press reports from Algeria say that as many as 2555 armes Polisario members aren in the territory.

    Spain

    Prince Juan Carlos is extracting maximum advantage out of his status as « temporary » head of state.

    Capitalizing on the emergeny nature ot the Sahara problem, he has acted decisively and is given much of credit for reversing the Moroccan march. His leadership imagr has been strengthened by his chairing of two National Defense Council meetings -something Franco rarely did. Juan Carlos’ handling of the Sahara issue to date has also improved his rapport with top military leaders whose support he will need in the months to come.

    Althoug Juan Carlos has not been as assertive on domestic issues, Franco’s continued presence has given the prince an excuse not to be. Eben so, the media have applauded Juan Carlos for the recent indications that the government is taking stemps to resolve the sensitive issue of regionalism.K On November 11 the cabinet adopted a decree -initiated several months ago- setting up a commission to prepare a special administrative statute for two of the Basque provinces (…) The press has also reported that a decree approved last May authorizing the teaching of regional languages in schools and their use in local government activities will also be issued soon.

    In general, however, there is a paralysis in domestci policy-making will probably continue as long as Franco lives. During the interregnum, the activities of the ultra-right -if left unchecked- will ci-omplicate Juan Carlo’s efforts to open up Spanish society after he is sworn in as king. Blas Pinar, leader of the ultra-right New Force, has been holding rallies around the country warning of the dangers posed by political parties. Pointing out that the monarchy will derive its legitimacy solely from Franco, he has called Juan Carlos to purge the government of all who have not supported Francoism.

    Right-wing extremists, such as the Guerrilas of Christ the King; who have been linked to the New Force, have recently beaten up student demonstrators and opposition lawyers, and sent threatening letteres to oppositionists and even to some of the more open-minded establishment figures.

    Security forces, meanwhile, have taken full advantage of th’ wide powers granted by last summer’s anti-terrorist decrees to step un arrests and repress all forms of dissent: Il the past few days; according to press estimates; more than 100 people have been arrested, including the editor of the presigious independe newspaper Ya who was indicted for publishing an article on the succession. Six priests have been fined because of their sermons, and the government has banned several conferences by important professors, including former minister Ruiz Gimenez.

    Juan Carlos will not be able to postpone domestic policy decisions much longer even if Franco lives. A decision is due on a successor for Rodriguez de Valcarcel; the conservative president of parliament whose six-year term expires later this month. The position is important because the incumbent automatically becomes president of the Council of the Realm, which is instrumental in the choice of new prime ministers, and the three-man Council of the Regency, which will govern from the time of Franco’s death until Juan Carlos is sworn in.

    Should Juan Carlos decide to retain Rodrgiuez de Valcarcel, the decision will be interpreted by the Spanish left as Francoism without Franco. If someone else is chosen, his political credential will be carefully examined for clues as to the direction in which Juan Carlos plans to take Spain.

    Source

    #Western_sahara #Morocco #Spain #Algeria

  • Why USA is engaged in Western Sahara conflict

    Morocco, Algeria, Polisario – Why USA is engaged in Western Sahara conflict

    Algeria-Morocco Crisis: The first American war in a long time which is not for oil but for food

    The United States of America has waged many devastating wars for oil. Of course, the military-industrial complex of America, or what is also known as the ‘deep state’, wages wars across the world to mint money for the United States, but that is a story to be told some other day. Today, with the Biden administration at the helm of affairs in Washington DC, the main drivers of war seem to be shifting. Now, the United States expects to not import any oil by 2035, owing to its own fracking revolution.

    But it does need food until human civilisation prevails on the face of the earth. There is no alternative to breakfasts, lunches and dinners. And the United States depends, like all other countries, on one particular region of the world for food. And that region is called the Western Sahara. Coincidence, right? We have been talking so much about the Western Sahara, the Morocco-Algeria conflict and how Joe Biden is trying to stoke tensions in North Africa. Today, we tell you the one reason behind the American deep state’s thirst for war in Western Sahara.

    Phosphate – the rock crucial for human existence:
    World agriculture depends on phosphates. Phosphate, along with nitrogen, is one of the two most necessary components of synthetic fertilizers. Phosphate, unlike nitrogen, is a finite and exhaustible resource – much like oil. Western Sahara – a disputed region between Morocco and Algeria, has perhaps the second-largest phosphate reserves in the world, after Morocco itself. Together, Morocco and Western Sahara hold more than 72% of all phosphate-rock reserves in the world. And Western Sahara is currently under the control of Morocco.

