Morocco, Hassan II, Elizabeth II, United Kingdom, Great Britain,
In 1980, the Queen of England, Elizabeth II, visited the kingdom of Morocco on a trip that would later be called « the tour of hell ». Received by King Hassan II, the Queen accompanied by her husband Prince Philippe and his staff stayed in the kingdom from October 27 to 30 and went to Rabat, Marrakech and Casablanca. However, her four-day trip is nothing like she expected.
Accounts emerged insisting that the queen was angered by the way King Hassan II treated her and her staff. Years later, Robert Hardman, an observer of the modern British royal scene revealed in his internationally acclaimed film “Our Queen” (ITV 2013), the details of this notorious journey. In an article published by the Daily Mail, « the true story of what happened when the Queen made a state visit to Morocco in 1980 » was revealed. Here is his story:
Afterwards, it was called ‘the tour from hell’. But the true tale of what happened when the Queen paid a state visit to Morocco in 1980 has never been told before.
‘It was a unique state visit in that nothing that had previously been arranged actually took place as arranged,’ says a Foreign Office official on that trip. ‘And if it did take place at the time it was arranged, it took place in a different place, probably several hundred miles away.’
Having survived a number of assassination attempts, including a massacre at his own birthday party, King Hassan II of Morocco — ‘a cat-like figure’ who ‘might pounce on you at any minute’, according to a diplomat — was deliberately erratic in his movements. Luncheons were moved from one palace to another at a moment’s notice or never took place at all.
At one, the king disappeared to issue orders to his chefs, leaving the Queen sitting in the sun for most of the afternoon until he reappeared, followed by some food, at around 5pm. Later, when the Queen arrived in full regalia for a state banquet, she discovered his palace was closed.
All these slights were endured with cheerful equanimity. What she wouldn’t tolerate, though, was the king mistreating her staff.
At one point during another belated meal, he pointed to Robert Fellowes, then her Assistant Private Secretary, and said: ‘That’s the person who’s responsible for this terrible muddle.’
The Queen shot back: ‘I’ll thank you not to speak about my staff like that.’
There was a further bust-up later on the same day when the Queen was due to take the king to see a British-funded Leonard Cheshire centre for the disabled. ‘He thought that sort of thing was beneath his dignity,’ says a member of the entourage.
‘So he told the Queen that it was too late to go to the Leonard Cheshire home and he’d take her back to the palace.’
The Queen was having none of it. ‘Well, you can stop the car in that case,’ she told him. ‘And I’ll go.’ Which she duly did.
The comedy of manners reached its climax on the final night as the Queen prepared to host her farewell banquet for the king on board Britannia.
‘The Minister of the Court turned up and said the king would be grateful if the banquet could be postponed for a few hours,’ says the former Foreign Secretary, Lord [Douglas] Hurd, who accompanied the Queen on that visit.
‘The real reason was that he was nipping about from one palace to the other for security reasons.’
At this point, the Queen could have sailed off there and then. Instead, she calmly explained that the event could not be postponed. ‘I will perfectly understand if His Majesty is late,’ she added.
In the event, he was a mere 54 minutes late, bringing with him various relatives who hadn’t been invited. ‘So we had to find a lot of extra knives and forks,’ says Lord Hurd. The king had also brought along iceboxes stuffed with food because he was terrified that someone might try to poison him.
To top it all, he was seething because the honorary British decorations granted to some of his family — all agreed long in advance — did not include knighthoods.
The Queen, meanwhile, was growing quite fond of the old ogre. A member of the Royal Household recalls: ‘She’d brought some toys for the king’s children. So she said to him: “Now, Hassan, have you given those toys to your children yet?”
‘And he said: “No, I haven’t had time.”
“Oh, Hassan!” she cried in despair. “You are hopeless!”
‘And it was very touching. He took it on the chin from her.’ Over dinner, the king did his best to charm the Queen — while hissing at Hurd that the British ambassador should be sacked over the missing knighthoods.
‘So, I consulted Prince Philip, who burst into laughter and said: “You do absolutely nothing and wait until tomorrow.” ’ says Lord Hurd.
Sure enough, the storm blew over. ‘The next day, everything was smiles,’ says Lord Hurd. ‘We took our leave, and there were presents of carpets and so on.’
The Queen sent an immediate thank-you letter to King Hassan, praising his ‘extremely warm and generous hospitality’ and adding: ‘We have been especially touched by the way in which Your Majesty took such a personal interest in our programme.’
Thus was diplomatic disaster averted at a time when the last thing Britain wanted was a high-profile falling-out with one of the more pro-Western nations in the Arab world.
What’s more, the visit provided the Royal Family with enough anecdotes to last for years.
‘You know, I think she actually rather enjoyed it,’ says one of the Queen’s team.
Comment of Mirror Diary on the incident :
What an insult! Queen gets ‘snub’ from Arab king From Edward Vale in Rabat, Morocco
The Queen received an astonishing insult Morocco’s King Hassan yesterday.
The trouble started after she arrived on a state visit. The 51-year-old king suddenlu wanted to cancel several events in the official programme.
It led to a major behind-the-scenes row between the top aides of the two monarchs.
The Queen herself was said privately to be « absolutely livid » and Prince Philip made it clear he was not happy about it.
One British official described the secene as « chaos ».
The three day visit started smoothly enough with a colourful procession in the Moroccan capital of Rabat after the Royal couple arrived from Algeria.
Then King Hassan suddenly sprang it on the Queen that he wanted to cancel the « welcome to Morocco » lunch.
He followed this up by suggesting another event should be scrapped and that they should « have a party » instead.
Late in the afternoon, the impetouous king was still undecided whether a banquet of the Queen and Prince Philip should go ahead.
The Moroccan felt the king’s wishes should be followed.
Buckingham Palace insisted the arrangements should go on unaltered.
Eventually, the king gave away.
There was some speculation that the Queen might call off the visit and return home. But palace sources said this was unlikely.
Comment of Belfast Telegraph :
Regal
Nearly everyone has on experience of the frustration of being kept waiting and of embarking on journeys or programmes that do not work out exactly as planned.
This is prone to happen when travelling abroad, and differences in cultures tend to tax the patience of even the most experienced traveller.
The Queen herself is no exception, and despite massuring sounds from Royal aides it seems that the visit to Morocco was not without its hitches and delays. What can be said is that the Queen, despite her personal feelings, behaved as ever with dignity and calm. Those who admired her excellence in public appearances should not underestimate the patience and the dedication as well.
OF ALL THE OLD PALACES… Hidden inside the high Atlas Mountains of Morocco sits a kasbah largely left to nature’s whims. But it was once the over-the-top home of the country’s now-hated ruler.
