Étiquette : russia

  • Por qué la cumbre de los BRICS podría ser tan importante

    ETIQUETAS : BRICS, ARABIA SAUDITE, CHINA, RUSSIA, EGIPTO, INDONESIA, ETIOPIA, IRAN,

    A pesar de las divisiones entre los miembros del BRICS, está surgiendo un consenso de que el orden internacional no está funcionando y que se necesita uno nuevo.

    Los líderes de los llamados BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica) se reunirán en Johannesburgo esta semana en lo que probablemente será una reunión fundamental para la trayectoria del bloque. El presidente ruso Vladimir Putin no asistirá debido a una orden de la Corte Penal Internacional. Pero Moscú y Beijing impulsarán la expansión del grupo en un intento por fortalecerlo como una alternativa al orden internacional liberal liderado por Estados Unidos. Más de 40 países han solicitado unirse. Pero hay división entre los cinco miembros. Brasil e India temen que la expansión diluya su influencia y afecte sus políticas exteriores no alineadas. A China y Rusia, por otro lado, les gustaría posicionar a los BRICS como un contrapeso al Grupo de los 7 (G7) y otras alineaciones lideradas por Occidente.

    Aunque no figura formalmente en la agenda de la cumbre, la “desdolarización” es un tema prioritario para muchos países BRICS y las docenas de otros estados asistentes. Algunos han sugerido que los BRICS establezcan su propia moneda para frenar la dependencia del dólar estadounidense, pero la mayoría de los observadores consideran que eso es inviable. Lo que es más probable es que los países BRICS y otros socios continúen con la tendencia de comerciar en sus propias monedas locales en lugar de utilizar el dólar. El banco BRICS ya presta en yuanes chinos y anunció ayer que también lo haría en monedas sudafricanas y brasileñas.

    LEA TAMBIEN : Marruecos pide oficialmente adherir el BRICS

    Andrew Cheatham y Adam Gallagher del USIP explican por qué esta cumbre es importante, qué significaría una expansión del bloque para su futuro y qué significa todo esto para Estados Unidos.

    ¿Por qué es importante esta cumbre de los BRICS y cómo figura en las principales tendencias geopolíticas?
    Cheatham: Muchas personas en todo el mundo tienen sus ojos puestos en la actual cumbre de los BRICS en Johannesburgo, en parte porque en conjunto las naciones BRICS abarcan una población de 3.500 millones de personas, lo que representa un segmento sustancial de los mercados emergentes globales. Originalmente, los países se unieron como una agrupación a finales de la década de 2000 para unirse en torno a cuestiones de finanzas, desarrollo y comercio. Sin embargo, el bloque ha crecido hasta convertirse en un símbolo de un lado del libro mayor en un mundo de amarga rivalidad estratégica y creciente multipolaridad.

    En esta narrativa , las economías avanzadas del G7 –Canadá, Francia, Alemania, Italia, Japón, el Reino Unido y Estados Unidos (y la Unión Europea)– están en el lado opuesto. Aunque Brasil ha discrepado con este marco antioccidental , la gran atención prestada a los BRICS en todo el mundo ha ayudado a la campaña retórica de China y Rusia para vincular a “Occidente” con “el resto”. Con la ilegal guerra de agresión de Rusia en Ucrania y la escalada de tensiones entre China y Estados Unidos, cada vez más se pide a los países que adopten posiciones de uno u otro bando.

    Sin embargo, esto no es una repetición de la Guerra Fría. Las llamadas “potencias medias” tienen una proporción mucho mayor de influencia global en la política internacional actual. Los BRICS son a menudo vistos como un espacio clave para tales potencias, particularmente para los estados no occidentales del Sur Global.

    La expansión de los BRICS es uno de los grandes temas de la cumbre. ¿Qué indicaría la expansión del grupo sobre su trayectoria?
    Cheatham: Más de 40 países han solicitado unirse a los BRICS. Al ser miembros, es probable que los países disfruten de una relación especial con los miembros del Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo , que fue fundado por las naciones BRICS y proporciona financiamiento a muchos estados que buscan alternativas al Club de París dominado por Occidente . Además, muchos posibles miembros esperan tener influencia dentro de una creciente coalición de estados no occidentales con ambiciones de remodelar el orden global.

    Durante casi 80 años, la vía convencional para lograr cambios y avances en el sistema internacional era a través de las propias instituciones multilaterales. Hoy, sin embargo, asistimos a una nueva ola de “minilateralismo”, un estilo de compromiso diplomático que da prominencia a coaliciones pequeñas y medianas de estados con ideas afines. Esta tendencia, que también está aumentando en Occidente, se verá exacerbada por la expansión de los BRICS.

    Un problema con el minilateralismo es que amenaza con erosionar aún más nuestros medios de acción colectiva global necesarios para enfrentar las amenazas masivas que hoy enfrenta la humanidad. Los fenómenos meteorológicos extremos observados recientemente ponen de relieve el equilibrio crítico entre las preocupaciones económicas y la necesidad apremiante de transiciones energéticas para abordar el cambio climático.

    LIRE AUSSI : Cómo Marruecos intentó impedir la participación de la RASD en la cumbre BRICS

    Pero el cambio climático es sólo uno de muchos problemas apremiantes. El aumento de las tecnologías disruptivas (especialmente la adopción generalizada de tecnologías armamentísticas innovadoras, como las armas biológicas, por parte de entidades no estatales) es particularmente alarmante. La popularidad de la película de Oppenheimer debería recordarnos a todos las perennes amenazas nucleares, ahora aumentadas por el precario estado del control de armas nucleares . Además, los desafíos actuales que plantean enfermedades como la COVID-19 subrayan el riesgo siempre presente de pandemias letales. Estos representan sólo una fracción de los peligros existenciales que exigen la colaboración global. Si el mundo se fragmenta en bloques antagónicos pequeños y medianos, nuestra capacidad colectiva para abordar estas amenazas podría verse comprometida.

    Gallagher: El debate sobre la expansión de los BRICS revela cuán dividido está realmente el bloque; también demuestra problemas estructurales que hacen improbable el desarrollo de una moneda común.

    A medida que la competencia entre Estados Unidos y China se ha intensificado durante la última década, Beijing ha buscado cada vez más posicionarse como líder de un mundo multipolar emergente. Su Iniciativa de Seguridad Global , lanzada el año pasado por el líder chino Xi Jinping, es un intento de diseñar un nuevo orden de seguridad global que, según Beijing, es más capaz de abordar desafíos intratables de paz y conflictos que el sistema liderado por Occidente. Dado que los BRICS ya representan el 40 por ciento de la población mundial y una cuarta parte del PIB global, sumarse al bloque significa que los BRICS serían un grupo más fuerte e influyente, lo que impulsaría aún más la multipolaridad.

    Por su parte, Moscú también está interesado en promover un mundo multipolar y considera que la expansión de los BRICS tiene una manera de socavar el orden internacional liberal. Aislada por Occidente tras su invasión ilegal de Ucrania, Rusia ha mirado al Sur Global para ayudar a mantener a flote su economía. Por lo tanto, un BRICS más grande ayuda a aislar a Moscú de las sanciones y el oprobio occidentales. Y Moscú considerará la asistencia de decenas de países a la cumbre como una señal positiva respecto de su posición internacional.

    Sudáfrica también ha sido un defensor de la expansión de los BRICS. Antes de la cumbre, el presidente sudafricano Cyril Ramaphosa dijo que quiere ver más países africanos unirse y asociarse con el bloque e invitó a más de 30 líderes africanos a participar en la cumbre de esta semana.

    India y Brasil lo ven de manera un poco diferente. Aunque es el séptimo país del mundo en población, Brasil no tiene el peso diplomático de Rusia o China y cree que la expansión de los BRICS disminuiría su influencia en el bloque y como líder del Sur Global.

    India teme que el bloque adquiera una orientación abiertamente antioccidental. India , una de las naciones fundadoras del movimiento de países no alineados durante la Guerra Fría, ha continuado con este legado en medio de la actual competencia entre grandes potencias. Si bien es miembro del grupo BRICS y de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghai fundada por China y Rusia, la relación de Nueva Delhi con los Estados Unidos ha alcanzado nuevas alturas en los últimos años y es miembro del Quad (junto con Japón, Australia y los Estados Unidos). Unidos), un esfuerzo no tan sutil para competir con China en el Indo-Pacífico. De hecho, contrarrestar la agresión y la influencia chinas en el patio trasero de la India es la “base” de la cooperación entre Estados Unidos e India, según el experto del USIP en el sur de Asia, Daniel Markey.

    Más de 40 países, incluidos Irán, Arabia Saudita, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Argentina, Indonesia, Nigeria y Etiopía, han solicitado unirse. Muchas de estas potencias medias también están frustradas por el orden internacional liberal y irritadas por lo que perciben como hegemonía estadounidense, con las sanciones estadounidenses y occidentales entre los principales irritantes. Para ellos, los BRICS representan una alternativa.

    Una forma sencilla en que la admisión de cualquiera de estos países afectaría a los BRICS es en su toma de decisiones. Los BRICS operan por consenso. Agregar más miembros significa que será más difícil alcanzar el consenso, ya que cada país tiene sus propios intereses, prioridades y relaciones.

    LEA TAMBIEN : ¿Qué países quieren unirse al BRICS?

    Los países que se unan también podrían ser críticos en la trayectoria de los BRICS. ¿Evolucionará hacia el tipo de bloque antioccidental que buscan China y Rusia? Irán, por ejemplo, estaría más que feliz de seguir el ejemplo de China y Rusia para promover una alternativa al orden liderado por Estados Unidos. Pero un país como Arabia Saudita –a pesar de los muchos problemas en su relación con Washington– probablemente esté menos inclinado a esa orientación, ya que valora sus vínculos de seguridad con Estados Unidos.

    ¿Por qué esto es importante para Estados Unidos?

    Al elaborar estrategias para las preocupaciones de seguridad nacional a corto, mediano y largo plazo, Estados Unidos debe monitorear de cerca la evolución de los BRICS. Si bien la competencia cada vez mayor con China seguirá siendo fundamental para la política exterior de Estados Unidos, también es fundamental comprender la creciente influencia relativa y los posibles puntos de estrangulamiento que mantienen otras potencias clave. Fomentar compromisos sólidos con amigos como India y Sudáfrica es primordial, incluso cuando este último muestra una afiliación más estrecha con Rusia. Estas asociaciones pueden servir como contrapesos, asegurando que la trayectoria de los BRICS no se desvíe hacia un alineamiento antioccidental. Sin embargo, esto no debería tentar a Washington a inclinarse excesivamente hacia la diplomacia minilateral en detrimento de los esfuerzos multilaterales.

