Étiquette : Western Sahara

A return to war in Western Sahara

Tags : Morocco, Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, UNO, MINURSO,

Nick Brooks

You may or may not have heard that the ceasefire that has held for nearly 30 years in Western Sahara broke down yesterday, and the territory is now at war again. There is nothing on the BBC news website about it at the tike of writing, although it did get a brief mention on the World Service and there is this article from the New York Times.

Both sides in the conflict – Morocco and the Polisario – have their versions of what’s happened, and Morocco is likely to have the loudest voice. So here’s my take.

Morocco invaded Western Sahara in 1975, when Spain pulled out. The Polisario, formed a few years earlier to fight for independence from Spain, opposed Morocco’s occupation. A war was fought until 1991, when the UN brokered a ceasefire and installed a peacekeeping force – the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, known by its French acronym, MINURSO. As the name indicates, this force was mandated to organise a referendum on self-determination. This has never happened, and MINURSO remains the only peacekeeping force without a human rights monitoring mandate. Western Sahara remains a non self-governing territory as defined by the UN Committee on Decolonisation. In other words, the decolonisation process has not yet been competed. Western Sahara is often referred to as the Last Colony in Africa.

Throughout the 1975-1991 conflict, Morocco secured territory it had taken behind defensive earthworks or berms. By 1991, these had merged into a single structure – The Berm – which stretches 2700km (about 1700 miles) across the territory, effectively partitioning it into a Moroccan controlled zone to the west and north, and a Polisario controlled zone to the east and south (Figure 1). A detailed analysis of the Berm and its evolution is provided by Garfi (2014).

Figure 1. Western Sahara under the ceasefire, showing partition by the Moroccan Berm, key locations, and deployment of MINURSO peacekeepers. Map from MINURSO/UN Peacekeeping.

Under the terms of the ceasefire, Western Sahara is divided into three areas (Figure 1):

i) a Buffer Strip extending for 5km east and south of the Berm on the Polisario side, which is effectively an exclusion zone or no-man’s land, in which no military personnel or equipment are permitted;

ii) two Restricted Areas, extending for 30km either side of the Berm, in which military activities are prohibited; and

iii) two Areas with Limited Restrictions, which include all the remaining territory of Western Sahara, in which normal military activities can be carried out with the exception of those that represent an escalation of the military situation.

Figure 2. Schematic showing the different areas defined under the ceasefire.

The above information, including maps showing the different zones and the text of the ceasefire (Military Agreement #1) used to be on the MINURSO website but were removed some years ago. When asked, MINURSO and UN Peacekeeping would not explain why, leading many to conclude this was a result of Moroccan lobbying. Morocco’s narrative is that it controls all of Western Sahara except a buffer strip established by the UN for its protection, and that the Polisario has no presence in Western Sahara. The maps and military agreement clearly contradict this.

Since 1991, Morocco has been entrenching its occupation of Western Sahara and developing its natural resources, against international conventions that prohibit occupying powers from exploiting resources in occupied territories for their own gain. These resources include phosphates, fisheries and water resources – Morocco has developed agriculture in occupied Western Sahara, including the production of water-intensive crops such as tomatoes (including the Azera brand).

Some of these resources and the products derived from them transit through Mauritania to the south, for example, fish products from occupied Western Saharan waters that are destined for African markets via the port of Nouadhibouin Mauritania. This route involves traffic passing through the Berm south of the settlement of Guergerat (Figure 3), then traversing the buffer strip for 5km to the border with Mauritania (Figure 4).

Figure 3. Guergerat location in the far southwest of Western Sahara.

In late October 2020, Sahrawi protestors started blockading the road between the Guergerat Berm crossing and the Mauritanian border (Figure 4), within the Buffer Strip. They were protesting against the export of natural resources, including fish destined for the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou, from occupied Western Sahara by Morocco. They also accused Morocco of facilitating the trafficking of drugs and people via Guergerat.

Figure 4. The road that passes through the Berm (top) south of Guergerat, traversing the 5km Buffer Strip established under the 1991 ceasefire, to the Western Sahara-Mauritania border. See Figure

On 12th/13th November, Morocco sent troops to disperse the protestors and take control of the section of road traversing the Buffer Strip. By merely entering the Buffer Strip, Morocco breached the ceasefire. On 13th November, the Polisario declared that this breach marked the end of the ceasefire and the resumption of hostilities, and that they were now at war with Morocco. Later on the 13th, Morocco reported clashes along the Berm in the north of Western Sahara, and on the 14th it appeared that fighting was taking place in the vicinity of Mahbes and Hauza in the north of Western Sahara, and Aouserd and Guergerat in the south.

This all comes against a background of 45 years of conflict and exile for the Sahrawi. Somewhere around 100,000 Sahrawi live under Moroccan occupation, while perhaps around 200,000 live in five refugee camps in the Algerian desert around the town of Tindouf. These camps are governed by the Polisario, and are effectively a society and state in exile. The Polisario also controls the areas to the east and south of the Berm, known to the Sahrawi as the Free Zone.

For decades, discontent in the camps has been growing, particularly among younger Sahrawis, in response to the stalemate, the failure of the UN to organise the long-promised referendum, and an understandable perception that they have been forgotten and abandoned by the rest of world. Many see a return to war as the only way of having any hope of resolving the conflict, whether through military means or as the result of diplomacy facilitated by what they hope will be a renewed spotlight on the territory if hostilities resume. For many years, the Polisario has managed to keep this discontent contained and has avoided conflict. It seems that the latest provocation by Morocco has been too flagrant for this approach to remain viable.

Nick Brooks has travelled extensively in Western Sahara, as co-director of the Western Sahara Project, a research project focusing on archaeology and past environmental change in the territory. Between 2002 and 2009 he led six seasons of fieldwork in the Polisario-controlled zone of Western Sahara, and travelled to the territory on seven occasions, also spending time in the Sahrawi refugee camps around Tindouf. Fieldwork involved frequent detours into Mauritania to avoid the Moroccan Berm.

@SAHARAWIVOICE on Twitter is a good source of updates on the conflict.

6 décembre 2022
The main arguments against Kerry’s suggestions

Tags : Morocco, Western Sahara, John Kerry, MINURSO, Human rights,

Mr. Kerry’s suggestion to expand the role of the MINURSO to include human rights monitoring in the Moroccan southern provinces and the Algerian controlled Sahrawi camps should be perceived as a hasty decision and a clear infringement of Moroccan sovereignty over its territories. This suggestion is, in diplomatic terms, “hasty and ill informed”.

This move was strongly criticized across the Moroccan political spectrum, not least because Morocco has shown a genuine and serious commitment in dealing with this issue, over ALL the parts of its territory, by establishing a solid human rights body (CNDH) that works in closer consultation with several international human rights bodies, such as the Human Rights Council and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human rights, in order to improve its human rights records.

Morocco’s claim is further legitimized because of the lack of impartiality in this matter, since The MINURSO has been reporting on the human rights situation on the Moroccan southern provinces without assessing properly the lack of freedom of movement in those camps, where creation of associations is forbidden (written in the constitution of the pseudo RASD) and where oppression of all kinds of dissidence is flagrant – Abdelaziz is probably the last person to get elected four times with a last election result win of 96% of the votes.

The main flaw however in Mr Kerry’s suggestion remains in trying to request it to be done for both sides, as if both are equal in terms of state structure and state recognition. It should be clearly spelled out that Morocco is a sovereign state, and has signed to all Human Rights conventions and adheres fully to the UN human rights charter, contrary to that pseudo state that has no legitimate existence. Furthermore, Morocco has regained that territory peacefully and in the last 37 years no armed rebellion took place in that area, the reason being is that 1) citizens of those provinces acknowledge Morocco’s right to that territory, and 2) (undoubtedly) the absence of systematic oppressive means of ruling in those regions didn’t urge the Sahrawi people to resort to violence.

The Moroccan government reiterates at every possible occasion its commitment to reach a mutually agreed and a just solution for this conflict, but it will spare no efforts in defending its sovereignty, national unity and territorial integration.

The US should be better informed about human rights abuses in Tindouf. The United Nations envoy to the Western Sahara should have an equal courage to expose to the international community the harsh economic conditions and the imposed civil liberties restrictions faced while living in those camps.

