Étiquette : UNO

  • Press release of Frente Polisario

    Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Frente Polisario, UNO, General Assembly, Omar Radi,

    PRESS RELEASE
    PRESS RELEASE

    New York, 27 September 2023

    The Statement of the Representative of the Occupying State is a discordant voice and an affront to everything that the United Nations stands for The occupying state of Morocco continues its desperate attempts to distort the established facts regarding the international status of Western Sahara and the legitimate struggle of the Sahrawi people, which is manifested in the statement delivered yesterday by the representative of the occupying state to the United Nations on behalf of his country before the seventy-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

    The statement of the representative of the occupying state is an insult to the intelligence of Member States because of the blatant lies and distortions that it contains regarding the question of Western Sahara, which has been on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies since 1963 as a decolonisation issue in recognition by the International Organisation of the inalienable right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) concerning the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

    Following the statements in support of the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and independence delivered successively by Member States since the beginning of the General Assembly session on Tuesday, the statement of the representative of the occupying state of Morocco came as a discordant voice and an affront to everything that the United Nations stands for, including the commitment to the principles of international law, the defence of peoples’ rights to freedom and independence, and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of land by the use of force.

    The false allegations contained in the statement of the occupying state of Morocco concerning the international status of Western Sahara and the legitimate struggle of the Sahrawi people had already been refuted by documented and irrefutable arguments in the letter (S/2023/219) dated 20 March 2023 and the letter (S/2023/456) of 19 June 2023, which were distributed to Member States as official documents of the Security Council, among other things. Therefore, rehashing the same preposterous allegations before the United Nations General Assembly demonstrates once again the incoherence of the representative of the occupying state and his lack of any “argument” to support his untenable position.

    What makes matters worse is that the representative of the occupying state of Morocco has resorted, as usual, to blaming others in a barefaced attempt to divert attention from the chronic structural problems facing his ruling regime, especially in the wake of the natural disaster that recently befell the Moroccan people, which exposed the Moroccan fragile regime before the whole world and showed its true face, despite its attempts to hide the dire situation with its false propaganda and poorly staged “charades”.

    The intransigence evident in the statement of the occupying sate of Morocco before the United Nations General Assembly demonstrates once again that the occupying state is a rogue state that disregards international law, and that it has no political will to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations and the African Union on the need to reach a peaceful, just and lasting solution to the decolonisation of Western Sahara, the last colony in Africa.

    However, no matter how long the occupying state of Morocco persists in its escalatory rhetoric and intransigence, the Sahrawi people, who are firmly attached to their internationally recognised and legitimate rights, will resolutely carry on their liberation struggle by all legitimate means until they attain their non-negotiable freedom and independence and the establishment of sovereignty over the entire Sahrawi Republic.

    Ambassador Sidi M. Omar

    Representative of the Frente POLISARIO at the United Nations and Coordinator with MINURSO

    #Western #Sahara #Westernsahara #Polisario #Morocco #UNGA #Omar_Hilale

  • Western Sahara : The Troika effects on other crises

    Tags : Western Sahara, African Union, PSC, AUC, Morocco, Algeria, UNO, SADR,

    How the latest AU decision on Western Sahara could affect other crises

    At its 31st summit in Nouakchott, Mauritania the African Union (AU) decided to limit its own peace efforts in the Western Sahara in order to support the process led by the United Nations (UN). This support will be through a troika of heads of state, together with the AU Commission (AUC) chairperson. The move is a big win for Morocco, which believes the AU-led efforts are biased. However, it could set a precedent for other AU member states that disapprove of AU interventions.

    Morocco’s return to the AU and subsequent election to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in January 2018 has brought a new dimension to the AU’s approach to the crisis in Western Sahara. In the past, the AU usually described this as a ‘decolonisation’ issue and accepted the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a member. This membership is still seen by Morocco as proof that the organisation is not impartial.

    Morocco has often objected to the way the PSC – at the level of ambassadors in Addis Ababa – continues to call for the territory’s independence.

    The AU’s decision in July 2018 to fully support the UN process in order to resolve tensions between member states could therefore be seen as a victory for Morocco. The assembly appealed to the parties in the conflict ‘to urgently resume negotiations without pre-conditions and in good faith under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the UN, whose Security Council is seized of the matter’.