Liza Foreman
Jean-Denis Joubert/Gamma-Rapho via Getty TELOUET, Morocco—Not so long ago, Morocco was all about sex, drugs and jazz. And the man in charge, T’hami El Glaoui, the pasha of Marrakesh from 1912 to 1956 and rumored to be the richest man in the world, ran a prostitution racket so large that the 27,000 hookers operating in Marrakesh represented a reported 10 percent of the population. “Putting them (this clan) in charge was like letting the Mafia run Las Vegas,” Vanity Fair said in a 2015 article—although he did, apparently, love jazz.
That was then. This is now.
It took me a good dozen trips to Morocco to finally reach the fabled Kasbah of Telouet, the Glaoui family residence that was designed to be the most beautiful palace in the world. It was said to boast the finest Islamic architecture in Morocco. El Glaoui apparently decorated it using some of his pimping cash.
Not everyone makes it to the kasbah but anyone in Morocco should try before it crumbles to dust.
The kasbah is hidden inside the high Atlas Mountains of Morocco. It presided over the old caravan route to the Sahara that the Glaoui clan oversaw. Along this route, precious goods like gold and ivory were transported from the south to the rulers in the north. It was big money for El Glaoui who leveraged his position here and the fact that he was in charge of the Berbers in the local mountains that the French could not control to become the Pasha of Marrakesh under French rule during that period. He was both loathed for betraying his people and for the lavish parties entertaining important out-of-towners in style here in the palace. As a result, his palace has largely been left to rot.
It was for no reason, other than the fact that I had given up California for Europe and was looking for a place to stay warm in winter that I found myself in Morocco, repeatedly, writing a book about his people, the Berbers—some of whom El Glaoui famously shopped in exchange for the Pasha title, bestowed upon him by the French.
Starting a few years ago now, I found myself traversing the old caravan route, over which his clan presided, regularly, before I finally reached the crumbling Kasbah. It is said 1,000 workers and 300 artisans worked on it, no less. But it’s a case of catch it while you can. And it is quite a trip to get there along the old caravan route which cuts through the majestic peaks of the Atlas Mountains, winding its way from the inviting red walls that surround Morocco’s beating heart—Marrakesh—through to the glistening sand dunes of the Sahara in the south. Its now-paved road cuts through rippling hills and mountain peaks dotted in intermittent green foliage.
The French stamped out the caravan routes when they ruled Morocco, in the first half of the 20th century. It is no longer as charming, as it sounded back then. But not everything has changed. On the day that I went there, donkeys trotted along shabby tracks by the roadside. Washing fluttered outside half-built houses, selling terracotta pots and hand woven carpets imbued with local symbolism, woven in wool and silk. Men in traditional djellaba robes board battered buses that ferried workers back and forth.
One passes pit stops featuring makeshift stands, placed outside barren cafes, grilling shavings of raw meat cut from the carcasses dangling in the wind. It is a far cry from the El Glaoui glory days here.
The site of legendary soirées, attended by the global glitterati, and the closest thing Morocco has ever had to Hearst Castle, the OTT California residence of the newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, the Kasbah beckoned from its perch on a hilltop hidden between those shivering mountains. From there, its owners, the El Glaoui warlords, had ruled over this important trading route.
The current kasbah was built in the 1860s, on the site of an existing one. It was lavishly re-decorated in the early 20th century when 300 workers spent three years on the ceilings and walls. Some of this was recently restored.
On several of those trips, I had passed by North Africa’s highest peak, Mount Toubkal, in complete ignorance of the Kasbah’s existence. But sitting a couple of years ago, in Dar Khalifa, the Casablanca mansion made famous by owner Tahir Shah’s best-selling book, The Caliph’s House, it was drawn to my attention.
“Haven’t you seen it?” he asked.
Soon it grabbed my imagination, and in a novel that I subsequently wrote in his garden, a plot unfolded in my mind which reached its climax at this legendary Kasbah that I had yet to see.
It was clear I had to go there before it crumbled into the dust. Shah had mentioned to me that, slowly, it had been falling into the ground. It’s myriad of rooms were disappearing as time went on.
The Kasbah was one of several hang-outs where El Glaoui liked to entertain important visitors. But it was very much an upstairs, downstairs kind of place. While guests partied upstairs, its dungeons were filled with traitors whose heads were often hung from the doors, as legend has it. Some of which still stand.
El Glaoui was so reviled by the people that, upon his death, his associates were hunted and burned. His property was confiscated and given to the government. That government has left his most fabled Kasbah to rot.
From the outside today, the Kasbah looks like a haunted house from a Disney film. Room upon room has fallen away, since it was all but abandoned in 1956. Jagged walls and piles of rubble, now roamed upon by donkeys and local children, stand in stark contrast to a half-dozen rooms that stand in their original splendor, at the heart of this eerie complex.
I had finally determined to see it and driven from Marrakech in a taxi. What was a $100 fare for a day’s drive? Two guards stood outside and levied a small fee when I arrived, but I was otherwise alone. I paid next to nothing for the privilege of venturing beyond the intricately woven doors to have what remains of the Kasbah to myself, for several hours that afternoon.
Hardly anyone, these days, ventures beyond the main caravan route to drive out to the ruins. It takes about an hour from the main road along a bumpy track. I was scared, as I clambered up broken staircases, and passed through long, empty corridors, before I reached this inner sanctum.
A bird darted from the roof. It flew out through a half-broken window that revealed a scene of pastoral bliss basked in sunshine.
I inspected the former harem, a long, dark subdued space next to the master bedroom. I marveled at the intricacy of the woodwork, the rippling arches in marble, the heavily carved doors that lead through this series of inner chambers. The fabled tiles. I spent time inspecting the deep colors of the walls, before settling on the window ledge, with the sun warming my back, as I wrote. I tried to imagine what had gone on in here back in the day.
My driver wandered in a couple of hours later, and broke the silence. The spell of being alone inside this ominous space. It was a slice of his history that he was discovering for the first time. The lair of a man that had betrayed his people. It wasn’t a memory that he or the government was keen to preserve.
But now I carried it forward, as the setting for a fictitious scene in a novel in which a French reporter is murdered uncovering the ancient lore of the Berbers, some of whom El Glaoui helped bury in history from this very spot.