The UN under its High Commission for Refugees (HCR) ought to dispatch an independent party, for a census and identification process (The only “refugee” camp in the world not to have gone through this process) and to collect, investigate and report on instances of human rights abuses in the refugee Camps.

Steps and actions to be taken by the Moroccan diplomacy, civil society and political parties

The Moroccan public opinion needs to be sensitized about the this issue and the Moroccan diplomacy should make the international community aware that the proposition of expanding the MINURSO monitoring on human rights in the Moroccan southern provinces is futile and unnecessary.

Civil society and the political parties have to raise a ONE million petition letter to the UN secretary General and lead a large media and social media campaign to denounce the hasty US proposition to expand the role of the MINURSO to include human rights monitoring in the Moroccan Southern provinces

Civil society and political parties have to raise a ONE million petition letter to the UN secretary General and lead a large media and social media campaign to denounce the state and request the freedom of our Moroccan sequestered brothers and sisters in the camps of Tindouf – The camps of shame.

A ONE million March needs to be organized in Rabat, and around the UN Headquarters in New York on the day and the hours the resolution is being discussed to give momentum to our Moroccan delegation at the UN.

Opening of channels of communication with International media outlets between the period of the submission of the UN envoy on the 22nd of April until the passing of the resolution. A common and well prepared documentation of arguments need to be provided in the English, French, Spanish and Arabic languages to controlled speakers who will be allowed to appear on those programs.

Request the Moroccan Diaspora to lobby and demonstrate in a peaceful manner (Americans are indeed our allies) its discontent with the American hasty decision and raise awareness on the fair and just claim of Morocco’s right to defend the total integrity of its territories, and the disastrous situation endured by the people living in those camps. The tempo should be intensified from the period of the release of the UN envoy report till the passing of the resolution.

#Morocco #Western_Sahara #MINURSO #John_Kerry #Human_rights

27 novembre 2022
What the Moroccans wanted from Hillary Clinton

Topics : Morocco, Western Sahara, USA, Hillary Clinton,

Background

Hillary Clinton’s scheduled February 26 visit to Morocco will very likely be her last trip to Morocco as US Secretary of State. She has made clear that she will not remain in her current position should President Obama win re-election in November. Consequently, her visit later this month will likely represent our best opportunity to secure a commitment from her to make significant progress on several important objectives that we have hoped to achieve during her tenure at the State Department. The visit will offer a good opportunity to consolidate progress made during Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri’s meeting with Secretary Clinton in Washington in March of last year, as well as a new opportunity to take an important step forward in consolidating US support for Morocco’s initiative to resolve the issue in Western Sahara.

Objectives for the Visit

-Secure a public statement of support from the Secretary for Morocco’s reforms and the importance that the US attaches to working with Morocco as a partner in promoting progress in the Middle East and North Africa. In this regard, seek assurance of the Secretary to formally inaugurate the Strategic Dialogue announced one year ago.

-Gain Clinton’s support for committing US development resources to improving the lives of those living in the Southern Provinces as authorized in the December 2011 Omnibus Appropriations Bill that gives the Obama Administration a green light to use US funds in the Sahara provinces.

-Receive a commitment from the Secretary that the Department will respond to the Leahy language in a strong positively worded answer, in order to put this issue to rest, once and for all.

-Encourage the Secretary to reiterate US support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative as “serious, credible and realistic” and to state publicly that events in the region make a resolution of the Western Sahara issue through a political compromise a necessity in order to promote regional cooperation and integration, as well as combat the growing influence and activities of regional terrorist and criminal elements that seek to profit from the uncertainties of Arab Spring developments in the region.

Suggested Points on Western Sahara

-Describe steps Morocco has taken in an effort to improve relations with Algeria and foster a better climate for regional cooperation and resolution of the Sahara. Explain Moroccan perception of the results of these efforts.

-Give Secretary Clinton a full understanding of Morocco’s commitment to resolving this issue as quickly as possible and explain the dangers of continued stalemate, especially as AQIM and other criminal groups seek to destabilize the region.

-Express Morocco’s appreciation for Congress’ authorization for the Obama Administration to use US development assistance funds to help improve the lives of those living in the Southern Provinces. Explain how such actions could help create a better climate for resolving the larger problem in the Sahara. Express willingness to work closely with the State Department and US development agencies to identify programs that could be implemented and suggest that a working level meeting in the near future should be arranged to address this opportunity to enhance US/Morocco efforts on this issue. This will be the one and only signal during her tenure that moves the WS issue incrementally forward. She should see it accomplished before she leaves office. This is one of the two most impactful items Clinton can do with Morocco before leaving office.

-The other issue that would leave an indelible Clinton signature is the US-Moroccan Strategic Dialogue. She should make sure that this Dialogue is established as an on-going process, and that the first meeting is held prior to her leaving office.

-Encourage Secretary Clinton to make a strong public statement of support for the need to resolve the Sahara problem and reiterate the need for compromise as she again expresses the US view of Morocco’s initiative as “serious, credible and realistic.” Anything less will be perceived as the State Department “walking back” previous commitments.

-In this regard reiterate Morocco’s commitment that the refugees in the Algerian camps are welcome to come home and will be assisted in building a new life for themselves and their families.

-Explain the consequences of the Leahy language to the bilateral relations and the perception by the Moroccan population. Specifically explain the importance of an unequivocal and strong positive response from the State Department in this regard in order to lay this issue to rest, once and for all.

#Morocco #Western_Sahara #Hillary_Clinton

23 novembre 2022
Thione Niang mission report

Tags : Morocco, United States, USA, Western Sahara, Young Democrats of America, lobbying,

Executive Summary

Upon my return to Tindouf I set up some meetings in DC to talk to key people to inform them about the situation in the Camps and my recommendations from a young American leader.

Conference Call with YDA National Executive board
The week of our return in DC Chris Anderson and I held a conference call briefing of the Trip and steps to take toward resolution with YDA (Young Democrats of America) national executive board.

Outcome: This again continues to bring awareness to the young leaders across the country whom knew nothing about the Sahara issue prior to our involvement.

Letters to the State Department
Upon my return to Tindouf I send a meeting request letter to inform the US State Department and the White House about my trip in both Tindouf and Morocco and share my thoughts with them. My main concern with them will be the need for the US to act for our security. I had was with Tashea Brodgins who is helping me set up the meeting in Washington with the young Moroccans and the Young people from the Camps.

Meeting with Congressman Payne

Background on Conyers:

Congressman Conyers is the chair of the Black Caucus. He wrote the letter to President Obama to pressure Morocco to investigate the recent issues in Layoone. He is an important person on this issue in DC.

In this meeting I gave a report of our trips in Tindouf and Morocco, what we have seen on both sides and the need for the United States to act quickly.

I also stressed the need for the Black Caucus to investigate all information it receives from all parties very carefully. Because when I arrived to the meeting there was impressions that the other side has gotten to them by their grassroots work on the recent events in Layoone. In result to that Payne’s office delivered a letter to the President to pressure Morocco to investigate the death of a young boy.

I have informed them that in my very recent trip in Morocco last week that those photos was not real and stressed the need to take time to investigate.

I have also indicated that it will be for the best interest our country and our reputation take a look at both sides to have a better picture of the situation like I just did which they promised to so.

Actions-Reoprt-1 Download the original file

Issue: In this matter I have learnt that the grassroots of the other side has been very strong in DC and was successfully able to put Morocco against the defense mode.

There is not enough pressure from Morocco on the grassroots side to do the same or at lest balance things.. In result to that the image of morocco here needs to be protected and I will just be honest.

Outcome of this meeting:

The Congressman, his office and many many people including my self receive so many emails every week from the other sides on every little thing that happens in Layoone or Dakhla and for that they get sensitive to the issue. I personally forwarded all of the emails I have been receiving since the Layoone from the other side.

So I shared with the Congressman what I have heard from Morocco that those pictures the Spanish newspapers are just using them to make Morocco look bad but there more untold stories there. He asked me to share those info Algene and follow up with a meeting with her.

Another Meeting with Algene Sajery

Background on Algene: She is the author of the letter that the Congressman wrote and is the point person dealing with this issue at the Africa Subcommittee. As of last week she became the new staff director of the committee. She is also important because her position tends to influence the Payne’s.