    Gallagher:Esta cumbre de los BRICS se produce en medio de un período tumultuoso y casi entrópico en la política internacional. La intensificación de la competencia entre Estados Unidos y China y la guerra ilegal de Rusia contra Ucrania han acentuado las tendencias geopolíticas. Si hay una gran conclusión para Washington, debería ser que muchos países, incluidos sus socios tradicionales, están frustrados por el orden internacional liberal e insatisfechos con la unipolaridad posterior a la Guerra Fría. El sistema posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial que Estados Unidos diseñó y dirigió ha experimentado uno de los períodos de paz y prosperidad globales más duraderos de la historia moderna. Pero nada dura para siempre. Estados Unidos debería tomar en serio estas preocupaciones y considerar cómo rehacer, o al menos modificar, el orden multilateral actual para abordar estas frustraciones e inquietudes, trabajando con aliados y socios para abordar los principales desafíos del momento. Dans le cas contraire, d’autres puissances interviendront, probablement d’une manière qui ne servira pas les intérêts des États-Unis.

    Qué saber sobre las naciones clave que buscan unirse al BRICS

    Arabia Saudita, Argentina, Indonesia y Egipto se encuentran entre los posibles candidatos para ampliar el bloque de cinco naciones, muchos de los cuales buscan lazos más fuertes con potencias no occidentales. Irán también está interesado.

    Decenas de países han expresado interés en unirse al BRICS, un grupo que incluye a Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica, y que se considera a sí mismo como un contrapeso al Occidente y que se reúne esta semana en Johannesburgo.

    Se cree que Argentina, Egipto, Indonesia y Arabia Saudita son los más propensos a ser admitidos. Irán también ha expresado interés.

    El líder de China, Xi Jinping, respalda la expansión del grupo. Pero se dice que el Primer Ministro Narendra Modi de India está preocupado por agregar naciones cercanas a Beijing; India y China tienen disputas fronterizas y tienden a considerarse mutuamente adversarios potenciales.

    LEA TAMBIEN : Six nouveaux membres invités à joindre les BRICS

    Aquí hay un vistazo a algunas de las naciones que compiten por unirse.

    Arabia Saudita

    La adición de Arabia Saudita, uno de los principales productores de petróleo del mundo, al BRICS agregaría influencia económica al grupo y aumentaría sus posibilidades de posicionarse como un rival del orden financiero liderado por Estados Unidos.

    La membresía en BRICS parece ser cada vez más adecuada para Arabia Saudita, que ha cultivado lazos con China y, a pesar de su relación de seguridad de larga data y estrecha con Estados Unidos, ha demostrado con énfasis su independencia de los intereses estadounidenses en años recientes.

    El año pasado, Arabia Saudita redujo la producción de petróleo justo cuando la administración Biden pensaba que había asegurado un aumento. En febrero, restableció los lazos diplomáticos con Irán, firmando el acuerdo en Beijing. Y a pesar de la presión estadounidense para apoyar a Ucrania en la guerra con Rusia, el reino, al igual que otros países árabes, se ha mantenido firmemente neutral.

    Para Arabia Saudita, podría parecer una buena geopolítica cultivar relaciones con importantes socios que, a diferencia de Estados Unidos, no discuten sobre los derechos humanos. Pero también podría ser buen negocio. El país, con más de 32 millones de personas, muchos de ellos jóvenes, busca diversificar una economía casi totalmente dependiente del petróleo.

    Arabia Saudita es el principal socio comercial del club BRICS en el Medio Oriente, con un comercio que alcanzó los $160 mil millones el año pasado, dijo en junio el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, el príncipe Faisal bin Farhan.

    Argentina

    Con casi 46 millones de personas, Argentina tiene la tercera economía más grande de América Latina, después de Brasil y México. Sus defensores en el BRICS incluyen a India; Brasil, su principal socio comercial; y China, con la que tiene vínculos financieros cada vez más estrechos.

    Argentina tiene una historia de crisis económicas y está en medio de una de las peores. Su moneda ha caído en picada; la inflación ha rondado el 113 por ciento durante los últimos 12 meses; y casi el 40 por ciento de la población está empobrecida. El país también está luchando por pagar una deuda de $44 mil millones al Fondo Monetario Internacional, dominado por Occidente.

    El presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva de Brasil dijo el martes que apoyaba la candidatura de Argentina, mencionando las dificultades del país con la falta de reservas extranjeras.

    El presidente de Argentina, Alberto Fernández, fue invitado a una reunión virtual de las naciones BRICS el año pasado.

    « Para mi país, los BRICS son una excelente alternativa de cooperación frente a un orden mundial que ha estado funcionando en beneficio de unos pocos », escribió a la organización en mayo de 2022.

    Llamó al Banco de Desarrollo del BRICS, creado por el grupo y al que Argentina quiere unirse, « la institucionalización de un nuevo orden mundial centrado en el desarrollo y alejado de la especulación financiera que ha causado tanto daño a nuestros países ».

    Irán

    Irán, que posee las segundas mayores reservas de gas del mundo y una cuarta parte de las reservas de petróleo en el Medio Oriente, presentó su solicitud para unirse al BRICS en junio como parte de sus esfuerzos por fortalecer los lazos económicos y políticos con potencias no occidentales.

    « La cooperación de Irán con BRICS tiene beneficios mutuos », dijo el portavoz del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Nasser Kanaani, el lunes.

    La economía de Irán, que ocupó el puesto 22 en el mundo el año pasado con un PIB de alrededor de $2 billones, ha sido afectada por la inflación, el crecimiento lento y las sanciones económicas de Estados Unidos.

    Pero el país ha logrado mantenerse a flote al vender petróleo con descuento a China, entre otras maniobras. También ha diversificado su economía lejos del petróleo y ha aumentado el comercio con los miembros del BRICS, con un aumento del 14 por ciento en el comercio no petrolero en el año fiscal 2022-23, valorado en $38.43 mil millones, según informes de noticias iraníes que citan datos aduaneros.

    Políticamente, Irán valoraría la membresía en BRICS como una indicación de que los intentos de Occidente de aislarlo han fracasado, consolidando su papel como una potencia regional y miembro de un grupo que se considera una alternativa al orden dominado por Occidente.

    El presidente de Irán, Ebrahim Raisi, viajará a la cumbre del BRICS el miércoles después de recibir una invitación para asistir, informaron los medios estatales iraníes.

    Indonesia

    Tanto China como India han estado promoviendo desde hace tiempo que Indonesia se una al BRICS. La nación del sudeste asiático es la cuarta más poblada del mundo, con alrededor de 280 millones de personas, y ya pertenece al Grupo de los 20.

    Jerry Sambuaga, el viceministro de Comercio de Indonesia, dijo la semana pasada a los periodistas que unirse al BRICS podría traer oportunidades comerciales en América del Sur y África.

    « El interés está ahí, el potencial es claro y la oportunidad está al alcance », dijo.

    El presidente de Indonesia, Joko Widodo, ha abogado durante mucho tiempo por un orden mundial que incluya a los países en desarrollo. El año pasado, las exportaciones indonesias a los estados del BRICS ascendieron a $93.2 mil millones.

    El acceso al banco del BRICS podría ayudar a los ambiciosos planes de infraestructura del Sr. Joko, que incluyen una nueva capital en Borneo.

    Pero es probable que sea cauteloso al parecer tomar partido.

    Aunque los lazos económicos de Indonesia con China superan con creces los de Estados Unidos, el país describe su política exterior como « libre y activa » y depende de la cooperación económica y los suministros militares occidentales.

    Egipto

    Egipto es uno de los principales receptores de ayuda estadounidense, pero ha mantenido durante mucho tiempo una fuerte relación con Rusia y tiene crecientes lazos comerciales con China.

    Su interés en desvincularse de la dependencia estadounidense se fortaleció en el último año y medio, ya que Egipto ha aprendido cuán problemático puede ser depender del dólar. La invasión de Ucrania por parte de Rusia desató una crisis de la moneda extranjera y luego una caída económica. Los inversores sacaron miles de millones de dólares de Egipto en pánico, y las importaciones cruciales de trigo y combustible, compradas con dólares, se dispararon de precio. Algunas importaciones escasearon y los precios subieron.

    La escasez de dólares también dificultó que el país pudiera pagar sus deudas y lo obligó a devaluar su moneda bruscamente, empeorando la situación para los egipcios comunes.

    Dentro del BRICS, Egipto podría comerciar en moneda local, lo cual ya está intentando a través de acuerdos bilaterales. También espera atraer más inversiones de los países miembros, lo que a su vez podría traer más dinero de Estados Unidos mientras busca mantener su influencia.

    Jugar en ambos bandos ha tendido a beneficiar a Egipto. Rusia está construyendo la primera planta de energía nuclear de Egipto, y China está construyendo parte de su nueva capital. El temor a perder influencia ha hecho que los gobiernos occidentales sean reacios a cortar lazos por abusos de derechos humanos u otros problemas.

    « Egipto tiene buenas relaciones con Estados Unidos y Occidente, así como buenas relaciones con Oriente », dijo el presidente Abdel Fattah el-Sisi el domingo. « Si el equilibrio actual continúa, podremos unirnos al bloque económico del BRICS ».

    Con la segunda economía más grande de África, Egipto tiene una fuerte posibilidad de ser admitido. Ya se ha unido al banco BRICS y tiene relaciones comerciales o políticas sólidas o en crecimiento con los miembros.

    #BRICS #China #Rusia #ArabiaSaudita #Egypte #Indonesia #Etiopia

  • ¿Qué países quieren unirse al BRICS?

    ETIQUETAS : BRICS, RUSSIA, BRASIL, INDIA, SUDAFRICA, CHINA,

    El interés por unirse a BRICS ha aumentado en los últimos años, con más de 20 naciones que han solicitado formalmente ser parte del bloque. Varios otros países, incluyendo Comoras, Gabón y la República Democrática del Congo, han mostrado informalmente interés en hacerlo.

    La expansión de BRICS se espera que sea un tema importante en la agenda cuando los líderes se reúnan en la cumbre en Johannesburgo. Sudáfrica propuso expandir la membresía de BRICS en 2018, pero otros miembros, especialmente Rusia y China, fueron reacios en ese momento. En su lugar, los líderes decidieron consolidar y posponer las discusiones sobre la expansión. Una decisión importante de la Cumbre BRICS 2022 fue comenzar el proceso de expansión de la membresía del bloque.