But it’s a case of catch it while you can. The Daily Beast, 30 avr 2019
Morocco, Mohammed VI, Israel, Palestine, jerusalem, Al Qord, Comité Al Qods,
Aziz Chahir
Rabat’s neutral response to the deadly strikes, coupled with public opposition to its normalisation with Israel, could weaken the credibility of the royal palace
Amid the Israeli army’s latest assault on Gaza, Moroccan authorities finally shook off their usual diplomatic torpor. In a communique issued by the foreign ministry in early August, Morocco expressed its « deep concern over the serious deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip ».
But the kingdom’s neutral response was more akin to the carefully worded statements of the European community than to the official declarations of numerous Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Algeria, which all condemned the Israeli attacks.
The Moroccan regime could hardly condemn the military offensive on Gaza, for fear of offending its « new » old partner. Following the Israel-Morocco normalisation agreement signed in 2020, which was sponsored by then-US President Donald Trump, the kingdom has willingly cooperated with Israel, particularly in the field of security.
The days of insisting that normalised relations would allow the kingdom to play « a more active part in the peace process aiming to establish a two-state solution » are long gone. The fact is, Morocco holds little political sway in the region with regards to the Israel-Palestine question – unlike Egypt, which, with the backing of Qatar, was able to broker a tenuous ceasefire.
Thus, King Mohammed VI appears to be the victim of his own political stratagem. By playing both sides, his authority as chairman of al-Quds Committee, responsible for helping to safeguard the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, has all but crumbled away.
Contrary to his response in 2021 to the Israeli raids at Al-Aqsa Mosque and the deadly 11-day offensive on the Gaza Strip, the Moroccan monarch did not dare condemn Israeli settlers’ recent incursions at Al-Aqsa. Rather, this opportunity was gladly seized by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is hoping to restore his reputation in the Muslim world after his direct involvement in the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
Mohammed bin Salman’s move could very well undermine the symbolic leadership of the Commander of the Faithful, Mohammed VI, particularly with regards to the Palestinian question and Muslim holy places in Jerusalem.
Waves of popular dissent
The Israeli bombing of Gaza was also a political test of the Moroccan regime’s ability to manage the waves of popular dissent that regularly swell in response to Israeli military strikes in Palestine and attempts by Israeli settlers to access Al-Aqsa.
Pro-Palestinian protests are nothing new in the kingdom, but dissent seems to have hardened in the wake of Morocco’s normalised relations with Israel.
At the time of the signing of the normalisation agreement, the government was headed by the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD). But today, the king can no longer count on the PJD’s backing, as the party is openly opposed to the normalisation process.
The PJD condemned Israel’s latest aggression against Gaza and reiterated its rejection of Morocco-Israel normalisation – reaffirming the party’s traditional stance, which had been momentarily and perhaps reluctantly disregarded when the normalisation deal was signed.
Now in opposition, the PJD appears to have thrown off its shackles to embrace once more the anti-normalisation position of the Unity and Reform Movement (MUR), widely recognised as the PJD’s ideological branch.
At a recent solidarity march for the Palestinian people in Rabat, the head of the MUR, Abderrahim Chikhi, condemned « the brutal attacks perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinian people, and the muted response of the Moroccan regime ». The sentiment was echoed by the Islamist Al Adl Wal Ihsane movement, which also accused Arab leaders who have normalised relations with Israel of « condoning Zionist crimes ».
Given the momentum of current protests, closer ties between the PJD-MUR and Al Adl Wal Ihsane are likely to emerge, which could ultimately lead to the further hardening of popular dissent in Morocco, particularly in relation to such mobilising issues as the Palestinian question.
With each new Israeli military offensive, political parties across the country, including leftists such as the Unified Socialist Party, vow to rally their troops to defend the Palestinian people. Israeli military offensives, like the most recent strike on Gaza, have considerable long-term political consequences in Rabat.
Tensions with Algeria
Israel, meanwhile, has been pressuring Moroccan authorities to speed up normalisation, left, right and centre. In November 2021, despite mounting tensions between Rabat and Algiers over Morocco’s geopolitical and military rapprochement with Israel and the US, a major security agreement was signed in Rabat by Benny Gantz, the first Israeli defence minister to visit the North African kingdom.
This past June, Israeli observers participated for the first time in the African Lion 2022 military exercise. In July, the chief of Israel’s armed forces, Aviv Kochavi, visited Morocco. This is not even to mention the Moroccan intelligence services’ large-scale cyber surveillance programme, which targeted, among others, Algerian officials using the Israeli Pegasus spyware.
All of this has only served to fan the flames of discord between the enemy brothers of North Africa. Algeria is fiercely opposed to the normalisation accords and sees the Morocco-Israel rapprochement as nothing short of a destabilisation campaign.
Thus, in a speech to the nation in late July, Mohammed VI, in all probability called to order by western powers, attempted to quell the anger of Algiers by urging Moroccans to preserve the spirit of « good neighbourliness towards our Algerian brothers ».
Algeria is slated to host the Arab League summit in November, at which time the costs and benefits of normalisation with Israel will surely be addressed. Meanwhile, Algiers is perhaps counting on the intervention of French President Emmanuel Macron, who visited Algeria this month and was no doubt informed of the tangible « threats » that military cooperation between Morocco and Israel posed for the region.
Drunk King Mohammed of Morocco was spotted on the streets of Paris, accompanied by his bodyguards. His walk was caught on video, which circulated through the Arab media. About it informs news portal Awras.
The video shows the king walking down the sidewalk in a denim shirt and with a glass of alcohol in his hand, while in a state of extreme intoxication. One of the staff who accompanied him saw the cameraman and attempted to stop filming.
Earlier, Finnish society was dissatisfied with the publication in the media of a video from a party with the participation of Prime Minister Sanna Marin and her friends. On the air of the YLE television company, the politician explained that she did not see the need to change her behavior. She later revealed that she had passed a negative drug test.
Stumbling through the streets of Paris, in an alleged state of intoxication and accompanied by several friends, this is how the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, has been captured by two citizens who recorded it on video. Several Saharawi media have echoed this video and have spread it accusing the monarch of “being drunk”.
“By God, it’s Mohamed VI!” Says one of the people who records the moment. The video shows how one of the monarch’s companions, realizing that they were being recorded, quickly goes to cover the camera and the video ends there.
Among those accompanying Mohamed VI, the Azatair brothers, close friends of the monarch, seem to stand out. Abu Bakr Azaitar, a 34-year-old mixed martial arts fighter, and his brothers, Ottman and Omar, have become faithful companions of Mohamed VI on his travels and nights out. The three are of German nationality and of Moroccan origin and have been involved in many controversies due to their closeness to Mohamed VI. One of them managed to fly to Morocco despite the closure of borders decreed during the months of the pandemic.
