Western Sahara, Morocco, UN, MINURSO, Frente Polisario, UN SG report,
Most firing incidents across the berm reported to MINURSO by the parties were concentrated in the north of the Territory, near Mahbas. According to MINURSO calculations based on the reported incidents, the incidents of firing reported by the parties have steadily decreased since January 2021. While MINURSO was not able to independently confirm the number and location of the reported firing incidents, their impact remained the subject of divergent claims.
MINURSO continued to note reports of strikes conducted by Royal Moroccan Army unmanned aerial vehicles east of the berm. In some instances, media reports indicated that civilian casualties had occurred as a result of the aerial strikes. Due to the time needed to receive authorization from the parties to visit these sites, MINURSO was only able to independently confirm that casualties had occurred on one occasion, on 16 November 2021 in the Mijek Area. Additionally, MINURSO observed traces of human remains at four other sites.
Low-intensity hostilities in the Mission area between the Royal Moroccan Army and Frente POLISARIO continued throughout the reporting period and continued to impact MINURSO’s aerial and ground activities. The presence of unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war also constituted a potential threat to UN personnel, assets and resources.
The Mission introduced preventive measures to address security concerns. Ground patrols and helicopter reconnaissance flights west of the berm maintained a safe distance from the live-fire areas. East of the berm, existing restrictions to ground patrols and helicopter reconnaissance flights also contributed to a lower security risk. Flights that did occur were carefully coordinated with both sides. The assessed residual risk to United Nations personnel, operations and assets was considered medium in Laayoune and Tindouf, but high in the areas west and east of the berm outside of Laayoune.
The presence of drug smugglers and other criminal elements in the Territory, as well as the risk of possible terrorist attacks, remained of concern.
Morocco and Frente POLISARIO retained primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel, assets and resources west and east of the berm, respectively, and MINURSO continued to have confidence in the commitment and capability of both parties.
During the reporting period, seven road traffic accidents involving Mission personnel were recorded, with an accident near Laayoune on 7 July 2022 resulting in one fatality and several injuries amongst Mission personnel. In Tindouf the situation remained stable with one incident of harassment against UN staff reported.
Lack of access to areas near the berm continued to pose significant challenges to MINURSO observation activities and the mission’s ability to obtain first-hand information and to verify reported developments on the ground. My Special Representative remained unable to meet with Frente POLISARIO representatives in Rabouni, in line with established practice.
Constraints to the MINURSO logistical supply and maintenance chain to Team Sites east of the berm continued to have increasingly serious consequences for the Mission’s ability to sustain its field presences in the austere and difficult conditions of the Territory. This negatively affected the delivery of fuel; the repair and maintenance of rapidly degrading critical equipment, installations and accommodations and the rotation of vehicles and transportation of heavy equipment that cannot be airlifted. It curtailed the Mission’s efforts to implement the UN Environmental Sustainability Strategy and also significantly impacted life support, including food, bulk water and fuel resupply.
In early August, MINURSO faced an interruption to the resupply of fuel to its Team Sites east of the berm following an incident on 2 August during which a Frente POLISARIO water truck used to supply bulk water to MINURSO was destroyed by a reported aerial strike in the vicinity of the MINURSO Team Site in Agwanit. MINURSO UNMAS experts visited the site of the incident on 4 August and observed one water truck with damage consistent with the use of an air-to-ground munition. On 4 August, the Frente POLISARIO Coordinator with MINURSO wrote to my Special Representative stating that “the Frente POLISARIO [had] no other option but to reconsider the existing arrangements with MINURSO including the assurances given to the Mission to carry out its regular passenger and logistic flights and other operations.” As a result, deliveries of fuel to all the Team Sites east of the berm were interrupted. Without re-supply, fuel reserves in at least two Team Sites east of the berm were estimated by MINURSO to reach critically low levels by early September. High level interventions by MINURSO and the Secretariat with both parties were activated alongside efforts to find alternative options to enable the continued operation of the Team Sites. On 24 August, the Royal Moroccan Army wrote to MINURSO conveying its assurances, “exceptionally” for “one-time only”, for the refuelling of all five TeamSites east of the berm.
I remain deeply concerned by the developments in Western Sahara. The resumption of hostilities between Morocco and Frente POLISARIO remains a major setback to the achievement of a political solution to this longstanding dispute. Daily incursions into the buffer strip adjacent to the berm and hostilities between the parties in this area violate its status as a demilitarized zone that should instead remain a cornerstone of a peaceful solution to the situation of Western Sahara. The continued lack of an effective ceasefire threatens the stability of the region, with a risk of escalation while hostilities persist. The conduct of aerial strikes and firing across the berm continues to contribute to increasing tensions.
Despite this challenging context, it remains my belief that a political solution to the question of Western Sahara is possible provided that all concerned engage in good faith and there is continued support from the international community. The United Nations remains available to convene all those concerned with the issue of Western Sahara in the search of a peaceful solution. The efforts by my Personal Envoy provide an opportunity that I urge all to seize. Strong political will is required to find a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the selfdetermination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with resolutions 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), 2548 (2020) and 2602 (2021).
To that end, I urge all concerned to approach the facilitation of the process by my Personal Envoy with an open mind, and to desist from preconditions for the political process. In guiding present and future approaches, due consideration should be given to the precedents set by my previous Personal Envoys in the framework of existing Security Council resolutions.
I regret to note that lack of trust continues to permeate the region. In the Territory, ongoing unilateral assertive actions and symbolic gestures are a source of enduring tension and have a negative impact on the situation. I encourage the parties to focus on the strong interests they have in common and urge them to refrain from escalating the situation further through rhetoric and actions.
As I reaffirm the crucial role of neighbouring states in the achievement of a solution to the question of Western Sahara, I reiterate the expression of my concern at the deteriorated relations between Morocco and Algeria. I encourage the two countries to re-establish dialogue towards the mending of their relations and renewed efforts aimed at regional cooperation, including with a view to an environment conducive to peace and security.
MINURSO has operated in a fundamentally changed operational and political context since the resumption of hostilities and has undertaken a wide range of efforts to adapt to the new circumstances, particularly with a renewed emphasis on operational planning. However, continued restrictions to freedom of movement have led to the inability of MINURSO to safely access areas at or near the berm or the buffer strip and operate a safe and reliable logistics, maintenance and resupply chain to Team Sites east of the berm. Fully restoring the ability of MINURSO to observe the situation in the entire Territory and to provide critical maintenance to its Team Sites east of the berm is intrinsic to its sustainability and as urgent as ever. I strongly urge the Frente POLISARIO to remove all restrictions to the free movement of MINURSO military observers, ground convoys, air assets and personnel east of the berm. It also remains essential that the Royal Moroccan Army refrain from conducting military activity that might directly or indirectly impact MINURSO operations east of the berm. I am concerned that, without full freedom of movement, MINURSO may soon be unable to sustain its presence east of the berm.
I welcome the resumed engagement between Morocco and my Special Representative and urge Frente POLISARIO to resume regular contacts in person with the MINURSO leadership, both civilian and military.
I remain concerned about the continued suspension of regular mine action operations east of the berm with the exception of ground patrol route clearance, emergency services and support of MINURSO investigations at sites of suspected aerial strikes. I am encouraged, however, by the signalled willingness by both parties to allow resumption of demining operations and call on both parties to reach a final agreement with MINURSO in this respect that enables the resumption of this lifesaving work. I also call on both parties to engage with the MINURSO Mine Action Service to facilitate the removal of landmines and explosive remnants of war throughout the Territory in adherence to international humanitarian mine action standards.
I would like to express my appreciation to the Mission’s troop-contributing countries for their support to MINURSO’s efforts to achieve full gender balance among its military observers, in line with the objectives of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. I remain convinced that the increased participation of women in peacekeeping improves the performance of United Nations peace operations and strengthens their effectiveness.
I reiterate my sincere gratitude to Morocco, Frente POLISARIO and Algeria for their cooperation to address the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular for the generosity of Morocco and Algeria for continuing to provide vaccines to the civilian and military staff of MINURSO.
I am concerned about the further deteriorating humanitarian situation in the refugee camps near Tindouf. Living standards for the vulnerable camp-based refugees worsened due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of the rise in global food and fuel prices and supply chain disruptions. As a result, the situation is becoming increasingly alarming with serious short-term threats on refugee population’s food security and access to basic services. I thank the international community and the Government of Algeria for its assistance to the Sahrawi refugees and wish to echo the call of UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP to the international community to renew efforts and provide additional and urgent support to bring an appropriate response to this emergency.
I also remain concerned about the continued lack of access of OHCHR to the Territory. I once again reiterate my call to the parties to respect, protect and promote the human rights of all people in Western Sahara, including by addressing outstanding human rights issues and enhancing cooperation with OHCHR and the United Nations human rights mechanisms, and to facilitate their monitoring missions. Independent, impartial, comprehensive and sustained monitoring of the human rights situation is necessary to ensure the protection of all people in Western Sahara.
MINURSO remains the main and often sole source of impartial information and advice to me, the Security Council, the Member States and the Secretariat concerning developments in and related to the Territory. It continues to fulfil this role despite the increasingly serious challenges it faces in a fundamentally changed operational and political environment and integrated strategic planning capabilities that are insufficient to respond to the current situation on the ground. MINURSO represents the commitment of the United Nations and the international community towards achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict in Western Sahara in accordance with resolutions 2440 (2018), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019), 2548 (2020) and 2602 (2021). I therefore recommend that the Councilextend the mandate of MINURSO for another year, until 31 October 2023.
