Western Sahara, Morocco, UN, MINURSO, Frente Polisario, UN SG report,
Most firing incidents across the berm reported to MINURSO by the parties were concentrated in the north of the Territory, near Mahbas. According to MINURSO calculations based on the reported incidents, the incidents of firing reported by the parties have steadily decreased since January 2021. While MINURSO was not able to independently confirm the number and location of the reported firing incidents, their impact remained the subject of divergent claims.
MINURSO continued to note reports of strikes conducted by Royal Moroccan Army unmanned aerial vehicles east of the berm. In some instances, media reports indicated that civilian casualties had occurred as a result of the aerial strikes. Due to the time needed to receive authorization from the parties to visit these sites, MINURSO was only able to independently confirm that casualties had occurred on one occasion, on 16 November 2021 in the Mijek Area. Additionally, MINURSO observed traces of human remains at four other sites.
Low-intensity hostilities in the Mission area between the Royal Moroccan Army and Frente POLISARIO continued throughout the reporting period and continued to impact MINURSO’s aerial and ground activities. The presence of unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war also constituted a potential threat to UN personnel, assets and resources.
The Mission introduced preventive measures to address security concerns. Ground patrols and helicopter reconnaissance flights west of the berm maintained a safe distance from the live-fire areas. East of the berm, existing restrictions to ground patrols and helicopter reconnaissance flights also contributed to a lower security risk. Flights that did occur were carefully coordinated with both sides. The assessed residual risk to United Nations personnel, operations and assets was considered medium in Laayoune and Tindouf, but high in the areas west and east of the berm outside of Laayoune.
The presence of drug smugglers and other criminal elements in the Territory, as well as the risk of possible terrorist attacks, remained of concern.
Morocco and Frente POLISARIO retained primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel, assets and resources west and east of the berm, respectively, and MINURSO continued to have confidence in the commitment and capability of both parties.
During the reporting period, seven road traffic accidents involving Mission personnel were recorded, with an accident near Laayoune on 7 July 2022 resulting in one fatality and several injuries amongst Mission personnel. In Tindouf the situation remained stable with one incident of harassment against UN staff reported.
Lack of access to areas near the berm continued to pose significant challenges to MINURSO observation activities and the mission’s ability to obtain first-hand information and to verify reported developments on the ground. My Special Representative remained unable to meet with Frente POLISARIO representatives in Rabouni, in line with established practice.
Constraints to the MINURSO logistical supply and maintenance chain to Team Sites east of the berm continued to have increasingly serious consequences for the Mission’s ability to sustain its field presences in the austere and difficult conditions of the Territory. This negatively affected the delivery of fuel; the repair and maintenance of rapidly degrading critical equipment, installations and accommodations and the rotation of vehicles and transportation of heavy equipment that cannot be airlifted. It curtailed the Mission’s efforts to implement the UN Environmental Sustainability Strategy and also significantly impacted life support, including food, bulk water and fuel resupply.
In early August, MINURSO faced an interruption to the resupply of fuel to its Team Sites east of the berm following an incident on 2 August during which a Frente POLISARIO water truck used to supply bulk water to MINURSO was destroyed by a reported aerial strike in the vicinity of the MINURSO Team Site in Agwanit. MINURSO UNMAS experts visited the site of the incident on 4 August and observed one water truck with damage consistent with the use of an air-to-ground munition. On 4 August, the Frente POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO wrote to my Special Representative stating that “the Frente POLISARIO [had] no other option but to reconsider the existing arrangements with MINURSO including the assurances given to the Mission to carry out its regular passenger and logistic flights and other operations.” As a result, deliveries of fuel to all the Team Sites east of the berm were interrupted. Without re-supply, fuel reserves in at least two Team Sites east of the berm were estimated by MINURSO to reach critically low levels by early September. High level interventions by MINURSO and the Secretariat with both parties were activated alongside efforts to find alternative options to enable the continued operation of the Team Sites. On 24 August, the Royal Moroccan Army wrote to MINURSO conveying its assurances, “exceptionally” for “one-time only”, for the refuelling of all five TeamSites east of the berm.
I remain deeply concerned by the developments in Western Sahara. The resumption of hostilities between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO remains a major setback to the achievement of a political solution to this longstanding dispute. Daily incursions into the buffer strip adjacent to the berm and hostilities between the parties in this area violate its status as a demilitarized zone that should instead remain a cornerstone of a peaceful solution to the situation of Western Sahara. The continued lack of an effective ceasefire threatens the stability of the region, with a risk of escalation while hostilities persist. The conduct of aerial strikes and firing across the berm continues to contribute to increasing tensions.
Despite this challenging context, it remains my belief that a political solution to the question of Western Sahara is possible provided that all concerned engage in good faith and there is continued support from the international community. The United Nations remains available to convene all those concerned with the issue of Western Sahara in the search of a peaceful solution. The efforts by my Personal Envoy provide an opportunity that I urge all to seize. Strong political will is required to find a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the selfdetermination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with resolutions 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), 2548 (2020) and 2602 (2021).
To that end, I urge all concerned to approach the facilitation of the process by my Personal Envoy with an open mind, and to desist from preconditions for the political process. In guiding present and future approaches, due consideration should be given to the precedents set by my previous Personal Envoys in the framework of existing Security Council resolutions.
I regret to note that lack of trust continues to permeate the region. In the Territory, ongoing unilateral assertive actions and symbolic gestures are a source of enduring tension and have a negative impact on the situation. I encourage the parties to focus on the strong interests they have in common and urge them to refrain from escalating the situation further through rhetoric and actions.
As I reaffirm the crucial role of neighbouring states in the achievement of a solution to the question of Western Sahara, I reiterate the expression of my concern at the deteriorated relations between Morocco and Algeria. I encourage the two countries to re-establish dialogue towards the mending of their relations and renewed efforts aimed at regional cooperation, including with a view to an environment conducive to peace and security.