The Moroccan media ‘Hepress’ published in May the background of one of the brothers, Abu Azaitar, the first Moroccan to sign for the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), and his long criminal history, which includes robbery, extortion, drug trafficking or assaults. Also in this publication they made reference to the life of luxury and the Azaitar and criticized the ostentation they made of their lives on social networks.
The friendship between the Azaitar brothers and Mohamed VI began in 2018, just after the King’s discreet divorce with Princess Laila Salma, when the monarch received them at an official reception in Rabat.
It is not surprising that Mohamed VI spends time in the French capital. His trips are frequent and his stays are getting longer. Especially because of his fragile health, which earned him regular stays in European hospitals, where he has been operated on several times.
The Azaitar brothers with the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI
Instagram
And he spends less and less time in his country. Last July, for the celebration that commemorates his arrival on the throne in 1999, Mohamed VI returned to Rabat but only for a few hours and immediately returned to France.
Paris is a city that Mohamed VI seems to like. In 2020 he bought a mansion in the seventh district of the French capital worth 80 million euros.
It is not very common to know details of the private life of the Moroccan monarch. Away from the cameras for several months, the sovereign reappeared in official images on April 7 to receive Pedro Sánchez, head of the Spanish Government, after the reestablishment of Moroccan-Spanish relations.
Western Sahara, Morocco, UN, MINURSO, Pecekeeping,
Maintaining Military Observers in the Middle of the Western Sahara Desert: A Logistic Challenge
Julio Cesar do Amaral Junior1; Raphael de Almeida Leitão2; Dr. Murillo de Oliveira Dias3 Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior da Aeronáutica- UNIF1; Universidade da Força Aérea, PPGCA-UNIFA, Brasil2; Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil3 Correspondence: Murillo de Oliveira Dias3, e-mail: agenda.murillo@gmail.
Abstract: Logistics plays a decisive role in any military campaign, including peacekeeping missions. In this article, we investigated how the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system overcome the environmental challenges to support their United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) deployed on Team Sites (TS) in 2017. Combining field experience with a wide-range analysis of relevant sources, key findings pointed out three critical factors: (a) the unique integration between civilian and military to provide logistic support despite the reduced number of military logisticians at the headquarter (HQ); (b) tactical aviation employment to supply TS, and (c) the use of operational contract support (OCS) to cover a lack of capabilities in the mission area. This work provides an overview of lessons learned about expeditionary logistical efforts for isolated troops. Furthermore, it will broaden the knowledge about supporting forces on the ground in challenging environments.
Keywords: Logistics, Military Campaign; Peacekeeping Missions; Environmental Challenges
I. INTRODUCTION The Sahara Desert in North Africa is a unique place on earth with harsh environmental conditions, the world’s largest hot desert. The UN faced many complicated challenges in maintaining a military observer mission in the disputed territory of Western Sahara on the northwest coast of the African continent. Western Sahara is a desert region having borders with the Atlantic Ocean, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. Its geographical characteristic is a flat terrain with some hills providing conditions for forming temporary rivers during the short rainy season. Water is scarce, and the soil is rocky and sandy with dunes. The climate has cold and dry winters, but summers are sweltering (above 122oF even in the shadow). The average rainfall is 45mm, and the other significant problem is the strong winds that move sand and in sandstorms (fig. 1). Some tribes live close to the ocean in these inhospitable conditions, and some Bedouins live in the desert. The terrain and climate were not the only challenges that MINURSO faced; there is also a lack of infrastructure (cities and their facilities) to support UNMOs in the middle of the desert, as illustrated in Figure 1, as follows:
Figure 1- Sandstorm approaching TS Smara
II. METHODOLOGY This article addressed the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system regarding the environmental challenges in supporting the United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), deployed on Team Sites (TS), as the unit of analysis (Yin, 1988). In this research, we combined direct participation, a descriptive single case study, and archival research. We followed an inductive rationale and an interpretive approach. The primary data were collected from January to December 2017.
III. BACKGROUND To accomplish operational requirements, the UN established most TS in the conflicted region, exposing them to the presence of mined fields and isolating them as there were no cities close enough to provide any kind of support, another challenge to its Logistics. The region was part of Spain, but in 1976, Morocco claimed it as part of their kingdom. Saharans fought for their independence from Morocco. The hostilities lasted until 1991 when they accepted a UN mission to mediate the peace. However, the Moroccans built a sand wall (a Berm) dividing the region in conflict with mined areas outside the Berm, one of the mission dangers. They occupied the west part and isolated Saharans on the east. The UN had to deploy military observers on both sides to ensure the ceasefire. When planning TS positions, they considered operational requisites such as military units’ position, security, and size for the area of responsibility. Finally, they established the MINURSO Headquarters (MHQ) in the city of Laayoune, four TS on the west (Mahbas, Smara, Oum Driega, and Awsard), and five TS on the east (Bir Lahlou, Tifariti, Mehaires, Mijek, and Agwanit) as seen in figure 2. The biggest challenge for logistics was to deploy TS in the desert with no cities/facilities in the neighborhood, resulting in a complete absence of infrastructure to provide support (paved roads, fuel, electric energy, water, food, hospitals, etc.). Smara, a small city with a population of 57,035 in 2014, was located near one of TS. Increasing the challenge to deploy observers in a conflict zone was the presence of Unexploded ordinances (UXO) due to the air war and mined fields that changed positions due to annual flooding. These conditions, combined the UN faced, were enough to characterize the logistic system they implemented as an expeditionary logistic., as depicted in Figure 2, as follows:
Figure 2 MINURSO map. Source: UN, 2017
Note in Figure 2 that the MINURSO logistic system had an expeditionary characteristic because it provided living and working conditions to military observers from different nationalities deployed to an arid region of conflict. Since ancient times, an army force’s outcomes rely on its logistic capabilities. Some outstanding military leaders from history were famous for their skills in supporting troops properly. Scholars recognized Alexander the Great as the first leader to develop a logistic system to keep his army. His logistics worked so well that it did not affect his strategic decisions.
MINURSO: Expeditionary Forces The US Department of Defense used it similarly when defining expeditionary forces as troops deployed to accomplish tasks abroad. Support troops under these conditions required logistical skills to provide some otherwise typical functions in the face of a dangerous environment. The duties of positioning troops on the ground, opening airfields, and establishing and maintaining operations under threat environments required some expeditionary logistics skills. Therefore, it is possible to claim that MINURSO’s logistics are expeditionary. The claim is sound because MINURSO deployed and supported a multinational military contingent’s operation in a conflict region under threat conditions, including isolation, presence of UXOs, possible ceasefire violations, and inhospitable desertic living conditions. The efficient way the MINURSO logistics system provided complete and sustainable support to its TS, operating in 2017, made it expeditionary and unique.