I commend my new Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Staffan de Mistura, for his efforts since taking up his duties. I also thank my Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO, Alexander Ivanko as well as the former Force Commander, Major General Zia Ur Rehman and Acting Force Commander, Commodore Faustina Boakyewaa Anokye for their dedicated leadership ofMINURSO. I also wish to remember and honour former Deputy Force Commander Brigadier General Constance Emefa Edjeani-Afenu, who passed away suddenly on 24 January 2022 shortly after leaving the Mission on 19 December 2021, for her distinguished leadership and dedicated service to the United Nations. Finally, I thank the men and women of MINURSO for their continued commitment, under difficult and challenging circumstances, to fulfilling the Mission’s mandate.
Why is King Mohammed VI of Morocco suddenly keen to join the African Union (AU) after his late father King Hassan II condescendingly ditched the continental Organization of African Unity the (OAU) in 1984?
Morocco is currently courting a number of African countries relentlessly, including Madagascar, Tanzania, Rwanda, and others. Morocco has signed 19 economic agreements with Rwanda and 22 with Tanzania—two countries that traditionally backed the Western Sahara’s quest for decolonization. Nigeria Morocco have signed a total of 21 bilateral agreements, a joint venture to construct a gas pipeline that will connect the two nations as well as some other African countries to Europe. It is easily transparent that the economic agreements with these countries imply ulterior motives for increasing Morocco’s leverage in its campaign to return to the AU and deal a blow to Western Sahara’s aspirations for self-determination. Morocco is waging a similar campaign internationally and in the halls of the U.S. congress by hiring expensive lobbyists and sleazy public relations firms.
In this endeavor, it appears Morocco is making significant progress in isolating the Western Sahara. For Morocco, joining the AU is part of the tactic of trying to use the organization for its objective of neutralizing Western Sahara from inside the AU. Already, it has the backing of 28 African countries. However, it needs two thirds (36) of the votes from the 54 member countries of the AU to get Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) expelled. To return to the organization, it only needs a simple majority while overcoming resistance from powerful countries like South Africa and Algeria along with Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea. South Africa and Algeria have been reliable allies for SADR.
This move by Morocco has become a terribly divisive wedge issue within the AU. Outside Africa, Morocco has powerful support for its position from influential Gulf States such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, which are not members of the AU, but which can still use their political influence and the power of the purse to coerce and lobby cash-strapped African countries and the United Nations. In a clear show of muscle, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and UAE walked out from a meeting of the Arab and African foreign ministers meeting, which was held in the capital of Equatorial Guinea, Malabo, in preparation for the fourth Arab-African summit, because of opposition to the presence of a delegation from SADR. Notable here are Saudi Arabian and UAE’s forceful expressions of solidarity with Morocco. Among African countries, Senegal strongly backs Morocco’s position, undoubtedly due to great pressure from France and Moroccan economic investors in Senegal. Morocco is also the largest investor in Ivory Coast and therefore can count on strong Ivorian support. Morocco has stronger support in Francophone Africa.
Kenya, which once supported SADR, reversed course in 2007 but now Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed, candidate to head the African Union Commission, is calling for holding, as quickly as possible, “the referendum on Western Sahara people’s self-determination.” Zambia has similarly vacillated after early support for the cause of Western Sahara. According to WikiLeaks, at least until 2009 Ethiopia’s position was to recognize the SADR, declared by the Polisario (Western Sahara’s guerrilla army) in 1976 as its representative body. It still remains to be seen, how countries will vote when it really matters.
Ironically, according to the WikiLeaks report, Eritrea’s position is unknown but is not listed among the countries that recognized SADR, although the history of the territory bears striking resemblance to its own struggle for independence from Ethiopia and the independence struggles of Belize and East Timor. Both Belize and East Timor recognize SADR. Africa committed itself to maintain colonial borders, drawn arbitrarily in the 19th and 20th centuries, after the collapse of European colonialism. This commitment was not made because those borders made any sense: borders were rarely congruent with ethnic geographical homelands or previous historical delineations. One can debate the pros and cons of this but Africa made the decision in Cairo in 1964, to keep these borders in order to avoid disruptive and endless conflict of trying to rearrange colonial boundaries, to fit language groups or ethnicities. For better or worse, that is what was decided with the Cairo resolution (AHG/Res. 16(I)). Nevertheless, Morocco is choosing to mess with that resolution by gobbling up Western Sahara.
But why does Morocco need the AU? And why does it need to bribe the African countries in order to return to the continental body as dysfunctional and weak as it is? The explanation for this dubious posturing lies in Morocco’s illegal Occupation of Western Sahara and its need to legitimize it by enlisting as many African countries as possible, to accept Western Sahara’s fate as fait accompli. Morocco has been occupying or colonizing (take your pick) the territory since 1974. Recently, U.N. General Secretary Ban Ki Moon characterized Morocco as an occupying force in Western Sahara, which obviously did not sit well with Morocco.
Background
The Western Sahara consists of the former Spanish colonies of Rio de Oro (River of Gold) and Saqiet al-Hamra (Red Creek) along the Atlantic coast, until the Spanish dictator Franco decided to leave the territories in 1974. The territories natural resources include phosphates, offshore fishing and potential oil. Morocco’s occupation has been aided by Spain and France (former colonizers) acting through the United Nations. Mauritania was also an early protagonist in occupying a part of Western Sahara but abandoned its claim after being soundly defeated by the Polisario, which precipitated the collapse of the Mauritanian government. Between Western Sahara and Morocco, there has been an impasse and a no-war, no-peace status quo since 1991, after a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. Morocco has proposed “internal autonomy” for Western Sahara, but the Saharawis insist on a United Nations supervised referendum vote, with independence on the table. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) after consideration of materials and information provided by both sides concluded there is no evidence:
establish[ING] any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity… the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.
In a rare show of some backbone, the OAU welcomed Western Sahara’s membership, which incensed Morocco and caused its withdrawal from the organization in 1984—making it the only country to do so in the history of the organization. This was a strategic mistake by Morocco, which it seems to have finally realized. It is notable that the only country vocally supporting the Moroccan position at the time was the kleptocracy of Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire. Upon his overthrow, Mobutu was granted asylum in Togo but died in Morocco in 1997, where he was receiving medical treatment.
Tit for Tat with Egypt
In a setback for Morocco, relations with Egypt have been strained visibly since the end of October due to President Abdelfattah El Sissi permitting a delegation from the Polisario Front to enter Sharm El-Sheikh in an official capacity. The delegation reportedly met with presidents of Arab and African parliaments and with members of the Egyptian legislature during its stay. The visit by the King of Morocco to Addis Ababa is likely in retaliation by Rabat to exploit Cairo’s ongoing dispute with Addis Ababa over the sharing of Nile waters and specifically over the issues surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia has been accusing Egypt of helping and stroking the ongoing ethnic rebellions in Ethiopia.
Illegal Mining of Western Sahara’s Potash Resource
Morocco is exploiting and using Western Sahara’s potash resource to bribe and lobby countries like Ethiopia, casting doubt on the sincerity of its offer for “internal autonomy” to the territory.
According to the financialpost.com:
Two Canadian fertilizer firms have become the dominant buyers of phosphate rock from the disputed territory of Western Sahara after other companies stopped the practice… Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) found that Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc. and Agrium Inc. shipped a combined 916,000 tonnes of phosphate from the territory last year. That accounted for 64.5 per cent of all purchases from Western Sahara in 2015. Potash Corp. shipped 474,000 tonnes and Agrium shipped 442,000… Unholy Overtures
At a time when the Ethiopian government is gripped by nationwide protests and foreign businesses are fleeing the country, there have been headlines that “Morocco signed an agreement…to invest over two billion dollars in Ethiopia over a five year period to build a fertilizer factory.” The Financial Times reported that the OCP (Morocco’s state-owned phosphate company) sealed a deal to build $3.7bn fertilizer plant in Ethiopia. This is hailed as the largest investment of Morocco outside the country and as an example of South-South cooperation. The dubious clue for this motive is to be found in “Ethiopia’s support for Morocco’s return to the African institutional family …articulated in a joint statement issued following King Mohammed VI’s … visit to Ethiopia, the first since his accession to the Throne.”
Here, it needs to be asked: where is this resource feeding the fertilizer company coming from? And why is Ethiopia chosen for such an investment? Is this deal another case of partnership-in-crime?
Moroccan robbery of Western Sahara’s resources is widespread. Hillary Clinton was complicit with relaxing U.S. foreign aid restrictions on Morocco during her tenure as Secretary of State, allowing U.S. funds to be used in the territory of Western Sahara where OCP operates phosphate-mining operations. Collaterally, Hillary’s favor to Morocco resulted in 12-million for the Clinton-Foundation, courtesy of King Mohammed VI.