MINURSO has operated in a fundamentally changed operational and political context since the resumption of hostilities and has undertaken a wide range of efforts to adapt to the new circumstances, particularly with a renewed emphasis on operational planning. However, continued restrictions to freedom of movement have led to the inability of MINURSO to safely access areas at or near the berm or the buffer strip and operate a safe and reliable logistics, maintenance and resupply chain to Team Sites east of the berm. Fully restoring the ability of MINURSO to observe the situation in the entire Territory and to provide critical maintenance to its Team Sites east of the berm is intrinsic to its sustainability and as urgent as ever. I strongly urge the Frente POLISARIO to remove all restrictions to the free movement of MINURSO military observers, ground convoys, air assets and personnel east of the berm. It also remains essential that the Royal Moroccan Army refrain from conducting military activity that might directly or indirectly impact MINURSO operations east of the berm. I am concerned that, without full freedom of movement, MINURSO may soon be unable to sustain its presence east of the berm.
I welcome the resumed engagement between Morocco and my Special Representative and urge Frente POLISARIO to resume regular contacts in person with the MINURSO leadership, both civilian and military.
I remain concerned about the continued suspension of regular mine action operations east of the berm with the exception of ground patrol route clearance, emergency services and support of MINURSO investigations at sites of suspected aerial strikes. I am encouraged, however, by the signalled willingness by both parties to allow resumption of demining operations and call on both parties to reach a final agreement with MINURSO in this respect that enables the resumption of this lifesaving work. I also call on both parties to engage with the MINURSO Mine Action Service to facilitate the removal of landmines and explosive remnants of war throughout the Territory in adherence to international humanitarian mine action standards.
I would like to express my appreciation to the Mission’s troop-contributing countries for their support to MINURSO’s efforts to achieve full gender balance among its military observers, in line with the objectives of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. I remain convinced that the increased participation of women in peacekeeping improves the performance of United Nations peace operations and strengthens their effectiveness.
I reiterate my sincere gratitude to Morocco, Frente POLISARIO and Algeria for their cooperation to address the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular for the generosity of Morocco and Algeria for continuing to provide vaccines to the civilian and military staff of MINURSO.
I am concerned about the further deteriorating humanitarian situation in the refugee camps near Tindouf. Living standards for the vulnerable camp-based refugees worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of the rise in global food and fuel prices and supply chain disruptions. As a result, the situation is becoming increasingly alarming with serious short-term threats on refugee population’s food security and access to basic services. I thank the international community and the Government of Algeria for its assistance to the Sahrawi refugees and wish to echo the call of UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP to the international community to renew efforts and provide additional and urgent support to bring an appropriate response to this emergency.
I also remain concerned about the continued lack of access of OHCHR to the Territory. I once again reiterate my call to the parties to respect, protect and promote the human rights of all people in Western Sahara, including by addressing outstanding human rights issues and enhancing cooperation with OHCHR and the United Nations human rights mechanisms, and to facilitate their monitoring missions. Independent, impartial, comprehensive and sustained monitoring of the human rights situation is necessary to ensure the protection of all people in Western Sahara.
MINURSO remains the main and often sole source of impartial information and advice to me, the Security Council, the Member States and the Secretariat concerning developments in and related to the Territory. It continues to fulfil this role despite the increasingly serious challenges it faces in a fundamentally changed operational and political environment and integrated strategic planning capabilities that are insufficient to respond to the current situation on the ground. MINURSO represents the commitment of the United Nations and the international community towards achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict in Western Sahara in accordance with resolutions 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), 2548 (2020) and 2602 (2021). I therefore recommend that the Councilextend the mandate of MINURSO for another year, until 31 October 2023.
I commend my new Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, for his efforts since taking up his duties. I also thank my Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO, Alexander Ivanko as well as the former Force Commander, Major General Zia Ur Rehman and Acting Force Commander, Commodore Faustina Boakyewaa Anokye for their dedicated leadership ofMINURSO. I also wish to remember and honour former Deputy Force Commander Brigadier General Constance Emefa Edjeani-Afenu, who passed away suddenly on 24 January 2022 shortly after leaving the Mission on 19 December 2021, for her distinguished leadership and dedicated service to the United Nations. Finally, I thank the men and women of MINURSO for their continued commitment, under difficult and challenging circumstances, to fulfilling the Mission’s mandate.
Morocco, UN, Ban Ki-moon, Tchad, Idriss Déby, MINUSMA, Mali, RCA, République Centrafricaine, MINUSCA,
Morocco received an email containing the minutes of the UN Secretary General’s meeting with Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno. The confidential mail was sent by a certain Isam Taib, of the Africa II Division, DPA.
Among the secrets revealed by French hacker Chris Coleman is also a document containing language elements that the UN chief should raise in this meeting
Here is the full text of the mail as well as the document hacked by the Moroccan secret services.
Chad I T [izmtyb@gmail.com] Date d’envoi : vendredi 26 septembre 2014 18:30 meeting with H.E. Mr. Idriss Déby Itno, President of the Republic of Chad, Held at United Nations Headquarters On 23 September 2014 at 18:15 pm
Present:
The Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Idriss Déby Itno, Ms. Malcorra Mr. Ladsous Mr. Koenders President of the Republic of Chad H.E. Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad Mr. Abdelaziz Mr. Zerihoun Ms. Guebre Selassie Ms. Rubira Mr. Taib (Note taker) H.E. Mr. Gali Ngote Koutou, Minister, Director of Cabinet of the President H.E. Mr. Cherif Mahamat Zene, Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations Mr. Ahmat Abdrahman Haggar, Diplomatic Adviser of the President
Key points raised:
The Secretary-General reiterated his condolences for the recent loss of Chadian peacekeepers in northern Mali and commended Chad for its important contribution to the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). He reassured Chad that their concerns would be addressed and encouraged Chad to continue supporting stabilization efforts in Mali. President Déby Itno reiterated Chad’s full commitment to continue supporting stabilization efforts in Mali and called on the United Nations to do more to address their concerns in relation to the conditions of their troops in northern Mali.
The Secretary-General expressed concern over the threat posed by terrorism and sought President Déby Itno’s assessment of the situation in north-eastern Nigeria. President Déby Itno expressed serious concern over the threat posed by Boko Haram and stressed the need to implement the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel to combat the spread of this phenomenon.
The Secretary-General commended Chad for its active contribution, as Chair of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and member of the Security Council, to resolve the ongoing crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR). He encouraged Chad to continue to support stabilization efforts in CAR and to cooperate with the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). President Déby Itno highlighted that Chad would continue to support stabilization efforts in the Car and indicated that the deployment of Chadian soldiers to the country was not an option.