    This decision is also in line with the outcome of the UN meeting in April 2018 that urged member states to support the UN peace process, which involves negotiations between the parties.

    Some view the 31st summit decision on Western Sahara as a compromise to prevent the deterioration of the relationship between Morocco’s allies and staunch supporters of Western Sahara such as Algeria, South Africa and other countries in Southern Africa. Keeping the discussions out of the PSC could be a way to avoid confrontation.

    However, the decision has serious implications for the PSC, owing to the precedent it sets for other member states.

    Reversal of prior AU decisions

    The latest decision to provide decisive support to the UN process is a reversal of the AU’s January 2018 decision, which called for ‘joint AU and UN facilitated talks for a free and fair referendum for the people of Western Sahara’.

    The new decision also states that the AU will engage the issue mainly at the level of the newly established troika, which is made up of the outgoing, current and incoming AU chairpersons and the AUC chairperson. The troika will provide support to the UN process and report directly to the AU Assembly and, if need be, the PSC, but only at the level of heads of state.

    The decision nullifies the ad hoc committee of heads of state on Western Sahara that was established in 1978, during the early years of the violent confrontations. The Nouakchott decision also makes no mention of the AU high representative for Western Sahara, currently the former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano.

    Precedent for other member states

    This latest Western Sahara decision is crucial for the AU and the PSC because, for the first time, the AU has taken a formal decision to limit the PSC’s involvement in a crisis in Africa. Since the re-launch of the continental body as the AU in 2002 and the operationalisation of the PSC in 2004, the PSC has seen itself as a major player in every security issue on the continent.

    In line with the PSC Protocol, conflict situations on the continent are discussed by the 15-member PSC at all levels. Most of the time it is at the level of the Addis Ababa-based permanent representatives, who meet regularly on security issues irrespective of whether the peace processes are led by other intergovernmental organisations.

    For instance, the PSC has engaged on several issues, including the situations in Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, where the UN and sub-regional actors play dominant roles. While the AU may play a minimal role in a peace process, the PSC’s discussions complement mainstream processes, thereby enabling the AU to fulfil its day-to-day conflict management role.

    While the PSC has shied away from discussing certain emerging security threats such as Cameroon and Zimbabwe owing to political pressure from member states, no formal decision was ever made in this regard. As a result, nothing prevents the PSC from putting it on the agenda of its deliberations at ambassadorial level in future.

    Impact on the PSC working methods

    The assembly’s decision to limit the PSC’s role in Western Sahara to heads of state could negatively impact the council’s working methods. PSC summits at the level of heads of state take place only once or twice a year and are usually scheduled to discuss a burning crisis situation. The past few summits since 2016 have been devoted to the situation in South Sudan.

    This means that the Western Sahara issue may not make it to the PSC summits and, even if it does, there may not be binding decisions, given that the AU is meant to support the UN process.

    The implications for other issues are evident. In future, member states that disagree with the PSC’s involvement could insist on a UN process with the support of heads of state. This not only affects the working methods of the PSC but could also undermine its relevance in addressing certain security threats on the continent.

    Limits of the AU troika

    Experience also shows that committees of heads of state often lack the political will to deal with crises. Besides, the troika of former, current and future AU chairs is a notion that is not inscribed in the AU Constitutive Act and it has no real powers outside the AU Assembly. Similar high-level committees were set up in the past to address conflicts in Libya, Burundi and South Sudan, but failed to record any major milestones in either setting the agenda for peace or effectively resolving the crises in those countries.

    Going forward, the AUC chairperson has a responsibility to include the issue of Western Sahara on the agenda of the AU Assembly and PSC summits of heads of state. This includes developing a roadmap for the AU troika to meet regularly to urge the UN to accelerate efforts to resolve one of Africa’s long-running crises.

    Source

    #Western_Sahara #Morocco #African_Union #AUC #PSC #SADR #Algeria

  • A return to war in Western Sahara

    A return to war in Western Sahara

    Tags : Morocco, Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, UNO, MINURSO,

    Nick Brooks

    You may or may not have heard that the ceasefire that has held for nearly 30 years in Western Sahara broke down yesterday, and the territory is now at war again. There is nothing on the BBC news website about it at the tike of writing, although it did get a brief mention on the World Service and there is this article from the New York Times.