    LEA TAMBIEN : Cómo Marruecos intentó impedir la participación de la RASD en la cumbre BRICS

    Sin embargo, la expansión del bloque se ha convertido en un tema delicado entre los cinco líderes, que no están de acuerdo sobre los méritos de ampliar la membresía, y mucho menos sobre los criterios para aceptar solicitudes.

    Fuentes oficiales le dijeron a Daily Maverick que China y Rusia, los dos miembros autocráticos de BRICS, están presionando para expandir la membresía, mientras que Brasil e India, democráticos, están cautelosos, y Sudáfrica está en la cuerda floja. Se cree que el fuerte impulso de Rusia para la expansión se debe en gran medida a su aislamiento de Occidente debido a su invasión de Ucrania, mientras que China busca aumentar su influencia geopolítica en medio de las crecientes tensiones entre Estados Unidos y China por Taiwán.

    Funcionarios y ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de BRICS han estado trabajando en los criterios de membresía, según la Ministra de Relaciones Internacionales y Cooperación de Sudáfrica, Naledi Pandor, y redactarán recomendaciones que serán consideradas por los líderes de BRICS durante la cumbre.

    Pandor había anunciado anteriormente que 23 naciones habían solicitado formalmente ser parte del bloque. El gobierno de Marruecos desde entonces ha negado haber solicitado la membresía y no asistirá a la reunión de alcance entre BRICS y África en la cumbre.

    LEA TAMBIEN : BRICS : Herido en su amor propio, Marruecos arremete contra Sudáfrica

    Un funcionario le dijo a Daily Maverick que Marruecos había preguntado sobre los criterios y procedimientos para unirse a BRICS. Parece que Pretoria podría haber interpretado esto como una solicitud de unión. Marruecos parece estar particularmente preocupado por la posibilidad de que Irán y Venezuela puedan unirse a BRICS.

    #BRICS #Rusia #China #India #Sudáfrica #Brasil

  • Hard attack of Medvedev against France president Macron

    Hard attack of Medvedev against France president Macron

    Tags : Russia, France, Ukraine, Macron, Medevedev, China,

    A certain person calling himself the president of France said that Russia had already lost geopolitically, and was transforming into the other countries’ vassal. The president of the Republic was obviously harmed by socializing with the Kiev junkie. He inhaled too much of the warm Paris air mixed with Ukrainian cocaine waste, that his guest was emitting. A geopolitical loss?

    It was back in 2022 that NATO was lazily shooing us away when the matter concerned the security guarantees. Like, leave us alone, no time for you. And now, all of the NATO member states go to bed at night, and wake up in the morning thinking of Russia. Moreover, some of the especially cowardly and suffering from phantom pains, like temporarily occupied Poland and our Baltic provinces, have well soiled themselves.

    So, if there has indeed been a loss, it is that of the primitive NATO politics, with its underlying ambition to play the exceptional role in the 21st century. Speaking of vassal dependence… Look who’s talking! Europe the beauty, including France, has turned into an elderly wench who is especially thoroughly satisfying all of the most perverted whims of Americans.

    And in the process, it is hurting its own economy and ordinary Europeans with masochistic lust.

    As they put it, tel maître, tel valet.

    #Russia #Ukraine #France #Macron #Medvedev

  • The announced end of Western hegemony

    Tags: Ukraine, Russia, China, United States, Europe, France, Emmanuel Macron, ammunition,

    by Djamel Labidi

    In the few months since the start of the war in Ukraine, the world has changed. Admittedly, the changes accumulated slowly, before they appeared all at once, under the thrusts given by Russia to the old world order and Western hegemony.

    Whatever happens, whether or not we agree with Russia’s action in Ukraine, the world will never be the same again. All the opposing camps agree to recognize this, the leaders of the Western world as well as those of the rest of the world.

    The West is naked

    Thanks to the war in Ukraine, the peoples of the world are discovering, flabbergasted, that the West is, militarily, naked. He does not have enough weapons to give to the Ukrainian regime. It has no stocks of light or heavy ammunition to oppose to a Russia which has a powerful war industry and which massively produces this ammunition as well as very varied armaments. It was the French general Thierry Bukhard who warned, recently, on February 26, in an interview with the French weekly “Le journal du dimanche”, against the shortage of ammunition in Western countries. The Financial Times reports that the German army’s arms stocks would be sufficient for only a few days, while the German Chief of Staff simply states that he has no army. . A large part of the “Leopard” tanks are broken down due to lack of maintenance. This is also the case for those purchased by European countries.

    In fact, all European armies are destitute and incapable of facing a high intensity war. This partly explains, alongside the fear of escalation, the procrastination in supplying arms to Ukraine. President Macron and his predecessors tried to mask, through contradictory declarations, the shortage of French weapons as soon as it was necessary to deprive themselves, in pain, for the benefit of Ukraine of guns and tanks, in reduced numbers , owned by France.

    Even the United States is struggling to supply the Ukrainian armed forces with ammunition. They went so far as to ask Israel and South Korea to supply them from their stockpiles of American weapons, while accusing the Russians of supplying them from North Korea. Do as I say and don’t do as I do.

    Western countries no longer have the same military status. Today, for example, when a delegation from the UK Ministry of Defense arrives in Algeria, as recently, the event is now trivial and goes virtually unnoticed. And when military delegations go to France to meet with their counterparts, we bet they must realize that the French army does not have much to offer to face a high intensity war. Times have changed.

    The Decline of Economic Hegemony

    No the West is no longer the same. Economically, China competes with the United States for the first place in the world economy. If we evaluate their reciprocal GDP in nominal dollars, China is still second, but if we evaluate it in purchasing power parity (PPP), it is already far ahead of the United States. The countries currently constituting the BRICS will represent, in 2030, 50% of the world’s GDP, not to mention those who will join them.

    Currently, Western propaganda tries to reassure itself by saying that Russia has a GDP of the order of that of Spain, but how then to explain its considerable military power and that it can face all the Western States. We must take into account here again the real economy and the production of material wealth. Moreover, in terms of GDP by purchasing power parity, Russia is the world’s sixth largest economy. In this new order that is taking shape, the new prospects for cooperation with and between the rest of the world, India, China, Russia, Brazil, Iran, Asia, Africa, Latin America now seem limitless. The dollar begins to lose its supremacy and with it the dictatorship of the Western financial system.

    The United States says that the war in Ukraine has united Europe and NATO. It’s wrong. It is exactly the opposite, at least in the medium and long term. The truth is that this war revealed and reinforced the total domination of the United States over Europe, the crushing of it by an extra-European power. It showed a Europe subject to the predominance of American interests. It is also one of the significant elements of the end, in perspective, of Western hegemony. That the United States manages to destroy, as the whole world suspects them, the Nord Stream gas pipeline, to definitively put an end to the supply of energy by this gas pipeline to Germany, one of their main allies, then that they impose on their ally prohibitive energy costs, which they thus weaken, without qualms, its economy, and that of other European States, for the sole benefit of theirs, this cannot be endured in the long term and can only leave traces. This is one of the aspects of the disarray and irresponsibility of American leaders in the context of the end of their unchallenged reign. If their responsibility is confirmed, they would thus have committed an act of extreme gravity, an act of sabotage, an act of international terrorism. It is surprising not to see this stressed enough in the West, and in the first place by the German leaders. Are they afraid of Americans? The Americans have thus opened Pandora’s box, at the risk of a situation of generalized chaos, where everyone would consider themselves entitled to destroy the gas pipelines and oil pipelines, the adversary’s submarine cables, telephone cables, cables internet communications, information highways. It seems, with the danger of a nuclear war, the most worrying event for the future.

    The Media

    One of the most obvious signs of the decline of Western hegemony is the degradation of communication and information ethics in many Western media. The evolution had begun in previous decades, at the same time as the United States asserted its unchallenged domination over the world. With the Ukrainian conflict, it has worsened terribly.

    Information is just propaganda. And the propaganda is brutal, coarse, caricatural, without nuance, and above all terribly aggressive. TV hosts, editorial writers, journalists, will give you without flinching, for the Russian losses, figures so enormous that they would suppose the disappearance of the Russian army. We insist that « Putin is lying », without saying about what and when he did not do what he said, We will carefully, regularly, revive the theme of Putin’s judgment when we know very well makes no sense. But the main thing is not there, it is a question of devaluing it and with it Russia, by seeking to inferiorize the country by implying that it is likely to be defeated and submitted, like the West. did for other countries.

    Astronomical figures are put forward for Putin’s personal fortune, with no proof being offered except for some bizarre videos of President Putin’s alleged properties, like glossy hotel flyers. Only the comment in Off says that this belongs to him. But what the hell would he do with a fortune he cannot enjoy given his visibility, his overwhelming responsibilities and his presence on all fronts. Coincidentally, the figures of his fortune put forward are around 300 billion dollars, exactly the amount of Russian state funds frozen by the United States and other European countries and which they would like to appropriate, and of which the he European Union and President Zelensky are loudly calling for the allocation to Ukraine “for its reconstruction”.

    We remember that the same techniques and the same themes had been used against Presidents Saddam and Kadhafi. Despite the difference in size and power of the adversary, this time Russia, we recycle them. Unawareness of the balance of power, delirium, or the desire to diminish the adversary? It all sounds like deja vu, deja vu. Similarly, the United States and its allies insisted that Saddam and Gaddafi were lying when they accepted UN terms and that supporters of the intervention feared that this would prevent it. In the same way, the theme of their trial was constantly evoked. In the same way astronomical figures of their personal fortune were given and which again strangely corresponded to the funds of the frozen Iraqi and Libyan states in the United States and elsewhere in the West. So when the peoples of the world remind the West of these conflicts about Ukraine, they don’t stray from the subject as Western leaders tell them with annoyance. The people are not mistaken. They simply indicate that the past explains the present, and that there is, there, the continuity of the same conflict, that led by the West to maintain its world hegemony. The people are not mistaken. They simply indicate that the past explains the present, and that there is, there, the continuity of the same conflict, that led by the West to maintain its world hegemony. The people are not mistaken. They simply indicate that the past explains the present, and that there is, there, the continuity of the same conflict, that led by the West to maintain its world hegemony.

    The worst horrors

    On the sets the worst horrors are told about Russia, without any restraint. Journalists spoke impassively of the 200,000 to 700,000 Ukrainian children deported to Russia, children “four years old! “raped. The only thing that hasn’t been said (yet?) is that the Russians are… cannibals.