President Déby Itno raised serious concern over the situation in Libya.
Summary of Discussion
1. The Secretary-General reiterated his sincere condolences for the recent loss of Chadian peacekeepers in northern Mali. He indicated that Chad had shown courageous leadership and set a strong example for peace and security in the region through its important contribution to the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). He expressed the UN’s appreciation for the excellent performance of Chadian soldiers within MINUSMA and commended Chad for its role in support of the Malian peace process. He underlined that the UN was determined to provide support to the Chadian contingent by improving the situation in their bases and through the provision of additional equipment. He informed the Chadian delegation that the United Nations is exploring options to increase the number of armored vehicles, pre-deployment training and collaboration with the French operation “Barkhane”. He announced that the UN would dispatch a high-level delegation to N’Djamena, Chad, to discuss these issues.
2. President Idriss Déby Itno indicated that, while Chad was shocked by the recent killing of its soldiers, it would remain committed to pursue its cooperation with the United Nations. He deplored the “very bad” management of Chadian peacekeepers located in the most volatile and difficult regions of the north of Mali (Aguelhok, Tessalit and Kidal). He called on the UN to improve the living conditions of Chadian soldiers and to take necessary measures to enhance their protection. He suggested that a rotation of troops within MINUSMA be established to allow Chadian peacekeepers to be regularly redeployed out of this “hardship zone”. President Déby Itno insisted on the need to implement the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel to tackle the spread of terrorism and to prevent further recruitment by these groups. He indicated that the promises made by the World Bank and the UN to the people of the region needed to materialize.
3. The Secretary-General encouraged President Déby Itno to work with national stakeholders to ensure that progress achieved in peace consolidation is further strengthened in the country.
4. The Secretary-General expressed concern about the threat posed by Boko Haram and sought Chad’s views on the situation in north-eastern Nigeria and its impact on peace and stability in the region.
5. President Déby Itno indicated that he was very pessimistic about the situation in north-eastern Nigeria, adding that the Nigerian army did not have the means to contain Boko Haram. He was very concerned with Boko Haram’s new tactics of conquering territories, expanding its activities into Cameroon, and increasing recruitment. He also expressed serious concern about Boko Haram’s allegiance to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
6. The Secretary-General commended Chad for its active contribution, as Chair of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and member of the Security Council, to resolve the ongoing crisis in CAR. He also welcomed the initial role played by Chadian soldiers to stabilize CAR and invited Chad to continue to cooperate and render support to stabilization efforts in CAR.
7. President Déby Itno welcomed the launch of MINUSCA’s operations and stated that the recent resumption of economic activity in Bangui was a good sign. He regretted that the Government had little influence beyond Bangui and indicated that more dialogue was needed. He warned against pushing for elections in the CAR and stressed the need to support the ongoing transition, including financially, to allow for the expansion of state authority throughout CAR. Concerning the anti-Balaka, he mentioned the need to confine these groups to barracks and to begin DDR operations as soon as possible. He indicated that the deployment of Chadian soldiers to CAR was not an option, adding that Chadian public opinion was adamantly against it. He added that Chad was however ready to support CAR, including through the training of its soldiers and officials.
8. resident Déby Itno expressed serious concern over the ongoing situation in Libya.
Maroc, ONU, Ban Ki-moon, Tchad, Idriss Déby, MINUSMA, Mali, RCA, République Centrafricaine, MINUSCA,
Le Maroc a reçu un email contenant le compte-rendu de la réunion du Secrétaire Général de l’ONU avec le président tchadien Idriss Déby Itno. Le courrier confidentiel a été envoyé par un certain Isam Taib, de l’Africa II Division, DPA.
Parmi les secrets dévoilés par le hacker français Chris Coleman se trouve aussi un document contenant des éléments de langage que le Chef de l’ONU devrait soulever dans cette réunion.
Voici le texte intégral du courrier envoyé par la source marocaine ainsi que le document subitlisé par les services secrets marocains.
Chad I T [izmtyb@gmail.com] Date d’envoi : vendredi 26 septembre 2014 18:30 rencontre avec S.E.M. Idriss Déby Itno, Président de la République du Tchad, Tenue au siège des Nations Unies Le 23 septembre 2014 à 18h15
Sont présents :
Le Secrétaire Général S.E. M. Idriss Déby Itno, Mme Malcorra M. Ladsous M. Koenders Le Président de la République du Tchad S.E. M. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Tchad M. Abdelaziz M. Zerihoun Mme Guebre Selassie Mme Rubira M. Taib (Preneur de notes) S.E. M. Gali Ngote Koutou, Ministre, Directeur du Cabinet du Président S.E. M. Cherif Mahamat Zene, Représentant permanent du Tchad auprès des Nations Unies M. Ahmat Abdrahman Haggar, Conseiller diplomatique du Président.
Principaux points soulevés :
Le Secrétaire général a réitéré ses condoléances pour la perte récente de soldats de la paix tchadiens dans le nord du Mali et a félicité le Tchad pour son importante contribution à la Mission intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA). Il a assuré le Tchad que ses préoccupations seraient prises en compte et l’a encouragé à continuer à soutenir les efforts de stabilisation au Mali. Le Président Déby Itno a réitéré l’engagement total du Tchad à continuer à soutenir les efforts de stabilisation au Mali et a appelé les Nations Unies à faire plus pour répondre à leurs préoccupations en ce qui concerne les conditions de leurs troupes dans le nord du Mali.
Le Secrétaire général s’est dit préoccupé par la menace que représente le terrorisme et a demandé au Président Déby Itno son évaluation de la situation dans le nord-est du Nigeria. Le président Déby Itno s’est dit très préoccupé par la menace que représente Boko Haram et a souligné la nécessité de mettre en œuvre la stratégie intégrée des Nations unies pour le Sahel afin de lutter contre la propagation de ce phénomène.
Le Secrétaire général a félicité le Tchad pour sa contribution active, en tant que président de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC) et membre du Conseil de sécurité, à la résolution de la crise actuelle en République centrafricaine (RCA). Il a encouragé le Tchad à continuer à soutenir les efforts de stabilisation en RCA et à coopérer avec la Mission intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République centrafricaine (MINUSCA). Le Président Déby Itno a souligné que le Tchad continuerait à soutenir les efforts de stabilisation en RCA et a indiqué que le déploiement de soldats tchadiens dans le pays n’était pas une option.