    According to the Atlantic, in the 1960s, the widespread use of synthetic fertilizer, part of the Green Revolution, allowed millions of people who would have otherwise starved, to be fed by dramatically expanding the land suitable for agriculture around the world. So, phosphate is crucial, and this resource is currently under Moroccan monopoly. Does the Biden administration like such vast reserves of phosphate being under Moroccan control? No, which is why it is strong-arming the North African country by signalling to it that it could end up on Algeria’s team soon.

    World food security depends on Phosphate controlled by Morocco:
    There are no moral reasons behind the sudden uptick in tensions in the Western Sahara. The fact is, the Biden administration is strongarming Morocco to hand over phosphate control to Washington. Biden seems to be hoping for a deal in which the United States is made a crucial member of Morocco’s phosphate monopoly. The U.S. does not abhor monopolies. It simply abhors those which it is not a part of. And then, recent inflation in the U.S., apart from stores running out of essential supplies including edible items, seems to have given the chills to Biden.

    Morocco alone, as a sovereign entity, controls phosphate supplies around the world. This is a nightmare for Democrats, who like to have control over all walks of life around the world. Food – which is essential for all, is what seems to have caught the attention of the Biden administration now. And while America has waged many wars for oil, it is soon about to trigger one for the sake of food.

    TFI Global, 25/11/2021

  • Western Sahara : Text of UNSC Resolution 2654 (2022)

    Western Sahara : Text of UNSC Resolution 2654 (2022)

    Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, MINURSO, UNO,

    The Security Council today voted to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October 2023, calling on the parties to resume negotiations in good faith towards a mutually acceptable political solution for the region.

    Adopting resolution 2654 (2022) (to be issued as document S/RES/2654) by a vote of 13 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Russian Federation, Kenya), the 15-member organ expressed full support for the Secretary-General and Staffan de Mistura, Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, to facilitate negotiations to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question, and strongly encouraged Morocco, Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania to engage with him throughout the duration of the process to ensure a successful outcome.

    Further to the text, it reaffirmed the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and called on the parties to comply fully with those agreements, implement their commitments to the former Personal Envoy, and refrain from any actions that could undermine United Nations-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in the Western Sahara.

    Speaking after the vote, Jeffrey DeLaurentis (United States) underlined the Council’s support for the Personal Envoy in his efforts to facilitate a just lasting and mutually acceptable political solution for Western Sahara. Despite the vote not being unanimous, he called on all concerned to engage in good faith with the Personal Envoy. Morocco’s autonomy plan is serious, credible and realistic and one potential approach to satisfying those aspirations. MINURSO peacekeepers are tasked with monitoring and reporting on the situation on the ground, and when possible, conducting dangerous mine clearance operations, he noted, calling for the restoration of their freedom of movement as well as the resumption of safe and regular re-supply of MINURSO team sites. Voicing concern about the dire situation in the Tindouf refugee camps, he urged donors to increase their humanitarian contributions.

    Martin Kimani (Kenya) recalled that his country’s supports for MINURSO was reflected in its affirmative vote on resolution 2602 (2021). In doing so, it hoped that the parties would engage with the Personal Envoy to return MINURSO to its core objective of implementing a referendum for the people of Western Sahara. However, today’s resolution continues the gradual — but noticeable — shift away from that mandate and will not help the parties achieve a just, lasting, mutually acceptable political solution as originally intended. His delegation abstained because its constructive proposals during negotiations were not taken on board. Further, the resolution does not substantively reflect the Council’s commitment to provide for the self-determination of the peoples of Western Sahara. The right to self-determination is a foundational principle for both the United Nations and the African Union, he said, adding that the African Union — which counts both parties as members — should not be ignored by any United Nations process.

    Amiera Alhefeiti (United Arab Emirates) welcomed the adoption, which enhances the role of peace and security. She cited the constructive approach of the Council, expressing support for balanced language and the efforts of the Special Envoy to work towards a mutually acceptable political solution, calling on him to build on previous progress. She affirmed the sovereignty of Morocco over the Moroccan Sahara, renewing support for that country’s autonomy plan presented in 2007, which is serious and credible.

    Dmitry Polyanskiy (Russian Federation), noting his abstention, said the process for preparing and agreeing on the document was not fully consultative. None of his delegation’s fundamental and well-founded comments were taken into consideration. Moreover, there was no response to useful proposals made by other Council members, resulting in an unbalanced text and raising doubts to the impartiality of the informal file sponsors. The resolution does not reflect the real situation on the ground and is unlikely to facilitate the Envoy’s efforts to renew direct negotiations between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO to achieve mutually acceptable solutions. Noting his delegation’s position is dictated purely by lack of agreement on wording, he voiced support for MINURSO and its key role in establishing conditions on the ground and pushing forward the peace process.