    Western television sets have become places where we gossip, where we fantasize. Coherence, logic, likelihood do not matter, the imagination is limitless, we are faced with information as a whole, entirely conspiratorial. But there are sometimes hiccups, moments when the truth suddenly emerges, quite involuntarily. It was this French general, General Nicolas Richoux, who exclaimed, annoyed by certain reservations made in the United States by the Republican party on the financing of the war in Ukraine: « The American army is in the process of pay the Russian army for 5% of its budget (40 billion dollars out of 800 billion, NB), anyway! Who could be against such a result in the United States! (LCI news channel, January 7, 2023)

    To explain Putin’s great popularity among his people, the entire Western organic intelligentsia, academics, editorialists, civilian and military analysts obviously linked to pharmacies and other services, come to say that it is the spirit of Russian submission, characteristics of the Slavic soul. The Russian “political exiles”, of which each plateau wants to have a representative, are asked to confirm. They do it with alacrity. They even add more. Here, as elsewhere, throughout centuries of hegemony, the West has always produced this type of Westernist elites and the self-hatred they carry. This is proof that the Western ideology has functioned everywhere as a dominant ideology.

    « The True Lie »

    The Americans continue to spread throughout the West their new information techniques, those of the theory of the « true lie » (1), by virtue of which it is considered that « lies can be useful », when they can prevent a bad event. Thus China was accused of having the « intent » (emphasis the word) to supply arms to Russia and the United States said it was « convinced » (emphasis again) that the China provides satellite information to Wagner. Based on these conceptions of a virtual or potential truth, conclusions, predictions of a simple analysis, or simple hypotheses could be considered as information since they « could take place ». Listen carefully to the propaganda, and you will see that it is, for the most part.

    Where is the time of the major Western news organizations that served as a benchmark for their objectivity of facts, even in times of war. They diffused the Western influence among Westernized elites seduced by a freedom of tone and a quality of debates which existed little in their country.

    On the question of information, the West, and especially the Americans, are making a strategic error: that the media can do anything, and that it is simply a question of seizing the minds of the people. In this they are mistaken. Facts are stubborn. Opinion cannot be fabricated, and even less so against a nation’s own interests. The opinion of the rest of the world on the West is proof of this. It is hostile to the West despite the considerable effort of Western propaganda aimed at it. If in Western countries, this propaganda has an impact it is that many, in the population, still believe to find their interests, a benefit and privileges on other peoples through Western hegemony. But even there, many, more and more.

    Disarray

    In fact the West is in disarray. He has isolated himself, or more exactly he continues, blind, to isolate himself from the rest of the world. Even the terms he now uses reveal this isolation. He no longer speaks, or very rarely, of the international community. He no longer sees the world. The West is increasingly alone. The West unites with the West, and it applauds itself. President Zelensky’s last tour of the parliaments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Brussels, the European parliament, is a striking image of this. People rushed to take a photo with President Zelensky, people frantically applauded the toreador, the gladiator, while Ukrainians and Russians killed each other in Bakhmut.

    The West is shrinking more and more in on itself, without realizing it. . It no longer associates other countries of the world with its destiny. When he speaks of himself, he says the West outright, and sometimes even simply NATO. He makes a good separation between himself and the other nations of the world. He says he is crudely defending his interests. He sometimes adds, as the Ukrainian leaders do, the « civilized world », to distinguish it well from « barbarians », outbidding neophytes.

    The West is worried

    Today the West is worried. He watches every day for the slightest sign of divergence or estrangement between China and Russia, or of revolt in these countries. He shoots down…weather balloons.

    We are far from the great era of a West confident in itself, sure of itself, from the great era of Western ideology, where the West thought of itself as the world, where it claimed freedom, democracy, liberalism, where he was convinced of the power of the values ​​he proclaimed to solve all human problems.

    He made his own totems fall today. It has attacked the sacrosanct principle of private property by stealing the money entrusted to its banks by sovereign states and by confiscating the property of people for the sole reason that they are citizens of a foreign country. with which they nevertheless declare that they are not belligerent. He himself attacked his sacrosanct rule of « free and fair competition », cynically trampling it underfoot to suit his interests. He thus attacked the principle of freedom of expression and competition in matters of information, by prohibiting, from the start of the war in Ukraine, alternative means of information, and in particular the Russian media, that it once had the reputation that « it did not act like totalitarian states ». He is even thinking of supervising social networks. He attacked the principle of freedom of trade and economic exchanges, giving himself the sovereign right, outside of any decision of international law, to economically sanction countries and peoples, to prohibit ports and airports to their ships and their planes. In short, he himself denied all the values ​​that he said he wanted to spread in the world, and in the name of which he justified his armed interventions.

    Another sign of decline is that the West is no longer producing great leaders. Heads of State or Government like Joe Biden, Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz, Boris Johnson, Ms Liz Truss, etc. .obviously don’t have the stature of a Xi Jining, a Vladimir Putin, a Narendra Modi or an Erdogan, whatever one may feel about them. In Ukraine, it is an actor who has been deemed the most suitable for this role of head of state.

    The ruling elites of the West are out of a universalist project, a new vision of the future of the world. This vision is now found in the opposing camp, that of a world rid of all forms of hegemony, of a world freed from the dictatorship of the dollar and the blackmail of economic sanctions, a world of nations with equal rights, where the Sovereignty is the guarantee of mutual respect as well as the freedom of citizens, in short a world where international democracy allows the development of national democracy.

    The incessant Western references to democracy, freedom and human rights now appear as empty slogans, not very credible, a broken record that the non-Western world welcomes with a gaze that is both polite and doubtful. They are no longer successful except in Westernist minorities who subsist here and there. Although the West has pampered these elites, giving media coverage to their most loyal intellectual representatives, they no longer have any other function than to reassure them, thus blinding them to the new realities of the world.

    Another symptom of a chilly West, which closes in on itself, is this panicky fear of emigration. We are far from this serene West which demanded in Helsinki in 1975 the end of the « Iron Curtain », the opening of borders and the free movement of people. We are also a long way from the period when the Bushes could bring together 35 states, in the name of democracy, to attack Iraq.

    We are obviously living today in a period of profound historical change, perhaps the greatest that has occurred in the modern period. These periods of mutation, of transformation are the most dangerous. The end of Western hegemony would only be justice. It would be beneficial for everyone, including Western peoples whose relations would be normalized with other peoples.

    But we should not rejoice too much for the moment of this historical development. History has taught us how dangerous forces in decline are because they perceive it as a tragedy, as their end. Can humanity achieve this turning point without sinking into a global confrontation? For today’s world, at least for the most conscious leaders, all the questions of geopolitics come down to this one: To be or not to be.

    (1) The new information war or “the truth if I lie” by Djamel Labidi

    Source

    #West #United States #Russia #China #Ukraine

  • The U.S.-China rift is only growing wider

    Tags : USA, China, Russia, Ukraine,

    Analysis by Ishaan Tharoor

    Last month, the Chinese Foreign Ministry published a 4,000-word tract titled “U.S. Hegemony and Its Perils.” The document, which was sent out by the Chinese Embassy to journalists in Washington, including Today’s WorldView, purported to present the “relevant facts” of a near-century of American interference and meddling on the world stage. It’s a catalogue of grievances that casts the United States as a hypocritical superpower, advancing its own self-interests on the pretext of high-minded values, while leaving a trail of abuse and harm in its wake.

    Whatever the validity of these historical claims, the real Chinese animus is about the present. “Clinging to the Cold War mentality, the United States has ramped up bloc politics and stoked conflict and confrontation,” the document warned, echoing the near-constant refrain from Chinese officials about current U.S. policy.

    Just weeks prior, there had been glimmers of rapprochement between the two countries. The United States and China were readying for talks that would, in the White House’s words, help set “guardrails” on a rocky yet vital relationship. Chinese President Xi Jinping, it appeared, wanted to embark on his third term in power with a spirit of pragmatism, and had set about softening his country’s conspicuously aggressive “wolf warrior” foreign policy.

    Then a Chinese spy balloon came along and floated over the United States before getting shot down over the Atlantic Ocean. The incident seemed to close the window for a diplomatic opening and led to Secretary of State Antony Blinken scrapping a major trip to China. The days since have only seen a hardening of lines between Washington and Beijing.

    The pall over U.S.-China ties grew darker this week with official comments from Xi and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. On Monday, the Chinese president called out the United States as a rival power seeking to stymie China’s growth. The remarks, made to China’s top political advisory body during an annual legislative session, represented an unusually explicit public riposte of the United States by the Chinese leader.

    “Western countries — led by the U.S. — have implemented all-round containment, encirclement and suppression against us, bringing unprecedentedly severe challenges to our country’s development,” Xi said.

    The next day, Qin picked up the baton, pointing a finger at Washington’s supposed collision course with Beijing. “If the United States does not pump the brakes and continues to go down the wrong road, no number of guardrails will be able to stop [the relationship] from running off-road and flipping over, and it is inevitable that we will fall into conflict and confrontation,” he said at a news conference on the sidelines of China’s rubber-stamp parliament.

    White House national security spokesman John Kirby appeared to brush off Beijing’s rhetoric at a briefing Tuesday, indicating that there had been no real change in the status quo. “We seek a strategic competition with China. We do not seek conflict,” he told reporters. “We aim to compete and we aim to win that competition with China, but we absolutely want to keep it at that level.”

    Yet elsewhere in Washington, China may see a more hostile view. Last week, the new House select committee on China convened, trotting out a panel of experts who are mostly hawks on China while entertaining talk of effectively “decoupling” the world’s two largest economies. Matthew Pottinger, a former Trump administration official, told the lawmakers that they should acknowledge that China has been waging a form of a Cold War against the United States and that they themselves should not shy away from viewing the challenge posed by Beijing in such terms.

    The Chinese Communist Party “should be thought of as a hungry shark that will keep eating until its nose bumps into a metal barrier. Sharks aren’t responsive to mood music,” Pottinger said in his written testimony. “But nor do they take it personally when they see divers building a shark cage. For them it’s just business. It’s what they do. The more resolutely and unapologetically we take steps to defend our national security, the more that boundaries will be respected and the more stable the balance of power is likely to be.”

    More striking, perhaps, than this strident language is the bipartisan backing for this sort of approach toward China. In a capital marred by bitter polarization, there’s genuine consensus on the perceived threat posed by China. But a lack of rigorous high-level foreign policy debate may prove to be a problem, some analysts argue.

    “This isn’t an evidence-driven exercise to identify America’s long-term interests and how China relates to them,” a former U.S. official told Washington Post columnist Max Boot, referring to the House committee. “It is a propaganda exercise that Beijing would find easily recognizable.”