Le président Déby Itno s’est dit très préoccupé par la situation en Libye.
Résumé des discussions
1. Le Secrétaire général a réitéré ses sincères condoléances pour la récente perte de soldats de la paix tchadiens dans le nord du Mali. Il a indiqué que le Tchad avait fait preuve d’un leadership courageux et montré un exemple fort pour la paix et la sécurité dans la région grâce à son importante contribution à la Mission intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA). Il a exprimé la reconnaissance de l’ONU pour l’excellente performance des soldats tchadiens au sein de la MINUSMA et a félicité le Tchad pour son rôle de soutien au processus de paix malien. Il a souligné que l’ONU était déterminée à apporter son soutien au contingent tchadien en améliorant la situation dans leurs bases et en leur fournissant des équipements supplémentaires. Il a informé la délégation tchadienne que les Nations unies étudient les possibilités d’augmenter le nombre de véhicules blindés, la formation préalable au déploiement et la collaboration avec l’opération française « Barkhane ». Il a annoncé que l’ONU enverrait une délégation de haut niveau à N’Djamena, au Tchad, pour discuter de ces questions.
2. Le Président Idriss Déby Itno a indiqué que, si le Tchad était choqué par le récent assassinat de ses soldats, il resterait déterminé à poursuivre sa coopération avec les Nations Unies. Il a déploré la « très mauvaise » gestion des casques bleus tchadiens situés dans les régions les plus volatiles et difficiles du nord du Mali (Aguelhok, Tessalit et Kidal). Il a appelé l’ONU à améliorer les conditions de vie des soldats tchadiens et à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour renforcer leur protection. Il a suggéré qu’une rotation des troupes au sein de la MINUSMA soit mise en place pour permettre aux casques bleus tchadiens d’être régulièrement redéployés hors de cette « zone de difficultés ». Le président Déby Itno a insisté sur la nécessité de mettre en œuvre la stratégie intégrée des Nations unies pour le Sahel afin de lutter contre la propagation du terrorisme et d’empêcher de nouveaux recrutements par ces groupes. Il a indiqué que les promesses faites par la Banque mondiale et l’ONU aux populations de la région devaient se concrétiser.
3. Le Secrétaire général a encouragé le Président Déby Itno à travailler avec les parties prenantes nationales pour faire en sorte que les progrès réalisés dans la consolidation de la paix soient encore renforcés dans le pays.
4. Le Secrétaire général s’est dit préoccupé par la menace que représente Boko Haram et a demandé l’avis du Tchad sur la situation dans le nord-est du Nigeria et son impact sur la paix et la stabilité dans la région.
5. Le président Déby Itno a indiqué qu’il était très pessimiste quant à la situation dans le nord-est du Nigeria, ajoutant que l’armée nigériane n’avait pas les moyens de contenir Boko Haram. Il s’est dit très préoccupé par les nouvelles tactiques de Boko Haram, qui consiste à conquérir des territoires, à étendre ses activités au Cameroun et à accroître le recrutement. Il s’est également dit très préoccupé par l’allégeance de Boko Haram au soi-disant État islamique d’Irak et du Levant (ISIL).
6. Le Secrétaire général a félicité le Tchad pour sa contribution active, en tant que président de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC) et membre du Conseil de sécurité, à la résolution de la crise actuelle en RCA. Il a également salué le rôle initial joué par les soldats tchadiens pour stabiliser la RCA et a invité le Tchad à continuer à coopérer et à apporter son soutien aux efforts de stabilisation en RCA.
7. Le Président Déby Itno a salué le lancement des opérations de la MINUSCA et a déclaré que la récente reprise de l’activité économique à Bangui était un bon signe. Il a regretté que le gouvernement ait peu d’influence au-delà de Bangui et a indiqué que davantage de dialogue était nécessaire. Il a mis en garde contre l’organisation d’élections en RCA et a souligné la nécessité de soutenir la transition en cours, y compris financièrement, afin de permettre l’expansion de l’autorité de l’État dans toute la RCA. Concernant les anti-balaka, il a mentionné la nécessité de confiner ces groupes dans des casernes et de commencer les opérations de DDR dès que possible. Il a indiqué que le déploiement de soldats tchadiens en RCA n’était pas une option, ajoutant que l’opinion publique tchadienne s’y opposait catégoriquement. Il a ajouté que le Tchad était cependant prêt à soutenir la RCA, notamment par la formation de ses soldats et de ses fonctionnaires.
8. le résident Déby Itno a exprimé sa profonde inquiétude quant à la situation actuelle en Libye.
Morocco, UN, Ban Ki-moon, Tchad, Idriss Déby, MINUSMA, Mali, RCA, République Centrafricaine, MINUSCA,
Morocco received an email containing the minutes of the UN Secretary General’s meeting with Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno. The confidential mail was sent by a certain Isam Taib, of the Africa II Division, DPA.
Among the secrets revealed by French hacker Chris Coleman is also a document containing language elements that the UN chief should raise in this meeting
Here is the full text of the mail as well as the document hacked by the Moroccan secret services.
Meeting with H.E. Mr. Idriss Déby Itno
Chad I T [izmtyb@gmail.com] Date d’envoi : vendredi 26 septembre 2014 18:30 meeting with H.E. Mr. Idriss Déby Itno, President of the Republic of Chad, Held at United Nations Headquarters On 23 September 2014 at 18:15 pm
Present:
The Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Idriss Déby Itno, Ms. Malcorra Mr. Ladsous Mr. Koenders President of the Republic of Chad H.E. Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chad Mr. Abdelaziz Mr. Zerihoun Ms. Guebre Selassie Ms. Rubira Mr. Taib (Note taker) H.E. Mr. Gali Ngote Koutou, Minister, Director of Cabinet of the President H.E. Mr. Cherif Mahamat Zene, Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations Mr. Ahmat Abdrahman Haggar, Diplomatic Adviser of the President
Key points raised:
The Secretary-General reiterated his condolences for the recent loss of Chadian peacekeepers in northern Mali and commended Chad for its important contribution to the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). He reassured Chad that their concerns would be addressed and encouraged Chad to continue supporting stabilization efforts in Mali. President Déby Itno reiterated Chad’s full commitment to continue supporting stabilization efforts in Mali and called on the United Nations to do more to address their concerns in relation to the conditions of their troops in northern Mali.