    Dai Bing (China) said that MINURSO contributes positively to the question of Western Sahara and the maintenance of stability in the region. He expressed his support for the extension of the Mission’s mandate for 12 months, which demonstrates the Council’s determination to promote a political solution to the question. He also expressed hope that future Council resolutions relating to this mandate will reflect the latest changes in the situation, and undergo thorough consultations, to arrive at a text acceptable to the relevant parties. China’s position on Western Sahara has been consistent — this situation should be handled based on relevant Council resolutions so that a just, durable, mutually acceptable solution can be reached.

    João Genésio De Almeida Filho (Brazil) noted that this year’s text, notwithstanding its many features, could have greatly benefitted from a more balanced approach on some of its innovative propositions. Something as simple as incorporating regional formulas, many of which are still very much valid, could have proven useful to breach some of the gaps during recent negotiations. These in turn could have allowed for an even stronger message of support for the Personal Envoy and the Special Representative. He reiterated steadfast support for a peaceful, just and mutually acceptable solution to the question under the auspices of the United Nations.

    Michel Xavier Biang (Gabon), Council President for October, speaking in his national capacity, said his delegation voted for the prolongation of the mandate in support of the political process to reach a realistic, achievable and lasting political solution based on compromise for Western Sahara. The resolution makes it possible to support the Personal Envoy’s efforts in relaunching the political process with the various stakeholders. He voiced support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative as a credible and reassuring prospect for a way out of the current impasse and for reaching an acceptable political solution for all.

    The meeting began at 10:07 a.m. and ended at 10:27 a.m.

    United Nations Resolution S/RES/2602 (2021) adopted by the Security Council at its 8890th meeting, on 29 October 2021

    The Security Council,

    Recalling and reaffirming all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

    Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary -Gen eral and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (200 8 ), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), 1979 (2011), 2044 (2012), 2099 (2013), 2152 (2014), 2218 (2015), 2285 (2016), 2351 (2017), 2414 (2018), 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494(2019), and 2548 (2020),

    Paying tribute to Horst Köhler, former Personal Envoy of the Secretary -General for Western Sahara, and commending his efforts in holding the round -table process, which created momentum in the political process,

    Welcoming the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-Gene ral for Western Sahara and urging the constructive resumption of the political process, building on the progress of the former Personal Envoy,

    Welcoming the momentum created by the first round -table meeting on 5−6 December 2018 and the second round -table meeting on 21–22 March 2019, and the engagement by Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania in the UN political process on Western Sah ara in a serious and respectful manner in order to identify elements of convergence,

    Encouraging the resumption of consultations between the Personal Envoy and Morocco, the Frente POLISAR IO, Algeria and Mauritania in this regard to build on the progress achieved,

    Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise , which will provide for the self-determi nation of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

    Reiterating its call upon Morocco, the Frente POLISAR IO, Algeria and Mauritania to cooperate more fully with each other, including through building additional trust, and with the United Nations, as well as to strengthen their involvement in the political process and to achieve progress towards a politica l solution,

    Recognizing that achieving a political solution to this long-standing dispute and enhanced cooperation between the Member States of the Maghreb Arab Union would contribute to stability and security, in turn leading to jobs, growth and opportunities for all the peoples in the Sahel region,

    Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-Gene ral to keep all peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINUR SO), under close review and reiterating the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments, and effective management of resources,

    Recalling resolution 2378 (2017) and its request of the Secretary -General to ensure that data related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, including peacekeeping performance data, is used to improve analytics and the evaluation of mission operations, based on clear and well i dentified benchmarks, and further recalling resolution 2436 (2018) and its request of the Secretary-General to ensure that decisions to recognize and incentivize outstanding performance and decisions regarding deployment, remediation, training, withholding of financial reimbursement, and repatriation of uniformed or dismissal of civilian personnel, are predicated on objective performance data,

    Recalling resolution 2242 (2015) and 2538 (2020) and its aspiration to increase the number of women in military and police contingents of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

    Recognizing the important role played by MINURSO on the ground and the need for it to fully implement its mandate, including its role in supporting the Personal Envoy to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution,

    Noting with deep concern the breakdown of the ceasefire,

    Expressing concern about the violations of existing agreements and reiterating the importance of full adherence to these commitments, and taking note of the commitments provided by the Frente POLISAR IO to the former Personal Envoy,

    Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-Gene ral and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Frente POLISARIO proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary -General,

    Encouraging in this context, the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other’s proposals and recommitting to UN efforts in a spirit of realism and compromise, and further encouraging the neighbouring countries to make contributions to the political process,

    Encouraging the parties to cooperate further with the United Nations Office of the High Commissione r for Refugees in identifying and implementing confiden ce – building measures that can serve to foster the trust necessary for a successful political process,