Algene and I met again few days after the initial meeting to talk about the event I am working on to bring the young Moroccans and young people from Tindouf on the table here. But most importantly follow up with her on Payne’s request. In this meeting I have stressed the need for her to go to Tindouf so she can see the difference.

She is very sensitive about the people on the camps I believe because of the pictures they have been showing them and there is no one up until now that is telling them the opposite and I guess that is what I am doing at this point with her and the rest of the members that I have been meeting.

Issue:

She informed me that they were working on another letter for Congress and the White House they are working on and this time for Human Rights issues in Layoone. She also had been received a lot of emails and info from the other side. They are daily sending info where there is nothing from Morocco in return.

Outcome of this meeting:

I was able to convince her to take her time to look at both sides because there is obviously some propaganda here when it comes to the info she receives from the other side and I care more than anything about the credibility of our Nation. I showed her the videos that I received from Manelle and pictures, which helped to have her think about things a little different, but there is still a lot of work to be done with her and I am willing to continue to do so.

Needs:

To continue to work with the Congressman Payne’s office and keep putting pressure on them to let them know that it is not Ok to take blunt decisions without consequences. The way to do that is to monitor the actions and always follow up with whatever comes up. We cannot wait till things happen to respond, there should be a permanent operation going on non‐stop in DC which I will highlight on my recommendations.

Meeting with Congressman Conyers and his stuff

Background on Conyers: He is the founder of the Black Caucus and been serving in Congress since 1965. He is the Chairman of the US Congress Judicial Committee. He is the second longest serving member in the US Congress now.

In our first trip to Morocco he arranged for the CIA to give us a report on the issue and set up a meeting for our delegation to be received by his friend US Ambassador Kaplan in Rabat.

Meeting:

In the meeting I gave him a full report of the rip to Morocco and Tindouf. I have shared with him what I have seen in Layoone, the progress, the development, my meeting with families who came back from the camps, the Cheikhs, the Human Rights Organizations who assured me that all was going well in that matter, etc… I have also shared with him the situation at the camps and how difficult it is for people there, and that our government should do something immediately. Because he is in charge of the security of our nation, CIA, FBI and Homeland security, we discussed the security aspect where I warned him of the potential threat if we don’t move fast because of the vulnerability of the youth in the camps who can be picked up by Al‐aeda if we do nothing.

I have shared with him pictures of both sides. He asked his staff member Isaac Robinson present in the meeting to note the security part and he will call a meeting to hear from the State Department to see what has been done and we go from there. He has been informed now and he is going to take steps and I will continue to follow up with him cause I am also helping him for a Bill he dearly cares about which is the Water for the World Act that I testified in Congress last Wednesday. I also organized a conference call for him with the National Board of the young Democrats of America. So it is a huge step to work on having him on our side because he is very listened to in Washington DC. I also urged him on the propaganda from the other side in case he receives anything from them or Payne’s office.

Outcome of this meeting

In this meeting I gave the Congressman a full report of both of my trips. He instructed his stuff/ advisor Isaac Robinson (Vice President of the Young Democrats of America whom I brought to Morocco with me) and work with me on following up with the State Department and see what have been done and he will take the steps forward. I am willing to follow up with that as well

Meeting with Congressman Bobby Rush’s staff (Angelle Kwemo)

Background on Bobby Rush: He is a senior member and also the Chair of the Commerce and trade committee. He is also one of the seniors of the Black Caucus. He is very close to the President. The Congressman signed the first letter sent to the President to pressure Morocco.

Angelle Kwemo: She is the Legal Counsel for the Congressman and advice the Congressman on this particular issue.

Once I received the letter that went to the White House, I immediately called a meeting with Angelle Kwemo who is a good friend of mine and we both serve in the Congressional African Staff Association( this association is for all African born staffers or former staffers of US Congress) which she is the President and I am the communication Director. I was able to clarify things with Angelle, to show her the videos that I received from Manele. She was shocked to learn about it from Morocco’s point of view. Few days later she talked to the Congressman and decided the will NOT SIGNED ANOTHER letter and they from now on as I urged them to investigate all of the info that they receive from either side.

Article

Upon my return I have written an article sent to the Washington Post and the New York Times, which was not published as of now.

Concerns:

I am aware that you stressed importance of this article in your last email but I think that if this article was published Ok it will be good for Morocco for a day or two but the long‐term I will be very limited to what I can do to help bring end to this issue. Many articles have been published about the issue both in New York Times and the Post and/or support letters sometimes by members but situations still did not change if it is not worsen. Therefore I believe we have got to take a different approach. And that approach has to be the grassroots and also for me to be able to navigate around DC having in mind that the end goal is to show that the autonomy plan is the ideal to resolve this issue. I can’t reach that by jumping to conclusion openly this soon. There is a lot of work to be done and it can’t be minimized.

Morocco is way behind when it comes to the grassroots in the US. Everyone has info from the other side but no office that I went had anything from Morocco on the

recent events in Layoone. If I openly step forward, the other side will scream to the rest of the people in DC whom can listen to me that I am bought by Morocco so I am not credible to speak. I have to try at least to bring solutions. This is how I have to be seen. And to be honest that’s how I feel because I want to see an end to this.

So the grassroots work I have been doing is way more important than a published letter or article because I am able to know who is thinking what and I am working on changing the perception toward the situation and specially toward Morocco.

Note: I am not excluding the support letter but I just want it to be more timely and more effective. Write a letter to just write it will not help.

Example: The other side agreed to let their youth come meet their counterparts from Morocco and if I do the letter now they will shut all of their doors immediately and we will not have no progress. We will start from zero again. But if I try those steps, I will be able to have the ear of my government afterward when I send a letter or go to Congress and testify which I plan to do. It will be important in Congress when I testify to show that I have taken the steps necessary and I believe after all that Morocco’s Autonomy Plan is the solution. For now it is premature and will not help Morocco at all.

Recommendations

What is clearly missing in DC for Morocco is the grassroots aspect I repeat. The other side is way ahead of you guys on this very important issue to you. In result to that Morocco is always on a defense side, which is not very good.

We ought to create strategic outreach plan to build a grassroots portfolio in DC to target the concerning parties and have a very constant operation. We can help with that, specially with the huge databases that we possess. I am open to discuss that after we clear this item. If needed, we will prepare a proposal for you. This will be with my team, as it will take more teamwork to get the job done.

Thione NIANG

Chair, International Affairs Committee
Young Democrats of America

#Morocco #Western_Sahara #Thione_Niang #Young_democrats_of-America

19 novembre 2022
Sahara : Madrid Agreement signature related by CIA

Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Spain, Juan Carlos, Transition, Mauritania, Frente Polisario, Algeria,

National Intelligence Bulletin November 15, 1975

Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania agreed yesterday to set up a joint provisional administration to govern Spanish Sahara withdraws completely early next year.

The Spanish information minister predicted yesterday that Spain would be out of the Sahara by the end of February. He said that details of the new agreeement would not be made public by Spain until the Spanish parliament completed the process – scheduled to start newx Tuesday- of formally decolonizing the territory.

Preliminary comments from Spanish officials indicate they are unhappy with the pact. One spanish officials who has been involved in the negotiations told the US embassy in Madrid that it was a « bad agreement », but was made necessary by the UN’s demonstrated inability to prevent the situation from degenerating into war.

CIA-accord-de-Madrid-1 Download

With the agreement, Madrid has abandonned ist insistence on a referendum for the area. The Spanish official said that « consultations3 will be held with local tribal leaders on the future of Spanish Sahara. Madrid is uneasy about the arrangement because it expects Algeria to be displeased. Algeria is Spain’s main supplier of natural gas, but Madrid apparently preferred to risk its energy supplies ratcher than become engaged in hostilities in the Sahara.

The UN may not have a role now that it has been presented with an accomplished fact. At best, there may be an attempt to obtain UN approval.

The agreeement is victory for Morocco’s King Hassan, who has long sought to annex at least part of Spanish Sahara. Hassan will be able to present the new joint authority as fulfilling a promise he made in August to liberate Spanish Sahara by the end of the year.