The Secretary-General expressed concern over the threat posed by terrorism and sought President Déby Itno’s assessment of the situation in north-eastern Nigeria. President Déby Itno expressed serious concern over the threat posed by Boko Haram and stressed the need to implement the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel to combat the spread of this phenomenon.
The Secretary-General commended Chad for its active contribution, as Chair of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and member of the Security Council, to resolve the ongoing crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR). He encouraged Chad to continue to support stabilization efforts in CAR and to cooperate with the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). President Déby Itno highlighted that Chad would continue to support stabilization efforts in the Car and indicated that the deployment of Chadian soldiers to the country was not an option.
President Déby Itno raised serious concern over the situation in Libya.
Summary of Discussion
1. The Secretary-General reiterated his sincere condolences for the recent loss of Chadian peacekeepers in northern Mali. He indicated that Chad had shown courageous leadership and set a strong example for peace and security in the region through its important contribution to the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). He expressed the UN’s appreciation for the excellent performance of Chadian soldiers within MINUSMA and commended Chad for its role in support of the Malian peace process. He underlined that the UN was determined to provide support to the Chadian contingent by improving the situation in their bases and through the provision of additional equipment. He informed the Chadian delegation that the United Nations is exploring options to increase the number of armored vehicles, pre-deployment training and collaboration with the French operation “Barkhane”. He announced that the UN would dispatch a high-level delegation to N’Djamena, Chad, to discuss these issues.
2. President Idriss Déby Itno indicated that, while Chad was shocked by the recent killing of its soldiers, it would remain committed to pursue its cooperation with the United Nations. He deplored the “very bad” management of Chadian peacekeepers located in the most volatile and difficult regions of the north of Mali (Aguelhok, Tessalit and Kidal). He called on the UN to improve the living conditions of Chadian soldiers and to take necessary measures to enhance their protection. He suggested that a rotation of troops within MINUSMA be established to allow Chadian peacekeepers to be regularly redeployed out of this “hardship zone”. President Déby Itno insisted on the need to implement the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel to tackle the spread of terrorism and to prevent further recruitment by these groups. He indicated that the promises made by the World Bank and the UN to the people of the region needed to materialize.
3. The Secretary-General encouraged President Déby Itno to work with national stakeholders to ensure that progress achieved in peace consolidation is further strengthened in the country.
4. The Secretary-General expressed concern about the threat posed by Boko Haram and sought Chad’s views on the situation in north-eastern Nigeria and its impact on peace and stability in the region.
5. President Déby Itno indicated that he was very pessimistic about the situation in north-eastern Nigeria, adding that the Nigerian army did not have the means to contain Boko Haram. He was very concerned with Boko Haram’s new tactics of conquering territories, expanding its activities into Cameroon, and increasing recruitment. He also expressed serious concern about Boko Haram’s allegiance to the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
6. The Secretary-General commended Chad for its active contribution, as Chair of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and member of the Security Council, to resolve the ongoing crisis in CAR. He also welcomed the initial role played by Chadian soldiers to stabilize CAR and invited Chad to continue to cooperate and render support to stabilization efforts in CAR.
7. President Déby Itno welcomed the launch of MINUSCA’s operations and stated that the recent resumption of economic activity in Bangui was a good sign. He regretted that the Government had little influence beyond Bangui and indicated that more dialogue was needed. He warned against pushing for elections in the CAR and stressed the need to support the ongoing transition, including financially, to allow for the expansion of state authority throughout CAR. Concerning the anti-Balaka, he mentioned the need to confine these groups to barracks and to begin DDR operations as soon as possible. He indicated that the deployment of Chadian soldiers to CAR was not an option, adding that Chadian public opinion was adamantly against it. He added that Chad was however ready to support CAR, including through the training of its soldiers and officials.
8. President Déby Itno expressed serious concern over the ongoing situation in Libya.
Western Sahara, Morocco, UN, MINURSO, Pecekeeping,
Maintaining Military Observers in the Middle of the Western Sahara Desert: A Logistic Challenge
Julio Cesar do Amaral Junior1; Raphael de Almeida Leitão2; Dr. Murillo de Oliveira Dias3 Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior da Aeronáutica- UNIF1; Universidade da Força Aérea, PPGCA-UNIFA, Brasil2; Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil3 Correspondence: Murillo de Oliveira Dias3, e-mail: agenda.murillo@gmail.
Abstract: Logistics plays a decisive role in any military campaign, including peacekeeping missions. In this article, we investigated how the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system overcome the environmental challenges to support their United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) deployed on Team Sites (TS) in 2017. Combining field experience with a wide-range analysis of relevant sources, key findings pointed out three critical factors: (a) the unique integration between civilian and military to provide logistic support despite the reduced number of military logisticians at the headquarter (HQ); (b) tactical aviation employment to supply TS, and (c) the use of operational contract support (OCS) to cover a lack of capabilities in the mission area. This work provides an overview of lessons learned about expeditionary logistical efforts for isolated troops. Furthermore, it will broaden the knowledge about supporting forces on the ground in challenging environments.
Keywords: Logistics, Military Campaign; Peacekeeping Missions; Environmental Challenges
I. INTRODUCTION The Sahara Desert in North Africa is a unique place on earth with harsh environmental conditions, the world’s largest hot desert. The UN faced many complicated challenges in maintaining a military observer mission in the disputed territory of Western Sahara on the northwest coast of the African continent. Western Sahara is a desert region having borders with the Atlantic Ocean, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. Its geographical characteristic is a flat terrain with some hills providing conditions for forming temporary rivers during the short rainy season. Water is scarce, and the soil is rocky and sandy with dunes. The climate has cold and dry winters, but summers are sweltering (above 122oF even in the shadow). The average rainfall is 45mm, and the other significant problem is the strong winds that move sand and in sandstorms (fig. 1). Some tribes live close to the ocean in these inhospitable conditions, and some Bedouins live in the desert. The terrain and climate were not the only challenges that MINURSO faced; there is also a lack of infrastructure (cities and their facilities) to support UNMOs in the middle of the desert, as illustrated in Figure 1, as follows:
Figure 1- Sandstorm approaching TS Smara
II. METHODOLOGY This article addressed the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system regarding the environmental challenges in supporting the United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), deployed on Team Sites (TS), as the unit of analysis (Yin, 1988). In this research, we combined direct participation, a descriptive single case study, and archival research. We followed an inductive rationale and an interpretive approach. The primary data were collected from January to December 2017.