One of the most significant aims of MINURSO logistics was to keep all TS operational despite the frequent absence of military specialists on the ground (TS) and a reduced number of them on MHQ. Theoretically, every TS should have seventeen to twenty-four unarmed UNMOs at full strength. The reality in 2017 was that, on average there were four fewer men than required on the ground in each TS. The main tasks of these UNMOs were to conduct daily patrols to ensure fulfillment of the military agreements and simultaneously conduct complementary duties to keep TS operational, such as logistics (G4). The G4 on TS counts seven subordinated positions to conduct all logistic matters such as material in general, vehicles, food, fire prevention, and generators. Due to personal restrictions such as observers on leave, some absences on duty, and other reasons, it was not easy to conduct logistic management on TS. This challenge became bigger because the G4 on TS was often not a logistician expert. This occurred because there were no specific background requirements to become a UNMO. On MHQ, things were not significantly different.
Overcoming Challenges Of all the appointments in the MHQ structure, one position was named Special Military Logistic Advisor (SMLA – U4). This position was the only appointment with a logistics expert, a lieutenant colonel from Egypt. Under his command, there were three supporting appointments: Project and Engineering (Proj/Eng), Supplies and Transport (Sup/Tpt), and Rations (food and water). These three UNMOs assisted him in conducting all military logistical tasks. Usually, to select them, the SMLA interviewed volunteer UNMOs working on G4-related positions on TS and chose one. He considered his previous background, experience on TS, and profile that fit the task for his decision. To improve system efficiency, MHQ conducted G4 (related appointments as food officer) training once per semester for UNMOs to enhance their skills in performing these appointments on TS. This routine training helped to remediate but did not completely solve the deficiency. To solve this gap of military logisticians, the basis of MINURSO’s logistics structure on MHQ relied on a civilian component.
The integration between the civilian and military, working to support the TS isolated in inhospitable places of the desert, made the MINURSO logistic system unique and was a critical factor for its efficiency. As the mission’s structure did not contemplate a military logistic unit, the civilian component was responsible for the mission’s logistics. They dealt directly with all logistic needs for TS such as ration, general supply, fuel, contract management, infrastructure in general, and logistic support. Recognizing the importance of the effort’s integration, MINURSO united the civilian component and the military working on logistics tasks in MHQ, creating the Joint Logistics Operational Centre (JLOC). The operational working concept for TS and MHQ interactions with JLOC needed to be simple to enhance efficiency. MINURSO recognized that most military were not logistical experts and logistics was a specialized subject playing an essential role in mission success. Aligned with these ideas, chapter eight of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) detailed basic logistics attributions for all military in the system (TS and MHQ). MHQ monitored TS logistic issues, reports, and supply levels on all TS. They also received all requests, compiled them, sent them to the civilian component, and monitored the deliveries. The civilians were responsible for all complex jobs. They received the consolidated demand from the military and managed acquisitions, contracts, maintenance, budget control, etc., and liaison with the UN to deal with these matters. They were also responsible for improvements made over thirty years of mission, such as installing containers to replace old tents as installations (offices, kitchen, lodging). The military and civilians’ proper coordination improved the system’s efficiency and allowed TS to operate autonomously. It worked so well that in 2017 there was no severe impact on TS due to logistics restrictions. Even when one of the helicopters that made the supply distribution once a week faced technical problems and stayed on the ground for two weeks, TS managed their supplies and overcame them. The critical factors for MINURSO logistic system efficiency were communication, integration, and coordination of efforts between TS and JLOC and overcoming the gap of military experts. Another contributing factor to this success was the aerial logistical modal to deliver supplies in the desert.
Supporting the Observers The tactical aviation support was the primary logistical system used by MINURSO to support their observers deployed on TS. It was tactical because the mission area was a conflict zone, now under a ceasefire agreement. The situation was calm but unpredictable. Scholars have many definitions for the concept of tactical, but this understanding is aligned with the intent that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization used in its documents. Tactical air transport is moving persons or cargo by air logistic support or aeromedical evacuation operations. Even more challenging for these operations was that crews had to fly visual over the Sahara Desert with no detailed aeronautical charts. They also faced the absence of air traffic control, landing on sandy improvised runaways or heliports with no specialized ground support. TS isolation and the lack of infrastructure were responsible for these challenges. To mitigate these risks, MINURSO implemented the duty for one observer to check the landing conditions before the arrival of the air support. This military task was to clear the runaway and send meteorological information (temperature, wind speed, direction, etc.) to MHQ. The correct performance of this task was essential for air safety since the crew had no way to know TS conditions. In some cases, flights were canceled or their destination changed because of harsh weather conditions. The resupply flights often stopped because of extreme weather conditions (sandstorms or temperatures permanently above 50 degrees Celsius). Communication and integration between the civilian crew, TS in the desert, and the aviation section on MHQ were crucial for the success of the flights. All supporting aircraft used were not military. The UN contracted two civilian companies to provide air support for the mission. MINURSO contracted Air Urga to deploy two fixed-wing aircraft (Antonov-26), accompanied by two complete crews and a maintenance package. They were established in Laayoune and made the liaison to load helicopters in Smara (North) and Award (South). The second contract was with Abakan Air which chartered two helicopters (Mi-8) with three complete crews and a maintenance package. They were established in Smara (north) and Awsard (south) and flew mainly to reach the four TS where the AN-26 could not land. This integration between airplanes and helicopters was essential to support all TS properly because their position in the desert made it hard to accomplish with ground convoys.
Tactical aviation employment was crucial to support Team Sites because of their location in the desert and the risks of arriving there by ground. All TS, except one, were isolated in the middle of the desert. There was no infrastructure to provide complimentary supplies or missing items nearby, so TS needed to work autonomously. Planning a convoy by ground meant driving long distances, mainly on unpaved roads, crossing some sandy areas, where even experienced drivers in 6×6 vehicles can get stuck. In addition to the route’s challenges, there were climatic threats and UXO’s risks along the way. Moving supplies was not easy because, in the desert, only a few roads were paved or in good condition, compounded by long distances; therefore, the food was mainly delivered to the team sites via air support. The fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were the main modal supply line for TS because sending weekly land convoys would be too dangerous. The exception was fuel, hazardous goods, and heavy items that could not go by air due to size/weight restrictions, so they went, when necessary, by ground convoys. Another primary justification for the air support was offering standby aircraft and helicopters to provide medical aid to MINURSO personnel because there was no medical facility close to TS. Therefore, in case of an accident evolving UNMOs in the desert, TS could request a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) to transport the injured from their position to an adequate medical facility. All observers learn and train how to ask a CASEVAC because this is the quickest way, and generally the only way, to save other observers’ lives. Conducting aerial reconnaissance patrols, at least two per month for all TS, was a third use for the air assets. Eventually, TS conducted aerial route reconnaissance patrols to ensure that the way between specific TS points was safe for a ground convoy to cross. Finally, aircraft use proved essential on the mission as part of logistical efforts. It was another critical factor in efficiently maintaining TS operational in the desert, just like contracted services.