As co-administrators; Rabat and Nouakchott will be able to hand-pick Sahara tribal leaders -including the head of the territory’s general assembly, who defected to Morocco- for any « consultations ». The outcome of such « consultations » would almost certainly be a decision to partition the territory; giving to Morocco the northern region; with its rich phosphate deposits; and to Mauritania the southern portion; with its iron ore.

Algeria looks like the big loser. The Algerian Foreign Ministry yesterday issued a statement indicating that Algiers would not approve any agreement to which it had not been a party. The statement strongly reiteratd Algeria’s unequivocal support for the principle of self-determination, suggesting it attends to push for a referendum for Spanish Sahara. An official Algerain news agency warned Madrid that any action to divide the territory would be a grave mistake. The agency said such an action would jeopardize Spain’s interests; apparently a reference to Algeria’a natural gas. Although the agency did suggest that the Saharan people would fight to liberate their homeland, it did imply that Algeria would participate directly in the struggle.

Algeria will; as a firts step, try to enlist support in the UN to reverse the agreement. Algiers will note that the proposed « consultations » are not in accord with an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which upheld the Saharan’s right to self-determination. Althoug a UN report last month stopped short of backing a referendum explicitly, earlier assembly resolutions endorsed self-determination.

The Algerians will also move to create as many problems for Morocco as possible. The will, for example, continue to provide arms, training, and possibly some « volunteers » to the Polisario Front, a pro-independence Saharan group. With sanctuary in Algeria and suffient arms, a relatively small number of Front guerrillas could carry out sabotage and terrorist attachs directed against the new joint administration. Algiers could also renew its support of dissidents inside Morocco.

Algeria would probably hope that a Polisario insurgeny againt Moroccan occupation would tie down a large number of troops for some time to come. The Front already claims it controls part of the territory. Front leaders want a complete independence for Spanish Sahara and have vowed to fight to achieve that aim. Press reports from Algeria say that as many as 2555 armes Polisario members aren in the territory.

Spain

Prince Juan Carlos is extracting maximum advantage out of his status as « temporary » head of state.

Capitalizing on the emergeny nature ot the Sahara problem, he has acted decisively and is given much of credit for reversing the Moroccan march. His leadership imagr has been strengthened by his chairing of two National Defense Council meetings -something Franco rarely did. Juan Carlos’ handling of the Sahara issue to date has also improved his rapport with top military leaders whose support he will need in the months to come.

Althoug Juan Carlos has not been as assertive on domestic issues, Franco’s continued presence has given the prince an excuse not to be. Eben so, the media have applauded Juan Carlos for the recent indications that the government is taking stemps to resolve the sensitive issue of regionalism.K On November 11 the cabinet adopted a decree -initiated several months ago- setting up a commission to prepare a special administrative statute for two of the Basque provinces (…) The press has also reported that a decree approved last May authorizing the teaching of regional languages in schools and their use in local government activities will also be issued soon.

In general, however, there is a paralysis in domestci policy-making will probably continue as long as Franco lives. During the interregnum, the activities of the ultra-right -if left unchecked- will ci-omplicate Juan Carlo’s efforts to open up Spanish society after he is sworn in as king. Blas Pinar, leader of the ultra-right New Force, has been holding rallies around the country warning of the dangers posed by political parties. Pointing out that the monarchy will derive its legitimacy solely from Franco, he has called Juan Carlos to purge the government of all who have not supported Francoism.

Right-wing extremists, such as the Guerrilas of Christ the King; who have been linked to the New Force, have recently beaten up student demonstrators and opposition lawyers, and sent threatening letteres to oppositionists and even to some of the more open-minded establishment figures.

Security forces, meanwhile, have taken full advantage of th’ wide powers granted by last summer’s anti-terrorist decrees to step un arrests and repress all forms of dissent: Il the past few days; according to press estimates; more than 100 people have been arrested, including the editor of the presigious independe newspaper Ya who was indicted for publishing an article on the succession. Six priests have been fined because of their sermons, and the government has banned several conferences by important professors, including former minister Ruiz Gimenez.

Juan Carlos will not be able to postpone domestic policy decisions much longer even if Franco lives. A decision is due on a successor for Rodriguez de Valcarcel; the conservative president of parliament whose six-year term expires later this month. The position is important because the incumbent automatically becomes president of the Council of the Realm, which is instrumental in the choice of new prime ministers, and the three-man Council of the Regency, which will govern from the time of Franco’s death until Juan Carlos is sworn in.

Should Juan Carlos decide to retain Rodrgiuez de Valcarcel, the decision will be interpreted by the Spanish left as Francoism without Franco. If someone else is chosen, his political credential will be carefully examined for clues as to the direction in which Juan Carlos plans to take Spain.

Source

#Western_sahara #Morocco #Spain #Algeria

6 novembre 2022
Marcelo Kohen: « Le Sahara occidental reste un territoire non autonome »

Source : RTS.CH, 24 jan 2021

Tags : Sahara Occidental, Front Polisario, Maroc, Western Sahara, Etats-Unis, Donald Trump, Joe Biden,

2 novembre 2022
Western Sahara : Text of UNSC Resolution 2654 (2022)
Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, MINURSO, UNO,

The Security Council today voted to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October 2023, calling on the parties to resume negotiations in good faith towards a mutually acceptable political solution for the region.

Adopting resolution 2654 (2022) (to be issued as document S/RES/2654) by a vote of 13 in favour to none against, with 2 abstentions (Russian Federation, Kenya), the 15-member organ expressed full support for the Secretary-General and Staffan de Mistura, Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, to facilitate negotiations to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question, and strongly encouraged Morocco, Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania to engage with him throughout the duration of the process to ensure a successful outcome.

Further to the text, it reaffirmed the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and called on the parties to comply fully with those agreements, implement their commitments to the former Personal Envoy, and refrain from any actions that could undermine United Nations-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in the Western Sahara.

Speaking after the vote, Jeffrey DeLaurentis (United States) underlined the Council’s support for the Personal Envoy in his efforts to facilitate a just lasting and mutually acceptable political solution for Western Sahara. Despite the vote not being unanimous, he called on all concerned to engage in good faith with the Personal Envoy. Morocco’s autonomy plan is serious, credible and realistic and one potential approach to satisfying those aspirations. MINURSO peacekeepers are tasked with monitoring and reporting on the situation on the ground, and when possible, conducting dangerous mine clearance operations, he noted, calling for the restoration of their freedom of movement as well as the resumption of safe and regular re-supply of MINURSO team sites. Voicing concern about the dire situation in the Tindouf refugee camps, he urged donors to increase their humanitarian contributions.

Martin Kimani (Kenya) recalled that his country’s supports for MINURSO was reflected in its affirmative vote on resolution 2602 (2021). In doing so, it hoped that the parties would engage with the Personal Envoy to return MINURSO to its core objective of implementing a referendum for the people of Western Sahara. However, today’s resolution continues the gradual — but noticeable — shift away from that mandate and will not help the parties achieve a just, lasting, mutually acceptable political solution as originally intended. His delegation abstained because its constructive proposals during negotiations were not taken on board. Further, the resolution does not substantively reflect the Council’s commitment to provide for the self-determination of the peoples of Western Sahara. The right to self-determination is a foundational principle for both the United Nations and the African Union, he said, adding that the African Union — which counts both parties as members — should not be ignored by any United Nations process.

Amiera Alhefeiti (United Arab Emirates) welcomed the adoption, which enhances the role of peace and security. She cited the constructive approach of the Council, expressing support for balanced language and the efforts of the Special Envoy to work towards a mutually acceptable political solution, calling on him to build on previous progress. She affirmed the sovereignty of Morocco over the Moroccan Sahara, renewing support for that country’s autonomy plan presented in 2007, which is serious and credible.

Dmitry Polyanskiy (Russian Federation), noting his abstention, said the process for preparing and agreeing on the document was not fully consultative. None of his delegation’s fundamental and well-founded comments were taken into consideration. Moreover, there was no response to useful proposals made by other Council members, resulting in an unbalanced text and raising doubts to the impartiality of the informal file sponsors. The resolution does not reflect the real situation on the ground and is unlikely to facilitate the Envoy’s efforts to renew direct negotiations between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO to achieve mutually acceptable solutions. Noting his delegation’s position is dictated purely by lack of agreement on wording, he voiced support for MINURSO and its key role in establishing conditions on the ground and pushing forward the peace process.