III. BACKGROUND To accomplish operational requirements, the UN established most TS in the conflicted region, exposing them to the presence of mined fields and isolating them as there were no cities close enough to provide any kind of support, another challenge to its Logistics. The region was part of Spain, but in 1976, Morocco claimed it as part of their kingdom. Saharans fought for their independence from Morocco. The hostilities lasted until 1991 when they accepted a UN mission to mediate the peace. However, the Moroccans built a sand wall (a Berm) dividing the region in conflict with mined areas outside the Berm, one of the mission dangers. They occupied the west part and isolated Saharans on the east. The UN had to deploy military observers on both sides to ensure the ceasefire. When planning TS positions, they considered operational requisites such as military units’ position, security, and size for the area of responsibility. Finally, they established the MINURSO Headquarters (MHQ) in the city of Laayoune, four TS on the west (Mahbas, Smara, Oum Driega, and Awsard), and five TS on the east (Bir Lahlou, Tifariti, Mehaires, Mijek, and Agwanit) as seen in figure 2. The biggest challenge for logistics was to deploy TS in the desert with no cities/facilities in the neighborhood, resulting in a complete absence of infrastructure to provide support (paved roads, fuel, electric energy, water, food, hospitals, etc.). Smara, a small city with a population of 57,035 in 2014, was located near one of TS. Increasing the challenge to deploy observers in a conflict zone was the presence of Unexploded ordinances (UXO) due to the air war and mined fields that changed positions due to annual flooding. These conditions, combined the UN faced, were enough to characterize the logistic system they implemented as an expeditionary logistic., as depicted in Figure 2, as follows:
Figure 2 MINURSO map. Source: UN, 2017
Note in Figure 2 that the MINURSO logistic system had an expeditionary characteristic because it provided living and working conditions to military observers from different nationalities deployed to an arid region of conflict. Since ancient times, an army force’s outcomes rely on its logistic capabilities. Some outstanding military leaders from history were famous for their skills in supporting troops properly. Scholars recognized Alexander the Great as the first leader to develop a logistic system to keep his army. His logistics worked so well that it did not affect his strategic decisions.
MINURSO: Expeditionary Forces The US Department of Defense used it similarly when defining expeditionary forces as troops deployed to accomplish tasks abroad. Support troops under these conditions required logistical skills to provide some otherwise typical functions in the face of a dangerous environment. The duties of positioning troops on the ground, opening airfields, and establishing and maintaining operations under threat environments required some expeditionary logistics skills. Therefore, it is possible to claim that MINURSO’s logistics are expeditionary. The claim is sound because MINURSO deployed and supported a multinational military contingent’s operation in a conflict region under threat conditions, including isolation, presence of UXOs, possible ceasefire violations, and inhospitable desertic living conditions. The efficient way the MINURSO logistics system provided complete and sustainable support to its TS, operating in 2017, made it expeditionary and unique.
One of the most significant aims of MINURSO logistics was to keep all TS operational despite the frequent absence of military specialists on the ground (TS) and a reduced number of them on MHQ. Theoretically, every TS should have seventeen to twenty-four unarmed UNMOs at full strength. The reality in 2017 was that, on average there were four fewer men than required on the ground in each TS. The main tasks of these UNMOs were to conduct daily patrols to ensure fulfillment of the military agreements and simultaneously conduct complementary duties to keep TS operational, such as logistics (G4). The G4 on TS counts seven subordinated positions to conduct all logistic matters such as material in general, vehicles, food, fire prevention, and generators. Due to personal restrictions such as observers on leave, some absences on duty, and other reasons, it was not easy to conduct logistic management on TS. This challenge became bigger because the G4 on TS was often not a logistician expert. This occurred because there were no specific background requirements to become a UNMO. On MHQ, things were not significantly different.
Overcoming Challenges Of all the appointments in the MHQ structure, one position was named Special Military Logistic Advisor (SMLA – U4). This position was the only appointment with a logistics expert, a lieutenant colonel from Egypt. Under his command, there were three supporting appointments: Project and Engineering (Proj/Eng), Supplies and Transport (Sup/Tpt), and Rations (food and water). These three UNMOs assisted him in conducting all military logistical tasks. Usually, to select them, the SMLA interviewed volunteer UNMOs working on G4-related positions on TS and chose one. He considered his previous background, experience on TS, and profile that fit the task for his decision. To improve system efficiency, MHQ conducted G4 (related appointments as food officer) training once per semester for UNMOs to enhance their skills in performing these appointments on TS. This routine training helped to remediate but did not completely solve the deficiency. To solve this gap of military logisticians, the basis of MINURSO’s logistics structure on MHQ relied on a civilian component.
The integration between the civilian and military, working to support the TS isolated in inhospitable places of the desert, made the MINURSO logistic system unique and was a critical factor for its efficiency. As the mission’s structure did not contemplate a military logistic unit, the civilian component was responsible for the mission’s logistics. They dealt directly with all logistic needs for TS such as ration, general supply, fuel, contract management, infrastructure in general, and logistic support. Recognizing the importance of the effort’s integration, MINURSO united the civilian component and the military working on logistics tasks in MHQ, creating the Joint Logistics Operational Centre (JLOC). The operational working concept for TS and MHQ interactions with JLOC needed to be simple to enhance efficiency. MINURSO recognized that most military were not logistical experts and logistics was a specialized subject playing an essential role in mission success. Aligned with these ideas, chapter eight of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) detailed basic logistics attributions for all military in the system (TS and MHQ). MHQ monitored TS logistic issues, reports, and supply levels on all TS. They also received all requests, compiled them, sent them to the civilian component, and monitored the deliveries. The civilians were responsible for all complex jobs. They received the consolidated demand from the military and managed acquisitions, contracts, maintenance, budget control, etc., and liaison with the UN to deal with these matters. They were also responsible for improvements made over thirty years of mission, such as installing containers to replace old tents as installations (offices, kitchen, lodging). The military and civilians’ proper coordination improved the system’s efficiency and allowed TS to operate autonomously. It worked so well that in 2017 there was no severe impact on TS due to logistics restrictions. Even when one of the helicopters that made the supply distribution once a week faced technical problems and stayed on the ground for two weeks, TS managed their supplies and overcame them. The critical factors for MINURSO logistic system efficiency were communication, integration, and coordination of efforts between TS and JLOC and overcoming the gap of military experts. Another contributing factor to this success was the aerial logistical modal to deliver supplies in the desert.