IV. DISCUSSION The lack of infrastructure in the mission area of responsibility and gaps in the military force deployed made operational contract support (OCS) crucial to MINURSO survival. The US Joint Forces defined OCS as the procedures of planning for and acquiring provisions, services, and construction from commercial providers. Fulfilling these tasks, the employment of OCS covering military logistic gaps is considered part of the warfighting capability of an armed force. Its use became a reality even for Great Powers such as the United States (US). This kind of logistical support played and shall continue to play, a vital role in the US’s ability to deploy, fight, and win wars. Considering this, it becomes evident that the evolution of OCS use is reshaping how armed forces conduct logistics. It has been improving expeditionary logistics capabilities and growing in importance over the last few years. The main benefits OCS can provide are adequate support, positive economic and social impact on the local populace, minimizing the military footprint, and others. Recognizing these benefits that OCS could bring, the MINURSO logistic system also used OCS to fill existent gaps. The mission had external contractors working in logistics and other services. Two were to get air support, essential for logistical and operational purposes. The lack of aircraft was because the planned military contingent had not contemplated the aircraft requirement. The solution adopted was chartering aircraft (rotary and fixed wings) from civilian companies to fly for the mission. Contracting aircraft was one successful OCS used in the task, but there were other gaps and other OCS.
Localizing and neutralizing explosive remnants of war (ERW) was another mission gap that the logistic system overcame by using OCS. The presence of landmines and UXOs was a significant security danger in the mission area of the MINURSO deal. These explosive hazards threatened the lives of UNMOs monitoring the ceasefire, humanitarian aid workers, and local nomads. These artifacts were present on both sides of the Berm. A secondary objective of the UN’s monitoring mission was to minimize this risk. The belligerent parts and MINURSO signed Military Agreements number 2 and 3 to deal with this issue. They compromised to reduce the danger of explosive devices in the mission area of responsibility. The belligerent parts and MINURSO should share information about landmines and UXO’s position and incidents to achieve this goal, destroy any landmine or UXO in identified locations, and clear or mark its vicinity. To safely conduct these activities, it demanded specialized personnel and equipment. On the west side of the Berm, the Royal Moroccan Army was a traditional armed force present on the ground and was able to do it. There was a gap in this capability on the east side of the Berm because Frente Polisario Armed Forces were guerrilla organized units. Therefore, they had neither the personnel nor material to conduct these activities. MINURSO had a small military contingent focused on operating ceasefire monitoring activities, not conducting demining tasks. The UN contracted an international civilian company and sent the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to coordinate their efforts to fill this gap. The contractors cleared areas contaminated with minefields, cluster ammunition, and other UXOs, verified UNMOs and convoys crossing routes, and destroyed thousands of artifacts. Since 2008, they proved more than nine thousand kilometers of roads and successfully destroyed almost forty thousand landmines, explosives, and sub-ammunitions. It granted UNMOS safety to patrol and monitor the ceasefire and reduced the threat to the local population. In other words, this OCS employment represented a key factor in MINURSO’s success in fulfilling its mandate, and it also made a humanitarian contribution to vulnerable local Bedouins. The use of OCS covered a lack of essential capabilities on the mission, contributing to its unique expeditionary logistic.
Reflecting on the points this essay provides, it becomes clear that the MINURSO logistic system overcame the environmental challenges of the Sahara Desert to support its TS in the desert in 2017. The sources analysis illustrates that MINURSO successfully used a unique expeditionary logistics system. Three complementary factors made it possible. Despite the lack of military logisticians, one of these components employed a unique and efficient integration between civilian and military to provide complete and sustainable assistance to TS. Another factor was the use of tactical aviation to send supplies to TS safely, efficiently, and quickly. Finally, the operational contract support supplemented mission logistic gaps. In simple words, MINURSO’s unique expeditionary logistics effectively supported TS. It occurred because of the integration between civil and military logisticians, the vital tactical aviation support, and OCS’s key role in coverage gaps. The lessons discussed in this study can provide a valuable background to military logisticians’ plans and support for future military or peacekeeping operations.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH LIMITATIONS In previous sections, we presented the results and content analysis of the raw data, pointing out adverse outcomes of trust violation and its implications in other fields of research, such as (i) Social Value Orientation (Dias, 2016; Balliet, D., & Van Lange, 2013); (ii) contract negotiations (Dias, M., Lopes, R., Cavalcanti, G., Golfetto, V., 2020; Dias, 2012; Dias, M.; Silva, L., 2021; Dias, M.; Pereira, L; Vieira, 2022; Dias, M et al. 2022; Dias, M., Lopes, R., 2020; Dias, M. Navarro, R., 2020; Dias, M., 2020a; Dias, M., Lopes, R., Duzert, Y., 2020; Dias, M., 2020; Dias, M., 2021a); (iii) project management (Soares, C.; Magalhães, M.; Barroca, J.; Dias, M., 2020; Dias, M., 2021); (iv) peripheral business, to name a few. This article is limited to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system to overcome the environmental challenges to support their United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) deployed on Team Sites (TS) in the Sahara region. Other countries and locations may convey incorrect understandings and should be investigated in separate studies.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH Future studies are encouraged to investigate Moroccan and Western Saharan (host countries) contributions to maintaining TS or the role of the civilian component for mission support; both will broaden the comprehension of MINURSO expeditionary logistics. Further, academic studies on military operations established the adjective expeditionary to qualify procedures, forces, air forces, and logistics operating abroad.
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Morocco, Mohammed VI, monarchy, social crisis, health of the king, Western Sahara,
The latest data available from the Moroccan Central Bank is in the red: the report prepared by the Moroccan CB showed that Morocco’s non-performing debt rate has risen to 8.5% of net banking facilities at the end of 2021, compared to 8.2% at the end of 2020. Indeed, the central bank said in its annual report on Monday night that total hanging claims at the end of last year stood at 85.1 billion dirhams ($8.4 billion at today’s prices), up from 79.8 billion dirhams ($7.8 billion) at the end of last year.