Morocco’s Questionable Commitment to South- South Cooperation
Ethiopia is seen as key for Morocco’s goals, as a founding member of the OAU hosting the headquarters of the AU’s Chinese-funded 200-million-dollar building in Addis Ababa, showcasing Chinese soft power. Morocco is framing its charm offensive in Africa in terms of South- South cooperation. But what really is Morocco’s commitment to South-South cooperation? Like Ethiopia, Morocco’s commitment, first of all, is commitment to an extreme form of neoliberalism and to an environmental narrative that blames pastoralists and their overgrazing practices as an excuse for invading and appropriating land for commercial agriculture and other land grabs. In Morocco, state services such as health care and education have faced drastic reduction. The promotion of exports and the lowering of tariffs is the reality. For the majority of their populations, rampant degradation and poverty are the reality in both countries.
A central tenet of South-South cooperation is poverty reduction, but neoliberalist market fundamentalism is incompatible with reducing inequality and protecting the environment. The beneficiaries from these policies are the elite and international capitalists; the results are a far cry from South-to-South cooperation that would alleviate poverty. Even the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP22) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was used by Morocco to insert itself in the 16 November 2016 meeting of the Africa Action Summit in Marrakesh. King Mohammed VI was the new face in the meeting, clearly pushing his campaign to get rid of SADR from the AU.
The struggle to deal seriously with climate change should not be circumvented by the unjust political agendas of opportunistic leaders. As Hamza Hamouchene of War on Want, articulates: there cannot be authentic environmental justice in Morocco when its government ignores the political rights of the Saharawi people.
In 2009, in his capacity as a designated negotiator, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi betrayed the G77’s and Africa’s collective stance in Copenhagen by making a back-door deal with France retreating from the agreed upon 1.5 degrees Celsius target to 2 degrees and thereby dealing a serious blow to the bargaining capacity of the global South. As Kate Sheppard of Mother Jones magazine wrote:
The major powers welcomed Ethiopia’s defection from the 1.5-degree target. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown…endorsed the side deal with France….Obama placed a call to Zenawi [in which he] expressed his appreciation for the leadership [of] the Prime Minister… [In negotiating] with African countries on climate change.
The truth was that Meles used Copenhagen to further his own immediate agenda at the expense of Africa in much the same way that King Mohammed VI used COP22 to support Morocco’s agenda of denying the rights of the Saharawi people.
Moroccan and Ethiopian versions of South-to-South cooperation is simply a repackaged version of neoliberalism based on extractive activities and destroying the lives of the most vulnerable. It is not a coincidence that both Ethiopia and Morocco are facing internal resistance from their populations, which they are trying to suppress with extreme violence.
The brutal death of the fish seller Mouhcine Fikri in the northern Moroccan town of Al Hoceima while trying to rescue his swordfish is being compared with the Tunisian fruit seller Mohamed Bouazizi in 2010, whose death sparked the Arab Spring uprisings. Neoliberal privatization is preventing and displacing folks who have been selling or consuming fish for as long as they have been living in the coastal towns of Morocco. In Ethiopia, it is land grab and extreme repression that is having similar effect on communities in Gambella, Benishangul, and the Amhara region, Sidama, Konso, Ogaden and Oromia.
January 31, 2017, in Addis Ababa is the next AU summit, where Morocco is hoping to achieve its sinister goal against SADR. The honorable thing for the AU to do is to rebuff Morocco’s arm twisting and vigorously support the self-determination of the Saharawi people.
Western Sahara, Morocco, UN, MINURSO, Pecekeeping,
Maintaining Military Observers in the Middle of the Western Sahara Desert: A Logistic Challenge
Julio Cesar do Amaral Junior1; Raphael de Almeida Leitão2; Dr. Murillo de Oliveira Dias3 Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior da Aeronáutica- UNIF1; Universidade da Força Aérea, PPGCA-UNIFA, Brasil2; Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil3 Correspondence: Murillo de Oliveira Dias3, e-mail: agenda.murillo@gmail.
Abstract: Logistics plays a decisive role in any military campaign, including peacekeeping missions. In this article, we investigated how the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system overcome the environmental challenges to support their United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) deployed on Team Sites (TS) in 2017. Combining field experience with a wide-range analysis of relevant sources, key findings pointed out three critical factors: (a) the unique integration between civilian and military to provide logistic support despite the reduced number of military logisticians at the headquarter (HQ); (b) tactical aviation employment to supply TS, and (c) the use of operational contract support (OCS) to cover a lack of capabilities in the mission area. This work provides an overview of lessons learned about expeditionary logistical efforts for isolated troops. Furthermore, it will broaden the knowledge about supporting forces on the ground in challenging environments.
Keywords: Logistics, Military Campaign; Peacekeeping Missions; Environmental Challenges
I. INTRODUCTION The Sahara Desert in North Africa is a unique place on earth with harsh environmental conditions, the world’s largest hot desert. The UN faced many complicated challenges in maintaining a military observer mission in the disputed territory of Western Sahara on the northwest coast of the African continent. Western Sahara is a desert region having borders with the Atlantic Ocean, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. Its geographical characteristic is a flat terrain with some hills providing conditions for forming temporary rivers during the short rainy season. Water is scarce, and the soil is rocky and sandy with dunes. The climate has cold and dry winters, but summers are sweltering (above 122oF even in the shadow). The average rainfall is 45mm, and the other significant problem is the strong winds that move sand and in sandstorms (fig. 1). Some tribes live close to the ocean in these inhospitable conditions, and some Bedouins live in the desert. The terrain and climate were not the only challenges that MINURSO faced; there is also a lack of infrastructure (cities and their facilities) to support UNMOs in the middle of the desert, as illustrated in Figure 1, as follows:
Figure 1- Sandstorm approaching TS Smara
II. METHODOLOGY This article addressed the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system regarding the environmental challenges in supporting the United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), deployed on Team Sites (TS), as the unit of analysis (Yin, 1988). In this research, we combined direct participation, a descriptive single case study, and archival research. We followed an inductive rationale and an interpretive approach. The primary data were collected from January to December 2017.
III. BACKGROUND To accomplish operational requirements, the UN established most TS in the conflicted region, exposing them to the presence of mined fields and isolating them as there were no cities close enough to provide any kind of support, another challenge to its Logistics. The region was part of Spain, but in 1976, Morocco claimed it as part of their kingdom. Saharans fought for their independence from Morocco. The hostilities lasted until 1991 when they accepted a UN mission to mediate the peace. However, the Moroccans built a sand wall (a Berm) dividing the region in conflict with mined areas outside the Berm, one of the mission dangers. They occupied the west part and isolated Saharans on the east. The UN had to deploy military observers on both sides to ensure the ceasefire. When planning TS positions, they considered operational requisites such as military units’ position, security, and size for the area of responsibility. Finally, they established the MINURSO Headquarters (MHQ) in the city of Laayoune, four TS on the west (Mahbas, Smara, Oum Driega, and Awsard), and five TS on the east (Bir Lahlou, Tifariti, Mehaires, Mijek, and Agwanit) as seen in figure 2. The biggest challenge for logistics was to deploy TS in the desert with no cities/facilities in the neighborhood, resulting in a complete absence of infrastructure to provide support (paved roads, fuel, electric energy, water, food, hospitals, etc.). Smara, a small city with a population of 57,035 in 2014, was located near one of TS. Increasing the challenge to deploy observers in a conflict zone was the presence of Unexploded ordinances (UXO) due to the air war and mined fields that changed positions due to annual flooding. These conditions, combined the UN faced, were enough to characterize the logistic system they implemented as an expeditionary logistic., as depicted in Figure 2, as follows:
Figure 2 MINURSO map. Source: UN, 2017
Note in Figure 2 that the MINURSO logistic system had an expeditionary characteristic because it provided living and working conditions to military observers from different nationalities deployed to an arid region of conflict. Since ancient times, an army force’s outcomes rely on its logistic capabilities. Some outstanding military leaders from history were famous for their skills in supporting troops properly. Scholars recognized Alexander the Great as the first leader to develop a logistic system to keep his army. His logistics worked so well that it did not affect his strategic decisions.
MINURSO: Expeditionary Forces The US Department of Defense used it similarly when defining expeditionary forces as troops deployed to accomplish tasks abroad. Support troops under these conditions required logistical skills to provide some otherwise typical functions in the face of a dangerous environment. The duties of positioning troops on the ground, opening airfields, and establishing and maintaining operations under threat environments required some expeditionary logistics skills. Therefore, it is possible to claim that MINURSO’s logistics are expeditionary. The claim is sound because MINURSO deployed and supported a multinational military contingent’s operation in a conflict region under threat conditions, including isolation, presence of UXOs, possible ceasefire violations, and inhospitable desertic living conditions. The efficient way the MINURSO logistics system provided complete and sustainable support to its TS, operating in 2017, made it expeditionary and unique.
One of the most significant aims of MINURSO logistics was to keep all TS operational despite the frequent absence of military specialists on the ground (TS) and a reduced number of them on MHQ. Theoretically, every TS should have seventeen to twenty-four unarmed UNMOs at full strength. The reality in 2017 was that, on average there were four fewer men than required on the ground in each TS. The main tasks of these UNMOs were to conduct daily patrols to ensure fulfillment of the military agreements and simultaneously conduct complementary duties to keep TS operational, such as logistics (G4). The G4 on TS counts seven subordinated positions to conduct all logistic matters such as material in general, vehicles, food, fire prevention, and generators. Due to personal restrictions such as observers on leave, some absences on duty, and other reasons, it was not easy to conduct logistic management on TS. This challenge became bigger because the G4 on TS was often not a logistician expert. This occurred because there were no specific background requirements to become a UNMO. On MHQ, things were not significantly different.