Supporting the Observers The tactical aviation support was the primary logistical system used by MINURSO to support their observers deployed on TS. It was tactical because the mission area was a conflict zone, now under a ceasefire agreement. The situation was calm but unpredictable. Scholars have many definitions for the concept of tactical, but this understanding is aligned with the intent that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization used in its documents. Tactical air transport is moving persons or cargo by air logistic support or aeromedical evacuation operations. Even more challenging for these operations was that crews had to fly visual over the Sahara Desert with no detailed aeronautical charts. They also faced the absence of air traffic control, landing on sandy improvised runaways or heliports with no specialized ground support. TS isolation and the lack of infrastructure were responsible for these challenges. To mitigate these risks, MINURSO implemented the duty for one observer to check the landing conditions before the arrival of the air support. This military task was to clear the runaway and send meteorological information (temperature, wind speed, direction, etc.) to MHQ. The correct performance of this task was essential for air safety since the crew had no way to know TS conditions. In some cases, flights were canceled or their destination changed because of harsh weather conditions. The resupply flights often stopped because of extreme weather conditions (sandstorms or temperatures permanently above 50 degrees Celsius). Communication and integration between the civilian crew, TS in the desert, and the aviation section on MHQ were crucial for the success of the flights. All supporting aircraft used were not military. The UN contracted two civilian companies to provide air support for the mission. MINURSO contracted Air Urga to deploy two fixed-wing aircraft (Antonov-26), accompanied by two complete crews and a maintenance package. They were established in Laayoune and made the liaison to load helicopters in Smara (North) and Award (South). The second contract was with Abakan Air which chartered two helicopters (Mi-8) with three complete crews and a maintenance package. They were established in Smara (north) and Awsard (south) and flew mainly to reach the four TS where the AN-26 could not land. This integration between airplanes and helicopters was essential to support all TS properly because their position in the desert made it hard to accomplish with ground convoys.
Tactical aviation employment was crucial to support Team Sites because of their location in the desert and the risks of arriving there by ground. All TS, except one, were isolated in the middle of the desert. There was no infrastructure to provide complimentary supplies or missing items nearby, so TS needed to work autonomously. Planning a convoy by ground meant driving long distances, mainly on unpaved roads, crossing some sandy areas, where even experienced drivers in 6×6 vehicles can get stuck. In addition to the route’s challenges, there were climatic threats and UXO’s risks along the way. Moving supplies was not easy because, in the desert, only a few roads were paved or in good condition, compounded by long distances; therefore, the food was mainly delivered to the team sites via air support. The fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were the main modal supply line for TS because sending weekly land convoys would be too dangerous. The exception was fuel, hazardous goods, and heavy items that could not go by air due to size/weight restrictions, so they went, when necessary, by ground convoys. Another primary justification for the air support was offering standby aircraft and helicopters to provide medical aid to MINURSO personnel because there was no medical facility close to TS. Therefore, in case of an accident evolving UNMOs in the desert, TS could request a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) to transport the injured from their position to an adequate medical facility. All observers learn and train how to ask a CASEVAC because this is the quickest way, and generally the only way, to save other observers’ lives. Conducting aerial reconnaissance patrols, at least two per month for all TS, was a third use for the air assets. Eventually, TS conducted aerial route reconnaissance patrols to ensure that the way between specific TS points was safe for a ground convoy to cross. Finally, aircraft use proved essential on the mission as part of logistical efforts. It was another critical factor in efficiently maintaining TS operational in the desert, just like contracted services.
IV. DISCUSSION The lack of infrastructure in the mission area of responsibility and gaps in the military force deployed made operational contract support (OCS) crucial to MINURSO survival. The US Joint Forces defined OCS as the procedures of planning for and acquiring provisions, services, and construction from commercial providers. Fulfilling these tasks, the employment of OCS covering military logistic gaps is considered part of the warfighting capability of an armed force. Its use became a reality even for Great Powers such as the United States (US). This kind of logistical support played and shall continue to play, a vital role in the US’s ability to deploy, fight, and win wars. Considering this, it becomes evident that the evolution of OCS use is reshaping how armed forces conduct logistics. It has been improving expeditionary logistics capabilities and growing in importance over the last few years. The main benefits OCS can provide are adequate support, positive economic and social impact on the local populace, minimizing the military footprint, and others. Recognizing these benefits that OCS could bring, the MINURSO logistic system also used OCS to fill existent gaps. The mission had external contractors working in logistics and other services. Two were to get air support, essential for logistical and operational purposes. The lack of aircraft was because the planned military contingent had not contemplated the aircraft requirement. The solution adopted was chartering aircraft (rotary and fixed wings) from civilian companies to fly for the mission. Contracting aircraft was one successful OCS used in the task, but there were other gaps and other OCS.