Dai Bing (China) said that MINURSO contributes positively to the question of Western Sahara and the maintenance of stability in the region. He expressed his support for the extension of the Mission’s mandate for 12 months, which demonstrates the Council’s determination to promote a political solution to the question. He also expressed hope that future Council resolutions relating to this mandate will reflect the latest changes in the situation, and undergo thorough consultations, to arrive at a text acceptable to the relevant parties. China’s position on Western Sahara has been consistent — this situation should be handled based on relevant Council resolutions so that a just, durable, mutually acceptable solution can be reached.

João Genésio De Almeida Filho (Brazil) noted that this year’s text, notwithstanding its many features, could have greatly benefitted from a more balanced approach on some of its innovative propositions. Something as simple as incorporating regional formulas, many of which are still very much valid, could have proven useful to breach some of the gaps during recent negotiations. These in turn could have allowed for an even stronger message of support for the Personal Envoy and the Special Representative. He reiterated steadfast support for a peaceful, just and mutually acceptable solution to the question under the auspices of the United Nations.

Michel Xavier Biang (Gabon), Council President for October, speaking in his national capacity, said his delegation voted for the prolongation of the mandate in support of the political process to reach a realistic, achievable and lasting political solution based on compromise for Western Sahara. The resolution makes it possible to support the Personal Envoy’s efforts in relaunching the political process with the various stakeholders. He voiced support for the Moroccan autonomy initiative as a credible and reassuring prospect for a way out of the current impasse and for reaching an acceptable political solution for all.

The meeting began at 10:07 a.m. and ended at 10:27 a.m.

United Nations Resolution S/RES/2602 (2021) adopted by the Security Council at its 8890th meeting, on 29 October 2021

The Security Council,

Recalling and reaffirming all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary -Gen eral and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (200 8 ), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), 1979 (2011), 2044 (2012), 2099 (2013), 2152 (2014), 2218 (2015), 2285 (2016), 2351 (2017), 2414 (2018), 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494(2019), and 2548 (2020),

Paying tribute to Horst Köhler, former Personal Envoy of the Secretary -General for Western Sahara, and commending his efforts in holding the round -table process, which created momentum in the political process,

Welcoming the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-Gene ral for Western Sahara and urging the constructive resumption of the political process, building on the progress of the former Personal Envoy,

Welcoming the momentum created by the first round -table meeting on 5−6 December 2018 and the second round -table meeting on 21–22 March 2019, and the engagement by Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania in the UN political process on Western Sah ara in a serious and respectful manner in order to identify elements of convergence,

Encouraging the resumption of consultations between the Personal Envoy and Morocco, the Frente POLISAR IO, Algeria and Mauritania in this regard to build on the progress achieved,

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise , which will provide for the self-determi nation of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

Reiterating its call upon Morocco, the Frente POLISAR IO, Algeria and Mauritania to cooperate more fully with each other, including through building additional trust, and with the United Nations, as well as to strengthen their involvement in the political process and to achieve progress towards a politica l solution,

Recognizing that achieving a political solution to this long-standing dispute and enhanced cooperation between the Member States of the Maghreb Arab Union would contribute to stability and security, in turn leading to jobs, growth and opportunities for all the peoples in the Sahel region,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-Gene ral to keep all peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINUR SO), under close review and reiterating the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments, and effective management of resources,

Recalling resolution 2378 (2017) and its request of the Secretary -General to ensure that data related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, including peacekeeping performance data, is used to improve analytics and the evaluation of mission operations, based on clear and well i dentified benchmarks, and further recalling resolution 2436 (2018) and its request of the Secretary-General to ensure that decisions to recognize and incentivize outstanding performance and decisions regarding deployment, remediation, training, withholding of financial reimbursement, and repatriation of uniformed or dismissal of civilian personnel, are predicated on objective performance data,

Recalling resolution 2242 (2015) and 2538 (2020) and its aspiration to increase the number of women in military and police contingents of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

Recognizing the important role played by MINURSO on the ground and the need for it to fully implement its mandate, including its role in supporting the Personal Envoy to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution,

Noting with deep concern the breakdown of the ceasefire,

Expressing concern about the violations of existing agreements and reiterating the importance of full adherence to these commitments, and taking note of the commitments provided by the Frente POLISAR IO to the former Personal Envoy,

Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-Gene ral and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Frente POLISARIO proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary -General,

Encouraging in this context, the parties to demonstrate further political will towards a solution including by expanding upon their discussion of each other’s proposals and recommitting to UN efforts in a spirit of realism and compromise, and further encouraging the neighbouring countries to make contributions to the political process,

Encouraging the parties to cooperate further with the United Nations Office of the High Commissione r for Refugees in identifying and implementing confiden ce – building measures that can serve to foster the trust necessary for a successful political process,

Stressing the importance of improving the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the Tindouf camps, and encouraging the parties to work with the international community to develop and implement independent and credible measures to ensure full respect for human rights, bearing in mind their relevant obligations under international law,

Encouraging the parties to sustain and prioritize their respective efforts to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights in Western Sahara and the Tindouf refugee camps, including the freedoms of expression and association,

Welcoming in this regard, steps and initiatives taken by Morocco, and the role played by the National Council on Human Rights Commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and Morocco’s interaction with Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council,

Strongly encouraging enhancing cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), including through facilitating visits to the region,

Noting with deep concern the continued hardships faced by Sahrawi refugees, their dependency on external humanitarian assistance, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and further noting with deep concern insufficient funding for those living in Tindouf refugee camps and the risks associated with the reduction of food assistance,

Reiterating its request for consideration of a refugee registration in the Tindouf refugee camps and emphasizing efforts be made in this regard,

Recalling United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 and 2250 and related resolutions;

stressing the importance of a commitment by the parties to continue the process of negotiations through the United Nations-sponso red talks and encouraging the full, effective and meaningful participation of women and active and meaningful participation of youth in these talks,

Recognizing that the status quo is not acceptable, and noting further that progress in negotiations is essential in order to improve the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

Affirming its full support for Special Representative of the Secretary -General for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO Alexander Ivanko,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 1 October 2021 (S/2021/843),
1. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 31 October 2022;
2. Emphasizes the need to achieve a realistic, practicable, enduring and mutually acceptable political solution to the question of Western Sahara based on compromise and the importance of aligning the strategic focus of MINURSO and orienting resources of the United Nations to this end;
1. Expresses its full support for the Secretary -General and his Personal
Envoy to facilitate the negotiations process in order to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question, notes the intention of the former Personal Envoy to invite Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania to meet again in the same format, and welcomes the engagement of Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria, and Mauritania throughout the duration of this process, in a spirit of realism and compromise, to ensure a successful outcome;

4. Calls upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the c ontext of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and

noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;
1. Invites Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;
1. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire and calls on the parties to comply fully with those agreements, implement their commitments to the former Personal Envoy, and refrain from any actions that could undermine UN-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in the Western Sahara;
1. Reiterates its call upon all parties to cooperate fully with MINURSO, including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of as well as unhindered movement and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformi ty with existing agreements;
1. Emphasizes the importance of a renewed commitment by the parties to advancing the political process in preparation for further negotiations, recalls its endorsement of the recommendation in the report of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251) that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations, and encourages the neighbouring countries to make important, active contributions to this process;
1. Calls upon the parties to demonstrate political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to advance negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007), 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), 1920 (2010), 1979 (2011), 2044 (2012), 2099 (2013), 2152 (2014), 2218 (2015), 2285(2016), 2351 (2017), 2414 (2018), 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), and 2548 (2020), and the success of negotiations;
1. Requests the Secretary-Gen e ral to brief the Security Council on a regular basis, and at any time he deems appropriate during the mandate period, to include within six months of this mandate’s renewal and again prior to its expiration, on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, on the implementation of this resolution, assessment of MINURSO’s operations and steps taken to address challenges, expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his briefings and in this regard, further requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;
11. Welcomes the initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General to standardize a culture of performanc e in UN peacekeeping, and reaffirms its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framewo rk that identifies clear standards of performance for evaluating all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel working in and supporting peacekeeping operations that facilitates effective and full implementation of mandates, and includes comprehensive and objective methodologies based on clear and well -defined

