Tags : CIA, United States, Algeria, Western Sahara, Frente Polisario, Chadli Bendjedid,
381. Intelligence information cable from the Central Intelligence Agency1
Washington, July 18, 1981, 1156Z
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Country : Algeria/Western Sahara2
SUBJECT : FLN Affirmation of Algeria’s Willingness to Impose a Political Settlement on The Polisario Front3 [less than 1 line not declassified]
Source : [4 lines not declassified]
1. [1½ lines not declassified] the Front of Liberation National (FLN) recently characterized Algeria’s current position on the Western Sahara as follows: Algeria has become persuaded that a continuation of the war in the Western Sahara will not benefit Algerian national interests and that regional developments dictate an end to the conflict as quickly as possible.4 Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid has definitely concluded that the Polisario must abandon the idea of continuing military hostilities indefinitely, and if need be, a political solution must be imposed on the Polisario.
2. Following the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Kenya and the most recent meeting of the FLN Central Committee, both of which events had an important effect in framing Algerian policy [Page 785] toward the Western Sahara. Algeria is prepared to accept a settlement in the Western Sahara with the following three caveats:5
A. Algeria wants at all costs to prevent Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi from developing a controlling influence over the Polisario Front;
B. Algeria will not accept a ceasefire in the Western Sahara without the agreement of the Polisario Front;
C. Algeria will not require that the Polisario accept less than recognition of the Western Sahara’s territorial independence.6
3. [less than 1 line not declassified] Comment: The meaning and importance of [name not declassified] three caveats has been a matter of speculation in the FLN. There is general agreement in the FLN that the Algerian Government is in fact prepared to bring its full weight to bear in influencing the Polisario to accept a ceasefire. This influence would be in the form of a reduction of military assistance7 on the one hand, and guarantees of continuing Algerian political and economic support of the other. Within the FLN, there is a consensus that while territorial independence is an essential element to a settlement, the amount of territory which would be involved is a Saharan entity is definitely negotiable.8 The caveats, therefore, should not obscure the fact that Algeria is committed to an end to hostilities in the Western Sahara, and prepared to show considerable flexibility in arriving at a political settlement.)9
1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–83–0104, 1981 Official Records (Secret & Below) of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Box 13, Morocco (Jul–Dec ‘81). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
2. An unknown hand underlined “Algeria/Western.”↩
3. An unknown hand underlined a portion of the subject line beginning with “Algeria’s Willingness” and ending with “Polisario Front.”↩
4. An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with “Algeria has” and ending with “interests.”↩
5. An unknown hand underlined “Algeria is prepared to accept a settlement in the Western Sahara with the following three caveats.”↩
6. An unknown hand placed a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this point.↩
7. An unknown hand underlined “a ceasefire” and “reduction of military assistance” and wrote: “KEY MOVES” in the left-hand margin.↩
8. An unknown hand underlined “The amount of territory which would be involved is a Saharan entity is definitely negotiable” and wrote: “MAYBE THE PART OF SAHARA WHICH MAURITANIA ONCE HELD” in the right-hand margin.↩
9. An unknown hand placed an asterisk in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.↩
Source : Department of State
#USA #Algeria #WesternSahara #Morocco #Bendjedid #Polisario
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