Localizing and neutralizing explosive remnants of war (ERW) was another mission gap that the logistic system overcame by using OCS. The presence of landmines and UXOs was a significant security danger in the mission area of the MINURSO deal. These explosive hazards threatened the lives of UNMOs monitoring the ceasefire, humanitarian aid workers, and local nomads. These artifacts were present on both sides of the Berm. A secondary objective of the UN’s monitoring mission was to minimize this risk. The belligerent parts and MINURSO signed Military Agreements number 2 and 3 to deal with this issue. They compromised to reduce the danger of explosive devices in the mission area of responsibility. The belligerent parts and MINURSO should share information about landmines and UXO’s position and incidents to achieve this goal, destroy any landmine or UXO in identified locations, and clear or mark its vicinity. To safely conduct these activities, it demanded specialized personnel and equipment. On the west side of the Berm, the Royal Moroccan Army was a traditional armed force present on the ground and was able to do it. There was a gap in this capability on the east side of the Berm because Frente Polisario Armed Forces were guerrilla organized units. Therefore, they had neither the personnel nor material to conduct these activities. MINURSO had a small military contingent focused on operating ceasefire monitoring activities, not conducting demining tasks. The UN contracted an international civilian company and sent the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to coordinate their efforts to fill this gap. The contractors cleared areas contaminated with minefields, cluster ammunition, and other UXOs, verified UNMOs and convoys crossing routes, and destroyed thousands of artifacts. Since 2008, they proved more than nine thousand kilometers of roads and successfully destroyed almost forty thousand landmines, explosives, and sub-ammunitions. It granted UNMOS safety to patrol and monitor the ceasefire and reduced the threat to the local population. In other words, this OCS employment represented a key factor in MINURSO’s success in fulfilling its mandate, and it also made a humanitarian contribution to vulnerable local Bedouins. The use of OCS covered a lack of essential capabilities on the mission, contributing to its unique expeditionary logistic.
Reflecting on the points this essay provides, it becomes clear that the MINURSO logistic system overcame the environmental challenges of the Sahara Desert to support its TS in the desert in 2017. The sources analysis illustrates that MINURSO successfully used a unique expeditionary logistics system. Three complementary factors made it possible. Despite the lack of military logisticians, one of these components employed a unique and efficient integration between civilian and military to provide complete and sustainable assistance to TS. Another factor was the use of tactical aviation to send supplies to TS safely, efficiently, and quickly. Finally, the operational contract support supplemented mission logistic gaps. In simple words, MINURSO’s unique expeditionary logistics effectively supported TS. It occurred because of the integration between civil and military logisticians, the vital tactical aviation support, and OCS’s key role in coverage gaps. The lessons discussed in this study can provide a valuable background to military logisticians’ plans and support for future military or peacekeeping operations.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH LIMITATIONS In previous sections, we presented the results and content analysis of the raw data, pointing out adverse outcomes of trust violation and its implications in other fields of research, such as (i) Social Value Orientation (Dias, 2016; Balliet, D., & Van Lange, 2013); (ii) contract negotiations (Dias, M., Lopes, R., Cavalcanti, G., Golfetto, V., 2020; Dias, 2012; Dias, M.; Silva, L., 2021; Dias, M.; Pereira, L; Vieira, 2022; Dias, M et al. 2022; Dias, M., Lopes, R., 2020; Dias, M. Navarro, R., 2020; Dias, M., 2020a; Dias, M., Lopes, R., Duzert, Y., 2020; Dias, M., 2020; Dias, M., 2021a); (iii) project management (Soares, C.; Magalhães, M.; Barroca, J.; Dias, M., 2020; Dias, M., 2021); (iv) peripheral business, to name a few. This article is limited to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system to overcome the environmental challenges to support their United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) deployed on Team Sites (TS) in the Sahara region. Other countries and locations may convey incorrect understandings and should be investigated in separate studies.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH Future studies are encouraged to investigate Moroccan and Western Saharan (host countries) contributions to maintaining TS or the role of the civilian component for mission support; both will broaden the comprehension of MINURSO expeditionary logistics. Further, academic studies on military operations established the adjective expeditionary to qualify procedures, forces, air forces, and logistics operating abroad.
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Cet après-midi, le Conseil de sécurité n’a pas réussi à s’entendre sur l’adoption d’une résolution destinée à commémorer le vingtième anniversaire de la première résolution du Conseil sur « Les femmes et la paix et la sécurité », à savoir la résolution 1325 (2000).
Le projet de résolution présenté par la Fédération de Russie a recueilli 10 abstentions (Allemagne, Belgique, Estonie, États-Unis, France, Niger, République dominicaine, Royaume-Uni, Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines, Tunisie) et seulement 5 voix en sa faveur (Afrique du Sud, Chine, Fédération de Russie, Indonésie, Viet Nam).
En raison de la pandémie de COVID-19, le Conseil de sécurité s’était déjà réuni hier par visioconférence pour son débat public annuel sur la question. Il a procédé au vote par voie de correspondance électronique. Les votes ont été envoyés au Directeur de la Division des affaires du Conseil de sécurité qui les a transmis au Président du Conseil. Le représentant de la Fédération de Russie, Président pour le mois d’octobre, a donc convoqué les membres du Conseil par visioconférence pour annoncer le résultat du vote.
Après des négociations difficiles, il semblerait que la majorité des délégations aient renoncé à appuyer un texte qui reprenait essentiellement les termes des résolutions précédentes, sans répondre à certaines de leurs préoccupations, notamment en ce qui concerne le rôle de la société civile, les violences sexuelles à l’égard des femmes en période de conflit ou encore leurs droits à la santé sexuelle et reproductive.
Tant qu’à commémorer le vingtième anniversaire de la première résolution sur la question des femmes et de la paix et de la sécurité, ces délégations auraient en outre penché pour un format plus percutant, l’essentiel étant la mise en œuvre du programme y relatif.
Par ce projet de résolution, le Conseil de sécurité aurait commémoré le vingtième anniversaire de l’adoption de la résolution 1325 (2000), « occasion unique de faire le bilan des progrès accomplis à ce jour ainsi que de s’engager à faire appliquer plus avant le programme pour les femmes et la paix et la sécurité », sachant que l’année 2020 coïncide aussi avec le vingt-cinquième anniversaire de l’adoption de la Déclaration et du Programme d’action de Beijing sur les femmes.
Conscient qu’il doit accorder une attention plus systématique au respect des engagements pris à ce sujet dans son propre travail, le Conseil aurait exhorté les États Membres « à s’engager à appliquer le programme pour les femmes et la paix et la sécurité et les priorités qui y sont fixées en assurant et en facilitant la participation pleine et véritable des femmes, sur un pied d’égalité, à toutes les étapes des processus de paix, notamment en prenant systématiquement en considération les questions de genre ».
À l’entame de ce projet, le Conseil aurait exprimé « sa profonde inquiétude » quant à l’impact négatif disproportionné de la pandémie de COVID-19, notamment du point de vue socioéconomique, sur les femmes dans le monde, en particulier celles qui vivent dans des pays ravagés par des conflits armés ou dans des situations postconflit, et celles qui sont touchées par des crises humanitaires.