benchmarks to ensure accountability for underperformanc e and incentives and recognition for outstanding performance, and calls on him to apply this framework to MINURSO as described in resolution 2436 (2018), requests the Secretary-General to seek to increase the number of women in MINURSO, as well as to ensure the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations;
1. Urges the parties and neighbouring states to engage productively with MINURSO as it further considers how new technologies can be used to reduce risk, improve force protection, and better implement its mandate;
1. Encourages the parties to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to identify and implement confidence-building measures, including to engage women and youth, and encourages neighbouring states to support these efforts;
1. Urges Member States to provide new and additional voluntary contributions to fund food programme s to ensure that the humanitarian needs of refugees are adequately addressed and avoid reductions in food rations;
15. Requests the Secretary-Gene ral to continue to take necessary measures to ensure full compliance of all personnel in MINURSO with the Unite d Nations zero -tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council fully informed through his reports to the Council about the Mission’s progress in this regard, and urges troop-contributing and police-contributing countries to continue taking appropriate preventative action including vetting of all personnel ,

predeployment and in-mission awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel through timely investigation of allegations by troop-contributing and police-contributing countries and MINURSO, as appropriate;
1. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
1 novembre 2022
Washington team March 2012 progress report

Tags : Morocco, USA, Lobbying, Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, Terrorism, Sahel,

Introduction

In the highly politicized atmosphere in Washington during this US presidential election year, US foreign policy receives little attention except when crises occur. In times past, US presidents could count on “flying the flag,” appealing to American patriotism as a means of building support for policies. Today, every word or action is placed under a magnifying glass to determine or infer hidden meanings that reveal the weakness of the proposed policies. Thus, very little moves in Washington regarding policy that is not related to problems and challenges that cannot be delayed.

This challenging milieu makes the efforts of the Washington Team to move the Obama Administration to approve US funding for projects in the Western Sahara even more daunting. Yet the results to date are largely positive. Despite the negative media coverage of the Amina Filali case and Aminatou Haidar’s regular visits to New York and Washington to speak against Morocco’s human rights record, Morocco continues to find a positive reception in Congress. The Washington Team’s drive to have more than 300 meetings with Congressional offices before the summer recess is making great progress. The key message, that US foreign assistance to the camps should be given on condition that it directly improves the lives of the refugees, is being well received. The Team is also working with members and staff to define what these “conditions” should be and concrete projects that the US should fund in the South.

There is a dilemma in the Washington Team’s activities in that Morocco is not in crisis, therefore, some policy makers would prefer to leave the Kingdom’s issues off the agenda while the Administration deals with Syria, Iran, Iraq, and crises beyond the MENA region. Ending the Western Sahara conflict, while a helpful outcome to US interests in the region, is not given a high priority by some in the government. It was therefore helpful that the remarks following the meeting between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Clinton reaffirmed the centrality of the Western Sahara conflict and the commitment to the bilateral strategic dialogue. This visit, and Secretary Clinton’s visit to Morocco, and the generally high praise that Morocco is receiving for its role on the UN Security Council, continue to make the case that Morocco is a leader in the region, and among America’s friends worldwide.

The Communications report below indicates that positive coverage of Morocco far outweighs negative coverage associated with Amina Filali and Aminatou Haidar. Security concerns related to the region, Morocco’s leadership at the UNSC, continued concerns with the direction of the Arab uprisings, and op-eds that show how Morocco is making progress in its reforms and economic development, all contribute to the positive image of Morocco in the media.

This report is not exhaustive nor is it fully detailed as we focus on the items that have the most impact on our strategy. Since it is difficult to distinguish some of the work of the Moroccan American Center from that of the Embassy, this report includes select activities of the Embassy, MAC, and its consultants as the “Washington Team”.

OR:

This report is prepared by the Moroccan American Center, including MACP, MACC and MATIC. It is not exhaustive nor is it fully detailed as we focus on the items that have the most impact on our strategy. While we attempt to only highlight work that MAC has been involved in, in some cases we touch upon the work of others, such as the Embassy or other pro-Moroccan entities. In such related cases, we try to only report on activities where MAC has had a role as well, or where the activity is worthy of highlighting to the Rabat team since it relates to one of the Team’s main objectives. In all cases we try as much as possible to keep this reporting to the principal work of MAC.

Campaigns

MoroccoOnTheMove.com (MOTM)

The Washington Team’s MOTM website and social media program (@MorocOnTheMove) continues to broaden the reach for our messaging, in terms of quantity and targeted audiences. After five months online, nearly 250 postings of news articles and original content by the Washington Team have appeared and the website has received more than 24,000 hits. In that same period, @MorocOnTheMove has sent nearly 900 tweets, has close to 250 followers, and has been retweeted regularly by influential personalities on Twitter. Although we have to improve these numbers even more in the months ahead, this is a strong beginning to our social media efforts.

As part of increasing efforts to engage more regularly with our target audiences, particularly through email and social media, the Washington Team distributed an e-letter, “Reform, stability, and the Western Sahara” to our contacts database of approximately 3,000 policymakers, media, academics, think-tank and NGO leaders, Administration officials, and Congressional staffs. This e-letter highlighted and redistributed materials mentioned in the Communications report including the ICTS report, the Atlantic magazine article, the paper published by the Carnegie Endowment, the Roll Call column, Congressional Record remarks, The Hill op-ed, , the Washington Post “Right Turn” column, the POMED column, and positive press about the launch of RAMED, Morocco’s large-scale healthcare program aimed at providing care to disadvantaged citizens, as well as specific items Rabat wants us to highlight though its mediatization requests.

Also, in March, the Washington Team began distribution of a weekly “Morocco highlight e-mail” to our contacts database, in which one or two events, publications, and/or positive press articles are featured. The purpose of this weekly highlight is to draw attention to an important messaging opportunity to the contacts about Morocco. The first “Morocco highlight e-mail” redistributed the March 27 Global Post op-ed.

Morocco as a Leader

During the month of March, the Washington Team continued its efforts to promote Morocco as a model of progress and reform by regularly briefing and engaging influential policy makers, think-tank leaders, and target journalists.

Activities:

On March 8, The Atlantic magazine, a well-respected publication on culture, current events, and politics for more than 150 years, published an article, “The coming Arab identity crisis,” by Massoud Hayoun which focuses on the questions of Arab identity that have resurfaced during the Arab Spring. The Washington Team arranged an interview for its author with Ambassador Edward Gabriel, who is quoted among other influential leaders in the Arab Diaspora. For further distribution, a blog column highlighting the article was posted on “Who’s who in the Arab world? Examining Arab identity,” on the Foreign Policy Association’s Foreign Policy Blog.

On March 13, Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, hosted a roundtable at the Council’s offices in Washington with Ambassador Bouhlal entitled, “Morocco and the Arab Spring.” At the event, which was organized through the Washington Team’s outreach to Abrams and CFR, Ambassador Bouhlal detailed Morocco’s reform process and answered questions about the implementation of the new Constitution.

In early March, the POMED Wire, a blog of the Project on Middle East Democracy, posted a report citing dubious torture allegations against Morocco made on the Sahara Press Service (SPS) website. The Washington Team contacted POMED’s executive director, alerted him to the questionable nature of many SPS publications, which prompted him to inform his bloggers to keep the unprofessional nature of SPS in mind before republishing or sourcing its work. Following the conversation, POMED agreed to post a piece on the POMED Wire authored by Ambassador Edward Gabriel, “Gabriel: Change, reform, and progress in Morocco,” which outlined the year of reform in Morocco and how its “Arab Spring” experience was successful and exceptional.

On March 23, the Foreign Policy Association’s Foreign Policy Blog published a column by Moroccan-American international attorney, Leila Hanafi, “Constitutional reforms in Morocco: Outlook for youth rights.” The article examined the success of the current reform process in Morocco and what measures will be necessary to insure that success is sustained and far-reaching. Knowing that Ms. Hanafi’s articles can be somewhat dubious in content, when she asked the Washington Team for feedback we reviewed the draft at her request in order to ameliorate any adverse consequences.

Results:

In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight Morocco’s role as a leader for democratic reforms and peace in the region generated more than 320 positive media placements and 20 million favorable media impressions.