    For now, flash points abound. The United States and China see themselves at odds over the war in Ukraine, where the latter may yet choose to supply the flagging Russian war machine with lethal aid. Such a move will trigger an angry reaction from the United States and its allies, but Qin and other Chinese officials pointed to a supposed double standard, noting the United States’ long record of weapons sales to Taiwan. Tensions over the island democracy have spiked over the course of the war in Ukraine, while China’s relations with Europe have also soured as it continues to help prop up Russia’s sanctioned economy.

    Critics of Beijing’s widely derided peace plan for Ukraine see in some of its proposals — such as an end to Western military assistance to Kyiv — a template for the future conditions China may need to launch a successful invasion of Taiwan. “If Taiwan, like Ukraine, can draw on extended external military equipment, training, and real-time intelligence support, all bets are off,” wrote Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, referring to the prospects of a Chinese amphibious invasion. “And so, Beijing remains focused on degrading the ability of international actors to inject strategic risk into Chinese decision-making, as well as on exploiting cleavages among U.S. allies.”

    Other experts argue Washington needs to lower the temperature with China for its and Taiwan’s own sake. “Efforts to reduce Beijing’s sense of urgency over Taiwan could help limit the degree of China-Russia alignment, strengthening the overall U.S. strategic position,” wrote Jessica Chen Weiss, a China scholar at Cornell University. “And Taiwan needs more time to muster the resources and political will to develop an asymmetric, whole-of-society defense.”

    Ultimately, Xi and Qin’s remarks this week were as much political as they were geopolitical. Faced with a slumping economy battered by the pandemic, Xi and his cadres are attempting a sweeping overhaul of China’s financial system and government bureaucracy.

    “Xi Jinping’s comment about containment may heighten tensions with the United States, but he is mainly speaking to a domestic audience,” Andrew Collier, managing director of Hong Kong-based Orient Capital Research, told the New York Times. “He’s trying to foster the country’s high-tech firms both for economic growth and to handle decoupling at a time when China is facing severe economic headwinds. Beating the nationalist drum is a politically savvy way to achieve these goals.”

    Source

    #USA #China #Russia #Ukraine

  • Ukraine. Are the Europeans in war with Russia?

    Tags : European Union, USA,

    (B2) One year after the start of Russia’s massive military intervention in Ukraine (February 24, 2022) and the equally massive European support for Ukraine, we can legitimately ask the question today. Elements of reflection .

    To see clearly… let’s take the definition of Clausewitz, the modern war theorist: “ war is 1. an act of violence whose 2. objective is to compel the adversary to carry out our will (…) To achieve this end with certainty 3. we must disarm the enemy ”. War leads to climbing “ to extremes ”, it is a question of having an “ unlimited use of force ”, but also of having a “ calculation of the efforts ” necessary and a “ measured escalation ”.

    Are these elements (objective, means, tempo) met? To get to the bottom of it, let’s examine the means implemented by the Europeans (and more generally by the Allies).

    1. Political will . The designation of the adversary is very clear. Russia, its government, are explicitly designated as the initiator of the conflict:  » an unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine « , an  » invasion  » according to the established terminology. She is considered responsible for most war crimes, on orders, and even for genocide. And its leaders must be judged for their deeds. Hence the idea of ​​an international tribunal or a special tribunal to judge its leaders.

    The objective of compelling the adversary to carry out the will is also clear. The Europeans regularly affirm their desire to “ increase the collective pressure on Russia so that it ends its war and withdraws its troops ”. They say just as regularly alongside Ukraine: “ the EU will support Ukraine and the Ukrainian people against [this] war […] as long as it takes ”.

    And the goal of this pressure is also clear: the liberation of all the territory within “ its internationally recognized borders ”. In other words: all of Donbass, even Crimea. The Europeans recalling their “ unwavering attachment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within [these] borders ”. NB: the quotes, taken from the joint declaration at the EU-Ukraine summit on February 3, will be repeated this Thursday (February 9) at the European summit in Brussels in the presence of Ukrainian President V. Zelensky.

    A position of the Atlantic Alliance. If the Allies (Europeans and Americans) have designated Russia as an adversary, they have avoided doing so in a too conspicuous way. But this is a political trick. It is indeed the Atlantic Alliance as a political being, linking the various European countries that are members of NATO and related countries (Finland, Sweden, etc.) which is committed today alongside the Ukrainians just as much as the European Union and its Member States. With one singular exception: Turkey.

    2. Economic pressure . She is very clear, strong and assumed. With almost ten sanctions packages (the last of which should be presented if not approved by February 24), the objective is not just to send a political signal. It is a question of laying down part of the Russian economic and technological resources. It is about undermining Russia’s military capacity to act in Ukraine, or at least slowing down its efforts, by cutting off all European financial and economic flows. In short, to  » disarm  » it in the classic sense of the term, but by « peaceful » means, soft power: the economy, by cutting off its supplies.

    3. The massive military support assumed . This support involves a wide range of equipment: from ammunition to fighter aircraft parts, including portable missiles, tanks, artillery support, air defense, or gasoline, … the Allies have gradually increased, and above all assumed, this military assistance.

    The amount today is negligible. We have reached almost €12 billion on the European side alone. That is one billion € per month on average. This is roughly half of the equipment budget of the French army. €3.6 billion of which is jointly financed via the European Peace Facility (EFF).

    The recent decision by Berlin and Washington to deliver Leopard and Abrams tanks (read: The Allies will equip a Ukrainian armored brigade. The Leopard tank club gets underway ), and London the Challengers is not in itself revolutionary. It is part of a continuum that began from the start with the delivery of Soviet-made heavy tanks (type T-72, more than 400 delivered).

    The novelty lies elsewhere: it lies rather in the media coverage and in the asserted desire to act in coalition. Where before, each country had a varying policy of media coverage — from Latin discretion to Polish-British excess. And where everyone was careful to specify that these were national decisions.

    4. Strong support in the training of the Ukrainian army . This support is not anecdotal. Europeans and other allies (United Kingdom and USA) want to train several Ukrainian brigades to prepare them in an express time (two months maximum per rotation) for combat.

    A massive effort unmatched in modern times! On the European side, the target of 15,000 (by May) at the start has been raised to 30,000 trained men by the fall of 2023. Ditto on the British and American sides. The objective is indeed to provide the Ukrainian forces with the manpower necessary to face a Russian offensive as well as to replenish its troops lost in combat (about 100,000 men dead or wounded out of action).

    5 . Intelligence support . Discretion is required in this area. But it is proven. European (French, German, British) and American satellite resources are used to provide valuable information to the Ukrainian forces.

    It is part of the Allied intelligence power placed at the service of the Ukrainians which allows them to have a complete perception of the combat zone, with its own field « sensors » (human intelligence in particular), quite effective (of the Ukrainian baba with his mobile phone which informs local sources to analysts). Ukrainian intelligence benefits from European analysts on the spot.

    Officially, there is no ground troop commitment . And the Europeans are careful not to deceive them on this point. If there are Europeans engaged alongside the Ukrainians in the troops, these are individual acts. And the presence of special forces, particularly in the context of intelligence or “training” support, remains underground (this is the very principle of these forces: neither seen nor known). But there are indeed “liaison officers” with the Ukrainian forces, in order to facilitate not only the delivery of materials and equipment, but also to try to coordinate the strategy.

    6. Place Ukraine beyond the reach of Russian influence.This political, military and economic pressure on Russia is coupled with a political and economic will to “snatch” Ukraine from Russian domination and influence. A desire that began gently in 2014 with the signing of an association agreement which today is coupled with a promise of membership of the European Union. An accelerated process! With the declaration of the recognition of candidate country in a few months. All accompanied by net financial support (approximately €1.5 billion per month in budgetary support, €18 billion for 2023), via the association of Ukraine at accelerated speed with European instruments. We are thus witnessing an urgent reorientation of the Ukrainian networks (train, electricity, road, etc.) to the European networks, until the insertion of Ukraine into the space ofEuropean telephone roaming .

    The war. .. or peace

    If we go back to the classic definition of war given by Clausewitz, we see that certain elements are there: the goal of  » compelling the adversary to carry out our will « , the  » seeking to overthrow the adversary « , to  » disarm « , the  » calculation of the necessary efforts « , etc. But there remains a notable absence all the same: it cannot be said that there is an act of “ violence ” on the part of the Europeans towards Russia nor of a desire to “ unlimited use of force ”.

    Without being belligerent — the notion of co-belligerent is very vague: one is belligerent or not — the Europeans are therefore halfway to belligerency, clearly alongside a party at war (Ukraine), using all the instruments at their disposal (except military force) against its adversary (Russia). Without any ambiguity. But they cautiously stay below the war line, confining themselves to self-defense.

    The final objective sought by the Europeans is not the overthrow of the regime in Russia (see box), but its withdrawal from Ukraine. It is thus a singular difference compared to the definition of the traditional war. It would rather be hybrid warfare: use all means, staying below the limit of open warfare. In fact, to the open war launched by the Russians, the Europeans and Allies reacted by hybrid means.

    It should be noted, however, that in the history of modern Europe, to my knowledge, never have Europeans committed themselves so clearly and so massively in favor of one country against another. Even during the Yugoslav wars, even if there was support, it remained more or less discreet (especially for military support). The military intervention in Kosovo under cover of NATO is an exception. But it was short and limited in space, and was not marked by confrontation with a member of the UN Security Council endowed with nuclear power.

    (Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

    Source

  • Stop the logic of war

    Stop the logic of war

    Ukraine, Russia, China, Taïwan, OTAN, nuclear war, United States, USA, NATO, West,

    On the occasion of September 21, the International Day of Peace, we must recognize that the international situation is currently evolving in an extremely dangerous direction. The world urgently needs disarmament and a de-escalation of the rhetoric of confrontation.

    For the past seven months, Russia’s war in Ukraine has been raging, bringing the country to the brink of destruction. Russia is also indirectly confronting NATO. All this is happening against the backdrop of a potential radioactive disaster at the Zaporizhia power plant, the largest in Europe.

    In April, it was announced that the new AUKUS military alliance – which has included Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. for the past year, with a view to equipping Australia with nuclear submarines – would also develop hypersonic weapons, which will probably be pointed at China.

    In June, the NATO summit in Madrid adopted a new Strategic Concept that stigmatized Russia as « the most important threat…to the Euro-Atlantic area » and China for its « coercive policies that are contrary to our interests, security and values.

    In August, China responded to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s provocative visit to Taiwan with large-scale live-fire exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan.

    Also in August, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference ended in abject failure, failing to reach consensus on a text that in any case would have done nothing to commit the nuclear-weapon states to a concrete disarmament process they committed to pursue « in good faith » 52 years ago!