Overcoming Challenges Of all the appointments in the MHQ structure, one position was named Special Military Logistic Advisor (SMLA – U4). This position was the only appointment with a logistics expert, a lieutenant colonel from Egypt. Under his command, there were three supporting appointments: Project and Engineering (Proj/Eng), Supplies and Transport (Sup/Tpt), and Rations (food and water). These three UNMOs assisted him in conducting all military logistical tasks. Usually, to select them, the SMLA interviewed volunteer UNMOs working on G4-related positions on TS and chose one. He considered his previous background, experience on TS, and profile that fit the task for his decision. To improve system efficiency, MHQ conducted G4 (related appointments as food officer) training once per semester for UNMOs to enhance their skills in performing these appointments on TS. This routine training helped to remediate but did not completely solve the deficiency. To solve this gap of military logisticians, the basis of MINURSO’s logistics structure on MHQ relied on a civilian component.
The integration between the civilian and military, working to support the TS isolated in inhospitable places of the desert, made the MINURSO logistic system unique and was a critical factor for its efficiency. As the mission’s structure did not contemplate a military logistic unit, the civilian component was responsible for the mission’s logistics. They dealt directly with all logistic needs for TS such as ration, general supply, fuel, contract management, infrastructure in general, and logistic support. Recognizing the importance of the effort’s integration, MINURSO united the civilian component and the military working on logistics tasks in MHQ, creating the Joint Logistics Operational Centre (JLOC). The operational working concept for TS and MHQ interactions with JLOC needed to be simple to enhance efficiency. MINURSO recognized that most military were not logistical experts and logistics was a specialized subject playing an essential role in mission success. Aligned with these ideas, chapter eight of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) detailed basic logistics attributions for all military in the system (TS and MHQ). MHQ monitored TS logistic issues, reports, and supply levels on all TS. They also received all requests, compiled them, sent them to the civilian component, and monitored the deliveries. The civilians were responsible for all complex jobs. They received the consolidated demand from the military and managed acquisitions, contracts, maintenance, budget control, etc., and liaison with the UN to deal with these matters. They were also responsible for improvements made over thirty years of mission, such as installing containers to replace old tents as installations (offices, kitchen, lodging). The military and civilians’ proper coordination improved the system’s efficiency and allowed TS to operate autonomously. It worked so well that in 2017 there was no severe impact on TS due to logistics restrictions. Even when one of the helicopters that made the supply distribution once a week faced technical problems and stayed on the ground for two weeks, TS managed their supplies and overcame them. The critical factors for MINURSO logistic system efficiency were communication, integration, and coordination of efforts between TS and JLOC and overcoming the gap of military experts. Another contributing factor to this success was the aerial logistical modal to deliver supplies in the desert.
Supporting the Observers The tactical aviation support was the primary logistical system used by MINURSO to support their observers deployed on TS. It was tactical because the mission area was a conflict zone, now under a ceasefire agreement. The situation was calm but unpredictable. Scholars have many definitions for the concept of tactical, but this understanding is aligned with the intent that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization used in its documents. Tactical air transport is moving persons or cargo by air logistic support or aeromedical evacuation operations. Even more challenging for these operations was that crews had to fly visual over the Sahara Desert with no detailed aeronautical charts. They also faced the absence of air traffic control, landing on sandy improvised runaways or heliports with no specialized ground support. TS isolation and the lack of infrastructure were responsible for these challenges. To mitigate these risks, MINURSO implemented the duty for one observer to check the landing conditions before the arrival of the air support. This military task was to clear the runaway and send meteorological information (temperature, wind speed, direction, etc.) to MHQ. The correct performance of this task was essential for air safety since the crew had no way to know TS conditions. In some cases, flights were canceled or their destination changed because of harsh weather conditions. The resupply flights often stopped because of extreme weather conditions (sandstorms or temperatures permanently above 50 degrees Celsius). Communication and integration between the civilian crew, TS in the desert, and the aviation section on MHQ were crucial for the success of the flights. All supporting aircraft used were not military. The UN contracted two civilian companies to provide air support for the mission. MINURSO contracted Air Urga to deploy two fixed-wing aircraft (Antonov-26), accompanied by two complete crews and a maintenance package. They were established in Laayoune and made the liaison to load helicopters in Smara (North) and Award (South). The second contract was with Abakan Air which chartered two helicopters (Mi-8) with three complete crews and a maintenance package. They were established in Smara (north) and Awsard (south) and flew mainly to reach the four TS where the AN-26 could not land. This integration between airplanes and helicopters was essential to support all TS properly because their position in the desert made it hard to accomplish with ground convoys.
Tactical aviation employment was crucial to support Team Sites because of their location in the desert and the risks of arriving there by ground. All TS, except one, were isolated in the middle of the desert. There was no infrastructure to provide complimentary supplies or missing items nearby, so TS needed to work autonomously. Planning a convoy by ground meant driving long distances, mainly on unpaved roads, crossing some sandy areas, where even experienced drivers in 6×6 vehicles can get stuck. In addition to the route’s challenges, there were climatic threats and UXO’s risks along the way. Moving supplies was not easy because, in the desert, only a few roads were paved or in good condition, compounded by long distances; therefore, the food was mainly delivered to the team sites via air support. The fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were the main modal supply line for TS because sending weekly land convoys would be too dangerous. The exception was fuel, hazardous goods, and heavy items that could not go by air due to size/weight restrictions, so they went, when necessary, by ground convoys. Another primary justification for the air support was offering standby aircraft and helicopters to provide medical aid to MINURSO personnel because there was no medical facility close to TS. Therefore, in case of an accident evolving UNMOs in the desert, TS could request a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) to transport the injured from their position to an adequate medical facility. All observers learn and train how to ask a CASEVAC because this is the quickest way, and generally the only way, to save other observers’ lives. Conducting aerial reconnaissance patrols, at least two per month for all TS, was a third use for the air assets. Eventually, TS conducted aerial route reconnaissance patrols to ensure that the way between specific TS points was safe for a ground convoy to cross. Finally, aircraft use proved essential on the mission as part of logistical efforts. It was another critical factor in efficiently maintaining TS operational in the desert, just like contracted services.
IV. DISCUSSION The lack of infrastructure in the mission area of responsibility and gaps in the military force deployed made operational contract support (OCS) crucial to MINURSO survival. The US Joint Forces defined OCS as the procedures of planning for and acquiring provisions, services, and construction from commercial providers. Fulfilling these tasks, the employment of OCS covering military logistic gaps is considered part of the warfighting capability of an armed force. Its use became a reality even for Great Powers such as the United States (US). This kind of logistical support played and shall continue to play, a vital role in the US’s ability to deploy, fight, and win wars. Considering this, it becomes evident that the evolution of OCS use is reshaping how armed forces conduct logistics. It has been improving expeditionary logistics capabilities and growing in importance over the last few years. The main benefits OCS can provide are adequate support, positive economic and social impact on the local populace, minimizing the military footprint, and others. Recognizing these benefits that OCS could bring, the MINURSO logistic system also used OCS to fill existent gaps. The mission had external contractors working in logistics and other services. Two were to get air support, essential for logistical and operational purposes. The lack of aircraft was because the planned military contingent had not contemplated the aircraft requirement. The solution adopted was chartering aircraft (rotary and fixed wings) from civilian companies to fly for the mission. Contracting aircraft was one successful OCS used in the task, but there were other gaps and other OCS.
Localizing and neutralizing explosive remnants of war (ERW) was another mission gap that the logistic system overcame by using OCS. The presence of landmines and UXOs was a significant security danger in the mission area of the MINURSO deal. These explosive hazards threatened the lives of UNMOs monitoring the ceasefire, humanitarian aid workers, and local nomads. These artifacts were present on both sides of the Berm. A secondary objective of the UN’s monitoring mission was to minimize this risk. The belligerent parts and MINURSO signed Military Agreements number 2 and 3 to deal with this issue. They compromised to reduce the danger of explosive devices in the mission area of responsibility. The belligerent parts and MINURSO should share information about landmines and UXO’s position and incidents to achieve this goal, destroy any landmine or UXO in identified locations, and clear or mark its vicinity. To safely conduct these activities, it demanded specialized personnel and equipment. On the west side of the Berm, the Royal Moroccan Army was a traditional armed force present on the ground and was able to do it. There was a gap in this capability on the east side of the Berm because Frente Polisario Armed Forces were guerrilla organized units. Therefore, they had neither the personnel nor material to conduct these activities. MINURSO had a small military contingent focused on operating ceasefire monitoring activities, not conducting demining tasks. The UN contracted an international civilian company and sent the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to coordinate their efforts to fill this gap. The contractors cleared areas contaminated with minefields, cluster ammunition, and other UXOs, verified UNMOs and convoys crossing routes, and destroyed thousands of artifacts. Since 2008, they proved more than nine thousand kilometers of roads and successfully destroyed almost forty thousand landmines, explosives, and sub-ammunitions. It granted UNMOS safety to patrol and monitor the ceasefire and reduced the threat to the local population. In other words, this OCS employment represented a key factor in MINURSO’s success in fulfilling its mandate, and it also made a humanitarian contribution to vulnerable local Bedouins. The use of OCS covered a lack of essential capabilities on the mission, contributing to its unique expeditionary logistic.