The Polisario and Terrorism in the Sahara/Sahel

During March, the Washington Team continued its efforts to call US attention to the growing threat of AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Sahara/Sahel in order to shape the debate and reinforce perceptions of the Polisario’s negative role in the region. These efforts included journalist outreach, arranging briefings by Washington Team members and third-party spokespeople, and creating fact sheets and other supporting documents for distribution to target audiences.

Activities:

Following the March 2 publication by The Hill of an op-ed by Ambassador Edward Gabriel, « Stop subsidizing recruiting grounds for terrorists and traffickers, » several other media outlets republished or cited the piece, including the World247.net News network and the U.K. Foreign Office/U.K. Government Online. Also, the Italian-based online newspaper, Lettera 43, published an article about terrorism in the Sahel that cited ICTS reports and maps.

To maintain US media attention on the continued detention of the European aid workers kidnapped by members of an AQIM-related group with suspected help from members of the Polisario Front, the Washington Team authored a blog posting on the MOTM website on March 20, “Day 150 – still hostage: Rosella Urru, two others seized by AQIM sect in Polisario camp.” This posting will be a part of a regular series of updates on the kidnapping as the situation develops.

On March 27, the Global Post published an op-ed by Jordan Paul, “Why are we perpetuating a source of instability in North Africa?” The op-ed made the case for retargeting non-humanitarian aid destined for the Polisario to stop perpetuating the refugee camps’ deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions and urged US leadership to resolve the Western Sahara conflict.

In late March, the Washington Team compiled a paper, “Spotlight: The case for redirecting US support for the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, which are becoming a recruiting ground for AQIM, arms and drug traffickers.” The paper provides background information and a chronology of documented incidents and reports linking members of the Polisario Front with AQIM, trafficking, and other illicit activities in the region. It will be widely distributed in April to key contacts in Congress, the media, and think tanks.

Results:

In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight the Polisario’s involvement with rising terrorism in the region generated more than 200 favorable media placements and 21 million media impressions.

Resolving the Western Sahara: Autonomy under Moroccan Sovereignty

Ahead of and following the ninth round of informal talks on the Western Sahara conflict, the Washington Team conducted outreach to journalists, policymakers, and government officials to highlight the urgent need to solve the conflict for security as well as humanitarian reasons and to promote Morocco’s compromise autonomy proposal.

Activities:

To focus US media attention on the informal talks and Morocco’s efforts to offer genuine compromise in the negotiations, the Washington Team issued a press release on March 12, “US, France voice strong support for Morocco’s autonomy plan to resolve Western Sahara dispute, remove obstacle to peace in region.” The release, which highlighted recent public declarations of support for the autonomy plan by US Secretary of State Clinton and French Foreign Minister Juppé, was distributed to PRNewswire and targeted journalists. It was posted by more than 150 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, Forbes, Boston Globe, Dallas Morning News, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sacramento Bee, Yahoo News, AOL News, AfricaBusiness, and Afrik-News. MAP published an article, “Les 9è pourparlers sur le Sahara se tiennent avec en toile de fond un soutien consolidé de Washington au Plan d’autonomie,” that referenced the release and the ICTS report, which was republished by L’Opinion, Le Matin, and several other Moroccan news publications.

Following regular briefings and updates by the Team, two Members of Congress also made strong, public statements of support for Morocco’s autonomy plan as a peaceful, compromise solution to the Western Sahara conflict. In an opinion piece published March 12 in Roll Call, “Changes offer positive sign for Western Sahara”, Rep. Steve Cohen of Tennessee gave the background on why the autonomy proposal was the best option for peace. In remarks for the Congressional Record, Rep. Chris Murphy of Connecticut said the people of the Western Sahara « deserve for this longstanding dispute to be resolved » and stated that Morocco’s compromise proposal is « a reasonable offer and can serve as a basis for negotiations. » Murphy acknowledged, « it is in the interest of the United States and the parties involved to achieve a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Western Sahara issue[.] » MAP ran stories on both Members’ statements, “US Congressman highlights overwhelming bipartisan support for Morocco’s autonomy plan within two chambers of US Congress,” and “Moroccan autonomy proposal, a democratic solution that can serve as a basis for negotiations, US Cong.”

On March 13, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a paper by Professor Anouar Boukhars, “Simmering discontent in the Western Sahara,” in which Boukhars examined a number of internal and external factors that affect resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. The paper – which cited several information sources the Washington Team helped generate – was distributed widely to key contacts and targeted journalists and incorporated into our regular information packet on the Western Sahara.

In order to highlight the urgent need to address the humanitarian crisis in the Polisario-controlled camps in southern Algeria through implementation of durable solutions for refugees, Robert Holley authored a blog posting on the MOTM website, ”You don’t have to live like a refugee”, which is a play on words from Tom Petty song with the same title.

Results:

In March, the Washington Team’s efforts to highlight to US audiences the broad support for Morocco’s autonomy plan and need for US leadership to help resolve the Western Sahara generated more than 650 favorable media placements and 57 million media impressions.

Upcoming in April

On April 3, the Washington Team will host a roundtable, “The Western Sahara crisis: Why US leadership is needed now,” where an expert panel will offer insights on the crisis in the Western Sahara, the growing threat of terrorism in the region, the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and how US leadership can help bring this conflict to a peaceful end. The roundtable will feature Jean AbiNader, Senior Advisor, Moroccan American Center (Moderator), Ambassador Michael Ussery, Former US Ambassador to Morocco, Dr J. Peter Pham, Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, The Atlantic Council, and Robert Holley, Senior Policy Advisor, Moroccan American Center for Policy. To encourage attendance and coverage of the roundtable, the Washington Team widely distributed a press advisory to target journalists, as well as an invitation to all major policymakers and US government officials who focus on Morocco. The advisory was picked up and posted by more than 120 US and international media outlets, including Reuters, the Wall Street Journal’s Market Watch, CNBC, CNN Top News, Boston Globe, African Press Organization, Sacramento Bee, Yahoo News, AOL News, and Afrik-News.

Congressional Activities

The Washington Team conducted over 90 meetings with Congressional offices in March alone, which focused on our core themes: Morocco as a leader, the rising threat of terrorism in the region and the dangers of the Polisario camps, the need to target assistance to the camps, and the need to resolve the issue of the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

These meetings serve to maintain our majority support in Congress, to ensure that the truth is known about the Polisario, to build support for targeting assistance to the camps, and to create a greater awareness of the importance of a strong US-Morocco bilateral relationship. These meetings constitute the base we build every year as we never take for granted our current supporters and always seek to secure the support of additional members. The Washington Team followed up on these meetings with a series of emails containing updates, recent news, publications so as reinforce our messaging provided at each meeting. The latter also lay the groundwork for our upcoming meetings so that members are aware of the issues to be discussed well in advance. .

The Ambassador continued his introductory meetings to key Members of Congress. In April, he was hosted for a lunch in the Congressional Members Dining Room where he met with Rep. Steve Cohen (who wrote the Op-Ed earlier in the month), Rep. Ed Towns, Rep. Ed Markey, Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee, and Rep. David Dreier. The Ambassador also met the co-Chair of the Morocco Caucus, Rep. Michael Grimm. These introductory meetings will continue throughout the year.

The Washington Team also produced significant statements around the latest informal round of the negotiations. Rep. Chris Murphy (D-CT) made a statement in support of Morocco on the eve of the Manhasset talks and Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN) published a very favorable Op-ed on the Monday of the talks. These statements and Op-Eds from leftist, democratic members help to reinforce the concept that the autonomy/sovereignty solution has broad based support and is the inevitable solution. The more that this message takes hold, the easier it will be to secure congressional support for establishing facts on the ground (building on the language from last year) and conditioning aid to the camps.

The Washington Team also worked with the office of Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart to pose questions to the Administration during oversight hearings with Secretary Clinton on how they planned to implement the language authorizing US assistance to Morocco to be spent in the southern provinces. This helps to keep the issue in front of the State Department and makes them aware that Congress is intent on seeing action this year. The Washington Team is also working with the Appropriations Committee to develop language and secure support for targeting assistance to the refugee camps away from the status quo and towards durable solutions, including a census and resettlement.