    Both sides in the conflict – Morocco and the Polisario – have their versions of what’s happened, and Morocco is likely to have the loudest voice. So here’s my take.

    Morocco invaded Western Sahara in 1975, when Spain pulled out. The Polisario, formed a few years earlier to fight for independence from Spain, opposed Morocco’s occupation. A war was fought until 1991, when the UN brokered a ceasefire and installed a peacekeeping force – the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known by its French acronym, MINURSO. As the name indicates, this force was mandated to organise a referendum on self-determination. This has never happened, and MINURSO remains the only peacekeeping force without a human rights monitoring mandate. Western Sahara remains a non self-governing territory as defined by the UN Committee on Decolonisation. In other words, the decolonisation process has not yet been competed. Western Sahara is often referred to as the Last Colony in Africa.

    Throughout the 1975-1991 conflict, Morocco secured territory it had taken behind defensive earthworks or berms. By 1991, these had merged into a single structure – The Berm – which stretches 2700km (about 1700 miles) across the territory, effectively partitioning it into a Moroccan controlled zone to the west and north, and a Polisario controlled zone to the east and south (Figure 1). A detailed analysis of the Berm and its evolution is provided by Garfi (2014).

    Figure 1. Western Sahara under the ceasefire, showing partition by the Moroccan Berm, key locations, and deployment of MINURSO peacekeepers. Map from MINURSO/UN Peacekeeping.

    Under the terms of the ceasefire, Western Sahara is divided into three areas (Figure 1):

    i) a Buffer Strip extending for 5km east and south of the Berm on the Polisario side, which is effectively an exclusion zone or no-man’s land, in which no military personnel or equipment are permitted;

    ii) two Restricted Areas, extending for 30km either side of the Berm, in which military activities are prohibited; and

    iii) two Areas with Limited Restrictions, which include all the remaining territory of Western Sahara, in which normal military activities can be carried out with the exception of those that represent an escalation of the military situation.

    Figure 2. Schematic showing the different areas defined under the ceasefire.

    The above information, including maps showing the different zones and the text of the ceasefire (Military Agreement #1) used to be on the MINURSO website but were removed some years ago. When asked, MINURSO and UN Peacekeeping would not explain why, leading many to conclude this was a result of Moroccan lobbying. Morocco’s narrative is that it controls all of Western Sahara except a buffer strip established by the UN for its protection, and that the Polisario has no presence in Western Sahara. The maps and military agreement clearly contradict this.

    Since 1991, Morocco has been entrenching its occupation of Western Sahara and developing its natural resources, against international conventions that prohibit occupying powers from exploiting resources in occupied territories for their own gain. These resources include phosphates, fisheries and water resources – Morocco has developed agriculture in occupied Western Sahara, including the production of water-intensive crops such as tomatoes (including the Azera brand).

    Some of these resources and the products derived from them transit through Mauritania to the south, for example, fish products from occupied Western Saharan waters that are destined for African markets via the port of Nouadhibouin Mauritania. This route involves traffic passing through the Berm south of the settlement of Guergerat (Figure 3), then traversing the buffer strip for 5km to the border with Mauritania (Figure 4).

    Figure 3. Guergerat location in the far southwest of Western Sahara.

    In late October 2020, Sahrawi protestors started blockading the road between the Guergerat Berm crossing and the Mauritanian border (Figure 4), within the Buffer Strip. They were protesting against the export of natural resources, including fish destined for the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou, from occupied Western Sahara by Morocco. They also accused Morocco of facilitating the trafficking of drugs and people via Guergerat.

    Figure 4. The road that passes through the Berm (top) south of Guergerat, traversing the 5km Buffer Strip established under the 1991 ceasefire, to the Western Sahara-Mauritania border. See Figure

    On 12th/13th November, Morocco sent troops to disperse the protestors and take control of the section of road traversing the Buffer Strip. By merely entering the Buffer Strip, Morocco breached the ceasefire. On 13th November, the Polisario declared that this breach marked the end of the ceasefire and the resumption of hostilities, and that they were now at war with Morocco. Later on the 13th, Morocco reported clashes along the Berm in the north of Western Sahara, and on the 14th it appeared that fighting was taking place in the vicinity of Mahbes and Hauza in the north of Western Sahara, and Aouserd and Guergerat in the south.