Reflecting on the points this essay provides, it becomes clear that the MINURSO logistic system overcame the environmental challenges of the Sahara Desert to support its TS in the desert in 2017. The sources analysis illustrates that MINURSO successfully used a unique expeditionary logistics system. Three complementary factors made it possible. Despite the lack of military logisticians, one of these components employed a unique and efficient integration between civilian and military to provide complete and sustainable assistance to TS. Another factor was the use of tactical aviation to send supplies to TS safely, efficiently, and quickly. Finally, the operational contract support supplemented mission logistic gaps. In simple words, MINURSO’s unique expeditionary logistics effectively supported TS. It occurred because of the integration between civil and military logisticians, the vital tactical aviation support, and OCS’s key role in coverage gaps. The lessons discussed in this study can provide a valuable background to military logisticians’ plans and support for future military or peacekeeping operations.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH LIMITATIONS In previous sections, we presented the results and content analysis of the raw data, pointing out adverse outcomes of trust violation and its implications in other fields of research, such as (i) Social Value Orientation (Dias, 2016; Balliet, D., & Van Lange, 2013); (ii) contract negotiations (Dias, M., Lopes, R., Cavalcanti, G., Golfetto, V., 2020; Dias, 2012; Dias, M.; Silva, L., 2021; Dias, M.; Pereira, L; Vieira, 2022; Dias, M et al. 2022; Dias, M., Lopes, R., 2020; Dias, M. Navarro, R., 2020; Dias, M., 2020a; Dias, M., Lopes, R., Duzert, Y., 2020; Dias, M., 2020; Dias, M., 2021a); (iii) project management (Soares, C.; Magalhães, M.; Barroca, J.; Dias, M., 2020; Dias, M., 2021); (iv) peripheral business, to name a few. This article is limited to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) logistic system to overcome the environmental challenges to support their United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) deployed on Team Sites (TS) in the Sahara region. Other countries and locations may convey incorrect understandings and should be investigated in separate studies.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH Future studies are encouraged to investigate Moroccan and Western Saharan (host countries) contributions to maintaining TS or the role of the civilian component for mission support; both will broaden the comprehension of MINURSO expeditionary logistics. Further, academic studies on military operations established the adjective expeditionary to qualify procedures, forces, air forces, and logistics operating abroad.
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Morocco, Mohammed VI, monarchy, social crisis, health of the king, Western Sahara,
The latest data available from the Moroccan Central Bank is in the red: the report prepared by the Moroccan CB showed that Morocco’s non-performing debt rate has risen to 8.5% of net banking facilities at the end of 2021, compared to 8.2% at the end of 2020. Indeed, the central bank said in its annual report on Monday night that total hanging claims at the end of last year stood at 85.1 billion dirhams ($8.4 billion at today’s prices), up from 79.8 billion dirhams ($7.8 billion) at the end of last year.
« This slowdown in loan growth comes in a context marked by the end of the Moroccan state-guaranteed lending phase, which was created as part of exceptional measures to deal with the repercussions of the coronavirus crisis, » it reads.
We will not speculate on the health of the sovereign, which can, in case of aggravation, still shake all the cards, which has raised the fear of the Israeli authorities on the maintenance or not of the agreements made with Mohamed VI.
By concentrating the entire political, diplomatic, economic and lobbying battery to undermine Algeria and Algerian positions, Morocco has discovered its weakest sides: debts have increased, social anger has become more visible, even in the heart of Rabat, the slowdown of growth is latent, the Akhannouch government has been put on the grill, the high cost of living feeds all the tensions, the lack of raw materials, and icing on the cake, « thwarted flirtation » with Israel is widely noted.
Normalization » has not had the desired effect either on the economy or on Moroccan penetration into the heart of decision-making centers, as it would have wished; on the contrary, this completely unnatural, and therefore counterproductive, normalization has caused Morocco to lose points on the Maghreb, Arab, African and international scene. Its few supporters, however powerful they may be, risk unloading it at any moment, thanks to the war in Ukraine, which has brought about a decantation and has made each country ensure its back, starting with the United States itself.
In reality, Morocco is following a certain logic. Obsessed for almost half a century with the Western Sahara, it has allied itself with the three powers of the moment, the United States, Israel and France, making concession after concession, which in the end will undoubtedly be detrimental to the Moroccans first. As a member of the Moroccan-Israeli-American triple entente, born of the so-called « Abrahamic Pact » meeting, Morocco has since then followed an arrowed path and it will be difficult for it to question its route.
The kingdom’s failures call into question the very principle of the monarchy and should eventually lead Moroccans to engage in serious and profound reflection on the abolition of a regime that holds all powers and has led to constitutional abuses that have put the state itself in mortal danger. This is the observation made by Moroccans, and this is why, for Moroccan society, the time is ripe for protest, a protest that is not only the anger of those left behind. And this is also how Morocco has burned its cards with its Maghrebian and African environment, which observes the drifts of the last colonizer in Africa with a twisted eye and a stern lip.
European Union, gas, Russia, Algeria, Western Sahara, Morocco, Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Egypt, Qatar,
With Strings Attached: Implications of Europe’s Turn to Mediterranean Gas Samuel Bruning and Dr Tobias Borck
In its efforts to wean itself off Russian energy supplies, Europe is increasingly looking to its southern neighbourhood. But this comes with its own set of geopolitical challenges.
As heatwaves hit Europe, governments across the continent are already worrying about a cold winter and a deepening energy crisis. Since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine five months ago, European countries have been scrambling to reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas imports, not least to limit one of Moscow’s most important sources of revenue. Yet, they also fear that Russia could beat them to the punch and cut off energy flows to Europe before alternative sources have been secured. Russia has already stopped supplying gas to Poland, Bulgaria and Finland, and reduced deliveries to Germany, Italy and other European states.
As Europe searches for alternatives to Russian gas, debates about fracking are re-emerging, and discussions about if and when Europe can import more liquified natural gas (LNG) from leading exporters such as the US and Qatar are drawing much attention. Additionally, European states are turning to old and new gas producers in the eastern and western Mediterranean, lured not least by the promise of short supply routes along which pipelines already exist or could feasibly be constructed.
In the eastern Mediterranean, Israel is emerging as a major gas producer. In June, the EU, Israel and Egypt agreed to work on a partnership that could eventually see Israeli gas be transformed into LNG in already existing Egyptian gas liquification plants before being shipped to Europe. Meanwhile, further west, Algeria, a longstanding gas producer that already sends about a quarter of its gas to Spain, signed a deal with Italy in May to increase its supplies to Europe.
Neither arrangement represents a quick fix. It will likely take years for the necessary infrastructure in Europe, Israel and Algeria to be built and for the latter two to sufficiently increase their production capacity to even begin to replace the volumes of gas Europe imports from Russia. Just as importantly, both deals tie Europe more closely to complex and potentially explosive geopolitical contexts. If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions; considering their strategic implications for European security is therefore vital.
Israeli Gas, Hizbullah’s Drones and the Egyptian Economy
The eastern Mediterranean has long been a highly contested space. Just over the past decade, the overlapping rivalries and shifting alignments among the region’s states – Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey – have shaped (and been shaped) by the conflicts in Libya and Syria, and between Israel and the Palestinians, to name but a few. At various times, these conflicts have repeatedly drawn in extra-regional powers, including European states, Russia, the US and even Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
With the gas deal with Israel and Egypt, the EU has increased its own stake in this complex environment beyond the obligations it already had to its member states of Cyprus and Greece. Two aspects are particularly important to consider.
If European countries should have learned anything from Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is surely that energy agreements are more than mere commercial transactions
Firstly, with the agreement, the EU wades into the longstanding maritime border dispute between Israel and Lebanon. The offshore Karish Field, from which the gas destined for Europe is supposed to come, is adjacent to the area that both countries claim to be part of their own exclusive economic zone. The US government has appointed a Special Envoy, Amos Hochstein, to mediate in the dispute, but negotiations have been progressing slowly – if at all – in recent months.
Buckling under an unprecedented economic crisis and a dysfunctional political system, the Lebanese state’s capacity to effectively engage on these matters is somewhat limited at the moment. But Hizbullah, which suffered a setback in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in May, appears to see the border dispute and the international spotlight on gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean as a useful opportunity to bolster its anti-Israeli credentials. On 2 July, Israeli authorities said that they had shot down three Hizbullah drones approaching a gas rig at Karish.
Hizbullah later said the drones had been unarmed and were part of a reconnaissance mission, but the incident certainly illustrated the volatility of the situation in the area. This does not have to deter Europe from seeking to expand energy trade with Israel or other eastern Mediterranean producers, but the obvious political risks must be taken into account in Brussels and should inform thinking about future security arrangements in the region.
Secondly, the EU–Israel–Egypt gas agreement comes at a time when policymakers across Europe are increasingly concerned about Egypt’s economic stability. Hit hard by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, particularly with regard to food security, the Egyptian government is struggling to contain a potentially burgeoning economic crisis. While macro-economic growth figures have remained relatively strong, inflation and soaring food and energy prices are causing increasing strain. Scarred by the experience of the political instability that gripped the Middle East and North Africa in the aftermath of the 2010/11 Arab Uprisings, and in particular the migration crisis triggered and facilitated by the violent conflicts in Syria and Lebanon, renewed instability in Egypt represents a nightmare scenario for many European governments.