MATIC

MATIC worked with the US Chamber of Commerce in setting up its first business delegation to Morocco March 20-22, which including major corporations such as Raytheon, Honeywell, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, and others, as well as six companies focused on renewable energies. The Moroccan Embassy arranged for the participation of a number of senior government officials to attend events and lunches and dinners hosted by AMDI and Maroc Export. MATIC hosted a luncheon for the delegation on March 21 and worked with ADEREE, MASEN, and ONE on a panel on renewable energies. Ambassador Kaplan and members of the US Embassy attended the luncheon.

The most important news of the month was an announcement by the China Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund) that it had chosen Morocco for its regional office for North, West, and Central Africa. MATIC has escorted three different CAD Fund delegations in Morocco and helped them survey possible office and apartment sites. MATIC was involved with them in setting up meetings for and providing logistical support, as well as coordinated with GOM officials. MATIC was the first among several Moroccan entities to make contact with the CAD Fund.

MATIC also set up the latest in a series of meetings for MANAS Development Group http://www.manasdevelopment.org/ an international company that provides training services to agencies and companies, which resulted in their choosing Morocco as the location for the regional office serving North, West, and Central Africa.

MACC

Throughout the month of March, MACC staff attended a number of events on the Maghreb and the Middle East, including an Ambassadors forum hosted by the US-Arab Chamber of Commerce, a roundtable on democracy in the Arab World held at the National Press Club, and a conference on access to justice hosted by the American Bar Association.

Ambassador Edward Gabriel

#Morocco #USA #Lobbying #Western_Sahara #Frente_Polisario #Edward_Gabriel

Rabat-Team-March-2012-report-English-1 Download the report

29 octobre 2022
Ambassador Ed Gabriel report on Western Sahara -Mar 22, 212-

Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Ambassador Edward Gabriel, Frente Polisario,

The information contained herein is from a generally reliable source but has not be corroborated by third party sources.

BEGIN TEXT :

As you may have seen in the media this morning, an attempted coup is under way in Mali, following a mutiny by troops stationed in the north of the country, where a Touareg revolt has been raging since the beginning of the year.

The following report, received shortly before the outbreak of the mutiny/coup d’Etat, may be relevant:

A Saharawi NGO activist based in Oran, NW Algeria, states that the Algerian army has introduced new security measures in SW Algeria, as of the end of February, aimed at preventing all movement by nomadic groups between Algeria, Mauritania and northern Mali. Saharawi refugees from the Tindouf camps can no longer travel as they please beyond the perimeter of the camps. Permits issued by the Saharawi authorities, which were hitherto commonly used by camp residents for travel, in particular to Mauritania, no longer suffice for refugees who wish to travel outside the camps. Refugees who wish to go out of the camps for whatever reason now need a permit to travel on Algerian territory.

According to an Algiers-based Saharawi journalist, the Algerian authorities have have informed the SADR/Polisario via PM Abdelkader Taleb Oumar that Algiers is willing to provide all possible assistance to facilitate family visits between the Tindouf camps and the territories administered by Morocco.

END

#Morocco #Western_Sahara #Edward_Gabriel #Frente_Polisario

28 octobre 2022
Western Sahara: Vote on the Mandate of MINURSO

Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Security Council, MINURSO,

Tomorrow morning (27 October), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October 2023. The US, the penholder on Western Sahara, circulated the initial draft text to Council members on 19 October. This followed Council members’ bi-annual consultations with Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara Staffan de Mistura and Special Representative and head of MINURSO Alexander Ivanko on 17 October. Members held one expert-level meeting on the text on 21 October. On 24 October, the US circulated a revised draft, which it placed under silence procedure until noon yesterday (25 October). Kenya and Russia broke silence; however, the US placed the draft resolution in blue without making further changes to the text.

Several updates to this year’s draft resolution renewing MINURSO’s mandate were made with the apparent objective of providing de Mistura, who was appointed in October 2021, with space and flexibility to advance the political process. As described in the Secretary-General’s most recent report on Western Sahara, dated 3 October, Morocco favours reconvening the roundtable talks that de Mistura’s predecessor, Horst Köhler, had initiated in 2018 and 2019, involving Morocco, the Polisario Front, Algeria and Mauritania. Morocco has said that this process should be based on its autonomy proposal for Western Sahara. (Morocco’s autonomy plan, which it submitted to the UN in 2007, calls for integrating the territory into Morocco, with the Sahrawi people managing their internal affairs while being represented externally by Morocco.) Conversely, Algeria has objected to the roundtable format, which it sees as potentially reframing the situation as a “regional conflict”, instead of one between Morocco and the Polisario Front, with Algeria and Mauritania viewed as “concerned neighbours”.

The draft resolution in blue introduces new language stressing the importance of “all concerned expanding on their positions in order to advance a solution”. It seems that the term “all concerned” was inserted as more ambiguous language to accommodate actors’ different views regarding who are considered the parties to the conflict, while giving de Mistura space to determine how to move forward with the political process. The draft text further expresses support for “building on the progress and framework of the former Personal Envoy”, and strongly encourages Morocco, the Polisario Front, Algeria and Mauritania to engage with the Personal Envoy.

Among other updates, the US added new language in this year’s draft calling for the resumption of the safe and regular resupply of MINURSO team sites. This is an issue raised in the Secretary-General’s report, as the Polisario Front has imposed movement restrictions on MINURSO since the breakdown of the ceasefire in November 2020, which have significantly limited the mission’s ability to re-supply its team sites east of the berm. According to the report, these restrictions have negatively affected the serviceability and lifecycle of equipment, as well as the morale and health of MINURSO personnel at the sites, and, if not removed, risk making these sites unsustainable.

The US also introduced new language to this year’s mandate renewal that strongly encourages donors to provide additional funds and for aid agencies to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This reflects concerns about severe food insecurity and malnutrition in the Tindouf refugee camps due to funding gaps, which have forced the World Food Programme (WFP) to cut food rations in the camps by 80 percent.

Kenya and Russia considered the draft text unbalanced—a position that they have expressed in previous mandate renewals for MINURSO—and they proposed several revisions. One of their main concerns was to have the draft resolution more clearly distinguish Morocco and the Polisario Front from the concerned neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania. It seems that both Kenya and Russia also requested making a broader reference to the contributions of all previous Personal Envoys, instead of singling out Personal Envoy Köhler, which appears to lend greater weight to his roundtable format.

Kenya and Russia also apparently reiterated concerns about the resolution’s reference to “realistic” approaches to a political settlement, among other issues. This was an issue they raised during last year’s mandate negotiations, as they consider the term ambiguous: it is often also used by countries expressing support for Morocco’s autonomy proposal. More broadly, it appears that they have maintained their concerns about the dilution of references in MINURSO resolutions to the referendum and to the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. During last week’s closed consultations on Western Sahara, Kenya apparently underscored that the original purpose of MINURSO when it was established in 1991 through resolution 690 was to implement a referendum for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, but that its mandate has subsequently deviated from this.

The revised text that the US circulated earlier this week contained three changes from the original draft. Ireland, supported by several Council members—including Kenya, Mexico, and Norway—had requested to update the language in a preambular paragraph on women’s participation in the UN-sponsored talks. The draft was revised to encourage women’s “full, equal and meaningful” participation as opposed to “full, effective and meaningful”. Ireland also apparently proposed including in the draft resolution’s operative section a paragraph from its preambular section on enhancing cooperation with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). While the penholder did not make this change, it strengthened the language in the preambular paragraph by replacing “strongly encouraging” with “urging” the enhancing of cooperation with OHCHR. It seems that a third and similar edit to the text was made “urging” aid agencies to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, instead of “strongly encouraging”.

Besides these edits, Kenya and Russia’s concerns and proposals were not accommodated, which led them to break silence. On the other hand, it seems that several Council members yesterday reiterated their support for keeping the draft resolution as is. With the US placing an unchanged text in blue, it is unclear if Kenya and Russia will support the resolution at tomorrow’s vote. Despite expressing some similar concerns during last year’s negotiations, Kenya voted in favour of resolution 2602 of 29 October 2021 that renewed MINURSO’s mandate. Russia has abstained on the adoption of all MINURSO mandate renewals since 2018 (six times).

Security Council Report, Oct 26, 2022

#Western_Sahara #Morocco #MINURSO #UN

27 octobre 2022