« This slowdown in loan growth comes in a context marked by the end of the Moroccan state-guaranteed lending phase, which was created as part of exceptional measures to deal with the repercussions of the coronavirus crisis, » it reads.
We will not speculate on the health of the sovereign, which can, in case of aggravation, still shake all the cards, which has raised the fear of the Israeli authorities on the maintenance or not of the agreements made with Mohamed VI.
By concentrating the entire political, diplomatic, economic and lobbying battery to undermine Algeria and Algerian positions, Morocco has discovered its weakest sides: debts have increased, social anger has become more visible, even in the heart of Rabat, the slowdown of growth is latent, the Akhannouch government has been put on the grill, the high cost of living feeds all the tensions, the lack of raw materials, and icing on the cake, « thwarted flirtation » with Israel is widely noted.
Normalization » has not had the desired effect either on the economy or on Moroccan penetration into the heart of decision-making centers, as it would have wished; on the contrary, this completely unnatural, and therefore counterproductive, normalization has caused Morocco to lose points on the Maghreb, Arab, African and international scene. Its few supporters, however powerful they may be, risk unloading it at any moment, thanks to the war in Ukraine, which has brought about a decantation and has made each country ensure its back, starting with the United States itself.
In reality, Morocco is following a certain logic. Obsessed for almost half a century with the Western Sahara, it has allied itself with the three powers of the moment, the United States, Israel and France, making concession after concession, which in the end will undoubtedly be detrimental to the Moroccans first. As a member of the Moroccan-Israeli-American triple entente, born of the so-called « Abrahamic Pact » meeting, Morocco has since then followed an arrowed path and it will be difficult for it to question its route.
The kingdom’s failures call into question the very principle of the monarchy and should eventually lead Moroccans to engage in serious and profound reflection on the abolition of a regime that holds all powers and has led to constitutional abuses that have put the state itself in mortal danger. This is the observation made by Moroccans, and this is why, for Moroccan society, the time is ripe for protest, a protest that is not only the anger of those left behind. And this is also how Morocco has burned its cards with its Maghrebian and African environment, which observes the drifts of the last colonizer in Africa with a twisted eye and a stern lip.
European Union, gas, Russia, Algeria, Western Sahara, Morocco, Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Egypt, Qatar,
With Strings Attached: Implications of Europe’s Turn to Mediterranean Gas Samuel Bruning and Dr Tobias Borck
In its efforts to wean itself off Russian energy supplies, Europe is increasingly looking to its southern neighbourhood. But this comes with its own set of geopolitical challenges.
As heatwaves hit Europe, governments across the continent are already worrying about a cold winter and a deepening energy crisis. Since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine five months ago, European countries have been scrambling to reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas imports, not least to limit one of Moscow’s most important sources of revenue. Yet, they also fear that Russia could beat them to the punch and cut off energy flows to Europe before alternative sources have been secured. Russia has already stopped supplying gas to Poland, Bulgaria and Finland, and reduced deliveries to Germany, Italy and other European states.
As Europe searches for alternatives to Russian gas, debates about fracking are re-emerging, and discussions about if and when Europe can import more liquified natural gas (LNG) from leading exporters such as the US and Qatar are drawing much attention. Additionally, European states are turning to old and new gas producers in the eastern and western Mediterranean, lured not least by the promise of short supply routes along which pipelines already exist or could feasibly be constructed.
In the eastern Mediterranean, Israel is emerging as a major gas producer. In June, the EU, Israel and Egypt agreed to work on a partnership that could eventually see Israeli gas be transformed into LNG in already existing Egyptian gas liquification plants before being shipped to Europe. Meanwhile, further west, Algeria, a longstanding gas producer that already sends about a quarter of its gas to Spain, signed a deal with Italy in May to increase its supplies to Europe.
Neither arrangement represents a quick fix. It will likely take years for the necessary infrastructure in Europe, Israel and Algeria to be built and for the latter two to sufficiently increase their production capacity to even begin to replace the volumes of gas Europe imports from Russia. Just as importantly, both deals tie Europe more closely to complex and potentially explosive geopolitical contexts. If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions; considering their strategic implications for European security is therefore vital.
Israeli Gas, Hizbullah’s Drones and the Egyptian Economy
The eastern Mediterranean has long been a highly contested space. Just over the past decade, the overlapping rivalries and shifting alignments among the region’s states – Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey – have shaped (and been shaped) by the conflicts in Libya and Syria, and between Israel and the Palestinians, to name but a few. At various times, these conflicts have repeatedly drawn in extra-regional powers, including European states, Russia, the US and even Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
With the gas deal with Israel and Egypt, the EU has increased its own stake in this complex environment beyond the obligations it already had to its member states of Cyprus and Greece. Two aspects are particularly important to consider.
If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions
Firstly, with the agreement, the EU wades into the longstanding maritime border dispute between Israel and Lebanon. The offshore Karish Field, from which the gas destined for Europe is supposed to come, is adjacent to the area that both countries claim to be part of their own exclusive economic zone. The US government has appointed a Special Envoy, Amos Hochstein, to mediate in the dispute, but negotiations have been progressing slowly – if at all – in recent months.
Buckling under an unprecedented economic crisis and a dysfunctional political system, the Lebanese state’s capacity to effectively engage on these matters is somewhat limited at the moment. But Hizbullah, which suffered a setback in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in May, appears to see the border dispute and the international spotlight on gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean as a useful opportunity to bolster its anti-Israeli credentials. On 2 July, Israeli authorities said that they had shot down three Hizbullah drones approaching a gas rig at Karish.
Hizbullah later said the drones had been unarmed and were part of a reconnaissance mission, but the incident certainly illustrated the volatility of the situation in the area. This does not have to deter Europe from seeking to expand energy trade with Israel or other eastern Mediterranean producers, but the obvious political risks must be taken into account in Brussels and should inform thinking about future security arrangements in the region.
Secondly, the EU–Israel–Egypt gas agreement comes at a time when policymakers across Europe are increasingly concerned about Egypt’s economic stability. Hit hard by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, particularly with regard to food security, the Egyptian government is struggling to contain a potentially burgeoning economic crisis. While macro-economic growth figures have remained relatively strong, inflation and soaring food and energy prices are causing increasing strain. Scarred by the experience of the political instability that gripped the Middle East and North Africa in the aftermath of the 2010/11 Arab Uprisings, and in particular the migration crisis triggered and facilitated by the violent conflicts in Syria and Lebanon, renewed instability in Egypt represents a nightmare scenario for many European governments.