The gas agreement should bring some economic benefits for Egypt, but not necessarily in a way that will help to address poverty and Egypt’s other related socio-economic challenges. The EU will therefore have to ensure that the energy deal is part of a more comprehensive engagement with Cairo that seeks to increase the resilience of the Egyptian economy through reform.
Algerian Gas, Morocco and the Western Sahara
In the western Mediterranean, meanwhile, Algeria has long been an important gas supplier for Europe. Spain has imported Algerian gas via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which runs through Morocco, since 1996, and via the undersea Medgaz pipeline since 2011. However, relations between Madrid and Algiers, including the energy trade between the two countries, have persistently been affected by the conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara, which Morocco claims as its territory, while Algeria supports the Polisario Front that seeks Sahrawi independence. Over the past two years, tensions have steadily grown.
New partnerships with Mediterranean energy producers must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are
In 2021, Algeria decided to end exports via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline and therefore cut off supplies to Morocco, planning instead to expand the capacity of the Medgaz pipeline. Subsequently, in March 2021, Algiers was angered by Spain’s reversal of its position on the Western Sahara. Having previously been mostly neutral on the territory’s status, insisting that it was a matter for the UN to resolve, Madrid endorsed Rabat’s plan to retain sovereignty over the Western Sahara while granting it autonomy to run its domestic affairs. The move was to a significant extent motivated by Spain’s need to deepen cooperation with Morocco to contain migration, particularly to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melita.
As things stand, Algeria has said that it will continue to supply Spain with gas via the Medgaz pipeline. But its Ambassador to Madrid, whom Algiers withdrew in March, has not returned. Moreover, the Algerian government has repeatedly warned Spain not to re-export gas it receives from Algeria to Morocco, which has struggled to make up for shortages caused by the termination of flows via the Maghreb-Europe pipeline.
The new deal concluded in May between Italy’s energy giant ENI and Algeria’s national oil company Sonatrach has to be considered within this context. Even if Italy may find it easier to avoid becoming embroiled in the Algeria–Morocco dispute, the tensions in the Algeria–Spain relationship demonstrate that energy trade in the western Mediterranean cannot be divorced from the geopolitical realities in North Africa.
Searching for a European Position
In the search for non-Russian energy supplies, Europe is rightly looking to its southern neighbourhood. Algeria, Israel and Egypt – and perhaps, in time, other (re)emerging Mediterranean energy producers and transit countries such as Libya and Turkey – can all play an important role in increasing the continent’s energy security. However, these new energy partnerships must be recognised for the imperfect and geopolitically complex undertakings that they are. More than mere commercial transactions, they tie Europe more closely into local conflict dynamics – be it between Israel, Lebanon and Hizbullah, or between Algeria and Morocco. They should therefore be embedded in a clear-eyed and strategic European approach to the EU’s southern neighbourhood.
In May, the EU published its new Gulf strategy, which offers at least a conceptual framework for how European governments intend to balance expanding energy relations with the Gulf monarchies with other interests, ranging from economic engagement to human rights concerns. The document is far from perfect, and it remains far from certain if and when many of its ambitious intentions will be implemented. But if the EU wants to become a more serious geopolitical actor and increase its resilience to political shocks such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, developing similar strategies for the eastern and/or western Mediterranean is necessary.
Spain, Morocco, Migration, Ceuta, Melilla, Western Sahara,
MADRID, June 25 (Reuters) – The deaths of at least 18 migrants on Friday during a mass attempt to cross from Morocco into a Spanish enclave took place at a pivotal time for often rocky relations between the neighbouring countries.
Moroccan authorities said the disaster occurred after migrants attempted to breach a fence into the Melilla enclave, with some dying in a crush after what authorities called a stampede, and others falling as they climbed.
Spain retained the enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, which were previously colonial territories, after Morocco gained independence in 1956.
The following is a timeline of relevant events:
– September 2005: Spain deploys troops to Ceuta and Melilla after about 600 migrants attempt to breach border fences, resulting in at least 11 migrants being killed and hundreds injured.
– Feb. 6, 2015: Fifteen migrants drown and more are injured as 400 people attempt to reach Ceuta by swimming around a seawall from Morocco. A judge in Ceuta later dismisses a case brought against 18 Spanish Civil Guards who fired rubber bullets at them.
– May 17-19, 2021 – Over several days, about 8,000 people swim into Ceuta or clamber over the border fence after Moroccan authorities appear to loosen controls.
The surge in crossings comes days after Rabat expresses anger over Madrid’s decision to allow Ibrahim Ghali, the leader of a rebel movement, into Spain for COVID-19 treatment. Ghali leads the Polisario Front which seeks independence for Western Sahara, a territory Rabat regards as its own.
– March 18, 2022 – Morocco reveals that Spain has changed its position on Western Sahara, describing Rabat’s autonomy plan for the territory as « the most serious, realistic and credible » basis for solving the dispute.
– April 7, 2022 – Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez travels to Rabat to meet Moroccan King Mohammed VI to mark a « new phase in relations based on mutual respect, mutual trust, permanent consultation and frank and faithful cooperation ».
– May 15, 2002 – The Interior ministers of Spain and Morocco reactivate their working group and agree to foster cooperation against illegal migration including through joint border patrols and an intensified crackdown on trafficking networks.
– June 24, 2022 – Some 2,000 migrants storm border fences from the Moroccan town of Nador into Melilla in an incident that leaves at least 18 migrants dead. Human rights groups say scores of injured migrants were left untreated and the death toll is likely to rise.
Morocco, African Union, lobbying, bribes, corruption, Western Sahara, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic,
Despite its flagrant trampling on the objectives of the constitutive act of the African Union that stipulates to “Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States”, the “Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence” and the “Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union” Morocco, that by means of military force still occupies a large portion of the AU member founder Western Sahara republic, smoothly joined the African Union. Despite, also, declaring Joachim Chissano, the African Union’s special envoy to Western Sahara, a persona non grata in the Saharawi occupied territories and even in Morocco, the Moroccan king was hosted inside the premises of the African Union as an African liberator. An admission that, weirdly, took place with a relaxing majority.
Why, then, the African Union admitted the membership of a country that not only tramples on this institution’s core constitutive act but also despises its role in the Saharawi cause, knowing that the peace plan set to resolve this protracted decolonization issue is under the auspices of the United Nations together with the African Union?
Some high officials from inside the African Union waxed lyrical on Morocco’s membership on the grounds that it might be a good opportunity to convince the Moroccans to abide by the Western Sahara peace plan of which the African Union is the second pillar partner.
In a similar vein, some political pundits that often show up on various media outlets agree on this view based on the allegation that Morocco’s membership is a tacit recognition of the Saharawi republic as the Moroccan parliament ratified the AU constitutive act in which the Saharawi republic is a state member.
On the other hand, some other analysts have an opposite stance considering that such move will even engender the destruction of this Pan-African institution as Morocco’s status goes against the very fundamental charter of the African Union Nevertheless, amid all these conflicting views and speculations, a silent voice, through a twitter account baptized “Chris Coleman” and who in recent time brought global attention to a cache of authentic secret documents of the Moroccan diplomacy, has indeed the refutable evidence; Morocco succeeded in garnering support to its admission to the African Union thanks to a long course of colossal corrupt acts.
As the content of the joined documents clearly witness, we can see mails of a Moroccan diplomat who seemed to have succeeded in setting up a network of relations behind the scenes at every summit of the African Union. Through these mails that were subsequently sent to his boss in Rabat, we learn that, at least on one occasion, cash money was handed over to some African delegations to swing the pendulum in favor of Morocco or, even worse, spy and leak secret information and internal files of the African Union to Morocco officials.
Morocco’s joining the African Union was the result of a lobbying policy in which an all pervasive corruption campaign has been its cornerstone.
As shown in the mails, it is Moha Tagma, Director of the African Affaires at Morocco Foreign Department, briefing his superior the Moroccan minister of foreign affaires on his action plan. In a note he sent to his minister on May 05th, 2014, he put forward “proposals for the undertaken preparations to the next African Union Summit” that would be held in Addis Ababa. He suggests giving “individual envelopes of 5000 euros for each friend” and he lists those “friends” who represent the delegations of the following countries: Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Comoros, Djibouti, Niger Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Mali, Eritrea and Mauritania (Chair of the Council of the AU) “.
In another note dated on June 4th, 2014, Moh Tagma proposed to give Jean-Baptiste Natama from Burkina Faso, $ 2,500 “as an incentive to get him continue working with us.” Jean-Baptiste Natama was the Chief of Staff to the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, from October 2012 to February 2015. He was tasked of filtering out confidential documents from the African Commission to the Moroccan diplomat Moha Oualki Tagma, who currently serves as Morocco’s ambassador to Nigeria. On July 29th, 2016, Morocco’s state-based “NGO” New Vision of Africa (NOV AFRIQUE) awarded Jean-Baptiste Natama the “PADEL 2016 international prize for the best promoter of diplomacy in Africa”.
Nevertheless, in spite of all these shenanigans, Morocco was unable to change the unwavering support of the majority of the Africans to the just cause of the Saharawi people. The role of the African Union, instead, intensified and its personal envoy, Mr. Chissano’s intervention before the UN Security Council in 2016 has accentuated Morocco’s isolation in front of a unified Africa on the right of the Saharawi people to self-determination and independence.