    Stressing the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps, and encouraging the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights, bearing in mind their relevant obligations under international law,

    Encouraging the parties to sustain and prioritize their respective efforts to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights in Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps, including the freedoms of expression and association,

    Welcoming in this regard, steps and initiatives taken by Morocco, and the role played by the National Council on Human Rights Commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and Morocco’s interaction with Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council,

    Strongly encouraging enhancing cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), including through facilitating visits to the region,

    Noting with deep concern the continued hardships faced by Sahrawi refugees, their dependency on external humanitarian assistance, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and further noting with deep concern insufficient funding for those living in Tindouf refugee camps and the risks associated with the reduction of food assistance,

    Reiterating its request for consideration of a refugee registration in the Tindouf refugee camps and emphasizing efforts be made in this regard,

    Recalling United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 and 2250 and related resolutions;

    stressing the importance of a commitment by the parties to continue the process of negotiations through the United Nations-sponso red talks and encouraging the full, effective and meaningful participation of women and active and meaningful participation of youth in these talks,

    Recognizing that the status quo is not acceptable, and noting further that progress in negotiations is essential in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

    Affirming its full support for Special Representative of the Secretary -General for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO Alexander Ivanko,

    Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 1 October 2021 (S/2021/843),

    1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 31 October 2022;
    2. Emphasizes the need to achieve a realistic, practicable, enduring and mutually acceptable political solution to the question of Western Sahara based on compromise and the importance of aligning the strategic focus of MINURSO and orienting resources of the United Nations to this end;
    1. Expresses its full support for the Secretary -General and his Personal

    Envoy to facilitate the negotiations process in order to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question, notes the intention of the former Personal Envoy to invite Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania to meet again in the same format, and welcomes the engagement of Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania throughout the duration of this process, in a spirit of realism and compromise, to ensure a successful outcome;

    4. Calls upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the c ontext of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and

    noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

    1. Invites Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;
    1. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and calls on the parties to comply fully with those agreements, implement their commitments to the former Personal Envoy, and refrain from any actions that could undermine UN-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in the Western Sahara;
    1. Reiterates its call upon all parties to cooperate fully with MINURSO, including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of as well as unhindered movement and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformi ty with existing agreements;
    1. Emphasizes the importance of a renewed commitment by the parties to advancing the political process in preparation for further negotiations, recalls its endorsement of the recommendation in the report of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251) that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations, and encourages the neighbouring countries to make important, active contributions to this process;
    1. Calls upon the parties to demonstrate political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to advance negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), 1979 (2011), 2044 (2012), 2099 (2013), 2152 (2014), 2218 (2015), 2285(2016), 2351 (2017), 2414 (2018), 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), and 2548 (2020), and the success of negotiations;
    1. Requests the Secretary-Gen e ral to brief the Security Council on a regular basis, and at any time he deems appropriate during the mandate period, to include within six months of this mandate’s renewal and again prior to its expiration, on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, on the implementation of this resolution, assessment of MINURSO’s operations and steps taken to address challenges, expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his briefings and in this regard, further requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

    11. Welcomes the initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General to standardize a culture of performanc e in UN peacekeeping, and reaffirms its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framewo rk that identifies clear standards of performance for evaluating all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel working in and supporting peacekeeping operations that facilitates effective and full implementation of mandates, and includes comprehensive and objective methodologies based on clear and well -defined

    benchmarks to ensure accountability for underperformanc e and incentives and recognition for outstanding performance, and calls on him to apply this framework to MINURSO as described in resolution 2436 (2018), requests the Secretary-General to seek to increase the number of women in MINURSO, as well as to ensure the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations;

    1. Urges the parties and neighbouring states to engage productively with MINURSO as it further considers how new technologies can be used to reduce risk, improve force protection, and better implement its mandate;
    1. Encourages the parties to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to identify and implement confidence-building measures, including to engage women and youth, and encourages neighbouring states to support these efforts;
    1. Urges Member States to provide new and additional voluntary contributions to fund food programme s to ensure that the humanitarian needs of refugees are adequately addressed and avoid reductions in food rations;

    15. Requests the Secretary-Gene ral to continue to take necessary measures to ensure full compliance of all personnel in MINURSO with the Unite d Nations zero -tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council fully informed through his reports to the Council about the Mission’s progress in this regard, and urges troop-contributing and police-contributing countries to continue taking appropriate preventative action including vetting of all personnel ,

    predeployment and in-mission awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel through timely investigation of allegations by troop-contributing and police-contributing countries and MINURSO, as appropriate;

    1. Decides to remain seized of the matter.