    A discourse that masks reality

    According to our leaders, the growing tensions in the world can only be blamed on Russia and China. This discourse is not only simplistic, but hypocritical. For if they claim to be defenders of international law in the case of Ukraine, Western countries have themselves attacked Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria. If they are defenders of the right to self-determination in Taiwan, they are not at all in favor of it for Palestine, the Donbass, the Western Sahara, Catalonia, etc. And they are ready to defend democracy and human rights… except in the many authoritarian countries that are their allies.

    Their main principles are only levers of their foreign policy, to be operated when it serves their interests. And the instantaneous information in which we are immersed – which provides neither historical context nor proof of the facts – simply echoes the indignant denunciations of our leaders and thus confirms public opinion in a posture of moral superiority of the West.

    But what is the point of all this theater and what exactly is China being reproached for, since it is above all in the crosshairs of the United States? In the new Strategic Concept adopted by all NATO countries, we read that China « uses a wide range of political, economic and military tools to strengthen its presence in the world and project its power… It seeks to gain control over key technological and industrial sectors…. It uses economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and increase its influence.

    In short, as a major economic power, China is adopting many of the same actions that were previously the sole preserve of the United States. In essence, the threat posed by China is that the United States will no longer be the sole ruler of the world, a prerogative it intends to retain at all costs… even at the cost of putting humanity at risk.

    Imminent nuclear danger

    As early as 1946, Albert Einstein stated: « The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything except our ways of thinking, and we are thus sliding towards an unprecedented catastrophe. » Our leaders, on the other hand, are showing total unconsciousness by pushing us more and more into a logic of confrontation with China and Russia, when a war between nuclear powers should be absolutely unthinkable.

    Not only do they think about it, but they talk about it openly. « For us, it is only a matter of time, » the director of intelligence of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command recently said. On May 23, and again last Sunday, President Biden said the United States would use force to defend Taiwan if China attacked.

    Not only are they thinking about it, they are talking about it openly. « For us, it’s just a matter of time, » the director of intelligence for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command recently said. On May 23, and again last Sunday, President Biden said the United States would use force to defend Taiwan if China attacked.

    Not only are they talking about it openly, they believe they can win such a war! For example, one of the four main priorities of the U.S. Defense Strategy (2022) reads: « Deter aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflicts if necessary, prioritizing the challenge of the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific, followed by the challenge of Russia in Europe. »

    A warlike escalation

    The war in Ukraine has created millions of new refugees and internally displaced persons. Elsewhere in the world, it has contributed to a significant increase in the rate of inflation, which is hitting the most vulnerable populations particularly hard, and risks leading to a food crisis.

    Moreover, in terms of the climate crisis, the war in Ukraine and the threat of war in Taiwan are leading to significant setbacks: on the one hand, a return to coal in Germany and plans for increased oil and gas development, particularly in Canada and the United States; and, on the other, the suspension of climate change negotiations between China and the United States, the world’s two largest GHG emitters.

    It is not only urgent to decarbonize human activity on the planet, but also to put an end to the logic of war, the bellicose rhetoric under humanitarian pretexts and the astronomical military expenditures that accompany them.

    One of the slogans of the climate justice movement is « Change the system, not the climate ». Let us also reject the logic of war inherent in this system. It is a matter of survival for humanity.

    Le Devoir, 21/09/2022

    #Russia #China #Ukraine #West #Europe #Nuclear_war #NATO

  • Algeria’s Foreign Policy: Facing a Crossroads

    Algeria’s Foreign Policy: Facing a Crossroads

    Algeria, USA, China, Russia, Spain, France, gas,

    by Vasilis Petropoulos

    The ongoing war in Ukraine, with its recrystallization of allegiances, can provide Algeria the opportunity to return from a shift towards Russia and China back to a more balanced relationship with great powers.

    USA: From Strategic Partnership to Irrelevance

    In many ways, Algeria’s most direct foreign relations with the United States and Western European countries are focused squarely on its northern neighbors of Spain and France. Yet as the unmatched superpower of the last three decades, the United States has had some type of impact on almost every country’s foreign policy decisions. Foreign direct investments, military aid, and access to American technology are just some of the tools Washington uses to entice its partners and shape their policies abroad. In many cases, securing such ‘gifts’ has become the driver of many countries’ foreign policy, gradually growing the ‘pro-American’ camp.

    Algeria, though never unequivocally ‘pro-American’ or officially aligned with the West, is no exemption to this rule. After espousing a ‘subjective neutrality’ in the Cold War era—leaning towards the communist bloc while remaining in the non-alignment movement—Algeria followed the tide of the post-Soviet unipolar world and deepened its ties with the West.

    This decision came about less as an ideological shift than due to economic opportunities much needed in the years after the Algerian Civil War (1991-2002). Capitalizing on its geostrategic position, its regional cache as an exemplar of revolutionary struggle against colonial rule, and its considerable military capabilities, Algeria subsequently demonstrated its geostrategic value to Washington. Algiers played a significant role in providing intelligence and assisting in counterterrorism operations targeted against Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and, later, ISIS, thus playing a pivotal part in the ‘war on terror.’

    In return, Algiers received large amounts of financial aid and training from its transatlantic partner and the U.S.-Algerian relationship appeared to be on the ascent. Instead, the neutralization of the Daesh threat in 2017, coupled with Trump’s advent to power and his administration’s ‘America First’ approach focused on historical partners and rivals constituted an unfavorable conjuncture for Algeria.

    The relationship clearly degraded when Trump decided to recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara over claims of the Polisario Front, Algeria’s strategic ally in checking Morocco. In return, Morocco entered the Abraham Accords, recognizing Israel—Washington’s crucial ally in the Middle East. Both U.S. and Moroccan decisions struck at the heart of Algiers’s national security and foreign policy concerns. The concurrent domestic turmoil of the Hirak movement in 2019 did not leave much space for foreign policy priorities, leaving the new government with little political capital to give a concrete response to this massive diplomatic failure by Algiers’ standards.

    Contrary to Algerian expectations that the Biden administration would change course, no reversal of this decision emerged, and the sour relations between Washington and Algiers have not improved since 2020. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that they are currently at their lowest point. This nadir, paired with the recent fallout with France and the simultaneous rupture with Spain over the colonial past of the former and the latter’s new approach to the Western Sahara question have all brought Algiers towards unprecedented isolation from the Western world. In turn, this isolation has resulted in Algeria reinforcing its bonds with revisionist powers and downgrading those with the West, a fact that is showcased by Algiers’ punitive attitude and growing intransigence towards France and Spain.

    Russia and China: Open Arms

    Over the past two years, the informal alliance of Russia and China have proved happy to bring Algeria closer in response, providing Algeria with a ticket to ‘de-isolation.’ These ties go back decades; Algiers and Moscow have shared a strong bond since the former’s independence and have built a close partnership. Through a 2006 Memorandum of Understanding, Russia’s Gazprom has also helped Algeria’s state-owned Sonatrach to evolve its LNG output.

    Security relations are especially close; Algeria is dependent on Russian arms imports, buying 81% of its military equipment from Russia over the last three years and serving as Russia’s third arms largest importer, after India and China. During the 2010s, Russian arms exports increased by 129% percent from the previous decade. In 2022, Algeria is Russia’s third largest arms client only behind India and China. Algeria and Russia have conducted joint military exercises in disputed areas, such as South Ossetia in October 2021, and have agreed to perform a similar activity on the Algerian borders with Morocco in November 2022—an agreement made during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

    Not only did Algiers acquiesce to this military exercise amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but its diplomats also refused to condemn Moscow in the UN in March, notwithstanding Algeria’s historical adherence to the principle of state sovereignty. In exchange, Russia supports Algeria in the Western Sahara issue—understood as a way to counter Morocco’s alliance with the United States—and it has forgiven billions of dollars of Algerian debt.

    Similar to the Russian-Algerian ties, the warm relations with China date back to the Cold War era, especially the Mao Zedong period. Recently, Beijing’s global ambitions buttressed by its mammoth Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project has brought China at the doorsteps of various countries around the world with partnership and investment proposals. North Africa was included in China’s global reach and Algeria is willing to further expand Beijing’s footprint as the latter’s most invaluable regional partner.

    China has already heavily invested in infrastructure in Algeria and trade flow between the two old friends has skyrocketed over the last decade. Chinese businesses in the energy and construction sectors are multiplying on the Algerian soil, while Algiers is a partaker in the BRI project. As part of this project in Algeria, Beijing and Algiers have agreed on a $3.3 billion project for the construction of the first deep-water port in Algeria in the coast town of Cherchell, west of the Algerian capital. The port of El Hamdania will be the second largest deep-water port in Africa. Finally, yet importantly, China is gradually becoming a significant arms exporter to Algeria. Since 2018, Algeria has received or ordered around twenty Chinese reconnaissance and combat drones of assorted classes. In 2018 for example, five Rainbow CH-3 and five Rainbow CH-4 drones were delivered to Algeria and as recently as January 2022, the latter ordered six Rainbow CH-5 Chinese drones that constitute the most advanced version of the series.

    To sum up, Algeria’s interest in its relations with China and Russia are not new developments. Yet Algeria’s perception of Washington as overtly and continually backing Morocco over itself is pushing Algeria further into the open arms of Russia and China and distancing its former ties with the other camp. Both states are happy to exploit Algiers’s disappointment and sense of isolation. By tapping into the old cold war bonds, the two have proved eager to sever Algeria’s policy of balance between them and the West and bring Algiers firmly into the revisionist camp. This strategy seems to have borne fruits so far: Algeria grows more assertive in its relations with the West, as the ongoing diplomatic crisis with Spain shows.

    Rebalancing: Opportunities and Challenges

    While Algeria is trying to curb domestic instability and navigate a changing geopolitical landscape, there are diplomatic opportunities and challenges it should consider before being sucked into this revisionist camp by inertia.

    To begin with, the Russian invasion in Ukraine might have triggered numerous global ripple effects, such as food insecurity, but it has also generated opportunities for Algiers that may help it deal with the ‘isolation challenge’ it has faced with Western states over the past few years.

    In the wake of the invasion, the West demonstrated more unity than any other moment after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The response to Putin’s act of aggression was so uniform and radical that the western countries seemed to rally around a common objective of safeguarding the post-Cold War liberal international order against Russia’s assertive revisionism. However, other actors such as China and Iran have embraced this revisionism and are backing Russia, either explicitly or implicitly.