Morocco, thus, has bought a seat at the African Union by its usual lethal and despicable weapon of corruption. The supposed economic development for the welfare of the African nation is no more than a smokescreen to the Moroccan main agenda; obstructing the mounting role of the African Union in decolonizing occupied Western Sahara besides coveting and taking hold of the Saharawi people’s land.
Western Sahara, Spain, Morocco, Algeria, France, USA, Europe, NATO, neo-colonialism,
Jesus L. Garay Member of Asociación de Amigos y Amigas de la RASD (Association of Friends of SADR)
We need all the strength of solidarity and all the democratic political will to stop this neo-colonialist coup, to dismantle the fallacious arguments of political expediency and false humanitarian compassion deployed by the PSOE and to launch an effective social and political mobilisation.
Three months after Morocco leaked Pedro Sánchez’s letter in which the Spanish government modified its formal position on the Western Sahara issue, the echoes of the reactions provoked by this turnaround, far from abating, continue to be at the forefront of political and media statements, this time in the wake of Algeria’s suspension of the friendship and cooperation treaty with Spain.
The Spanish government’s decision undoubtedly has many implications that would be impossible to cover briefly, just as it is impossible to deal with the multitude of blunders that have been and are being made in commenting on the various aspects of this issue.
Above all, the implications of the government’s position on the internal politics of the state have been commented on; but beyond generic statements and motions, if anything has become clear on this issue it is that the parties that make up or support this government are incapable – or perhaps simply have no real will – of reversing the decision to implicitly recognise Moroccan sovereignty over the Spanish colony. Equally, it seems that social organisations have not been able to channel the sympathy and solidarity that the Sahrawi cause arouses in the vast majority of the population into a clear expression of rejection or indignation. However, as Algeria’s decision shows, it is never too late to take the initiative.
However, Algeria’s latest decisions highlight a dimension that has been almost silenced by the noise caused by the forms and timing of the government’s decision. Indeed, at the international level, the declarations of support for the Moroccan occupation reveal that the decision is not the result of a simple ‘hot flash’ by Mr Sánchez, as some media outlets are trying to describe it – although there is clearly some improvisation – nor, as is being done especially on social networks, a simple surrender to Morocco’s brutal blackmail – which is also the case.
The Spanish government’s current position is the result of a far-reaching strategic effort to consolidate a balance of power in the Arab Maghreb that is definitely favourable to the neo-colonial interests of the capitalist West. This effort, initially led by the United States, as befits its status as a hegemonic power, found its ultimate expression in the declaration of an outgoing president, Donald Trump, accepting Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for the full restoration of relations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the state of Israel.
In the current international order, however, geopolitical control of this area of North Africa does not lie directly with the US, but with Europe. Not the Europe of rights and democratic values that they want to sell us, but the Europe of migratory necropolitics, a subsidiary of NATO and heir to the most recent colonialism, which in recent years has been sliding towards the ideological far right.
Many of the reactions of policy-makers to Algeria’s severing of relations with Spain demonstrate that, at bottom, Europe’s view of Africa has hardly changed since the Berlin conference of 1885 and, like the US with Latin America, it continues to treat the African continent as its backyard: a kind of huge estate from which to extract the resources necessary for its economic and social development and where African inhabitants and leaders should confine themselves to doing that job effectively.
The list of assassinations, coups d’état and military interventions to control independence movements or simply to « moderate » policies deemed potentially dangerous to Europe’s interests is not closed. France, the UK and Germany openly and clandestinely strive to condition the political and economic life of the peoples of Africa, because the direction of the European economy they lead largely depends on it.
Certainly, European neo-colonial practice is in open contradiction with the legal framework created after the Second World War, the so-called international legality, which is why, to a large extent, the interventions are of a « covert » type or simply silenced from public opinion. And yes, Spain, although it is the only European country that still has a recognised colony in Africa, Western Sahara, plays a marginal role in this endeavour. Like remaining in NATO, this is part of the price it had to pay in exchange for EU membership.
In this context, the Arab Maghreb has become one of the most obvious theatres of confrontation between neo-colonial interests and the rights of African peoples, with Western Sahara probably the most decisive battleground in this respect. If Morocco finally succeeds in appropriating the strategic territory of Western Sahara and controlling its assets, the West will have largely succeeded in balancing the main power in the region, which is currently Algeria.
The only problem is the resistance put up by the small Sahrawi people, using international law in their favour. Indeed, the Saharawi people, at least since the creation of the Polisario Front, have based the legitimacy of their struggle on international law. This has been an important asset in confronting colonialism and reaffirming their will to achieve the right to self-determination and independence. Thus, every time the neo-colonial forces have tried to justify or perpetuate their misdeeds, each and every international body and court has ratified the legitimacy of the Saharawi resistance and condemned colonial practices.
So-called international legality is, curiously enough, a creation of those who support the occupation of the territory, the plundering of its resources, and the attempt to annihilate the original population. That is, the political-economic group of governments and companies that finance and provide the means and weapons for the occupation of Western Sahara. In this lobby of death and plunder, Spanish governments and companies do have, for historical and geographical reasons, a prominent role.
It has been 50 years of an unstable balance between legitimacy and economic and geopolitical interests. It is a struggle in which neither side can be considered the definitive winner. Neo-colonialism has tried to make the Saharawi people surrender by bombing civilian refugees, mass disappearances, the invasion of settlers, the massive plundering of resources, all kinds of tactics to delay the implementation of UN resolutions, lies and silence, and the blatant support of Spain, France and the USA for the genocidal regime of Mohamed VI, but the Saharawi resistance continues, supported by international law. The sale of arms, the gigantic theft of phosphates and fish, the agricultural business with the King of Morocco, the fossil and green energy from Western Sahara exploited by companies such as Siemens-Gamesa, thus appear as facts that have been fulfilled but are impossible to justify or legalise.
The key to breaking this cruel stalemate could lie in a series of rulings by the European Court of Justice which, since 2016, have been narrowing the margin for these colonial practices to be carried out, by declaring the economic agreements with Morocco on which they are based to be null and void. Throughout 2023, it is expected that the highest European judicial instance will definitively resolve the dispute in favour of the Polisario Front’s arguments, which should lead the EU to rethink its relations with Morocco as a whole. Not only trade relations, but all issues affecting the territory of Western Sahara, which Morocco considers its own and which constitutes not only the Alawi kingdom’s main source of wealth, but, as we have explained, the only hope, both for Morocco and for Europe, of being able to confront its main rival on the Maghreb chessboard.
The Spanish government’s decision, therefore, would be part of a plan to impose the reality of the occupation through international political consensus, whatever the decision of the European courts. Building such a consensus in the European case requires the direct involvement of the two main governments, France and Germany, and, in the case of Western Sahara, the colonial power of reference, Spain – as would be Belgium in the case of the Republic of Congo or Portugal in the case of Mozambique. Once this « realpolitik » consensus has been built, it would be easy to bring together the majority of European governments – although perhaps not as easy as it has been in the case of the war in Ukraine – and, together with the United States, impose the law of the strongest in this corner of the world.
That is why we need all the strength of solidarity and all the democratic political will to stop this neo-colonialist coup, to dismantle the fallacious arguments of political expediency and false humanitarian compassion that the PSOE has deployed, and to launch an effective social and political mobilisation. Because it is not only the freedom and rights of an African people that are at stake, but also whether or not governments and companies can impose their will above the law, which they themselves claim to promote.
Gonzalez Laya: « Everything was involved in the crisis with Morocco: eavesdropping, denunciations and press campaigns ».
The former head of MFA assures in an interview with ‘El Periódico de España’ that everything was used to « muddy » the attention to BrahimGhali, alluding to Morocco. « And when I say everything, has been everything »
Sacrificed in the remodeling of the Government last July to try to calm Morocco, Arancha González Laya (San Sebastián, 1969), is now dean of the Paris School of International Affairs*. She remains linked to what could be summed up as ‘power’, because this institution acts as an incubator for some of the next international leaders. But she doesn’t seem to miss him. She exercised it in the Ministry and lost it, without an iota of nostalgia. She also helps the wide network of contacts that she treasures. Having concluded her stage of « public service » – it is obvious that she feels more like a high-ranking official than a politician – she is now going to dedicate herself to rethinking Europe and imagining the idea of a new political community on the continent, launched by Emmanuel Macron.
Q. She was dismissed in July of last year, in the middle of the diplomatic crisis with Morocco. Did she become aware that this matter was going to cost her job?
A. I have never acted either to keep myself in office or to lose it. I have always remained faithful to the principles, interests, and values of my country, which are what I had to represent.
Q. What did the PM tell you when he called you?
A. That must be within the discretion between the PM and his ministers.
Q. Morocco turned the reception of BrahimGhali into an element of confrontation against Spain and against you, but the root of the problem was something else: the fact that the Government had not made any gesture of support for the change in the US position on Western Sahara.
A. Everything served at that time to muddy a decision of a humanitarian nature towards a Spanish citizen, who needed immediate help. Humanitarian care has a long tradition in our foreign policy. Saharawis and many other nationalities. We must defend this tooth and nail because it is part of our identity as a country. And we also must be defenders of relations with our neighbors, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Senegal, Mauritania, and many others, understanding that they will only be good if they are managed from co-responsibility and represent the interests of both parties.