The gas agreement should bring some economic benefits for Egypt, but not necessarily in a way that will help to address poverty and Egypt’s other related socio-economic challenges. The EU will therefore have to ensure that the energy deal is part of a more comprehensive engagement with Cairo that seeks to increase the resilience of the Egyptian economy through reform.
Algerian Gas, Morocco and the Western Sahara
In the western Mediterranean, meanwhile, Algeria has long been an important gas supplier for Europe. Spain has imported Algerian gas via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which runs through Morocco, since 1996, and via the undersea Medgaz pipeline since 2011. However, relations between Madrid and Algiers, including the energy trade between the two countries, have persistently been affected by the conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara, which Morocco claims as its territory, while Algeria supports the Polisario Front that seeks Sahrawi independence. Over the past two years, tensions have steadily grown.
New partnerships with Mediterranean energy producers must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are
In 2021, Algeria decided to end exports via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline and therefore cut off supplies to Morocco, planning instead to expand the capacity of the Medgaz pipeline. Subsequently, in March 2021, Algiers was angered by Spain’s reversal of its position on the Western Sahara. Having previously been mostly neutral on the territory’s status, insisting that it was a matter for the UN to resolve, Madrid endorsed Rabat’s plan to retain sovereignty over the Western Sahara while granting it autonomy to run its domestic affairs. The move was to a significant extent motivated by Spain’s need to deepen cooperation with Morocco to contain migration, particularly to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melita.
As things stand, Algeria has said that it will continue to supply Spain with gas via the Medgaz pipeline. But its Ambassador to Madrid, whom Algiers withdrew in March, has not returned. Moreover, the Algerian government has repeatedly warned Spain not to re-export gas it receives from Algeria to Morocco, which has struggled to make up for shortages caused by the termination of flows via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline.
The new deal concluded in May between Italy’s energy giant ENI and Algeria’s national oil company Sonatrach has to be considered within this context. Even if Italy may find it easier to avoid becoming embroiled in the Algeria–Morocco dispute, the tensions in the Algeria–Spain relationship demonstrate that energy trade in the western Mediterranean cannot be divorced from the geopolitical realities in North Africa.
Searching for a European Position
In the search for non-Russian energy supplies, Europe is rightly looking to its southern neighbourhood. Algeria, Israel and Egypt – and perhaps, in time, other (re)emerging Mediterranean energy producers and transit countries such as Libya and Turkey – can all play an important role in increasing the continent’s energy security. However, these new energy partnerships must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are. More than mere commercial transactions, they tie Europe more closely into local conflict dynamics – be it between Israel, Lebanon and Hizbullah, or between Algeria and Morocco. They should therefore be embedded in a clear-eyed and strategic European approach to the EU’s southern neighbourhood.
In May, the EU published its new Gulf strategy, which offers at least a conceptual framework for how European governments intend to balance expanding energy relations with the Gulf monarchies with other interests, ranging from economic engagement to human rights concerns. The document is far from perfect, and it remains far from certain if and when many of its ambitious intentions will be implemented. But if the EU wants to become a more serious geopolitical actor and increase its resilience to political shocks such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, developing similar strategies for the eastern and/or western Mediterranean is necessary.
Dutch national television news’ NOS-Journaal has reported that the new king of Morocco, Sidi Moulay Mohammed (Mohammed VI), is gay, according to the Dutch newspaper De Gay Krant. The report has led to weekly anti-media demonstrations in the city of Utrecht, which has a large Moroccan population and is 15 kilometers from the TV network’s headquarters in Hilversum.
Mohammed, 36, went to college in Brussels, Belgium, and regularly hung out in gay bars there, De Gay Krant said.
And his homosexuality is « common knowledge » in Moroccan intellectual circles, Marrakech resident Tony Flavel told the newspaper.
« But you better not talk about it, » he said. « The police and the armed forces are against the new king for precisely this reason. They would prefer his younger straight brother, Moulay Rashid. » NOS-Journaal Editor-in-Chief Hans Brom told De Gay Krant that the program’s journalists are sure of their facts.
« The truth cannot be rectified, » he said « Our correspondent, Robbert Bosschard, spoke with the chief of police and the commander-in-chief of the Moroccan army. They were convinced that the new king is gay and they were afraid of the future under a homosexual monarch. »
Gay sex is banned in Morocco by Article 489 of the Penal Code. The punishment is up to three years in jail and a fine of up to 1200 dirham (US$122).
Spain, Morocco, Migration, Ceuta, Melilla, Western Sahara,
MADRID, June 25 (Reuters) – The deaths of at least 18 migrants on Friday during a mass attempt to cross from Morocco into a Spanish enclave took place at a pivotal time for often rocky relations between the neighbouring countries.
Moroccan authorities said the disaster occurred after migrants attempted to breach a fence into the Melilla enclave, with some dying in a crush after what authorities called a stampede, and others falling as they climbed.
Spain retained the enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, which were previously colonial territories, after Morocco gained independence in 1956.
The following is a timeline of relevant events:
– September 2005: Spain deploys troops to Ceuta and Melilla after about 600 migrants attempt to breach border fences, resulting in at least 11 migrants being killed and hundreds injured.
– Feb. 6, 2015: Fifteen migrants drown and more are injured as 400 people attempt to reach Ceuta by swimming around a seawall from Morocco. A judge in Ceuta later dismisses a case brought against 18 Spanish Civil Guards who fired rubber bullets at them.
– May 17-19, 2021 – Over several days, about 8,000 people swim into Ceuta or clamber over the border fence after Moroccan authorities appear to loosen controls.
The surge in crossings comes days after Rabat expresses anger over Madrid’s decision to allow Ibrahim Ghali, the leader of a rebel movement, into Spain for COVID-19 treatment. Ghali leads the Polisario Front which seeks independence for Western Sahara, a territory Rabat regards as its own.
– March 18, 2022 – Morocco reveals that Spain has changed its position on Western Sahara, describing Rabat’s autonomy plan for the territory as « the most serious, realistic and credible » basis for solving the dispute.
– April 7, 2022 – Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez travels to Rabat to meet Moroccan King Mohammed VI to mark a « new phase in relations based on mutual respect, mutual trust, permanent consultation and frank and faithful cooperation ».
– May 15, 2002 – The Interior ministers of Spain and Morocco reactivate their working group and agree to foster cooperation against illegal migration including through joint border patrols and an intensified crackdown on trafficking networks.
– June 24, 2022 – Some 2,000 migrants storm border fences from the Moroccan town of Nador into Melilla in an incident that leaves at least 18 migrants dead. Human rights groups say scores of injured migrants were left untreated and the death toll is likely to rise.