    This all comes against a background of 45 years of conflict and exile for the Sahrawi. Somewhere around 100,000 Sahrawi live under Moroccan occupation, while perhaps around 200,000 live in five refugee camps in the Algerian desert around the town of Tindouf. These camps are governed by the Polisario, and are effectively a society and state in exile. The Polisario also controls the areas to the east and south of the Berm, known to the Sahrawi as the Free Zone.

    For decades, discontent in the camps has been growing, particularly among younger Sahrawis, in response to the stalemate, the failure of the UN to organise the long-promised referendum, and an understandable perception that they have been forgotten and abandoned by the rest of world. Many see a return to war as the only way of having any hope of resolving the conflict, whether through military means or as the result of diplomacy facilitated by what they hope will be a renewed spotlight on the territory if hostilities resume. For many years, the Polisario has managed to keep this discontent contained and has avoided conflict. It seems that the latest provocation by Morocco has been too flagrant for this approach to remain viable.

    Nick Brooks has travelled extensively in Western Sahara, as co-director of the Western Sahara Project, a research project focusing on archaeology and past environmental change in the territory. Between 2002 and 2009 he led six seasons of fieldwork in the Polisario-controlled zone of Western Sahara, and travelled to the territory on seven occasions, also spending time in the Sahrawi refugee camps around Tindouf. Fieldwork involved frequent detours into Mauritania to avoid the Moroccan Berm.

    @SAHARAWIVOICE on Twitter is a good source of updates on the conflict.

  • Western Sahara : Text of UNSC Resolution 2654 (2022)

    Western Sahara : Text of UNSC Resolution 2654 (2022)

    Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, MINURSO, UNO,

    The Security Council today voted to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October 2023, calling on the parties to resume negotiations in good faith towards a mutually acceptable political solution for the region.

    Adopting resolution 2654 (2022) (to be issued as document S/RES/2654) by a vote of 13 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Russian Federation, Kenya), the 15-member organ expressed full support for the Secretary-General and Staffan de Mistura, Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, to facilitate negotiations to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question, and strongly encouraged Morocco, Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania to engage with him throughout the duration of the process to ensure a successful outcome.

    Further to the text, it reaffirmed the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and called on the parties to comply fully with those agreements, implement their commitments to the former Personal Envoy, and refrain from any actions that could undermine United Nations-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in the Western Sahara.

    Speaking after the vote, Jeffrey DeLaurentis (United States) underlined the Council’s support for the Personal Envoy in his efforts to facilitate a just lasting and mutually acceptable political solution for Western Sahara. Despite the vote not being unanimous, he called on all concerned to engage in good faith with the Personal Envoy. Morocco’s autonomy plan is serious, credible and realistic and one potential approach to satisfying those aspirations. MINURSO peacekeepers are tasked with monitoring and reporting on the situation on the ground, and when possible, conducting dangerous mine clearance operations, he noted, calling for the restoration of their freedom of movement as well as the resumption of safe and regular re-supply of MINURSO team sites. Voicing concern about the dire situation in the Tindouf refugee camps, he urged donors to increase their humanitarian contributions.

    Martin Kimani (Kenya) recalled that his country’s supports for MINURSO was reflected in its affirmative vote on resolution 2602 (2021). In doing so, it hoped that the parties would engage with the Personal Envoy to return MINURSO to its core objective of implementing a referendum for the people of Western Sahara. However, today’s resolution continues the gradual — but noticeable — shift away from that mandate and will not help the parties achieve a just, lasting, mutually acceptable political solution as originally intended. His delegation abstained because its constructive proposals during negotiations were not taken on board. Further, the resolution does not substantively reflect the Council’s commitment to provide for the self-determination of the peoples of Western Sahara. The right to self-determination is a foundational principle for both the United Nations and the African Union, he said, adding that the African Union — which counts both parties as members — should not be ignored by any United Nations process.