    In its effort to counter this revisionist bloc, the West needs every possible ally and Algeria can use this card to gain from both sides. Algeria has been presented with the opportunity to become relevant in the eyes of the United States once again while keeping channels of communication open with Russia, China, and Iran, at the same time. In other words, Algeria can adopt a foreign policy akin to that successfully employed by India, i.e., unfettered and non-aligned.

    Furthermore, the war in Ukraine offers Algeria numerous energy-related opportunities. Spiking oil and gas prices have helped to generate high rents to the energy-dependent Algerian economy, which has suffered from the dive in oil prices during the Covid-19 pandemic. Europe has made it clear that it aims to replace the Russian oil and gas imports with LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) and crude oil imports from other partners, with many planned LNG terminals on the horizon.

    Algeria, a longtime energy exporter to southern Europe, therefore has the chance to increase its sales to the whole continent dramatically. By doing so, Algiers will benefit both economically and diplomatically, since it will acquire reinvigorated importance in Washington’s agenda as a crucial partner to Europe’s quest for energy independence, something the U.S. has long prioritized. In fact, Algeria has already harnessed this new dynamic by signing a mammoth energy deal with Italy in April 2022. The agreement will render Algeria Italy’s largest gas supplier, supplanting Russia’s hold on this position for many years.

    Apart from addressing its isolation in the Mediterranean, Algiers must restore its ties with France and Spain to benefit the country’s fragile economy. It urgently needs to access large European markets to profit from the soaring energy prices and to exploit the West’s aspirations to end Russia’s quasi-monopoly on energy exports to Europe. The latter will also bring Washington’s attention back to the region. It’s a fine line—Algeria must also address its economy’s over-dependency on the oil sector and the economic precariousness that this entails. Like other victims of the ‘Dutch disease,’ exports become more expensive and its imports cheaper resulting in the decay of other crucial sectors of the economy.

    Algeria’s challenge in managing its energy exports is also linked with the galloping domestic demand for energy. The conditions are ideal for Algiers to embark on a rally of energy exports in order to fully recover from the economic regression triggered by Covid-19, but it should do so without neglecting the considerable increase in the country’s population every year, which will translate into growing energy demand domestically.

    Nevertheless, a reset with Algiers’ northern neighbors is in order. For such a rapprochement with France and Spain to occur, Algeria should temper the nationalist discourse that permeates its foreign policy with pragmatism and emphasize on the benefits it can reap through further robust trade agreements with its European energy partners. Nor can the thawing Franco/Spanish-Algerian relations be a one sided effort. On their end, Madrid and Paris should also appease Algiers by refraining from raising controversial and sensitive issues, against the latter, and by not publicly siding with Morocco on the Western Sahara issue.

    In France’s case, Champs Elysées seem to understand that and appear willing to take steps towards the easing of tensions. President Macron’s recent appeal to his Algerian counterpart demonstrates the French desire for rapprochement. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Algerian independence, the French leader sent a letter to President Tebboune calling for the ‘strengthening of the already strong Franco-Algerian ties’.

    Algeria is perhaps in the most critical period in its diplomatic history since the end of the civil war in the 1990s. Pressing challenges on one side and promising opportunities on the other form the current geopolitical environment. Algeria must recognize this, and that as the war in Ukraine continues to reshape broader multilateral relations, Algiers must determine whether it maintains neutrality or drifts further into the revisionist camp—a decision that will affect its position in the regional and the international systems.

    Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 09/08/2022

    #Algeria #USA #Russia #China #Gas #Petrol

  • Implications of Europe’s Turn to Mediterranean Gas

    European Union, gas, Russia, Algeria, Western Sahara, Morocco, Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Egypt, Qatar,

    With Strings Attached: Implications of Europe’s Turn to Mediterranean Gas
    Samuel Bruning and Dr Tobias Borck

    In its efforts to wean itself off Russian energy supplies, Europe is increasingly looking to its southern neighbourhood. But this comes with its own set of geopolitical challenges.

    As heatwaves hit Europe, governments across the continent are already worrying about a cold winter and a deepening energy crisis. Since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine five months ago, European countries have been scrambling to reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas imports, not least to limit one of Moscow’s most important sources of revenue. Yet, they also fear that Russia could beat them to the punch and cut off energy flows to Europe before alternative sources have been secured. Russia has already stopped supplying gas to Poland, Bulgaria and Finland, and reduced deliveries to Germany, Italy and other European states.

    As Europe searches for alternatives to Russian gas, debates about fracking are re-emerging, and discussions about if and when Europe can import more liquified natural gas (LNG) from leading exporters such as the US and Qatar are drawing much attention. Additionally, European states are turning to old and new gas producers in the eastern and western Mediterranean, lured not least by the promise of short supply routes along which pipelines already exist or could feasibly be constructed.

    In the eastern Mediterranean, Israel is emerging as a major gas producer. In June, the EU, Israel and Egypt agreed to work on a partnership that could eventually see Israeli gas be transformed into LNG in already existing Egyptian gas liquification plants before being shipped to Europe. Meanwhile, further west, Algeria, a longstanding gas producer that already sends about a quarter of its gas to Spain, signed a deal with Italy in May to increase its supplies to Europe.

    Neither arrangement represents a quick fix. It will likely take years for the necessary infrastructure in Europe, Israel and Algeria to be built and for the latter two to sufficiently increase their production capacity to even begin to replace the volumes of gas Europe imports from Russia. Just as importantly, both deals tie Europe more closely to complex and potentially explosive geopolitical contexts. If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions; considering their strategic implications for European security is therefore vital.

    Israeli Gas, Hizbullah’s Drones and the Egyptian Economy

    The eastern Mediterranean has long been a highly contested space. Just over the past decade, the overlapping rivalries and shifting alignments among the region’s states – Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey – have shaped (and been shaped) by the conflicts in Libya and Syria, and between Israel and the Palestinians, to name but a few. At various times, these conflicts have repeatedly drawn in extra-regional powers, including European states, Russia, the US and even Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

    With the gas deal with Israel and Egypt, the EU has increased its own stake in this complex environment beyond the obligations it already had to its member states of Cyprus and Greece. Two aspects are particularly important to consider.

    If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions

    Firstly, with the agreement, the EU wades into the longstanding maritime border dispute between Israel and Lebanon. The offshore Karish Field, from which the gas destined for Europe is supposed to come, is adjacent to the area that both countries claim to be part of their own exclusive economic zone. The US government has appointed a Special Envoy, Amos Hochstein, to mediate in the dispute, but negotiations have been progressing slowly – if at all – in recent months.

    Buckling under an unprecedented economic crisis and a dysfunctional political system, the Lebanese state’s capacity to effectively engage on these matters is somewhat limited at the moment. But Hizbullah, which suffered a setback in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in May, appears to see the border dispute and the international spotlight on gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean as a useful opportunity to bolster its anti-Israeli credentials. On 2 July, Israeli authorities said that they had shot down three Hizbullah drones approaching a gas rig at Karish.

    Hizbullah later said the drones had been unarmed and were part of a reconnaissance mission, but the incident certainly illustrated the volatility of the situation in the area. This does not have to deter Europe from seeking to expand energy trade with Israel or other eastern Mediterranean producers, but the obvious political risks must be taken into account in Brussels and should inform thinking about future security arrangements in the region.

    Secondly, the EU–Israel–Egypt gas agreement comes at a time when policymakers across Europe are increasingly concerned about Egypt’s economic stability. Hit hard by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, particularly with regard to food security, the Egyptian government is struggling to contain a potentially burgeoning economic crisis. While macro-economic growth figures have remained relatively strong, inflation and soaring food and energy prices are causing increasing strain. Scarred by the experience of the political instability that gripped the Middle East and North Africa in the aftermath of the 2010/11 Arab Uprisings, and in particular the migration crisis triggered and facilitated by the violent conflicts in Syria and Lebanon, renewed instability in Egypt represents a nightmare scenario for many European governments.

    The gas agreement should bring some economic benefits for Egypt, but not necessarily in a way that will help to address poverty and Egypt’s other related socio-economic challenges. The EU will therefore have to ensure that the energy deal is part of a more comprehensive engagement with Cairo that seeks to increase the resilience of the Egyptian economy through reform.

    Algerian Gas, Morocco and the Western Sahara

    In the western Mediterranean, meanwhile, Algeria has long been an important gas supplier for Europe. Spain has imported Algerian gas via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which runs through Morocco, since 1996, and via the undersea Medgaz pipeline since 2011. However, relations between Madrid and Algiers, including the energy trade between the two countries, have persistently been affected by the conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara, which Morocco claims as its territory, while Algeria supports the Polisario Front that seeks Sahrawi independence. Over the past two years, tensions have steadily grown.

    New partnerships with Mediterranean energy producers must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are

    In 2021, Algeria decided to end exports via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline and therefore cut off supplies to Morocco, planning instead to expand the capacity of the Medgaz pipeline. Subsequently, in March 2021, Algiers was angered by Spain’s reversal of its position on the Western Sahara. Having previously been mostly neutral on the territory’s status, insisting that it was a matter for the UN to resolve, Madrid endorsed Rabat’s plan to retain sovereignty over the Western Sahara while granting it autonomy to run its domestic affairs. The move was to a significant extent motivated by Spain’s need to deepen cooperation with Morocco to contain migration, particularly to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melita.

    As things stand, Algeria has said that it will continue to supply Spain with gas via the Medgaz pipeline. But its Ambassador to Madrid, whom Algiers withdrew in March, has not returned. Moreover, the Algerian government has repeatedly warned Spain not to re-export gas it receives from Algeria to Morocco, which has struggled to make up for shortages caused by the termination of flows via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline.

    The new deal concluded in May between Italy’s energy giant ENI and Algeria’s national oil company Sonatrach has to be considered within this context. Even if Italy may find it easier to avoid becoming embroiled in the Algeria–Morocco dispute, the tensions in the Algeria–Spain relationship demonstrate that energy trade in the western Mediterranean cannot be divorced from the geopolitical realities in North Africa.

    Searching for a European Position

    In the search for non-Russian energy supplies, Europe is rightly looking to its southern neighbourhood. Algeria, Israel and Egypt – and perhaps, in time, other (re)emerging Mediterranean energy producers and transit countries such as Libya and Turkey – can all play an important role in increasing the continent’s energy security. However, these new energy partnerships must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are. More than mere commercial transactions, they tie Europe more closely into local conflict dynamics – be it between Israel, Lebanon and Hizbullah, or between Algeria and Morocco. They should therefore be embedded in a clear-eyed and strategic European approach to the EU’s southern neighbourhood.