Q. Was it a mistake to welcome Ghali without measuring the consequences? I mean, you must have been aware that there was a prior malaise about Western Sahara. Shouldn’t he have at least minimized the impact by warning Rabat instead of opting for a discreet entry by the leader of POLISARIO?
A. It is that they are issues that run through different channels. Spain has always been very clear about the need to seek an agreed solution, and this is very important, in accordance with international law and giving the maximum support to the UN. That has been the constant in our country’s position and it had to be defended very clearly, helping the parties, trying not to do anything that could frustrate that agreement, but bearing in mind that it was one more issue (in the relationship with Morocco), not the only one. We must not mix the plans because if we do, we may fall into the temptation of restricting Spain’s ability to exercise its foreign policy.
Q. But a previous call would not have prevented Morocco from using it against Spain and against you.
A. History cannot be remade and that is why it makes no sense to enter in considerations of the type what if, what if, what if… I insist, Spain must have the capacity to exercise an autonomous foreign policy, always seeking the best relations with our neighbors. I did it during my tenure. I have been the FM who has made the most visits to these countries and I paid particular attention to all of them.
Q. Has Spain given in to Morocco, first with your dismissal and then with support for its autonomy plan for Western Sahara?
A. You will allow me not to enter intosuch considerations. I am extremely respectful of the principle of loyalty to the Government in which I have served. I will not go into those considerations.
Q. Your telephone number, like that of the PM and other ministers, was attacked at the worst moments of the diplomatic crisis with Morocco
A. Everything has served in this crisis to muddy that humanitarian aid. And when I say everything has been everything: wiretaps, complaints, campaigns, including press campaigns. It has been quite evident. For me it is a chapter that belongs to the past.
Q. Minister, but it has not been known if your phone, like the rest, was spied on with Pegasus. In the Executive they have not wanted to confirm it. They maintain that they are not aware that in their case it was with this ‘software’, which Morocco has.
A. The telephone numbers of those responsible for government have a channel for their protection and to investigate violations of their integrity and I believe that this question should be addressed to whom it belongs, which is not me.
Q. But did you put your phone in the hands of the competent authorities within the Government, when you thought that your mobile could have been attacked?
A. Yes, but all these questions, I would prefer if you addressed them where they belong, which is not me. I want to be, I repeat, tremendously scrupulous with the rules of the game, especially in a matter like this, which is very serious.
Q. You pointed to wiretapping, complaints… the accusations against you for Ghali’s entry have just been dismissed. Do you think Rabat was behind? I say this for two circumstances. There was at least one accusation with Moroccan interests and the judge’s actions have been very striking. He never accepted any of the MFA arguments and just completely changed his mind a week before the agreement with Morocco on Western Sahara was known. The Court has knocked down all his investigation.
A. Of this episode, certainly a bit curious, I am left with the decision of the Provincial Court of Zaragoza, after an appeal filed by the State Attorney, to whom I have much to thank, for the good work in defending the interests of our country. The court has said the same thing that I have maintained from the beginning. First, that it was a humanitarian decision. And second, that it was done in accordance with the law. But we have a very serious problem in our country, which is a judicialization of politics and the growing politicization of justice.
Q. Do you think that after the Western Sahara, Mohamed VI’s next claim will be Ceuta and Melilla?
A. We must be very clear to anyone who has any doubts: Ceuta and Melilla are part of Spain and, therefore, of the EU.
Q. Can you help them understand the establishment of commercial customs at the two borders, which is one of the issues included in the joint statement with Morocco?
A. I don’t want to make value judgments about which are the elements that would reinforce or not… It is very clear: Ceuta and Melilla have been and are part of Spain.
Q. How deep do you think the diplomatic crisis with Algeria is now?
A. I am going to be very cautious on this issue as well, but I do believe that Spain should have the best relations with all its neighbors. With Algeria, with Morocco, with Libya, with Mauritania, with Senegal. And when I say the best, they must be the best. In a neighborhood we all need each other.
Q. Can the gas supply to Spain be at risk?
A. I hope not, and I want to believe not. Spain and Algeria, and more broadly Algeria and the EU, have a framework of relations that should allow them to deepen, also in the energy field. Spanish firms are committed to investments in Algeria and to their industrial project in this area.
Q. Can’t Italy get ahead of us?
A. I believe that relations between Spain and Algeria must be redirected. It’s very important. For the two countries.
Q. I mentioned before the historical position of Spain of a solution on Western Sahara around the UN, but in the last two years several countries, the US, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, have spoken in favor of the Moroccan plan.
A. There will only be long-term stability if there is an agreement between the parties. That pact can be illuminated only through the PESG de Mistura.
Q. But, is it more difficult now, when Spain has opted for an option?
A. It is more necessary than ever. (…)
*(Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) is a graduate school of Sciences Po [also referred to as the Institutd’études politiques de Paris])
Morocco, Mohammed VI, Senegal, Karim Wade, hashish, Western Sahara, Wikileaks
According to a cable from the American embassy in Rabat, revealed by the website Wikileaks on September 6, 2009, a Moroccan police officer arrested Karim Wade at the Casablanca airport, in possession of hashish. The Minister of State was detained for some time before being released on the orders of Mohammed VI. This oversight earned the officer a transfer to Western Sahara as punishment. Here is the full text of the diplomatic cable:
S E C R E T RABAT 000752
SIPDIS NOFORN
DEPT FOR INL/AAE AND NEA/MAG MADRID AND PARIS ALSO FOR DEA
SUBJECT: MOROCCAN DRUG INTERDICTION: TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK
REF: RABAT 0486 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: Since at least August 14, when according to Moroccan media police arrested 16 suspected drug barons in a major operation across the country, the press has been reporting regularly on some aspect of the GOM,s efforts to disrupt the drug trade and apprehend those suspected of involvement in it. From reports of confiscation and eradication to implication of current or former high-ranking or elected officials, observers are treated to a steady diet of drug-related fare. To date, between 110 and 140 tons of cannabis has been seized although some has reportedly made its way back to the streets. With the Islamic holy month of Ramadan underway, one Moroccan likened this both to an exercise in « cleansing » and to a soap opera, remarking that every year during Ramadan it seems a scandal of some sort plays out in the papers. Included in this one is the arrest of Senegalese Minister of State Karim Wade, son of Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. With drugs center-stage this year, the scene is SET for off-camera whispering and back-stage political expediency. End summary.
—————– Two Steps Forward —————–
2. (U) Citing a statement from the National Security Service (DGSN), Moroccan media reported that on August 14 police arrested 16 suspected drug barons in a major operation in several cities across the country. Police seized a large quantity of hard drugs, as well as false documents, including identity papers and drivers’ licenses. They also impounded vehicles and other equipment. A police source told one Moroccan daily that many of the arrests were made in the northern Tetouan and Nador regions of the country. The source also said the investigation is expected to yield further information about what he called one of the biggest drug busts in Morocco this year.
3. (U) The action comes on the heels of a major operation earlier this year in which Moroccan police arrested more than 100 persons, also in Nador. Those arrests included police officers, gendarmes, sailors and soldiers. A trial date has not been set, as the prosecution continues to develop the case. The Public Prosecutor at the Casablanca Court stated on August 25 that criminal justice applies to all persons shown to be involved in drug trafficking, regardless of their title or position.
————– And Maybe More ————–
4. (U) Perhaps indicative of the assertion that there is no one outside the reach of the law, media on August 31 reported widely on the arrest of former Member of Parliament Mohammed Jouahi, considered by some to be among the biggest and most powerful of the drug barons. Jouahi was, and may still be, a member of the centrist RNI party; some reports note the party leadership was quick to assert that he was no longer a member. Further reports of an ongoing crackdown state that high-profile arrestees have implicated a number of security officers and attorneys in several areas of the country. Journalists have speculated that the current campaign against drug trafficking in the country has come on orders from the highest levels.
——————— But One Step Backward ———————
5. (S/NF) If it is the highest levels that are directing the crackdown, they may be directing the outcome of drug interdiction effort as well. It was reported in mid-August that a senior police official at the Casablanca airport was abruptly reassigned to a post with no responsibilities in Layounne, the Western Sahara. The reasons given varied: one paper stated it was because he had stopped a relative of an African leader who was carrying drugs; others claimed it was due to an unspecified series of professional mistakes, perhaps even a sexual scandal. Intelligence reports confirm that it was the former, and that the relative stopped was the son of Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. The son, Senegalese Minister of State for International Cooperation, Land Use, Air Transport and Infrastructure Karim Wade, was apparently found in possession of hashish while passing through airport security. King Mohammed VI, with whom Wade is a close friend, reportedly did not appreciate the actions of the local authorities who failed to inform him that Wade had been detained; so he reassigned two officials.
——- Comment ——-
6. (S/NF) While reports of the crackdown on the drug trade in Morocco suggest that authorities continue to focus on the problem, their efforts are not immune to politicization. Given that the younger Wade,s arrest could imperil relations between Morocco and Senegal, one can understand the King’s pique at the Casablanca airport police. Post reported reftel on the potential impact of drug eradication on voter participation in the June local elections; this latest incident suggests that, despite the king,s ongoing calls for judicial reform, apprehension for criminal offense, too, is subject to political expediency. End comment.