    Amiera Alhefeiti (United Arab Emirates) welcomed the adoption, which enhances the role of peace and security. She cited the constructive approach of the Council, expressing support for balanced language and the efforts of the Special Envoy to work towards a mutually acceptable political solution, calling on him to build on previous progress. She affirmed the sovereignty of Morocco over the Moroccan Sahara, renewing support for that country’s autonomy plan presented in 2007, which is serious and credible.

    Dmitry Polyanskiy (Russian Federation), noting his abstention, said the process for preparing and agreeing on the document was not fully consultative. None of his delegation’s fundamental and well-founded comments were taken into consideration. Moreover, there was no response to useful proposals made by other Council members, resulting in an unbalanced text and raising doubts to the impartiality of the informal file sponsors. The resolution does not reflect the real situation on the ground and is unlikely to facilitate the Envoy’s efforts to renew direct negotiations between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO to achieve mutually acceptable solutions. Noting his delegation’s position is dictated purely by lack of agreement on wording, he voiced support for MINURSO and its key role in establishing conditions on the ground and pushing forward the peace process.

    Dai Bing (China) said that MINURSO contributes positively to the question of Western Sahara and the maintenance of stability in the region. He expressed his support for the extension of the Mission’s mandate for 12 months, which demonstrates the Council’s determination to promote a political solution to the question. He also expressed hope that future Council resolutions relating to this mandate will reflect the latest changes in the situation, and undergo thorough consultations, to arrive at a text acceptable to the relevant parties. China’s position on Western Sahara has been consistent — this situation should be handled based on relevant Council resolutions so that a just, durable, mutually acceptable solution can be reached.

    João Genésio De Almeida Filho (Brazil) noted that this year’s text, notwithstanding its many features, could have greatly benefitted from a more balanced approach on some of its innovative propositions. Something as simple as incorporating regional formulas, many of which are still very much valid, could have proven useful to breach some of the gaps during recent negotiations. These in turn could have allowed for an even stronger message of support for the Personal Envoy and the Special Representative. He reiterated steadfast support for a peaceful, just and mutually acceptable solution to the question under the auspices of the United Nations.

    Michel Xavier Biang (Gabon), Council President for October, speaking in his national capacity, said his delegation voted for the prolongation of the mandate in support of the political process to reach a realistic, achievable and lasting political solution based on compromise for Western Sahara. The resolution makes it possible to support the Personal Envoy’s efforts in relaunching the political process with the various stakeholders. He voiced support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative as a credible and reassuring prospect for a way out of the current impasse and for reaching an acceptable political solution for all.

    The meeting began at 10:07 a.m. and ended at 10:27 a.m.

    United Nations Resolution S/RES/2602 (2021) adopted by the Security Council at its 8890th meeting, on 29 October 2021

    The Security Council,

    Recalling and reaffirming all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

    Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary -Gen eral and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (200 8 ), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), 1979 (2011), 2044 (2012), 2099 (2013), 2152 (2014), 2218 (2015), 2285 (2016), 2351 (2017), 2414 (2018), 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494(2019), and 2548 (2020),

    Paying tribute to Horst Köhler, former Personal Envoy of the Secretary -General for Western Sahara, and commending his efforts in holding the round -table process, which created momentum in the political process,

    Welcoming the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-Gene ral for Western Sahara and urging the constructive resumption of the political process, building on the progress of the former Personal Envoy,

    Welcoming the momentum created by the first round -table meeting on 5−6 December 2018 and the second round -table meeting on 21–22 March 2019, and the engagement by Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania in the UN political process on Western Sah ara in a serious and respectful manner in order to identify elements of convergence,

    Encouraging the resumption of consultations between the Personal Envoy and Morocco, the Frente POLISAR IO, Algeria and Mauritania in this regard to build on the progress achieved,

    Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise , which will provide for the self-determi nation of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

    Reiterating its call upon Morocco, the Frente POLISAR IO, Algeria and Mauritania to cooperate more fully with each other, including through building additional trust, and with the United Nations, as well as to strengthen their involvement in the political process and to achieve progress towards a politica l solution,

    Recognizing that achieving a political solution to this long-standing dispute and enhanced cooperation between the Member States of the Maghreb Arab Union would contribute to stability and security, in turn leading to jobs, growth and opportunities for all the peoples in the Sahel region,

    Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-Gene ral to keep all peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINUR SO), under close review and reiterating the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments, and effective management of resources,

    Recalling resolution 2378 (2017) and its request of the Secretary -General to ensure that data related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, including peacekeeping performance data, is used to improve analytics and the evaluation of mission operations, based on clear and well i dentified benchmarks, and further recalling resolution 2436 (2018) and its request of the Secretary-General to ensure that decisions to recognize and incentivize outstanding performance and decisions regarding deployment, remediation, training, withholding of financial reimbursement, and repatriation of uniformed or dismissal of civilian personnel, are predicated on objective performance data,

    Recalling resolution 2242 (2015) and 2538 (2020) and its aspiration to increase the number of women in military and police contingents of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

    Recognizing the important role played by MINURSO on the ground and the need for it to fully implement its mandate, including its role in supporting the Personal Envoy to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution,

    Noting with deep concern the breakdown of the ceasefire,

    Expressing concern about the violations of existing agreements and reiterating the importance of full adherence to these commitments, and taking note of the commitments provided by the Frente POLISAR IO to the former Personal Envoy,

    Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-Gene ral and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Frente POLISARIO proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary -General,

    Encouraging in this context, the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other’s proposals and recommitting to UN efforts in a spirit of realism and compromise, and further encouraging the neighbouring countries to make contributions to the political process,

    Encouraging the parties to cooperate further with the United Nations Office of the High Commissione r for Refugees in identifying and implementing confiden ce – building measures that can serve to foster the trust necessary for a successful political process,

    Stressing the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps, and encouraging the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights, bearing in mind their relevant obligations under international law,

    Encouraging the parties to sustain and prioritize their respective efforts to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights in Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps, including the freedoms of expression and association,

    Welcoming in this regard, steps and initiatives taken by Morocco, and the role played by the National Council on Human Rights Commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and Morocco’s interaction with Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council,

    Strongly encouraging enhancing cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), including through facilitating visits to the region,

    Noting with deep concern the continued hardships faced by Sahrawi refugees, their dependency on external humanitarian assistance, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and further noting with deep concern insufficient funding for those living in Tindouf refugee camps and the risks associated with the reduction of food assistance,

    Reiterating its request for consideration of a refugee registration in the Tindouf refugee camps and emphasizing efforts be made in this regard,

    Recalling United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 and 2250 and related resolutions;

    stressing the importance of a commitment by the parties to continue the process of negotiations through the United Nations-sponso red talks and encouraging the full, effective and meaningful participation of women and active and meaningful participation of youth in these talks,

    Recognizing that the status quo is not acceptable, and noting further that progress in negotiations is essential in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

    Affirming its full support for Special Representative of the Secretary -General for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO Alexander Ivanko,

    Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 1 October 2021 (S/2021/843),

    1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 31 October 2022;
    2. Emphasizes the need to achieve a realistic, practicable, enduring and mutually acceptable political solution to the question of Western Sahara based on compromise and the importance of aligning the strategic focus of MINURSO and orienting resources of the United Nations to this end;
    1. Expresses its full support for the Secretary -General and his Personal

    Envoy to facilitate the negotiations process in order to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question, notes the intention of the former Personal Envoy to invite Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania to meet again in the same format, and welcomes the engagement of Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania throughout the duration of this process, in a spirit of realism and compromise, to ensure a successful outcome;

    4. Calls upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the c ontext of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and

    noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

    1. Invites Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;
    1. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and calls on the parties to comply fully with those agreements, implement their commitments to the former Personal Envoy, and refrain from any actions that could undermine UN-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in the Western Sahara;
    1. Reiterates its call upon all parties to cooperate fully with MINURSO, including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of as well as unhindered movement and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformi ty with existing agreements;
    1. Emphasizes the importance of a renewed commitment by the parties to advancing the political process in preparation for further negotiations, recalls its endorsement of the recommendation in the report of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251) that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations, and encourages the neighbouring countries to make important, active contributions to this process;
    1. Calls upon the parties to demonstrate political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to advance negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), 1979 (2011), 2044 (2012), 2099 (2013), 2152 (2014), 2218 (2015), 2285(2016), 2351 (2017), 2414 (2018), 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), and 2548 (2020), and the success of negotiations;
    1. Requests the Secretary-Gen e ral to brief the Security Council on a regular basis, and at any time he deems appropriate during the mandate period, to include within six months of this mandate’s renewal and again prior to its expiration, on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, on the implementation of this resolution, assessment of MINURSO’s operations and steps taken to address challenges, expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his briefings and in this regard, further requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