    In May, the EU published its new Gulf strategy, which offers at least a conceptual framework for how European governments intend to balance expanding energy relations with the Gulf monarchies with other interests, ranging from economic engagement to human rights concerns. The document is far from perfect, and it remains far from certain if and when many of its ambitious intentions will be implemented. But if the EU wants to become a more serious geopolitical actor and increase its resilience to political shocks such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, developing similar strategies for the eastern and/or western Mediterranean is necessary.

    The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 25 July 2022

    #European_Union #Gas #Russia #Algeria #Morocco #Western_Sahara #Israel #Egypt #Qatar #Lebanon #Hezbollah

  • Guerra digital en Ucrania

    Guerra digital en Ucrania

    Ucrania, guerra digital, Russia, China, Estados Unidos,

    La de Ucrania es la primera guerra viralizada, con un número de actores online sin precedentes tomando parte en la confrontación. Las grandes plataformas tecnológicas se han convertido, además, en instrumentos del conflicto: recogiendo y compartiendo datos con gobiernos, controlando la información, apuntándose a los boicots internacionales, eliminando cuentas de redes sociales, o actuando como instrumentos de movilización y emocionalidad. Ucrania puede convertirse en el primer frente bélico donde miden sus fuerzas las dos grandes tendencias globales de digitalización y sus plataformas: el tecnoautoritarismo de Rusia y China, y el modelo estadounidense del Silicon Valley.

    Si los mapas siempre son esenciales en cualquier conflicto, en la guerra de Ucrania hay toda una batalla de imágenes y (des)información librándose en las redes sociales. Un número de actores online sin precedentes están tomando parte en esta confrontación asimétrica, desde voluntarios de Anonymus a rastreadores digitales, los equipos de ciberdefensa de la OTAN, o el recién creado equipo cibernético de respuesta rápida de la Unión Europea, dirigido desde Lituania. Las grandes plataformas tecnológicas -sin distinción de origen, desde el Silicon Valley, a Rusia o China- se han convertido en instrumentos del conflicto: recogiendo y compartiendo datos con gobiernos, hackeando webs o controlando la información, apuntándose a los boicots internacionales, eliminando cuentas de redes sociales, o actuando como instrumentos de movilización y emocionalidad. Pero, sobre todo, la de Ucrania es la primera guerra viralizada; retransmitida en tiempo real a partir de fragmentos de imágenes que, en pocos segundos, intentan reflejar amenazas, miedos, heroicidades y devastación.

    Durante las primeras semanas, The Washington Post pudo rastrear el movimiento de las tropas rusas en Ucrania utilizando solo videos subidos a TikTok por usuarios que iban compartiendo imágenes de tanques y soldados de manera cada vez más viral, hasta el punto que The New Yorker bautizó la invasión de Ucrania como “la primera guerra de Tik Tok”. La aplicación china con más de mil millones de usuarios, convertida en la red social de las coreografías virales familiares en plena pandemia, se ha erigido ahora en fuente de información para centenares de miles de jóvenes, que siguen las imágenes de la guerra de Ucrania deslizando el dedo por sus teléfonos móviles. Avanzando indiscriminadamente entre la emocionalidad, las escenas bélicas y los memes, la realidad y la ficción se mezclan. Uno de los vídeos sobre Ucrania que más ha circulado por las redes, con más de siete millones de visualizaciones, donde se ven soldados fatigados despidiéndose de sus familias, resultó ser una escena de una película ucraniana de 2017.

    Tik Tok se ha convertido en una fuente de galvanización de apoyo para los ucranianos, pero también en un terreno fértil para la proliferación de cuentas fraudulentas que distribuyen contenido falso con el objetivo de conseguir dinero rápido a través de vídeos que pedían donaciones para la causa ucraniana. Los creadores de contenido en esta red pueden recibir obsequios virtuales, como rosas y pandas digitales, durante las transmisiones en vivo y convertirlos en Diamantes, una moneda de TikTok que luego se puede retirar como dinero real. TikTok cobra una comisión del 50 por ciento sobre el dinero gastado en regalos virtuales. Todo el sistema ha quedado en evidencia por los deficientes controles de moderación de contenido y el negocio que hay detrás de la viralización de ciertos videos.

    Confrontación tecnológica

    Los gigantes tecnológicos de Estados Unidos ejercen también de actores privados en esta guerra, alineados con la estrategia occidental, ya sea para la presión política (como Apple suspendiendo las ventas de iPhone y otros productos en Rusia) o para la captura y control tanto de datos como de información (desde el mapeo a la censura). Ante la consciencia de que Google Maps podía ser empleado como una herramienta de guerra más, tanto por el bando ruso como por el ucraniano, a la hora de confeccionar las estrategias militares, Google decidió desactivar temporalmente esta funcionalidad en esta parte del mundo. Además, el paquete de sanciones aprobadas por Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea incluye un boicot a las exportaciones tecnológicas. Microsoft, Apple, Samsung, Oracle o Cisco se han negado, desde entonces, a vender servicios en Rusia o han cerrado sus operaciones en ese país.

    Esta colaboración se extiende también al terreno de la seguridad. A mediados de enero, mientras Rusia concentraba tropas y armamento en la frontera rusa al este de Ucrania, un ataque informático bautizado como el WhisperGate inhabilitó durante horas unas 70 páginas webs del gobierno ucraniano, que acabaron mostrando un mensaje que conminaba a “tener miedo y esperar lo peor”. Después del hackeo, Microsoft decidió compartir su análisis y los detalles técnicos del ataque, así como recomendaciones a los afectados para aumentar su capacidad de resistencia.

    Otra empresa de ciberseguridad fundada en Kíev en 2017, Hacken, ha armado un ejército de hasta 10.000 hackers en 150 países distintos, según sus propias declaraciones, dedicados a irrumpir en las plataformas de medios rusos y a amplificar las narrativas ucranianas del conflicto a través de las redes sociales.

    Si esta es, como afirma el centenario filósofo francés, Edgar Morin, “la primera ciberguerra en la historia de la humanidad”, Ucrania puede convertirse en el primer frente bélico donde miden sus fuerzas las dos grandes tendencias globales de digitalización: el tecnoautoritarismo y el modelo estadounidense del Silicon Valley, donde las corporaciones privadas despliegan el llamado “capitalismo de vigilancia” que denuncia Shoshana Zuboff.

    Mucho antes de la invasión, el mundo digital ya había empezado a bifurcarse en una confrontación tecnológica marcada por la rivalidad entre China y Estados Unidos. La “soberanía” rusa de internet ya se construía sobre la censura de la información y la persecución de la oposición política. Los aliados del Kremlin controlaban VKontakte, el Facebook ruso, y desde 2019 la ley sobre la soberanía de internet ya obligaba a todos los proveedores de servicios online a pasar por los filtros del censor digital Koscomnadzor. Y, a pesar de ello, la guerra ha acelerado y profundizado el alcance de este telón de acero digital que pretende aislar a los rusos de cualquier narrativa que se aleje del argumentario oficial del Kremlin para la construcción de su casus belli.

    En un escenario tan polarizado de guerra informativa, donde la censura y la emocionalidad narrativa se han convertido en una parte esencial del relato de bélico, la apuesta comunitaria por la supresión de determinados medios, así como la instrumentalización de los grandes monopolios digitales en favor de su propia estrategia, plantean también contradicciones con la idea de libertad de expresión defendida por unos y otros.

    El mismo fundador y CEO de la red de mensajería encriptada rusa, Telegram, Pável Dúrov, ha advertido a los internautas que “duden de tota la información” que puedan encontrar en la plataforma y ha pedido explícitamente a los usuarios que no se utilice la herramienta para “exacerbar conflictos e incitar a la discordia interétnica”. Telegram se ha convertido en un instrumento perfecto para medir el choque de narrativas sobre la guerra. La plataforma se ha posicionado en los últimos tiempos como una herramienta de información muy útil para los periodistas en Ucrania, sobre todo para la creación de canales de noticias especialmente dirigidos a una audiencia menor de 25 años que ha dejado de escuchar la radio o ver la televisión tradicional. A diferencia de WhatsApp, Telegram no limita el número de usuarios en un mismo canal y, al mismo tiempo, como no hay casi moderación de contenidos, también ha funcionado como espacio de movilización del apoyo a las tropas rusas, como demuestra la capacidad de penetración del canal “Intel Slava Z”.

    Si, según los expertos, el estancamiento militar sobre el terreno puede acelerar la ciberguerra, a corto plazo, la estrategia rusa sigue centrada en la censura y el control del relato: en el poder de la conocida como granja de trolls rusa, la Internet Research Agency con sede en San Petersburgo, y en su capacidad para crear contenido y orquestar reacciones organizadas.


    En el súmmum de la confusión, una investigación de Pro Publica ha demostrado como, en la guerra de Ucrania, se ha dado incluso la paradoja de utilizar falsos verificadores que aparentemente desmentían fakes inexistentes. Los investigadores identificaron al menos una docena de vídeos denunciando supuestas campañas de propaganda ucraniana que nunca se produjeron. El objetivo, según los expertos, sería implantar la duda ante cualquier imagen posterior que denunciara el impacto de supuestos ataques rusos.

    Dilemas éticos y estratégicos

    La batalla por el control del relato se libra también desde la propia Unión Europea, consciente desde hace tiempo de la capacidad de penetración e influencia rusa sobre la opinión pública europea. A petición de Bruselas, Google, Meta y Twitter decidieron tomar medidas contra las cuentas vinculadas al Kremlin para evitar la diseminación de desinformación, y especialmente el acceso a contenidos de canales oficiales rusos como RT y Sputnik; Apple retiró la app de RT News de su tienda y YouTube bloqueó el canal de noticias ruso. Anunciar la prohibición de las emisiones de RT y Sputnik en la Unión Europea no solo es políticamente arriesgado sino también difícil de imponer legalmente.

    En un escenario tan polarizado de guerra informativa, donde la censura y la emocionalidad narrativa se han convertido en una parte esencial del relato de bélico, la apuesta comunitaria por la supresión de determinados medios, así como la instrumentalización de los grandes monopolios digitales en favor de su propia estrategia, plantean también contradicciones con la idea de libertad de expresión defendida por unos y otros.

    La guerra híbrida expande el impacto disruptivo de una confrontación que va más allá de los avances militares rusos y la capacidad de resistencia ucraniana. Se despliega a través de la desinformación y en cada intento de infección con software malicioso de infraestructuras y vías de comunicación. Bots, trolls o troyanos, todo vale para debilitar al enemigo.

    Carme Colomina, investigadora principal, CIDOB @carmecolomina

    BARCELONA CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, mayo 2022

    #Ucrania #Rusia #EstadosUnidos #EEUU #Guerra_digital