    11. Welcomes the initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General to standardize a culture of performanc e in UN peacekeeping, and reaffirms its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framewo rk that identifies clear standards of performance for evaluating all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel working in and supporting peacekeeping operations that facilitates effective and full implementation of mandates, and includes comprehensive and objective methodologies based on clear and well -defined

    benchmarks to ensure accountability for underperformanc e and incentives and recognition for outstanding performance, and calls on him to apply this framework to MINURSO as described in resolution 2436 (2018), requests the Secretary-General to seek to increase the number of women in MINURSO, as well as to ensure the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations;

    1. Urges the parties and neighbouring states to engage productively with MINURSO as it further considers how new technologies can be used to reduce risk, improve force protection, and better implement its mandate;
    1. Encourages the parties to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to identify and implement confidence-building measures, including to engage women and youth, and encourages neighbouring states to support these efforts;
    1. Urges Member States to provide new and additional voluntary contributions to fund food programme s to ensure that the humanitarian needs of refugees are adequately addressed and avoid reductions in food rations;

    15. Requests the Secretary-Gene ral to continue to take necessary measures to ensure full compliance of all personnel in MINURSO with the Unite d Nations zero -tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council fully informed through his reports to the Council about the Mission’s progress in this regard, and urges troop-contributing and police-contributing countries to continue taking appropriate preventative action including vetting of all personnel ,

    predeployment and in-mission awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel through timely investigation of allegations by troop-contributing and police-contributing countries and MINURSO, as appropriate;

    1. Decides to remain seized of the matter.



  • Morocco used Hacking Team to spy on the UN

    Morocco used Hacking Team to spy on the UN

    Morocco, UNO, Ban Ki-moon, DPKO, Pegasus, Idriss Déby, Tchad, Algeria, Ramtane Lamamra,

    Before the Israeli Pegasus, Morocco used the computer control software of the private company Hacking Team to spy on the activities of the UN Secretariat General, related to the Western Sahara issue. According to confidential documents, Morocco is the third largest client of this Italian company and has paid more than 3 million euros to Hacking Team. Including 1.19 million euros for the Moroccan DST, 1.93 million euros for the CSDN (Supreme Council of Defense, chaired by Mohammed VI).

    These serious revelations come from 400 gigabytes of information extracted from the website of the company Hacking Team and published by anonymous hackers. The Milan-based company sells spyware for hundreds of thousands of euros to countries and security services that flout virtual ethics, including Morocco. Several confidential documents of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) stolen by the Moroccan services have been revealed by the hacker who acts under the pseudonym of Chris Coleman.

    Other documents seem to emanate from other services dependent on the UN General Secretariat. Among these documents, the minutes of meetings of the UN Secretary General with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramtan Lamamra, and with the Chadian President, Idriss Déby. Morocco had set up three monitoring points. In Rabat, with massive surveillance tools from the French company Amesys (Bull-France). In Casablanca and Tangier, with offensive security tools from Hacking Team and Vupen (France) respectively.

    According to the NGO, Reporters Without Borders, Hacking Team’s software was identified on the computers of the offices of the Moroccan news website Mamfakinch, a few days after this media had received the Breaking Borders Award 2012 by Global Voices and Google. Malware had been deployed there, via a Word document, which claimed to contain important confidential information.

    Shortly thereafter, the electronic site « Algérie Patriotique » published two confidential documents fraudulently stolen by Morocco to learn about Algeria’s intentions. These are the minutes of meetings between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramtane Lamamra, and the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon.

    Let us note in passing that the content of these talks proves that Algeria has no double talk and does not plot against anyone. Algeria’s only concern is peace in the region. So why does the Makhzen want to spy on its neighbor?

    It is an established fact that Algeria’s diplomatic activities prevent the Makhzen’s people from getting any sleep. Algeria is active internationally and particularly on issues affecting the region facing a major destabilization operation, including through armed conflict in Libya, a situation conducive to the development of terrorist groups, which has had an extension in Mali and a dramatic impact also in Tunisia, as evidenced by the recent attack in Sousse.

    This does not please the Moroccan leaders who are doing everything to sabotage the Algiers roadmap on Mali and efforts to bring the conflicting parties in Libya together. The Makhzen is enraged every time Algeria makes progress in this direction. And even more so, when Algeria’s foreign partners give it the thumbs up.

    « Algeria plays a key role in the peace process in Mali. I welcome the collaboration of Algeria, Mali’s neighbors, regional organizations and my Special Representative in developing a roadmap in Algiers. It is essential that all relevant actors continue to work together to support the political process, » noted UN SG Ban Ki-moon in the PV hacked by the Makhzen.

    Regarding Libya, the UN Secretary General wrote: « I encourage Algeria to support the efforts of my new Special Representative, Bernardino León, to reach a comprehensive agreement on the future of the transition in Libya.

    The site Privacy International addresses the issue in the following post:

    Facing the Truth: Hacking Team leak confirms Moroccan government use of spyware

    On July 6th, the company Hacking Team was hacked: over 400GB of administrative documents, source code and emails are now available for download.

    Documents from the hack confirm once again the claims made in our report Their Eyes on Me, the Moroccan intelligence services made use of Hacking Team’s spyware ‘Remote Control System’ to target those whom they perceive as their opponents. The documents show the two intelligence agencies in the country have been renewing their contracts and are currently still using the piece of spyware. Over the past six years Morocco has spent more than €3 million on Hacking Team equipment.

    Among the documents, a client list showed that the two Moroccan intelligence agencies – the High Council for National Defence (CSDN) and the Directory of Territorial Surveillance (DST) – have both purchased Remote Control System. The CSDN first acquired it back in 2009 and the DST obtained it in 2012.

    In total Morocco spent €3,173,550 to purchase the licenses and maintain the product. In 2015 alone, the CSDN spent €140,000 and the DST €80,000 for spyware that can reach respectively up to 300 and 2,000 targeted devices.

    The contracts were both signed through Al Fahad Smart Systems, an Emirati company that acts as an intermediary for government and private companies seeking to purchase “security services”.

    The documents also reveal that the Moroccan Gendarmerie was listed as an “opportunity” for 2015 and expected to obtain €487,000 from them.

    The documents arrived two months after the Moroccan government threatened members of Moroccan civil society with a lawsuit following the publication in Morocco of the Privacy International report ‘Their Eyes on Me’. The report was a series of testimonies of activists who had been targeted by Hacking Team spyware.

    In a press release relayed by the press agency MAP, the Government said they had “filed a lawsuit against some people who prepared and distributed a report which includes serious accusations of spying by its services”. And they added that “(the) ministry has asked for an investigation to identify people behind such accusations to try them by the competent court ».

    The staff of our partner organisation in Morocco reported that their neighbours and family members were interrogated by the police following the announcement.

    All the claims stated in the report were in fact backed by research from the Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary research group affiliated to the University of Toronto. Back in 2012, they had identified the use of Remote Control System against Mamfakinch, a collective of citizen journalists, whose stories are documented in our report.

    Emails from Hacking Team employees, spotted by The Intercept, reveal that their opinion of the Moroccan government had remained untainted. David Vincenzetti, the CEO of Hacking Team, wrote to his colleagues in a recent email: “The King of Morocco is a benevolent monarch. Morocco is actually the most pro-Western Arab country, national security initiatives are solely needed in order to tighten stability.”

    Those revelations are, however, yet more evidence that the reality of the Moroccan regime is very different from the public image the Government likes to spread. Far from a liberal Kingdom led by a benevolent monarch, Morocco is in fact yet another regime that has been caught red-handed using highly invasive technology to spy on journalists and pro-democracy activists. And when their wrongdoing is exposed, the government attempts to discredit the solid work of independent researchers and to silence local activists.

    #Morocco #Hacking_team #Pegasus #UN #Ban_ki_moon #Idriss_Déby #Tchad